| Matter of Calverton Manor, LLC v Town of Riverhead |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 02611 [160 AD3d 842] |
| April 18, 2018 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Calverton Manor, LLC,Appellant, v Town of Riverhead et al., Respondents. |
Certilman Balin Adler & Hyman LLP, Hauppauge, NY (John M. Wagner of counsel),for appellant.
Twomey, Latham, Shea, Kelley, Dubin & Quartararo LLP, Riverhead, NY (JenniferNigro of counsel), for respondents.
In a hybrid proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, inter alia, to review a determination ofthe respondent/defendant Town Board of the Town of Riverhead dated April 19, 2005, adoptinga resolution enacting Local Law No. 12 (2005) of the Town of Riverhead, which implemented atransfer of development rights law, and an action for a judgment declaring, inter alia, in effect,that the transfer of development rights law is void and unenforceable, the petitioner/plaintiffappeals from an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (WilliamB. Rebolini, J.), dated July 15, 2014, which denied its motion for summary judgment on thepetition/complaint, denied the petition, in effect, dismissed the proceeding, and declared thatLocal Law No. 12 (2005) of the Town of Riverhead is a legal, constitutional, and valid exerciseof the police and zoning powers of the respondent/defendant Town Board of the Town ofRiverhead.
Ordered that the order and judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion forsummary judgment on the petition/complaint is granted, the resolution is annulled, and it isdeclared that Local Law No. 12 (2005) of the Town of Riverhead is void and unenforceable.
The petitioner/plaintiff (hereinafter the petitioner) submitted a site plan application in 2001to construct numerous commercial and residential buildings on an undeveloped parcel of land inthe respondent/defendant Town of Riverhead (hereinafter the Town). The petitioner worked withofficials of the Town to revise the site plan application to bring it into compliance withthen-applicable zoning rules. Meanwhile, since 1997, the respondent/defendant Town Board ofthe Town [*2]of Riverhead (hereinafter the Town Board) hadbeen in the process of developing a new Comprehensive Plan (hereinafter the ComprehensivePlan) for the Town. The "goals and policies" of the Comprehensive Plan included "protect[ing]open space and farmland, while concentrating development" into certain specified areas. TheComprehensive Plan proposed eliminating certain permitted uses on the petitioner's parcelcritical to the site plan application. The petitioner submitted its last revised site plan applicationin September 2003. While that application was still pending, the Town Board adopted theComprehensive Plan on November 3, 2003.
The petitioner commenced several related hybrid proceedings/actions against the Town andthe Town Board (hereinafter together the respondents) in the Supreme Court, Suffolk County.The instant hybrid proceeding/action challenges the Town Board's adoption of Local Law No. 12(2005), which amended the Town's zoning code to implement the transfer of development rightscomponent of the Comprehensive Plan (hereinafter the TDR law). The TDR law designated theproperty subject to the petitioner's site plan application as a sending district, meaning that it wasan area of land from which development rights were to be transferred to receiving districts(see Town Law § 261-a).
The petitioner moved for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that the TownBoard failed to comply with General Municipal Law § 239-m. The Supreme Courtdenied the motion, denied the petition, in effect, dismissed the proceeding, and declared that theTDR law is a legal, constitutional, and valid exercise of the police and zoning powers of theTown Board. The petitioner appeals, and we reverse.
"General Municipal Law § 239-m provides that a proposed amendment of azoning ordinance by a town must be referred to the county planning agency if the amendmentaffects real property located within 500 feet of the boundary of any city, village, or town" (Matter of 24 Franklin Ave. R.E. Corp. vHeaship, 139 AD3d 742, 744 [2016]; see General Municipal Law§ 239-m [3] [b] [ii]). That statute requires a town to refer a "full statement"(General Municipal Law § 239-m [1] [c]; [4] [b]) of its proposed action, which isdefined as including "the complete text of the proposed ordinance or local law," to the relevantcounty planning agency (General Municipal Law § 239-m [1] [c]).
Here, the Town Board adopted a resolution on January 19, 2005, in which it directed theTown Clerk to publish a copy of the final draft of the TDR law and notice of a hearing to be held10 days later regarding the proposal. Around that time, the Town Board attempted to refer theproposed TDR law to the Suffolk County Planning Commission (hereinafter the PlanningCommission) in accordance with General Municipal Law § 239-m. The PlanningCommission, however, responded by letter dated February 9, 2005, in which it explained that theproposed TDR law would "not be reviewed until the following information is submitted throughthe offices of the municipal referring agency. Complete revised text of proposed TDRamendment." There is no evidence in the record contradicting the Planning Commission'sstatement that it never received the text of the proposed TDR law. Consequently, the TownBoard failed to refer a "full statement" of its proposed TDR law before enacting it as requiredunder the statute (General Municipal Law § 239-m [1] [c]; [4] [b]).
The respondents argue that the referral of prior drafts of the TDR law obviated the need for anew referral under General Municipal Law § 239-m. Where changes are made to aproposed action following referral, a new referral is not required if "the particulars of theamendment [*3]were embraced within the original referral" (Matter of Benson Point Realty Corp. vTown of E. Hampton, 62 AD3d 989, 992 [2009]; see Matter of Gernatt AsphaltProds. v Town of Sardinia, 87 NY2d 668, 678-680 [1996]). Here, the TDR law as enactedcontained substantial modifications that warranted a new referral (see Matter of LCS RealtyCo. v Incorporated Vil. of Roslyn, 273 AD2d 474, 475 [2000]). Among other things, thefinal version of the TDR law "hereby" mapped sending and receiving districts and specified thedegree to which landowners in receiving districts could exceed density limitations under theprogram. Prior versions of the TDR law that the Town Board referred to the PlanningCommission reserved these details for future consideration. Underscoring the importance ofthese and other post-referral changes, the Town Board itself declared in the January 19, 2005resolution that the draft contained "significant modifications to the proposed local law," andprepared a supplemental generic environmental impact statement over the course of the nextseveral months to evaluate those changes and other features that were not adequately addressedin connection with the Town's adoption of the Comprehensive Plan (cf. Matter of Ferrari vTown of Penfield Planning Bd., 181 AD2d 149, 152-153 [1992]).
The Town Board's failure to comply with the referral requirements of General MunicipalLaw § 239-m constitutes a "jurisdictional defect" (Annabi v City Council of City ofYonkers, 47 AD3d 856, 857 [2008]; see Matter of 24 Franklin Ave. R.E. Corp. vHeaship, 139 AD3d at 744; Matterof Eastport Alliance v Lofaro, 13 AD3d 527, 528-529 [2004]; Matter of Zelnick vSmall, 268 AD2d 527, 529 [2000]). The Town Board's adoption of the resolution enactingthe TDR law was, therefore, of no effect, and the TDR law is void and unenforceable (seeMatter of LCS Realty Co. v Incorporated Vil. of Roslyn, 273 AD2d at 474-475; Matter ofOld Dock Assoc. v Sullivan, 150 AD2d 695, 697 [1989]; see also Matter of EastportAlliance v Lofaro, 13 AD3d at 528-529).
The parties' remaining contentions are academic in light of our determination (see Matter of EMB Enters., LLC v Town ofRiverhead, 70 AD3d 689, 690 [2010]). Dillon, J.P., Leventhal, LaSalle and BrathwaiteNelson, JJ., concur.