Matter of Foreclosure of Tax Liens
2018 NY Slip Op 07123 [165 AD3d 1112]
October 24, 2018
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, November 28, 2018


[*1]
 In the Matter of Foreclosure of Tax Liens. County of Orange,Appellant; Tammy Burton Goldman, Respondent.

Langdon C. Chapman, County Attorney, Goshen, NY (Matthew J. Nothnagle of counsel), forpetitioner-appellant.

In a proceeding pursuant to RPTL article 11 to foreclose a tax lien, the petitioner appealsfrom an order of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Maria S. Vazquez-Doles, J.), dated October21, 2016. The order denied the petitioner's motion for summary judgment on the petition and tostrike the answer, and, in effect, upon searching the record, dismissed the petition.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

This proceeding involves a parcel of real property (hereinafter the subject property) locatedin the Town of Newburgh. The County of Orange alleged that the Town of Newburgh had issuedtax bills relating to the subject property which were not paid and which became tax liens on theproperty by operation of law (see RPTL 902).

On November 1, 2013, the County filed with the Orange County Clerk a list of delinquenttaxes (see RPTL 1122). The subject property was included in this list of delinquenttaxes.

The County subsequently commenced proceedings to foreclose on the outstanding tax liensthat were set forth in the list of delinquent taxes with a "Petition and Notice of Foreclosure" datedAugust 5, 2014 (see RPTL 1123). The portion of the petition that has been included inthe record on appeal indicated that the last day to redeem the subject property was March 2,2015. The record on appeal does not include the total redemption amount that was due on thesubject property at the time these proceedings were commenced.

The petition stated that if a person with the right to redeem the property did not redeem oranswer by March 2, 2015, that person would be "forever barred and foreclosed of all his or herright, title and interest and equity of redemption in and to the [subject property]." Under suchcircumstances, the County would be entitled to take title to the subject property in fee simpleabsolute (see RPTL 1136 [3]; Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 8 [2003]). Oncevested with title to the subject property, the County would be "authorized to sell and convey thereal property so acquired, which shall include any and all gas, oil or mineral rights associatedwith such real property, either with or without advertising for bids" (RPTL 1166 [1]; seeKennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d at 8).

The County alleged that on October 16, 2014, it "mailed the Petition and Notice of [*2]Petition to the record owners of the parcel, Thomas Dixon andSharon Dixon, . . . at the address in the Town's records." The United States PostalService returned the certified mailing with a legend "forward time exp[ired]." A P.O. Box locatedin Pine Bush, New York, was listed above the note "return to sender."

The County alleged that an unidentified individual mailed notice of the proceeding toThomas Dixon and Sharon Dixon at the P.O. Box in Pine Bush. The record reflects that anindividual named Stephanie Burton signed for the certified mailing on January 7, 2015. TheCounty alleged that the United States Postal Service did not return the regular mailing.

In January and February 2015, employees of the Orange County Real Property Tax ServiceAgency allegedly affixed notices of the proceeding "at every parcel of real property in thethen-underlying tax foreclosure proceeding." An affidavit from one of these employees statedthat notice of the proceeding was posted at the subject property on February 11, 2015.

A document titled "Verified Answer of Thomas O. Dixon and Sharon L. Dixon" wasinterposed in response to the County's petition. It was dated February 27, 2015, and verified byan individual named Tammy Burton Goldman. The answer was signed by Goldman's attorneyand served on the County by counsel.

The answer stated that Thomas Dixon and Sharon Dixon were "the fee owners" of the subjectproperty. The answer asserted that Thomas Dixon died on August 10, 2002, and that SharonDixon died on March 8, 2013.

The answer stated that "[the Dixons'] niece, Tammy Burton Goldman indicates that no estateproceeding has been commenced on behalf of either of the decedents." The answer stated thatGoldman "resides in Nashville, Georgia."

In the answer, Goldman's attorney stated: "I am in the process of being retained to openestate proceedings therein naming an administrator for the estates of decedents who. . . passed away without wills." The answer concluded with the assertion that "if infact, open taxes on this property are rightfully due and owing . . . the yet unnamedpersonal administrator of said estates would be the responsible party to be named in the taxproceedings."

