Matter of Ballard v New York Safety Track LLC
2015 NY Slip Op 01845 [126 AD3d 1073]
March 5, 2015
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, April 29, 2015


[*1]
 In the Matter of Kitty L. Ballard et al., Respondents, vNew York Safety Track LLC et al., Appellants.

Sahn Ward Coschignano & Baker, PLLC, Uniondale (Jon A. Ward of counsel),for New York Safety Track, LLC and another, appellants.

Young Sommer LLC, Albany (Allyson M. Phillips of counsel), for Town ofHarpersfield Planning Board and others, appellants.

Law Office of Douglas H. Zamelis, Cooperstown (Douglas H. Zamelis of counsel),for respondents.

Devine, J. Appeals (1) from an order of the Supreme Court (Burns, J.), enteredSeptember 17, 2013 in Delaware County, which, in a combined proceeding pursuant toCPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment, partially denied respondents'motions to dismiss the petition, and (2) from a judgment of said court, entered January17, 2014 in Delaware County, which partially granted petitioners' application, in acombined proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment,to, among other things, annul a 2013 agreement between certain respondents.

In 2011, respondent New York Safety Track LLC (hereinafter Safety Track) made anapplication for site plan approval to respondent Town of Harpersfield Planning Board toconvert a former airport property to a motorcycle safety training facility.[FN1] Minutes from a Planning[*2]Board meeting indicate that it had conditionallyapproved the proposed site plan application and the facility was completedthereafter.

In January 2013, after receiving numerous complaints from neighboring landownersthat the facility was hosting large, high-speed racing events, respondent Town ofHarpersfield Code Enforcement Officer (hereinafter CEO) advised Safety Track that itsadvertised racing and large track events were not authorized uses pursuant to the site planthat had been approved by the Planning Board. The CEO's letter explained that the scopeof permissible land use was defined by Safety Track's site plan application materials,which indicated, among other things, that the facility "would be used for safety coursesand training" sessions that were limited to no more than 20 participants at any given time.A few weeks later, the CEO, the Planning Board, respondent Town of Harpersfield andSafety Track executed an "Agreement for Operation of New York Safety Track"(hereinafter the 2013 agreement) and an events calendar for the 2013 facility's season,which purported to outline Safety Track's approved land uses for May 1, 2013 toDecember 31, 2013.

Petitioners, a group of concerned landowners within the vicinity of the facility,commenced this hybrid CPLR article 78 proceeding and action seeking, among otherthings, the annulment of the 2013 agreement and a judicial declaration that Safety Trackmust limit its uses to those particularly described in its 2011 site plan application.Thereafter, the Planning Board, CEO, respondent Town of Harpersfield Town Board andrespondent Town of Harpersfield Town Clerk (hereinafter collectively referred to as theTown respondents) moved to, among other things, dismiss the petition/complaint. In aSeptember 2013 order, Supreme Court partially denied the Town respondents' motion todismiss, but granted the motion solely to the extent that it sought the dismissal of thefourth cause of action, which alleged a violation of General Municipal Law§ 239-m. Thereafter, Safety Track and respondent Mountain Top AirfieldLLC and the Town respondents served their respective answers. Supreme Court laterissued a judgment determining that petitioners' challenge to the then-expired 2013agreement was not moot, annulled it and made declarations regarding the scope of SafetyTrack's permissible land uses. The court also found that the Town had committed variousviolations of the Public Officers Law and awarded petitioners costs and counsel fees.The Town respondents appeal from both the 2013 order[FN2] and the 2014 judgment, and SafetyTrack and Mountain Top appeal from the 2014 judgment.

