Matter of Tinter v Board of Trustees of the Pound Ridge Lib.Dist.
2017 NY Slip Op 08385 [155 AD3d 1054]
November 29, 2017
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, January 3, 2018


[*1]
 In the Matter of Marilyn Tinter, Petitioner,
v
Board ofTrustees of the Pound Ridge Library District et al., Respondents.

Meyers Tersigni Feldman & Gray LLP, New York, NY (Anthony L. Tersigni andAndrea Tersigni of counsel), for petitioner.

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Board of Trusteesof the Pound Ridge Library District, dated September 26, 2016, which adopted therecommendation of a Hearing Officer, made after a hearing, finding the petitioner guilty ofcharges of misconduct and incompetence, and terminated her employment as the Director of thePound Ridge Library.

Adjudged that the petition is granted, on the law, without costs or disbursements, to theextent that so much of the determination as found the petitioner guilty of charges one, three, six,seven, eight, nine, ten, and eleven and specifications six, seven, eight, and nine of charge two isannulled, those charges and specifications are dismissed, the penalty imposed is vacated, thepetition is otherwise denied, the determination is otherwise confirmed, the proceeding isotherwise dismissed on the merits, and the matter is remitted to the Board of Trustees of thePound Ridge Library District for a new consideration of the appropriate penalty to be imposed inaccordance herewith, and the imposition of such a penalty thereafter.

The petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review adetermination of the Board of Trustees of the Pound Ridge Library District (hereinafter theBoard) adopting the findings of a Hearing Officer that the petitioner was guilty of certain chargesof misconduct and incompetence, and terminating her employment. In an order dated April 3,2017, the Supreme Court transferred the proceeding to this Court pursuant to CPLR 7804(g).

Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the Board's minutes reflecting a resolution to appointthe Hearing Officer and a letter addressed to the Hearing Officer on Pound Ridge Libraryletterhead and signed by the Board's president, advising that the Hearing Officer had beendesignated to hold a hearing on the disciplinary charges preferred against the petitioner and onamendments or supplements to the charges as might thereafter be preferred, sufficientlydocumented the validity of the Hearing Officer's appointment and satisfied the relevantprovisions of Civil Service Law § 75 (2) (see Matter of McKenzie v Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. ofAlbany, 100 AD3d 1096, 1097-1098 [2012]; Matter of Perryman v Village of Saranac Lake, 64 AD3d 830,832-833 [2009]; Matter of Stafford vBoard of Educ. of Mohonasen Cent. School Dist., 61 AD3d 1259, 1259-1260 [2009];Matter of Salley v [*2]Hempstead School Dist., 121AD2d 547, 548 [1986]; see also Matter of Ost v Supervisor of Town of Woodstock, 251AD2d 724, 726 [1998]).

Civil Service Law § 75 (2) provides, inter alia, that in a case where a hearingofficer is designated, he or she must "make a record of such hearing which shall, with his [or her]recommendations, be referred to [the officer or body having the power to remove the personagainst whom the charges were preferred] for review and decision." Individuals "who arepersonally or extensively involved in the disciplinary process should disqualify themselves fromreviewing the recommendations of a Hearing Officer and from acting on the charges" (Matter of Baker v Poughkeepsie CitySchool Dist., 18 NY3d 714, 718 [2012] [internal quotation marks omitted]). However,"[i]nvolvement in the disciplinary process does not automatically require recusal" (id. at717 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Birch v County of Madison, 123 AD3d 1324, 1326[2014]).

Here, the Board members who reviewed the recommendations of the Hearing Officer andacted on the charges were not so personally or extensively involved in the disciplinary process soas to compel the conclusion that they could not fairly consider the evidence and recommendationresulting from the hearing and, thus, that their recusal was necessary (see Matter of Dolan v New Hyde Park FireDept., 137 AD3d 1026, 1028 [2016]; Matter of Birch v County of Madison, 123AD3d at 1326-1327; cf. Matter of Baker v Poughkeepsie City School Dist., 18 NY3d at716).

Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the Hearing Officer's undisclosed participation inanother matter involving the Board's counsel did not compel the Hearing Officer'sdisqualification (see Matter of Breton v Thompson, 200 AD2d 923, 923 [1994]; cf.Matter of Romeo v Union Free School Dist., No. 3, Town of Islip, 64 AD2d 664, 666[1978]).

The petitioner's contention that the Board's determination should be annulled because theBoard made no independent review of the record lacks merit. The Board had an opportunity toreview the record, transcripts, exhibits, and post-hearing memorandum, and the petitioner failedto make any clear showing that the Board did not make an independent appraisal and did notreach an independent conclusion (seeMatter of Bruso v Clinton County, 139 AD3d 1169, 1171 [2016]; Matter ofPerryman v Village of Saranac Lake, 64 AD3d at 835-836; Matter of McKinney v Bennett, 31AD3d 860, 861 [2006]; Matter of Motell v Napolitano, 186 AD2d 989, 990 [1992];see also Matter of Taub v Pirnie, 3 NY2d 188, 195 [1957]).

A person holding a position covered by Civil Service Law § 75 may not beremoved or otherwise subjected to any disciplinary penalty except for incompetency ormisconduct shown after a hearing (see Civil Service Law § 75 [1]). In anemployee disciplinary case, judicial review of factual findings made after a hearing pursuant toCivil Service Law § 75 is limited to considering whether the determination wassupported by substantial evidence (see 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of HumanRights, 45 NY2d 176, 181 [1978]; Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free SchoolDist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222,230 [1974]; Matter of Sassi v City ofBeacon, 145 AD3d 789, 790 [2016]; Matter of Argenti v Town of Riverhead, 131 AD3d 1053, 1054[2015]; Matter of Jeffery v Israel,109 AD3d 543, 544 [2013]). Here, the Board's determination that the petitioner was guilty ofthe misconduct and incompetence alleged in charges four and five and specifications three, four,and five of charge two was supported by substantial evidence. However, so much of thedetermination as found her guilty of charges one, three, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, and elevenand specifications six, seven, eight, and nine of charge two is not supported by substantialevidence. Moreover, the penalty of termination of the petitioner's employment for the chargesand specifications which were supported by substantial evidence is so disproportionate to theoffense as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness (see Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. ofUnion Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, WestchesterCounty, 34 NY2d 222 [1974]; Matter of DeStefano v Board of Coop. Educ. Servs. of Nassau County,26 AD3d 433, 433-434 [2006]).

The petitioner's remaining contention is without merit. Balkin, J.P., Austin, Sgroi andBrathwaite Nelson, JJ., concur.


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