Matter of Wir Assoc., LLC v Town of Mamakating
2018 NY Slip Op 00059 [157 AD3d 1040]
January 4, 2018
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, February 28, 2018


[*1]
 In the Matter of Wir Associates, LLC, Appellant, v Town ofMamakating et al., Respondents, et al., Respondents.

Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP, White Plains (John M. Flannery ofcounsel), for appellant.

Jacobwitz and Gubits, LLP, Walden (J. Benjamin Gailey of counsel), for respondents.

Devine, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (McGuire, J.), entered July 7, 2016in Sullivan County, which, in a combined proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and action fordeclaratory judgment, granted certain respondents' motion to dismiss the petition/complaint.

Petitioner owns approximately 530 acres of real property (hereinafter the subject property) inthe Town of Mamakating, Sullivan County that lie between the shores of Yankee Lake and thetown line. In 2001, respondent Town Board of Town of Mamakating adopted a comprehensiveplan finding that the subject property, which was vacant and enjoyed easy access to State Route17, would be appropriate for mixed use resort development. The Town Board simultaneouslyenacted a zoning law that placed the subject property within a planned resort-office (hereinafterPRO) district where such a use was authorized.

The comprehensive plan and zoning law were revisited on occasion, but nothing of substanceoccurred until after it was revealed that a large residential and commercial development projectinvolved the subject property. The Town Board, in early 2014, imposed a one-year moratoriumon residential development while it "consider[ed] changes to [respondent Town ofMamakating's] comprehensive plan and . . . land use regulations." A 2015 report[*2]studied whether the zoning law was consistent with thecomprehensive plan and proposed various zoning amendments that would purportedly bring thetwo into alignment, including one to rezone the subject property as Mountain Greenbelt(hereinafter MG) that would effectively prohibit the proposed development. Following anenvironmental review of the proposed zoning changes pursuant to the State EnvironmentalQuality Review Act (see ECL art 8 [hereinafter SEQRA]), the Town Board issued anegative declaration. Zoning amendments, including one to rezone the subject property as MG,were then adopted in August 2015.

Petitioner commenced this combined CPLR article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgmentaction against, in relevant part, the Town and Town Board (hereinafter collectively referred to asrespondents). Petitioner sought to annul the rezoning of the subject property on the grounds thatit conflicted with the comprehensive plan and occurred after a deficient SEQRA review,requested a declaration that the rezoning constituted illegal spot zoning and demanded damagespursuant to 42 USC § 1983 for a purported regulatory taking wrought by therezoning. Respondents moved to dismiss the petition/complaint on various grounds. SupremeCourt granted the motion, prompting this appeal by petitioner.

Supreme Court found that some of petitioner's claims were not ripe for judicial review and,with respect to petitioner's regulatory taking claim made pursuant to 42 USC§ 1983, we agree. The claim rests upon provisions of the Federal and StateConstitutions "requir[ing] that owners receive just compensation when private property is takenfor public use" (520 E. 81st St. Assoc. v State of New York, 99 NY2d 43, 47 [2002];see US Const 5th Amend; NY Const, art I, § 7 [a]). A takings claim istherefore not justiciable until "the governmental entity charged with implementing theregulations has rendered a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to theproperty, and . . . the landowner has availed itself of the procedures providedby [s]tate law to obtain just compensation" (Town of Orangetown v Magee, 88 NY2d 41,50 [1996] [emphasis added]; see Suitum v Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 US725, 733-734 [1997]). Petitioner did not allege that it sought just compensation for the purportedtaking and, as a result, its takings claim was unripe (see Matter of Ken Mar Dev., Inc. v Department of Pub. Works of City ofSaratoga Springs, 53 AD3d 1020, 1024 [2008]).

