| Matter of Wilson v New York City Dept. of Hous. Preserv.& Dev. |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 08533 [145 AD3d 905] |
| December 21, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Lawrence S. Wilson,Respondent, v New York City Department of Housing Preservation andDevelopment, Appellant, et al., Respondents, and Nickita Skopelitis et al., Intervenors-Appellants. |
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, NY (Pamela Seider Dolgow,Rachel Moston, and Kathy Chang Park of counsel), for respondent-appellant.
Himmelstein, McConnell, Gribben, Donoghue & Joseph, New York, NY(David Hershey-Webb of counsel), for intervenors-appellants.
Lawrence S. Wilson, Brooklyn, NY, petitioner-respondent pro se.
Separate appeals from an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court,Kings County (Bernadette Bayne, J.), dated June 11, 2014. The order and judgment,insofar as appealed from by the New York City Department of Housing Preservation andDevelopment, granted a petition pursuant to CPLR article 78. The order and judgment,insofar as appealed from by the intervenors, granted the petition and, in effect, deniedthat branch of the intervenors' motion which was to direct the expeditious processing ofan application.
Ordered that the order and judgment is modified, on the law, by deleting theprovision thereof granting the petition pursuant to CPLR article 78, and substitutingtherefor a provision denying the petition and dismissing the proceeding; as so modified,the order and judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs to the appellantNew York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development payable by thepetitioner.
The petitioner is a tenant/cooperator in a building governed by the Mitchell-Lamaprogram (see Private Housing Finance Law § 10 et seq.). In2014, the petitioner sought a transfer to a different apartment within that same building.At that time, the petitioner and his partner occupied a two-bedroom apartment; theysought to transfer to a different two-bedroom apartment. Nickita Skopelitis and JoannPapamichael, who live in the subject building along with their child, sought a transfer tothe same two-bedroom apartment that was sought by the petitioner. The New York CityDepartment of Housing Preservation and Development (hereinafter HPD) denied thepetitioner's application on the ground that he did not meet the applicable occupancyrequirements. As relevant here, those regulations provide that, in a Mitchell-Lamabuilding, a two-bedroom apartment may be occupied only by a household consisting of"[n]o fewer than three persons, a brother and a sister who are both adults, or a parent orguardian with at least one child" (28 RCNY 3-02 [m] [iii]). At the time of theapplication, the petitioner resided only with his partner, whom he subsequentlymarried.
The petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review theHPD's determination. Skopelitis and Papamichael (hereinafter together the intervenors)moved, inter alia, for leave to intervene in the proceeding and to direct the HPD to"expeditiously process" their application for a transfer to the subject apartment. In theorder and judgment appealed from, the Supreme Court granted the CPLR article 78petition, granted that branch of the intervenors' motion which was for leave to intervenein the proceeding, and, in effect, denied that branch of the intervenors' motion which wasto direct the HPD to "expeditiously process" their application for a transfer to the subjectapartment. The HPD and the intervenors separately appeal.
In a CPLR article 78 proceeding to review a determination of an administrativeagency, the standard of judicial review is whether the determination was made inviolation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law, or was arbitrary andcapricious or an abuse of discretion (see CPLR 7803 [3]; Matter of Gottlieb v City of NewYork, 129 AD3d 724, 725 [2015]; Matter of JP & Assoc. Corp. v New York State Div. of Hous.& Community Renewal, 122 AD3d 739, 739 [2014]). An administrativeagency's interpretation of the regulations it administers is entitled to deference, and mustbe upheld if reasonable (seeMatter of ATM One, LLC v New York State Div. of Hous. & CommunityRenewal, 37 AD3d 714, 714 [2007]; Matter of 85 E. Parkway Corp. v NewYork State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 297 AD2d 675, 676[2002]).
Here, the HPD had a rational basis for determining that the applicable regulation,read as a whole, requires that an applicant for any transfer of apartment, includingtransfers from one apartment to another apartment with the same number of rooms, mustcomply with the occupancy rules (see 28 RCNY 3-02 [i]). Further, "estoppelcannot be invoked against a governmental agency to prevent it from discharging itsstatutory duties" (Matter of New York State Med. Transporters Assn. v Perales,77 NY2d 126, 130 [1990]; seeMatter of Schorr v New York City Dept. of Hous. Preserv. & Dev., 10 NY3d776, 779 [2008]; Matter ofNew Surfside Nursing Home, LLC v Daines, 103 AD3d 637, 640-641 [2013]).Thus, evidence of any prior lack of enforcement of the applicable occupancyrequirements with respect to apartment transfers does not estop the HPD from enforcingsuch rules (see Matter of Schorr v New York City Dept. of Hous. Preserv. &Dev., 10 NY3d at 779). Therefore, the Supreme Court erred in annulling the HPD'sdetermination (see 28 RCNY 3-02 [i]; see also Matter of Suffolk County Assn. of Mun. Empls., Inc. vLevy, 133 AD3d 676, 677 [2015]; Matter of Jennings v Commissioner, N.Y.S. Dept. of SocialServs., 71 AD3d 98, 109-110 [2010]).
The intervenors' remaining contention is without merit. Chambers, J.P., Dickerson,Duffy and Connolly, JJ., concur.
Motion by the petitioner-respondent, inter alia, to strike the intervenors-appellants'brief or stated portions thereof on the ground that it refers to matter dehors the record andcontains improper arguments. By decision and order on motion dated August 12, 2015,this Court held in abeyance that branch of the motion which is to strike theintervenors-appellants' brief or stated portions thereof on the ground that it refers tomatter dehors the record and contains improper arguments, and referred that branch ofthe motion to the panel of Justices hearing the appeals for determination upon theargument or submission thereof.
[*2] Uponthe papers filed in support of the motion, the papers filed in opposition thereto, and uponthe argument of the appeals it is
Ordered that the branch of the motion which is to strike the intervenors-appellants'brief or stated portions thereof on the ground that it refers to matter dehors the record andcontains improper arguments is denied. Chambers, J.P., Dickerson, Duffy and Connolly,JJ., concur.