Attached to the answer was a copy of Sharon Dixon's death certificate. Her death certificateset forth the date of Sharon Dixon's death, along with other personal information, including thenames of her parents, the date of her burial, and the name and address of the relevant funeralhome. The death certificate listed an individual named Kevin Dixon as the source of this personalinformation about Sharon Dixon.

In December 2015, the County moved for judgments of foreclosure with respect "to eachparcel in the tax foreclosure proceeding for which no payment was made and no Answer served."The County also requested "an Order of Severance as to each parcel for which an Answer wasserved," including the subject property.

On March 30, 2016, the Supreme Court issued a judgment of foreclosure which, among otherthings, directed the severance of this proceeding. In accordance with the judgment, thisproceeding was severed.

The County subsequently applied for an index number for this severed proceeding. In itsapplication, the County listed Goldman as the only respondent.

This proceeding was subsequently assigned Supreme Court index Number 3559/16. Thisproceeding's caption, in accordance with the County's application, lists Goldman as the solerespondent.

Sometime in August 2016, the County moved "for an Order striking Respondent's [*3]Answer and granting the Petitioner a Judgment of foreclosure." Inan affirmation, a Chief Assistant County Attorney asserted that the answer "has no merit." Hestated that he had "reviewed the records of the Orange County Surrogate, and . . .found no proceedings with respect to any estate of Thomas Dixon or Sharon Dixon." He alsostated that he had reviewed the records of the Orange County Clerk and "found no documentsindicating that a person named Tammy Burton Goldman or Tammy Burton has any right, title orinterest in [the subject property]."

The County also submitted a memorandum of law in support of its motion. The Countyargued that Goldman was the proper respondent to this proceeding and that she had receivedactual notice thereof. The County argued that "[Goldman] seems to believe that if a propertyowner dies, his or her heirs can simply neglect to file probate proceedings, negate the taxingmunicipality's ability to enforce, and live tax-free on the property forever."

There was no opposition to the County's motion. The attorney who drafted and signed theanswer, upon receiving notice of the County's motion, stated that his office did not representGoldman in this case. The attorney stated that his office had represented Goldman "on an estatematter several years ago, but that matter [was] complete."

In the order appealed from, the Supreme Court concluded that since the proceeding wascommenced against deceased individuals, it was a nullity. Accordingly, the court denied theCounty's motion "without prejudice" and, in effect, upon searching the record, dismissed thepetition. The court stated that the County "should seek the appointment of an administrator andrecommence this [proceeding] with notice to the proper parties."

The County appeals from the order. Goldman, the only other party to this proceeding, has notsubmitted an appellate brief. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the Supreme Court'sorder.

"[I]t is well established that the dead cannot be sued" (Marte v Graber, 58 AD3d 1, 3 [2008]). Accordingly, "[a] party maynot commence a legal action or proceeding against a dead person, but must instead name thepersonal representative of the decedent's estate" (Jordan v City of New York, 23 AD3d 436, 437 [2005]; see Krysa v Estate of Qyra, 136 AD3d760, 760-761 [2016]; Dime Sav. Bank of N.Y. v Luna, 302 AD2d 558, 558 [2003];see also 1-210 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac CPLR ¶ 210.04).

Although the passage of time is no bar to the County's enforcement of tax liens (seeRPTL 1160), as a general matter, "[t]he remedy for a [party] who faces the running of the Statuteof Limitations under these circumstances is to petition the Surrogate's Court pursuant to SCPA1002 for the appointment of . . . [a] personal representative of the estate"(Laurenti v Teatom, 210 AD2d 300, 301 [1994]). The Surrogate's Court Procedure Actprovides that, depending on the circumstances of the particular case, letters of administrationmay be granted to "persons who are distributees of an intestate" (SCPA 1001 [1]), or to certainother individuals including "the public administrator, . . . the chief fiscal officer ofthe county, . . . the petitioner, in the discretion of the court, or . . . anyother person or persons" (see SCPA 1001 [8]).

Similarly, if the death of a party occurs after the commencement of a proceeding oraction "and the claim for or against him [or her] is not thereby extinguished[,] the court shallorder substitution of the proper parties" (CPLR 1015 [a]). "A motion for substitution may bemade by the successors or representatives of a party or by any party" (CPLR 1021; see Dieye v Royal Blue Servs., Inc.,104 AD3d 724, 725 [2013]).