In contrast, petitioner "need not have first sought and been denied any [relief] prior tofiling [its] facial challenge[s]" to the rezoning (Lamar Adv. of Penn, LLC v Town of OrchardPark, N.Y., 356 F3d 365, 374 [2d Cir 2004]; see Nicholson v Incorporated Vil. of Garden City, 112 AD3d 893,893-894 [2013], appeals dismissed 23 NY3d 947 [2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 936[2014]; Trustees of Union Coll. v Members of Schenectady City Council, 230 AD2d 17,21 [1997], affd 91 NY2d 161 [1997]). Those claims are accordingly ripe, but respondentsalso assert that they fail to state a cause of action. The question accordingly turns to whether,after "treating all allegations in the [petition/complaint] as true and affording [petitioner] everypossible favorable inference," petitioner advances any cognizable legal theory to support itsclaims (American Economy Ins. Co. vState of New York, 30 NY3d 136, 149 [2017]; accord Leon v Martinez, 84NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]). Notwithstanding this liberal standard, we are not obliged to accept"allegations consisting of bare legal conclusions [or] factual claims flatly contradicted bydocumentary evidence" as the basis for a valid claim (Maas v Cornell Univ., 94 NY2d 87,91 [1999] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Sullivan Farms IV, LLC v Village of Wurtsboro, 134 AD3d1275, 1277 [2015]).

A municipality is free to alter its zoning regulations, but must do so in a manner thatcomports with its comprehensive plan (see Town Law § 263; Matter of Birchwood Neighborhood Assn.v Planning Bd. of the Town of Colonie, 112 AD3d 1184, 1185 [2013]). [*3]Petitioner alleges that rezoning the subject property as MG clashedwith the comprehensive plan, pointing to language in the plan finding it suitable "for potentiallarge-scale nonresidential development" that would spur economic growth. The plan states thatthe large vacant parcels and easy access to a nearby highway made the area appropriate for "lowimpact resort-related activities as well as limited non-residential uses," including tourist-relatedactivities, resort development and a planned resort community. Petitioner alleges in itspetition/complaint—and the documentary evidence reflects—that a planned resortcommunity is permitted in a PRO district but is not in a MG district. Petitioner asserts, as aresult, that the Town Board's decision to rezone the subject property arbitrarily disregarded thecomprehensive plan's finding that a planned resort community was appropriate for the subjectproperty. The 2015 report proposed the rezoning in order to address changed conditions inkeeping with the spirit of the comprehensive plan, and it is debatable whether petitioner canultimately "establish[ ] by competent evidence that the Town Board's decision to . . .change its zoning ordinance as it affects [the subject] property was arbitrary and unreasonable"(Matter of Rossi v Town Bd. of Town ofBallston, 49 AD3d 1138, 1143-1144 [2008]; see Matter of Birchwood NeighborhoodAssn. v Planning Bd. of the Town of Colonie, 112 AD3d at 1185-1186). Nevertheless,accepting the allegations in the petition/complaint as true, and noting the absence of documentaryproof conclusively establishing a defense to them (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d at87-88), petitioner articulated a cognizable claim.

Petitioner also alleges that the subject property was "arbitrarily singled out for different, lessfavorable treatment than neighboring properties in a manner that was inconsistent with awell-considered land-use plan" so as to constitute discriminatory reverse spot zoning(Nicholson v Incorporated Vil. of Garden City, 112 AD3d at 895; see Matter of C/S 12th Ave. LLC v City ofNew York, 32 AD3d 1, 9 [2006]; Peck Slip Assoc. LLC v City Council of City of N.Y., 26 AD3d209, 210 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 703 [2006]). Petitioner alleges, for the reasonsnoted above, that rezoning the subject property as MG was "inconsistent with thewell-considered land-use plan for the area" set forth in the comprehensive plan (Peck SlipAssoc. LLC v City Council of City of N.Y., 26 AD3d at 210). Petitioner further alleges, withrecord support, that the Town Board rejected recommendations to rezone other property in aPRO district as MG and, without explanation, limited its exertions to the area around the subjectproperty. In our view, the foregoing allegations are sufficient to state a cognizable claim forreverse spot zoning (cf. Nicholson v Incorporated Vil. of Garden City, 112 AD3d at895).

