Crewe v Pisanova
2015 NY Slip Op 00041 [124 AD3d 1264]
January 2, 2015
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, March 4, 2015


[*1]
 Ariane Crewe, Respondent, v Tatjana Pisanova et al.,Appellants.

Law Offices of Theresa J. Puleo, Syracuse (Michelle M. Davoli of counsel), fordefendants-appellants.

Law Office of Marc Jonas, Utica (Jason D. Flemma of counsel), forplaintiff-respondent.

Appeal from a revised order of the Supreme Court, Oneida County (David A. Murad,J.), entered October 23, 2013. The revised order denied in part the motion of defendantsfor summary judgment.

It is hereby ordered that the revised order so appealed from is unanimously affirmedwithout costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for injuries shesustained in a motor vehicle accident when the vehicle she was driving was rear-endedby a vehicle operated by defendant Tatjana Pisanova and owned by defendant NikolayPisanov. Defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on thegrounds that plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of the fourcategories of serious injury set forth in plaintiff's bill of particulars (see InsuranceLaw § 5102 [d]), and did not sustain economic loss in excess of the$50,000 threshold for basic economic loss (§ 5102 [a]). Supreme Courtgranted the motion only with respect to the permanent loss of use category of seriousinjury, and defendants contend on appeal that the court should have granted their motionin its entirety. We affirm.

The court properly denied defendants' motion with respect to the remaining threecategories of serious injury. With respect to two of those categories, i.e., permanentconsequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use, we note that" '[w]hether a limitation of use or function is significant or consequential (i.e.,important . . .) relates to medical significance and involves a comparativedetermination of the degree or qualitative nature of an injury based on the normalfunction, purpose and use of the body part' " (Matte v Hall, 20 AD3d 898, 899 [2005], quoting Tourev Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345, 353 [2002]; see Dufel v Green, 84NY2d 795, 798 [1995]). Objective proof is required to prove such limitations (seeMatte, 20 AD3d at 899; Leahey v Fitzgerald, 1 AD3d 924, 925 [2003]). Here,defendants' own submissions raise triable issues of fact with respect to those categories(see Thomas v Huh, 115AD3d 1225, 1225 [2014];Summers v Spada, 109 AD3d 1192, 1192 [2013]).

Defendants' expert opined that plaintiff did not have a serious injury within themeaning of those two categories, based upon his examination of plaintiff and his reviewof plaintiff's medical records. The expert concluded, inter alia, that plaintiff did notsustain a serious injury because she did not have radicular pain. In addition, however,defendants submitted an electromyography study of plaintiff in support of their motion,indicating that plaintiff suffered from "moderate chronic left C5-6 radiculopathy."Further, when defendants' expert reviewed plaintiff's medical history, it was admittedlymissing the first page of that electromyography study. That is the page containing theconclusion that plaintiff has "moderate . . . radiculopathy," and we thusconclude that the basis for the expert's conclusion was thereby undermined. [*2]Consequently, defendants failed to eliminate all triableissues of fact with respect to the permanent consequential limitation of use andsignificant limitation of use categories (see Mugno v Juran, 81 AD3d 908, 909 [2011]; Lesser vSmart Cab Corp., 283 AD2d 273, 273-274 [2001]; see also Little v Ajah, 97AD3d 801, 802 [2012]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendants met their initialburden with respect to those two categories, we conclude that plaintiff raised triableissues of fact. Plaintiff submitted the affidavit of her treating chiropractor and a reportfrom her expert physician, which discussed plaintiff's inability to return to pre-lossactivity levels, abnormalities she exhibited in her spine, and the likelihood that plaintiffwill continue to experience physical problems even when the injuries heal.

Defendants also failed to meet their burden with respect to the 90/180-day categoryof serious injury, inasmuch as their own submissions again raise a triable issue of fact(see Thomas, 115 AD3d at 1225; Summers, 109 AD3d at 1192). "Toqualify as a serious injury under the 90/180[-day] category, there must be objectiveevidence of a medically determined injury or impairment of a non-permanent nature. . . as well as evidence that plaintiff's activities were curtailed to a greatextent" (Zeigler vRamadhan, 5 AD3d 1080, 1081 [2004] [internal quotation marks omitted];see Licari v Elliott, 57 NY2d 230, 236 [1982]). Here, defendants rely onplaintiff's deposition testimony addressing how her activities were curtailed as of the timeof the deposition, over a year after the accident, rather than how they were curtailedduring the relevant statutory period, and the report of their expert physician, "who did notexamine plaintiff during the relevant statutory period and did not address plaintiff'scondition during the relevant period" (Robinson v Joseph, 99 AD3d 568, 569 [2012]; see Lowell v Peters, 3 AD3d778, 779-780 [2004]).

Finally, we reject defendants' contention concerning plaintiff's alleged failure tosustain economic loss in excess of basic economic loss. "[P]laintiff[ ] correctlycontend[s] that [she] need not await the full $50,000 payout for basic economic losses. . . before making a claim under Insurance Law § 5102 (a) forthose additional economic losses that exceed the basic economic loss threshold" (Wilson v Colosimo, 101 AD3d1765, 1767 [2012]; see generally Montgomery v Daniels, 38 NY2d 41,47-48 [1975]; Colvin vSlawoniewski, 15 AD3d 900, 900 [2005]; Barnes v Kociszewski, 4 AD3d 824, 825 [2004];Watkins v Bank of Castile, 172 AD2d 1061, 1062 [1991]). Here, the three-yearperiod in which plaintiff may accrue economic loss in excess of basic economic loss, asset forth in Insurance Law § 5102 (a) (2), commenced on the date of theaccident and had not yet elapsed when the motion was decided. Therefore, summaryjudgment on this ground was premature. Present—Smith, J.P., Peradotto,Valentino, Whalen and DeJoseph, JJ.


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