| Dischiavi v Calli |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 01116 [125 AD3d 1435] |
| February 6, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
[*1]
| Gary M. Dischiavi et al., Appellants, v William S. Calli,Jr., as Administrator of the Estate of William S. Calli, Deceased, et al., Respondents, etal., Defendant. |
Luibrand Law Firm, PLLC, Latham (Kevin A. Luibrand of counsel), forplaintiffs-appellants.
Kernan and Kernan, P.C., Utica (Leighton R. Burns of counsel), fordefendant-respondent William S. Calli, Jr., as Administrator of the Estate of William S.Calli, Deceased.
George F. Aney, Herkimer, for defendant-respondent Robert Calli.
Smith, Sovik, Kendrick & Sugnet, P.C., Syracuse (Karen Felter of counsel), fordefendants-respondents Andrew S. Kowalczyk, Joseph Stephen Deery, Jr. and Calli,Kowalczyk, Tolles, Deery and Soja.
Getnick Livingston Atkinson & Priore, LLP, Utica (Michael E. Getnick ofcounsel), for defendant-respondent Thomas S. Soja.
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Oneida County (James P. McClusky,J.), dated March 3, 2014. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted the motions ofdefendants-respondents to preclude plaintiffs from introducing certain evidence attrial.
It is hereby ordered that the order insofar as appealed from is unanimously reversedon the law without costs and the motions are denied.
Memorandum: In this legal malpractice action, plaintiffs appeal from that part of anorder granting the motions of defendants-respondents (hereafter, defendants) to precludeplaintiffs from introducing certain evidence at trial. We agree with plaintiffs thatSupreme Court erred in granting the motions, and we therefore reverse the order insofaras appealed from.
This case has been before us on two prior occasions (Dischiavi v Calli[appeal No. 2], 68 AD3d 1691 [2009] [Dischiavi I]; Dischiavi v Calli, 111 AD3d1258 [2013] [Dischiavi II]), both involving, inter alia, the motions of variousdefendants for summary judgment. In both appeals, at least some defendants soughtsummary judgment dismissing the legal malpractice cause of action based upon theexpiration of the statute of limitations, and we rejected that contention in both priorappeals. Specifically, in Dischiavi I, we concluded that, "[w]ith respect to thelegal malpractice cause of action, there is a triable issue of fact whether plaintiffs areentitled to the toll provided by the continuous representation doctrine" (68 AD3d at1694). Again in Dischiavi II, we affirmed that part of the order on appeal thatdenied the various defendants' motions for [*2]summaryjudgment on the ground "that plaintiffs raised a triable issue of fact whether the doctrineof continuous representation tolled the statute of limitations" (111 AD3d at1260-1261).
The matter progressed toward trial after this Court issued its decision in DischiaviII. In the order on appeal, the court granted defendants' motions to preclude plaintiffsfrom introducing evidence that any of the defendants represented plaintiffs with respectto any issue other than an issue in the context of a medical malpractice action against aphysician. The effect of that order was to limit plaintiffs to introducing evidence that, in1994, one of the defendants made a statement to Gary M. Dischiavi (plaintiff) indicatingthat the medical malpractice action was not viable.
We note at the outset that, although the parties do not address the appealability ofthis order determining a motion in limine, we conclude that plaintiffs may appeal fromthe order at issue (see FranklinCorp. v Prahler, 91 AD3d 49, 54 [2011]). "Generally, an order ruling [on amotion in limine], even when made in advance of trial on motion papers constitutes, atbest, an advisory opinion which is neither appealable as of right nor by permission" (Innovative Transmission &Engine Co., LLC v Massaro, 63 AD3d 1506, 1507 [2009] [internal quotationmarks omitted]; see Scalp & Blade v Advest, Inc., 309 AD2d 219, 224[2003]). This Court has noted, however, that "there is a distinction between an order that'limits the admissibility of evidence,' which is not appealable . . . , and onethat 'limits the legal theories of liability to be tried' or the scope of the issues at trial,which is appealable" (Scalp & Blade, 309 AD2d at 224). Here, the orderprecluded the introduction of the vast majority of the evidence on the issue whetherdefendants continued to represent plaintiffs so as to toll the statute of limitations, andthus it is appealable because it limits the scope of the issues at trial (see generally O'Donnell vFerguson, 100 AD3d 1534, 1535-1536 [2012]; Catanese v Furman, 27 AD3d1050, 1051 [2006]).
With respect to the substantive issue, we note that, after our determinations inDischiavi I and Dischiavi II that there was a triable issue of fact whetherthe doctrine of continuous representation tolled the statute of limitations, the courtgranted those parts of defendants' motions in limine seeking to preclude plaintiffs fromoffering evidence to establish that there had been such representation. Although the courthas broad discretion to determine the admissibility of evidence, we agree with plaintiffsthat the court abused that discretion here. Defendants are correct that, "in the context of alegal malpractice action, the continuous representation doctrine tolls the [s]tatute of[l]imitations only where the continuing representation pertains specifically to the matterin which the attorney committed the alleged malpractice" (Shumsky v Eisenstein,96 NY2d 164, 168 [2001]). The continuous representation doctrine is derived from thecontinuous treatment doctrine in medical malpractice cases (see Mercone v Monroe CountyDeputy Sheriffs' Assn., Inc., 90 AD3d 1698, 1699 [2011]; Pollicino vRoemer & Featherstonhaugh, 260 AD2d 52, 54 [1999]), however, and as theCourt of Appeals explained later in Shumsky, "[i]ncluded within the scope ofcontinuous treatment is a timely return visit instigated by the patient to complain aboutand seek treatment for a matter related to the initial treatment" (id. at 170 [internalquotation marks omitted]). Thus, the statute of limitations in a legal malpractice action istolled where, as here, a "defendant continuously represented the plaintiffs during [therelevant] period by performing legal services related to the matter out of which themalpractice claim arose" (Kuritzky v Sirlin & Sirlin, 231 AD2d 607, 608[1996]).
Furthermore, in both prior appeals we concluded that there was a triable issue of factwhether the statute of limitations was tolled because, in opposition to the variousdefendants' motions for summary judgment, plaintiffs raised a triable issue of factwhether one or more of the defendants continued to represent plaintiffs on a relatedmatter (Dischiavi I, 68 AD3d at 1694; Dischiavi II, 111 AD3d at1260-1261). We reached that conclusion because, in opposition to defendants' motionsfor summary judgment, plaintiffs "adduced persuasive evidence establishing that[defendants] performed continuing legal services [throughout the time during which thestatute is alleged to have been tolled] to correct [their] alleged failure to effectively"commence an action to recover damages for plaintiff's injuries (N&S Supply vSimmons, 305 AD2d 648, 650 [2003]). Here, the evidence that defendants sought topreclude was highly relevant to the issue whether the actions in question involved "anattempt by the attorney to rectify an alleged act of malpractice" that would constitutecontinuing representation sufficient to toll the statute of limitations (Luk Lamellen U.Kupplungbau GmbH v Lerner, 166 AD2d 505, 506-507 [1990]; see Weiss vManfredi, 83 NY2d 974, 977 [1994], rearg denied 84 NY2d 848 [1994]; DeStaso v Condon Resnick,LLP, 90 AD3d 809, 812-813 [2011]).
[*3] Consequently, we reverse the order insofar as appealedfrom and deny the motions. Present—Smith, J.P., Fahey, Whalen and DeJoseph,JJ.