"The death of a party divests the court of jurisdiction and stays the proceedings until a propersubstitution has been made pursuant to CPLR 1015 (a)" (Singer v Riskin, 32 AD3d 839, 839-840 [2006]). "Moreover, anydetermination rendered without such substitution will generally be deemed a nullity" (id.at 840; see Hicks v Jeffrey, 304 AD2d 618, 618 [2003]). "A motion for substitutionpursuant to CPLR 1021 is the method by which the court acquires jurisdiction" over the deceasedparty's successors in interest, and such a motion "is not a mere technicality" (Bossert v FordMotor Co., 140 [*4]AD2d 480, 480 [1988]; see Matter ofEinstoss, 26 NY2d 181, 189-190 [1970]; Singer v Riskin, 32 AD3d at 840).

"In most instances a personal representative appointed by the Surrogate's Court should besubstituted . . . to represent the decedent's estate" (Lambert v Estren, 126 AD3d 942,943 [2015]; see Dieye v Royal Blue Servs., Inc., 104 AD3d at 725; see also3-1015 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac CPLR ¶ 1015.06). "However, in the event nosuch representative exists, an appropriate appointment may be made by the Supreme Court andthat individual may be substituted in place of the decedent" (Lambert v Estren, 126 AD3dat 943; see Dieye v Royal Blue Servs., Inc., 104 AD3d at 725; Grillo v Tese, 113AD2d 871, 873 [1985]; see also Matter of St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 261 AD2d320, 320-321 [1999]). Indeed, "[t]he Supreme Court is a court of general jurisdiction with thepower to appoint a temporary administrator, and may do so to avoid delay and prejudice in apending action [or proceeding]" (Dieye v Royal Blue Servs., Inc., 104 AD3d at 726; see Laroche v Laroche, 162 AD3d1000 [2018]; Harding v Noble Taxi Corp., 155 AD2d 265, 266 [1989]; see alsoGrillo v Tese, 113 AD2d at 873). "The determination whether to exercise its authority toappoint a temporary administrator is addressed to the broad discretion of the Supreme Court"(Laroche v Laroche, 162 AD3d at 1001; see Rosenfeld v Hotel Corp. of Am., 20NY2d 25, 28 [1967]; Meczkowski vE.W. Howell Co., Inc., 63 AD3d 803, 804 [2009]).

Here, the foreclosure proceeding was commenced against the record owners of the subjectproperty with the filing of the petition of foreclosure (see RPTL 1123; Matter of County of Orange [Al TuriLandfill, Inc.], 75 AD3d 224, 232 [2010]). However, the record owners of the subjectproperty had died before this proceeding was commenced against them. Accordingly, thisproceeding "was a nullity from its inception" (Krysa v Estate of Qyra, 136 AD3d at 760;see Rivera v Bruchim, 103 AD3d700, 700-701 [2013]). The fact that an attorney retained by Goldman purported to answer onbehalf of the deceased individuals did not confer jurisdiction over their respective estates (see Arbelaez v Chun Kuei Wu, 18AD3d 583, 584 [2005]). Furthermore, the County's act of amending the caption of the voidpetition to eliminate the names of the record owners and to include Goldman as the solerespondent was ineffective to retroactively render this proceeding properly commenced (seeKrysa v Estate of Qyra, 136 AD3d at 761; Wendover Fin. Servs. v Ridgeway, 93 AD3d 1156, 1157 [2012];Marte v Graber, 58 AD3d at 4-5). Under the circumstances, the proceeding was properlydismissed (see e.g. Maldonado v LawOff. of Mary A. Bjork, 64 AD3d 425, 425-426 [2009]).

