Matter of New Cr. Bluebelt, Phase 4
2014 NY Slip Op 08029 [122 AD3d 859]
November 19, 2014
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, December 21, 2017


[*1]
 In the Matter of New Creek Bluebelt, Phase 4.Lawrence N. Paolella et al., Respondents-Appellants; City of New York,Appellant-Respondent.

Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Rochelle Cohen, FredKolikoff, and Leslie Wright of counsel), for appellant-respondent.

Goldstein, Rikon, Rikon & Houghton, P.C., New York, N.Y.(Jonathan Houghton and Ashley Levi of counsel), for respondents-appellants.

In a condemnation proceeding, the condemnor, City of New York, appeals, aslimited by its brief, from so much of a first separate and partial final decree of theSupreme Court, Richmond County (Saitta, J.), dated June 6, 2012, as, upon a decision ofthe same court dated May 7, 2012, made after a nonjury trial, determined that there was areasonable probability that the imposition of wetlands regulations on the subject realproperty constituted a regulatory taking and applied an increment of 75% in calculatingthe final condemnation award, and the claimants, Lawrence N. Paolella and LianaPaolella, cross-appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of the same first separateand partial final decree, as applied extraordinary development costs of $723,000 incalculating the final condemnation award, and awarded them the principal sum of only$810,000 as just compensation for the taking of their real property.

Ordered that the first separate and partial final decree is affirmed insofar as appealedand cross-appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

Lawrence N. Paolella and Liana Paolella (hereinafter together the claimants) werethe owners of a vacant, unimproved, 19,500-square-foot property on Staten Island.Sometime after they acquired title, the entire property was designated as wetlands, and onJune 11, 2007, the City of New York, as part of its New Creek Bluebelt, Phase 4 project,acquired the property from the claimants. The claimants commenced this action againstthe City, seeking $1,090,000 as just compensation for the regulatory taking resultingfrom the wetlands regulations imposed on the property.

A nonjury trial was held, after which the Supreme Court held, in pertinent part, that:(1) the claimants established a reasonable probability that the imposition of the wetlandsregulations on the property constituted a regulatory taking; (2) in calculating the finalcondemnation award, it would apply the 75% increment sought by the claimants, not theapproximately 41% increment sought by the City; (3) in calculating the finalcondemnation award, it would apply, as extraordinary development costs, the sum of$723,000 sought by the City, not the sum of $62,000 sought by the claimants; and (4) thefinal condemnation award to which the claimants were entitled was$810,000.

[*2] The City challenges theSupreme Court's determinations that a reasonable probability existed that the impositionof the wetlands regulations on the property constituted a regulatory taking, and that theapplication of a 75% increment in calculating the final condemnation award wasappropriate. The claimants challenge the court's determinations to accept the City'sestimate of extraordinary development costs in the sum of $723,000, and that they wereentitled to a final condemnation award of only $810,000.

In reviewing a determination made after a nonjury trial, the power of this Court is asbroad as that of the trial court, and we may render a judgment we find warranted by thefacts, bearing in mind that in a close case, the trial judge had the advantage of seeing thewitnesses (see Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v Town ofBedford, 60 NY2d 492, 499 [1983]; Yu Ling Hu v Zapas, 108 AD3d 621 [2013]; Pernell v 287 Albany Ave.,LLC, 95 AD3d 1094 [2012]).

In a condemnation proceeding, a property restricted by wetlands regulations is valuedpursuant to the restrictions imposed by the wetlands regulations at the time of the taking,unless the claimant can demonstrate a reasonable probability that "a higher or moreproductive use of the property would have been available by reason of a legislativerezoning or a judicial declaration of invalidity of the use restriction" (ChaseManhattan Bank v State of New York, 103 AD2d 211, 217 [1984]; see Berwickv State of New York, 107 AD2d 79, 84 [1985]). "A landowner who claims that landregulation has effected a taking of his [or her] property bears the heavy burden ofovercoming the presumption of constitutionality that attaches to the regulation and ofproving every element of his [or her] claim beyond a reasonable doubt" (de St. Aubinv Flacke, 68 NY2d 66, 76 [1986]; see Adrian v Town of Yorktown, 83 AD3d 746 [2011]; Matter of Friedenburg v NewYork State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 3 AD3d 86, 92 [2003]).

