Matter of Levitsky v Garden Time, Inc.
2015 NY Slip Op 02541 [126 AD3d 1264]
March 26, 2015
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, April 29, 2015


[*1]
 In the Matter of the Claim of Eugene Levitsky,Appellant, v Garden Time, Inc., et al., Respondents. Workers' Compensation Board,Respondent.

Erwin, McCane & Daly, Albany (Kimberly I. Gould of counsel), forappellant.

Walsh & Hacker, Albany (Kelly B. Dean of counsel), for Garden Time, Inc. andanother, respondents.

Clark, J. Appeal from a decision of the Workers' Compensation Board, filed June 12,2013, which ruled that claimant was entitled to a schedule loss of use award and thatapportionment applied to that award.

Claimant suffered a work-related injury to his right shoulder while lifting a stove inNovember 2009 and was awarded workers' compensation benefits. X rays and an MRIshowed, among other things, a severe degenerative glenohumeral joint due to arthritis,and he had shoulder surgery in January 2011. At a hearing on the issues of schedule lossof use (hereinafter SLU) and apportionment at which claimant testified, the workers'compensation carrier's consultant, Edwin Mohler, and claimant's treating surgeon,Shankar Das, agreed that claimant had an SLU of his right shoulder of between 60% and65%. Mohler, who the Workers' Compensation Board credited, concluded that claimanthad a 60% SLU of which 10% is attributable to the 2009 injury, which he concededaggravated claimant's degenerative condition; he attributed the remainder of the SLUprimarily to claimant's progressive degenerative arthritis and, to a lesser extent that he didnot quantify, to a 1981 work-related shoulder injury sustained while claimant was apolice officer. A Workers' Compensation Law Judge determined that the SLU awardshould be apportioned 10% to the 2009 injury and the remainder to his preexistingconditions. The Board upheld that [*2]determination, andclaimant appeals contending that his award should not have been apportioned.

The parties do not dispute that where, as here, "there is no continuing need formedical treatment and the medical condition is essentially stable, [an SLU] award isappropriate" (Matter ofKondylis v Alatis Interiors Co., Ltd., 116 AD3d 1184, 1186 [2014] [internalquotation marks and citation omitted]). Further, while apportionment of a workers'compensation award presents a factual issue for the Board to resolve, its decision will beupheld only where it is supported by substantial evidence (see Matter of Morin v Town ofLake Luzerne, 100 AD3d 1197, 1197 [2012], lv denied 21 NY3d 865[2013]). Importantly, "[h]owever, apportionment is inapplicable as a matter of law whenthe preexisting condition was not due to a compensable injury and the claimant was fullyemployed and capable of effectively performing his or her job duties notwithstanding thepreexisting condition" (id. at 1198 [citations omitted]).

Here, the evidence established that after claimant's 1981 injury, a "severe sprain" tohis right shoulder, he returned to work as a police officer with no SLU or permanencyand thereafter changed careers for personal reasons; he worked for stove suppliers forover 20 years with no restrictions on his work duties and did not again seek medicaltreatment for his shoulder until the 2009 work injury. While there was some evidencethat claimant's shoulder was symptomatic over the years, a fact on which the Boardrelied, the degenerative condition was not attributed to either work-related injury andclaimant remained fully employed. Under settled precedent, "the dispositive issue [forapportionment] is not whether a claimant's preexisting condition was symptomatic but,rather, whether such condition was disabling" (Matter of Bruno v Kelly TempServ., 301 AD2d 730, 731 [2003]). That is, apportionment applies to claimant'sdegenerative condition only if it "constitutes a disability in a compensation sense"(id. [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Hroncich v ConEdison, 21 NY3d 636, 644 n 8 [2013]), because "degeneration and infirmities. . . which have not previously produced disability are not a proper basis forreduction of compensation" (Matter of Hogan v Hilltop Manor of Niskayuna, 303AD2d 822, 823 [2003] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

In applying apportionment here, the Board incorrectly relied upon the fact thatclaimant's degenerative condition was symptomatic over the years prior to the 2009injury notwithstanding the uncontroverted evidence that it was not disabling in acompensation sense in that he was fully employed and able to effectively perform hisduties despite that condition (see Matter of Morin v Town of Lake Luzerne, 100AD3d at 1198; Matter ofWilcox v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 69 AD3d 1264, 1265 [2010];Matter of Hogan v Hilltop Manor of Niskayuna, 303 AD2d at 823). Accordingly,since there is no evidence of an apportionable disability before the 2009 injury,apportionment of claimant's award was inappropriate and not supported by substantialrecord evidence, and he is entitled to an award for the full 60% SLU for that injury.

Peters, P.J., McCarthy and Rose, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is reversed,with costs, and matter remitted to the Workers' Compensation Board for furtherproceedings not inconsistent with this Court's decision.


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