Moreover, even if the proceeding had been properly commenced against the record owners(cf. RPTL 1122 [6] [b]; 1123 [3]), once the County and the Supreme Court were madeaware of their deaths, it was incumbent upon the County to substitute a personal representative ofthe deceased parties' estates before the matter could proceed (see CPLR 1015 [a]; 1021;Singer v Riskin, 32 AD3d at 839-840). The County's act of amending the caption of thepetition to name Goldman as the sole respondent would not have constituted a propersubstitution under CPLR 1015 (a), given that Goldman had not been appointed to represent thedeceased individuals' estates (seeMaldonado v Altemburger, 66 AD3d 570, 570-571 [2009]; Maldonado v Law Off.of Mary A. Bjork, 64 AD3d at 426; Abley Props., Inc. v Reid, 52 AD3d 442, 443 [2008]; Rumola v Maimonides Med. Ctr., 37AD3d 696, 696-697 [2007]). Indeed, the answer served in this proceeding did not allege thatGoldman had any interest in the deceased individuals' estates and the County itself, in moving forsummary judgment, took the position that there was no evidence that Goldman had "any right,title or interest in [the subject property]."

We are unaware of any exceptions to the general principles which prohibit a party fromcommencing or maintaining a proceeding against a deceased individual. We have not beenreferred to any authority upholding an exception to these general principles, or to an example of acase that was properly commenced or maintained against individuals who were known to bedeceased.

Our dissenting colleague contends, without citation to any positive authority, that in remproceedings may be properly commenced and maintained against individuals who are known tobe deceased so long as the County has provided those deceased individuals with notice of theproceeding in accordance with statutory law. We are unaware of any purpose such notice wouldserve to the deceased individuals, and unaware of "any method for serving with process thosewho [*5]have moved beyond the vale" (Marte v Graber,58 AD3d at 4).

In any event, "the procedure in special proceedings is the same as in actions and is governedby the CPLR provisions applicable to actions except as otherwise prescribed by law" (HumanDev. Servs. of Port Chester v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Vil. of Port Chester, 67 NY2d 702,705 [1986]; see CPLR 103 [b]). Accordingly, in the absence of any affirmative legislationexplicitly authorizing the County to commence or maintain an in rem tax lien foreclosureproceeding against deceased individuals (cf. CPLR 1015 [a]; 1021), there is no statutoryreason to distinguish between the forms of civil judicial proceedings with respect to this issue(see CPLR 103 [b]).

Indeed, this Court has previously applied these general principles to an in rem tax lienforeclosure case (see NYCTL 2004-ATrust v Archer, 131 AD3d 1213, 1214 [2015]). In that case, this Court determined thatthe failure to substitute the administrator of the estate of a deceased defendant deprived theSupreme Court of jurisdiction (see id. at 1214). Numerous trial-level decisions havesimilarly applied these principles to proceedings in rem (see NYCTL 2009-A Trust v 706Fourth Ave., LLC, 39 Misc 3d 1202[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 50402[U] [Sup Ct, Kings County2013]; East Harlem Pilot Block Bldg. 1 Hous. Dev. Fund Corp. v Serrano, 153 Misc 2d776 [1992]; 100 W. 72nd St. Assoc. v Murphy, 144 Misc 2d 1036 [1989]). In the absenceof any countervailing authority, we conclude that the prohibition against commencing ormaintaining an action or proceeding against a deceased individual, which applies to every othertype of judicial proceeding, is applicable here, too.

Our dissenting colleague nevertheless maintains that, as a constitutional matter, the SupremeCourt could properly exercise jurisdiction in this case without directing any notice to thesuccessors in interest of the record owners. Our colleague asserts that a tax lien foreclosureproceeding is not against any individual, but rather, is against the subject property itself and so itis unnecessary to acquire personal jurisdiction over any individuals whose interests may beaffected by these types of proceedings.

We must respectfully disagree. Personal jurisdiction has two fundamental components(see Keane v Kamin, 94 NY2d 263, 265 [1999]). "One component involves service ofprocess, which implicates due process requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard"(id. at 265). "Notice of a proceeding is . . . a fundamental component of acourt's proper exercise of personal jurisdiction over a party" (John Galliano, S.A. v Stallion, Inc., 15 NY3d 75, 80 [2010]; see e.g. Matter of Greenburgh Cent. SchoolDist. No. 7 v Westchester County Human Rights Commn., 82 AD3d 980, 981[2011]).

"The other component of personal jurisdiction involves the power, or reach, of a court over aparty, so as to enforce judicial decrees" (Keane v Kamin, 94 NY2d at 265). "Thisconsideration—the jurisdictional basis—is independent of service of process"(id.). "To satisfy the jurisdictional basis there must be a constitutionally adequateconnection between the defendant, the State and the action" (id. at 265; seeInternational Shoe Co. v Washington, 326 US 310 [1945]).