The Town respondents argue that Supreme Court erred in finding that petitioners'causes of action challenging the propriety of the 2013 agreement had satisfied theexception to the [*3]mootness doctrine, and we agree. "Itis well settled that a court's jurisdiction extends only to live controversies" (Matter of NRG Energy, Inc. vCrotty, 18 AD3d 916, 918 [2005]), and a matter becomes moot "unless therights of the parties will be directly affected by the determination of the [claim] and theinterest of the parties is an immediate consequence of the judgment" (Matter ofHearst Corp. v Clyne, 50 NY2d 707, 714 [1980]). Where, as here, the passage oftime or "a change in circumstances prevents a court from rendering a decision that wouldeffectively determine an actual controversy," the claim must be dismissed (Matter of Kowalczyk v Town ofAmsterdam Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 95 AD3d 1475, 1477 [2012] [internalquotation marks and citation omitted]). The 2013 agreement, by its own terms, pertainedsolely to Safety Track's land uses and events that occurred during the 2013 track seasonand expired at the end of that year, thereby rendering the challenges to the 2013agreement moot (see e.g. Matter of Horton, 255 AD2d 642, 643 [1998]). Further,we do not agree with Supreme Court's finding that the exception to the mootnessdoctrine was satisfied (seeMatter of Cobleskill Stone Prods., Inc. v Town of Schoharie, 112 AD3d 1024,1025 [2013]), and therefore reverse the court's judgment in that regard.

Next, respondents assert that Supreme Court's summary determination of the meritsof petitioners' fifth cause of action for a declaratory judgment was erroneous in theabsence of a formal motion following the parties' completion of necessary discovery. "Ina hybrid proceeding and action, separate procedural rules apply to those causes of actionwhich are asserted pursuant to CPLR article 78, on the one hand, and those which seekdeclaratory relief, on the other hand" (Matter of Lake St. Granite Quarry, Inc. v Town/Village ofHarrison, 106 AD3d 918, 920 [2013]; see Matter of 24 Franklin Ave. R.E. Corp. v Heaship, 74 AD3d980, 980 [2010]). In the absence of a formalized motion requesting the "summarydetermination of the causes of action which seek . . . declaratory relief, it iserror for [a court] to summarily dispose of those causes of action" (Matter of Rosenberg v New YorkState Off. of Parks, Recreation, & Historic Preserv., 94 AD3d 1006, 1008[2012]; see Matter of Alltow,Inc. v Village of Wappingers Falls, 94 AD3d 879, 882 [2012]).

It is undisputed that there was no pending motion for summary disposition of thedeclaratory judgment action when Supreme Court rendered its 2014 judgment. Nor didthe court provide notice to the parties that it was considering the summary disposition ofthe declaratory judgment action, such that the parties would be afforded an opportunityto further develop the evidentiary record and offer competent proof supportive of theirrespective positions (see Matterof G&C Transp., Inc. v McGrane, 72 AD3d 819, 821 [2010]; During v City of New Rochelle,N.Y., 55 AD3d 533, 534 [2008]; see also Wells Fargo Bank Minn., N.A. v Garrasi, 80 AD3d1061, 1062-1063 [2011]). Supreme Court acknowledged that a myriad issues of factexisted in this matter, thereby rendering summary determination of petitioners' action fordeclaratory relief—in the absence of a formal application for suchdisposition—improper. Accordingly, we reverse that part of the court's judgmentand remit the matter to Supreme Court to conduct further proceedings relating to suchcause of action (see Matter ofTown of Woodbury v County of Orange, 114 AD3d 951, 954 [2014], lvdenied 24 NY3d 903 [2014]).

Finally, we take no issue with Supreme Court's determination that the Towncommitted violations of the Open Meetings Law on several occasions leading up to theexecution of the 2013 agreement with Safety Track and its subsequent award ofreasonable counsel fees and costs to petitioners. Generally, "[e]very meeting of a publicbody shall be open to the general public, except that an executive session of such bodymay be called and business transacted thereat in accordance with [Public Officers Law§ 105]" (Public Officers Law § 103 [a]). While a governingbody may enter into an executive session, it may do so only for certain purposes,including, as is relevant here, the consideration of an appointment or to engage in private[*4]discussions relating to proposed or pending litigation(see Public Officers Law § 105 [1] [f]; Matter of Jefferson Val.Mall [Concerned Citizens to Review] v Town Bd. of Town of Yorktown, 83 AD2d612, 613 [1981], lv denied 55 NY2d 604 [1981]). However, the body must"identify the subject matter to be discussed . . . with some degree ofparticularity" (Matter of Gordon v Village of Monticello, 207 AD2d 55, 58[1994], revd 87 NY2d 124 [1995]).

