| Matter of 24 Franklin Ave. R.E. Corp. v Heaship |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 03516 [139 AD3d 742] |
| May 4, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of 24 Franklin Ave. R.E. Corp. et al.,Respondents, v Thomas Heaship et al., Respondents, and Stephen Malfitano etal., Appellants. |
Bond, Schoeneck & King, PLLC, Garden City, NY (Richard S. Finkel ofcounsel), for respondents/defendants-appellants.
Joseph C. Messina, Mamaroneck, NY, for petitioners/plaintiffs-respondents.
In a hybrid proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and action, inter alia, for ajudgment declaring invalid Local Law No. 4 (2007) of the Town/Village of Harrison, therespondents/defendants Stephen Malfitano, Joseph Cannella, Robert Paladino, ThomasScappaticci, Pat Vetere, and Robert W. Fitzsimmons appeal from an order of theSupreme Court, Westchester County (Giacomo, J.), dated March 24, 2014, which grantedthe petitioners/plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment declaring invalid Local Law No.4 (2007) of the Town/Village of Harrison and directing the Building Official of theTown/Village of Harrison to issue certain building permits to the petitioners/plaintiffs,and denied their cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the petition/complaintinsofar as asserted against them.
Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereofgranting that branch of the petitioners/plaintiffs' motion which was for summaryjudgment directing the Building Official of the Town/Village of Harrison to issue certainbuilding permits to the petitioners/plaintiffs, and substituting therefor a provisiondenying that branch of the motion and remitting the matter to the Planning Board of theTown/Village of Harrison for further proceedings consistent herewith; as so modified,the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
In this hybrid proceeding and action, the petitioners/plaintiffs (hereinafter theplaintiffs) sought, inter alia, a judgment declaring invalid Local Law No. 4 (2007) of theTown/Village of Harrison (hereinafter Local Law No. 4). The plaintiffs own twoadjacent parcels of real property within the Town/Village of Harrison (hereinafter theTown). In 2007, the plaintiffs sought to subdivide the two parcels into three parcels, andthey received final subdivision approval from the Town Planning Board. Thatsubdivision approval was based on a site map indicating that one of the existing houseson the property was "to remain," while a second existing house would be demolished andreplaced by two new two-family homes. The plaintiffs subsequently sought buildingpermits for the construction of three, not two, two-family homes on the combined lots.That use was permitted by the zoning code as it then existed; however, that use was notencompassed by the Planning Board subdivision approval.
In September 2007, the Town Board enacted Local Law No. 4, which amended thezoning [*2]code, as relevant, by providing that theconstruction of only single-family homes would be permitted in the area in which thesubject property is located.
The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the plaintiffs' motion which wasfor summary judgment declaring invalid Local Law No. 4 based on the failure of theTown Board to comply with the requirements of General Municipal Law§ 239-m. The appellants assert that the Town Board was not required tocomply with the mandatory referral requirements of General Municipal Law§ 239-m, as that statute was superseded by Westchester CountyAdministrative Code § 277.61 (2) with respect to the referral requirements.As relevant here, General Municipal Law § 239-m provides that a proposedamendment of a zoning ordinance by a town must be referred to the county planningagency if the amendment affects real property located within 500 feet of the boundary ofany city, village, or town (see General Municipal Law § 239-m [3][b] [i]). A town must submit to the county planning agency a "full statement of suchproposed action," defined as "all materials required by and submitted to the referringbody as an application on a proposed action, including a completed environmentalassessment form and all other materials required by [the] referring body" to make adetermination of significance pursuant to the State Environmental Quality Review Act(ECL art 8 [hereinafter SEQRA]) (General Municipal Law § 239-m [1][c]). The county planning agency will then have 30 days to report its recommendations tothe referring body (see General Municipal Law § 239-m [4][b]).
By comparison, Westchester County Administrative Code § 277.61requires only, as relevant here, that a town must provide to the County Planning Board10 days notice of any hearing as to a zoning amendment (see Westchester CountyAdministrative Code § 277.61 [2]).