Generally, while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes toofar, it will be recognized as a taking (see Lingle v Chevron U. S. A. Inc., 544 US528, 537-538 [2005]; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Mahon, 260 US 393, 415 [1922]).Analysis of whether nonpossessory governmental regulation of property has gone so faras to constitute a taking involves factual inquires in which three factors of particularsignificance have been identified: (1) "[t]he economic impact of the regulation on theclaimant"; (2) "the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinctinvestment-backed expectations"; and (3) "the character of the governmental action"(Penn Central Transp. Co. v New York City, 438 US 104, 124 [1978]; seeLingle v Chevron U. S. A. Inc., 544 US at 538-539; Yee v Escondido, 503US 519, 522-523 [1992]; Matter of Friedenburg v New York State Dept. of Envtl.Conservation, 3 AD3d at 95-96).

As to the first factor, "the property owner must show by 'dollars and cents' evidencethat under no use permitted by the regulation under attack would the properties becapable of producing a reasonable return; the economic value, or all but a bare residue ofthe economic value, of the parcels must have been destroyed by the regulations at issue"(de St. Aubin v Flacke, 68 NY2d at 77; see Spears v Berle, 48 NY2d 254,262-263 [1979]; Chase Manhattan Bank v State of New York, 103 AD2d at 215).Accordingly, standing alone, a serious and significant diminution of property value willtypically not be deemed to constitute a regulatory taking (see Concrete Pipe &Products of Cal., Inc. v Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal., 508US 602, 645 [1993]; Noghrey vTown of Brookhaven, 92 AD3d 851, 853 [2012]; Noghrey v Town ofBrookhaven, 48 AD3d 529, 531-532 [2008]).

Here, the trial court accepted the estimate of the City's expert appraiser that thewetlands regulations reduced the value of the property by 82%, a diminution which,standing alone, is within the range generally found to be insufficient to constitute aregulatory taking (see e.g. Village of Euclid v Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365[1926] [75% reduction]; Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v United States, 18 F3d 1560,1567 [Fed Cir 1994] [62% reduction]; Adrian v Town of Yorktown, 83 AD3d 746 [2011] [64%reduction]; cf. Matter of Friedenburg v New York State Dept. of Envtl.Conservation, 3 AD3d at 95 [95% reduction was a regulatory taking]).

Although the claimants admit that, at trial, they did not set forth any evidence withrespect to the second factor (see Matter of Gazza v New York State Dept. of Envtl.Conservation, 217 AD2d 202, 211 [1995], affd 89 NY2d 603 [1997]), underthe circumstances presented here, such an omission is not fatal to their claim, especiallyupon consideration of the third factor. Under the third factor, [*3]generally, a property owner "must establish that theregulation attacked so restricts his [or her] property that he [or she] is precluded fromusing it for any purpose for which it is reasonably adapted" (de St. Aubin vFlacke, 68 NY2d at 77).

Here, the parties agree that, because of the wetlands regulations, it is highlyimprobable that the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation wouldissue a permit to develop the property in accordance with the applicable R3-1 zoning,which allows for attached and semi-attached one- and two- family dwellings, and that,accordingly, the highest and best use of the property is to leave it undeveloped andvacant. Thus, although the purpose of the wetlands regulations benefits the public goodby providing flood prevention and mitigation, the wetlands regulations effectivelyprevent any economically beneficial use of the property (see id.).