During the first of the three allegedly improper executive sessions, which occurred inJanuary 2013, the Planning Board failed to announce any reason for going into thehalf-hour executive session. While the Town respondents now explain that the purposeof the session was to discuss the appointment of a new Planning Board member, suchomission was a clear violation of the Open Meetings Law (see generally PublicOfficers Law art 7). Further, transcripts from the subsequent two Planning Boardmeetings indicate that executive sessions were undertaken, at the suggestion of thePlanning Board's counsel, to discuss potential enforcement actions against Safety Trackby the CEO and, finally, the provisions of a draft version of the 2013 agreement. Whilethe Town respondents assert that any discussion of the 2013 agreement was protected bythe attorney-client privilege, the Planning Board's inclusion of additional persons into thesession necessarily eliminated any reasonable expectation of confidentiality, effectivelywaiving any privilege attendant to such conversations (see Matter of Morgan v New YorkState Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 9 AD3d 586, 588 [2004]). As the Townfailed to demonstrate that it comported with the relevant statutory provisions whenconducting the instant executive sessions, such sessions were violative of the PublicOfficers Law (see Matter of Goodson Todman Enters. v City of Kingston CommonCouncil, 153 AD2d 103, 106 [1990]).

Furthermore, despite the Town respondents' insistence that the Town was not obligedor that it was not feasible to make available to petitioners the proposed 2013 agreementbefore it was put to a vote, we affirm that part of Supreme Court's judgment as found thatthe Town's conduct in that regard denied petitioners "any meaningful participation" inthe process leading to the final adoption of the controversial 2013 agreement, in clearcontravention of Public Officers Law § 103 (e).

Finally, the Town Clerk's failure to make the minutes from a March 2013 PlanningBoard meeting available within "two weeks from the date" of such meeting was anexpress violation of Public Officers Law § 106 (3). In light of these obviousviolations of the Open Meetings Law, Supreme Court reasonably exercised its discretionin awarding counsel fees and costs to petitioners (see Matter of Gordon v Village ofMonticello, 87 NY2d 124, 128 [1995]; compare Matter of New York Civ. Liberties Union v City ofSaratoga Springs, 87 AD3d 336, 339 [2011]).

Any remaining arguments not expressly discussed herein have been found to beunavailing.

Lahtinen, J.P., Garry and Rose, JJ., concur. Ordered that the appeal from the orderentered September 17, 2013 is dismissed, without costs. Ordered that the judgmententered January 17, 2014 is modified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so muchthereof as annulled the 2013 agreement between certain respondents and as summarilydetermined that part of the petition/complaint as sought declaratory relief; matter remittedto the Supreme Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court's [*5]decisions; and, as so modified, affirmed.

Footnotes


Footnote 1:Respondent Town ofHarpersfield does not have a zoning code, but has enacted a Site Plan Review Law(see Local Law No. 1 [2006] of the Town of Harpersfield), which requireslandowners to submit site plans for proposed land uses for approval by the PlanningBoard.

Footnote 2:"No appeal as of rightlies from a nonfinal order in a CPLR article 78 proceeding" (Matter of Pettersen v Town of FortAnn, 72 AD3d 1322, 1323 [2010] [citation omitted]; see CPLR 5701 [b][1]). Furthermore, although "no similar bar exists as to a nonfinal order issued in thecontext of a declaratory judgment action, the right to appeal [such] order terminates uponthe entry of a final judgment" (Matter of 1801 Sixth Ave., LLC v Empire Zone DesignationBd., 95 AD3d 1493, 1495 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citationomitted], lv dismissed 20 NY3d 966 [2012]). As such, the appeal from the ordermust be dismissed.


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