Turning to petitioner's attack upon the SEQRA determination rendered by the Town Boardwith regard to the rezoning, petitioner's ownership of the subject property confers "a legallycognizable interest in being assured that the [T]own satisfied SEQRA before taking action torezone its land" (Matter of Har Enters. v Town of Brookhaven, 74 NY2d 524, 529[1989]; see Matter of Gernatt Asphalt Prods. v Town of Sardinia, 87 NY2d 668, 687[1996]; Matter of MombaccusExcavating, Inc. v Town of Rochester, N.Y., 89 AD3d 1209, 1210 n [2011], lvdenied 18 NY3d 808 [2012]). Petitioner therefore had standing to assert the claim but, asSupreme Court correctly found, the claim as stated was not viable.

Petitioner alleges that the SEQRA process was procedurally deficient in that the Town Boardfailed to adequately complete the full environmental assessment form required for a SEQRAreview of proposed "changes in the allowable uses within any zoning district, affecting 25 ormore acres of the district" (6 NYCRR 617.4 [b] [2]; see 6 NYCRR 617.6 [a] [2]). Thereis no doubt "that a lead agency must strictly comply with SEQRA's procedural mandates, andfailure to do so will result in annulment of the lead agency's determination of significance" (Matter of Town of Marilla v Travis,151 AD3d 1588, 1590-1591 [2017]; see Matter of King v Saratoga County Bd. ofSupervisors, 89 NY2d 341, 347 [1996]). That being said, petitioner [*4]annexed the prepared form to its petition and, while that documentmay not satisfy petitioner's lofty drafting standards, it provided "enough information to describethe proposed action, its location, its purpose and its potential impacts on the environment" so asto be complete (6 NYCRR 617.2 [m]; Matter of Town of Marilla v Travis, 151 AD3d at1591). Petitioner's procedural attack upon the SEQRA process was therefore "flatly contradictedby [the] documentary evidence" and fails (Maas v Cornell Univ., 94 NY2d at 91; see Balunas v Town of Owego, 56AD3d 1097, 1098 [2008], lv denied 12 NY3d 703 [2009]).

As for the SEQRA determination itself, the Town Board was required to "identif[y] therelevant areas of environmental concern, [take] a hard look at them, and ma[k]e a reasonedelaboration of the basis for its determination" (Matter of Chinese Staff & Workers' Assn. v Burden, 19 NY3d922, 924 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of Riverkeeper, Inc. v New YorkState Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 152 AD3d 1016, 1021 [2017]). The determinationwas annexed as an exhibit to the petition/complaint, and it sets forth how the zoning changeswere consistent with the comprehensive plan and intended to harmonize the two. Thedetermination described in detail how most of the proposed zoning changes restricted possibleland uses and cogently explained why, for the remaining changes, no significant adverseenvironmental impact would result. The Town Board further explained why the changes wouldhave either positive or neutral effects on a range of concerns that included, contrary to petitioner'sallegations, housing availability and economic development. The Town Board was not requiredto "investigate every conceivable environmental problem" in conducting its analysis, andpetitioner failed to allege the existence of any significant environmental problem that wasoverlooked (Matter of Save the PineBush, Inc. v Common Council of City of Albany, 13 NY3d 297, 307 [2009]). Thus,inasmuch as "[t]he wealth of documentation contained in this record" shows that the Town Boardtook a hard look at the environmental impacts of the zoning changes in determining that anegative declaration was appropriate, and petitioner provided no substantive assertions to thecontrary, Supreme Court properly dismissed the SEQRA claim in its entirety (Matter of Ellsworth v Town of Malta,16 AD3d 948, 950 [2005]; see Sullivan Farms IV, LLC v Village of Wurtsboro, 134AD3d at 1280).

McCarthy, J.P., Egan Jr., Lynch and Pritzker, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment ismodified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as granted the motion byrespondents Town of Mamakating and Town Board of Town of Mamakating to dismiss the firstand third causes of action in the petition/complaint; motion denied to that extent and matterremitted to the Supreme Court to permit said respondents to serve an answer within 20 days ofthe date of this Court's decision; and, as so modified, affirmed.


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