Contrary to the appellants' contention, the cited provision of the Westchester CountyAdministrative Code does not conflict with the referral requirements of GeneralMunicipal Law § 239-m. Therefore, Westchester County AdministrativeCode § 277.61 (2) does not supersede the referral requirements set forth inGeneral Municipal Law § 239-m (see Annabi v City Council of City of Yonkers, 47 AD3d856, 858 [2008]; cf. 208 E. 30th St. Corp. v Town of N. Salem, 88 AD2d281, 285-286 [1982]; Bloom v Town Bd. of Town of Yorktown, 80 AD2d 823,824 [1981]).
Further, the Town does not dispute that it failed to comply with the notice andreferral requirements of General Municipal Law § 239-m. This failureconstitutes a "jurisdictional defect" rendering the zoning amendment, Local Law No. 4,invalid (Annabi v City Council of City of Yonkers, 47 AD3d at 857; see Matter of Roanoke Sand &Gravel Corp. v Town of Brookhaven, 24 AD3d 783, 785 [2005]).
In light of our determination that Local Law No. 4 was properly invalidated, wefurther note that the Town Board, in enacting that local law, failed to comply with thenotice provisions of Town Law § 264 (1) and (2). Contrary to theappellants' contention, the record does not show that the notice requirements of TownLaw § 264 were inapplicable to Local Law No. 4 (see generally Matter of Village ofChestnut Ridge v Town of Ramapo, 45 AD3d 74, 84 [2007]). Additionally, inenacting Local Law No. 4, the Town Board failed to comply with the requirements ofSEQRA as, inter alia, the Town Board failed to prepare and review a completeEnvironmental Assessment Form prior to the enactment of that law (see 6NYCRR 617.6, 617.7; see alsoMatter of Falcon Group Ltd. Liab. Co. v Town/Village of Harrison Planning Bd.,131 AD3d 1237, 1240 [2015]; Tauber v Village of Spring Val., 56 AD3d 660[2008]).
While the Supreme Court properly determined that Local Law No. 4 was invalid, iterred in directing the Town Building Official to issue the building permits to theplaintiffs. The Planning Board's resolution granting the plaintiffs' application forsubdivision approval incorporated information submitted by the plaintiffs, including theaforementioned site map indicating that one of the existing houses on the property was"to remain" and that only two new two-family homes were to be constructed. Theresolution provided that the approval "authorize[d] only the subdivision activitiesapproved . . . as delineated on the signed and filed Final Subdivision Platand associated improvements drawings," and that "[a]ny alternation or modification tothe Final Subdivision Plat or to the existing or approved facilities and site shall requirethe review and approval by the Planning Board." Here, as noted, the plaintiffs submittedbuilding permits for construction that was not depicted on the site map submitted to thePlanning Board and not encompassed in the subdivision [*3]approval resolution.
Further, the negative SEQRA declaration issued by the Planning Board in connectionwith the subdivision approval was also premised on the documents submitted to thePlanning Board by the plaintiffs, including the site plan map showing the plannedconstruction of only two new homes. Moreover, the plaintiffs, in support of their motion,did not submit any evidence showing, prima facie, that their building permit applicationsand plans complied with all other requirements, such as building code requirements.
Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court erred in directing the Town BuildingOfficial to issue the subject building permits to the plaintiffs (see Matter of EMB Enters., LLC vTown of Riverhead, 70 AD3d 689, 691 [2010]; see also Matter of J. Owens Bldg.Co., Inc. v Town of Clarkstown, 128 AD3d 1067, 1069 [2015]). Consequently,the matter must be remitted to the Planning Board for further proceedings as to anyplanned subdivision of the subject property. Dillon, J.P., Austin, Maltese and Barros, JJ.,concur. [Prior Case History: 43 Misc 3d 1203(A), 2014 NY Slip Op50456(U).]