Considering the 82% property value diminution estimated by the City as a result ofthe wetlands regulations, together with the effective prohibition on development of anypart of the property effectuated by the wetlands regulations, we agree with the SupremeCourt that the claimants established that there was a reasonable probability that theimposition of the wetlands regulations constituted a regulatory taking of the subjectproperty (see Berwick v State of New York, 107 AD2d at 89-91; ChaseManhattan Bank v State of New York, 103 AD2d at 223-224; cf. Putnam County Natl. Bank vCity of New York, 37 AD3d 575, 576-577 [2007]).

The increment above the regulated value of the property that must be added to theregulated value of the property is a percentage that represents the premium a reasonablebuyer would pay for the probability of a successful judicial determination that theregulations were confiscatory (see Berwick v State of New York, 107 AD2d at84; Chase Manhattan Bank v State of New York, 103 AD2d at 217). Whenadding an increment to the value of vacant land to reflect its development potential, thespecific increment which is selected and applied must be based on sufficient evidenceand be satisfactorily explained (see Matter of County of Suffolk [Firester], 37NY2d 649, 653 [1975]; Matterof Village of Haverstraw [AAA Electricians, Inc.], 114 AD3d 955, 956[2014]).

Here, the 75% increment applied by the Supreme Court was based on sufficientevidence. The claimants' appraiser, who proposed the use of such increment and appliedit in his calculations of the subject property's value, set forth the requisite "statement ofthe method of appraisal relied on and the conclusions as to value reached by the expert,together with the facts, figures and calculations by which the conclusions were reached"(22 NYCRR 202.60 [g] [3]; see 22 NYCRR 202.61 [a] [1]). We have previouslyapplied the 75% increment in similar circumstances (see Estate of Berwick v State ofNew York, 159 AD2d 544 [1990]). While a prior application of this increment,standing alone, is insufficient to justify its application in this case, its use is appropriateunder the circumstances of this case. We agree with the Supreme Court's rejection of theCity's proffered $343,000 (approximately 41%) increment, as it lacks a sound,evidentiary basis. Among other things, the City's expert effectively disavowed hisestimated increment of $343,000 at trial, when he acknowledged that it was not based onthe realities of the marketplace.

We do not disturb the Supreme Court's acceptance of the estimate of the City's expertland use planner that extraordinary costs to develop the property would total $723,000.The Supreme Court had the discretion to determine that the City's expert land use plannerwas qualified to testify on the issue of extraordinary costs, and we find no seriousmistake, error of law, or abuse of discretion sufficient to disturb that determination(see Meiselman v Crown Hgts. Hosp., 285 NY 389, 398-399 [1941]; Board of Mgrs. of 195 Hudson St.Condominium v 195 Hudson St. Assoc., LLC, 63 AD3d 523, 524 [2009]). Theclaimants' contention that the City's expert lacked the expertise and knowledge needed toestimate extraordinary costs goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility(see Meiselman v Crown Hgts. Hosp., 285 NY at 398; Board of Mgrs. of 195Hudson St. Condominium v 195 Hudson St. Assoc., LLC, 63 AD3d at 524). Further,the Supreme Court's determination to credit the estimate of extraordinary costs providedby the City's expert is supported by the record. Accordingly, we affirm the finalcondemnation award in the principal sum of $810,000 as just compensation for thetaking of the claimants' real property. Skelos, J.P., Dillon, Maltese and Barros, JJ.,concur. [Prior Case History: 35 Misc 3d 1224(A), 2012 NY Slip Op50851(U).]


NYPTI Decisions © 2026 is a project of New York Prosecutors Training Institute (NYPTI) made possible by leveraging the work we've done providing online research and tools to prosecutors.

NYPTI would like to thank New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, New York State Senate's Open Legislation Project, New York State Unified Court System, New York State Law Reporting Bureau and Free Law Project for their invaluable assistance making this project possible.

Install the free RECAP extensions to help contribute to this archive. See https://free.law/recap/ for more information.