"Jurisdictional basis on the one hand and the requirement of notice on the other, althoughboth are products of due process and each is essential to jurisdiction, are best investigatedseparately" (Siegel, NY Prac § 58 at 86 [5th ed 2011]). As this case well illustrates,"[a] failure to separate them can breed confusion" (id.).

Contrary to the contention of our dissenting colleague, the physical presence of propertywithin a state merely provides a jurisdictional basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction(see Shaffer v Heitner, 433 US 186, 206-212 [1977]; see also Restatement[Second] of Conflict of Laws § 38, Comment b; accord CPLR 302[a] [4]). It does not obviate the independent notice component of personal jurisdiction (seeMullane v Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 US 306, 312-313 [1950]; seealso Restatement [Second] of Conflict of Laws § 57, Comment c).

Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the fiction that an inrem proceeding is not asserted against any individuals, but only against the property itself (seeShaffer v Heitner, 433 US at 216). Rather, the Court has long acknowledged that "an adverse[*6]judgment in rem directly affects the property ownerby divesting him [or her] of his [or her] rights in the property before the court" (id. at 206[emphasis added]; see Mennonite Bd. of Missions v Adams, 462 US 791, 796 n 3 [1983];Schroeder v City of New York, 371 US 208, 213 [1962]; see also Restatement[Second] of Judgments § 6, Comment b).

Recognizing that "[n]otice by publication is a poor and sometimes a hopeless substitute foractual service of notice" (City of New York v New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 344 US293, 296 [1953]), the United States Supreme Court has concluded that where an individual'slegally protected interests are directly affected by the proceedings in question, "notice bypublication is not enough" (Schroeder v City of New York, 371 US at 212; seeMullane v Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 US at 318).

The United States Supreme Court's case law has thus "required the State to make efforts toprovide actual notice to all interested parties comparable to the efforts that were previouslyrequired only in in personam actions" (Mennonite Bd. of Missions v Adams, 462 US at796 n 3). In other words, persons claiming interests in real property that is the subject of an inrem proceeding "are entitled to notice that functionally approximates the service of process thatis employed in in personam actions" (Restatement [Second] of Judgments § 5,Comment b; see Schroeder v City of New York, 371 US at 212-213; Mullanev Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 US at 312-315; see also Restatement[Second] of Conflict of Laws § 57, Comment c).

We acknowledge that the United States Supreme Court "has not hesitated to approve ofresort to publication as a customary substitute . . . where it is not reasonablypossible or practicable to give more adequate warning" (Mullane v Central Hanover Bank& Trust Co., 339 US at 317). "Thus it has been recognized that, in the case of personsmissing or unknown, employment of an indirect and even a probably futile means of notificationis all that the situation permits and creates no constitutional bar to a final decree foreclosing theirrights" (id.). However, "[e]xceptions in the name of necessity do not sweep away the rulethat within the limits of practicability notice must be such as is reasonably calculated to reachinterested parties" (id. at 318).

Here, the County contends that the individuals who acquired an interest in the subjectproperty by virtue of the death of the record owners are unknown. The County argues that noticeto these individuals is impractical since, if it is required to provide such notice, it "would have tonot only consult the internet and library materials, but probably retain an investigator to canvassamong present and former neighbors and employers, in Nashville, Newburgh, and who knowswhere else, not just to find Ms. Goldman, but some indeterminate number of brothers, sisters,aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, cousins, or whomever."

Echoing these concerns, our dissenting colleague similarly concludes that there is no legalauthority "that even remotely suggests that the taxing authority is required to undertake aninvestigation to ascertain the whereabouts of missing taxpayers or to identify and locate therelatives of deceased or absent taxpayers, such as by conducting an Internet search or searchingthe public records of all the counties or other places where an absent, missing, or deceasedtaxpayer may have lived" (dissenting op at 1130).

These arguments ignore the fact that the Surrogate's Court Procedure Act makes available aprocedure by which the interests of these unknown individuals may be protected even thoughthey have not yet been identified or located (see SCPA 1002). As in any other caseinvolving the death of a defendant, the County need not provide notice to every potentialbeneficiary of the record owners' estates, it need only provide notice to the representative of theirestates (see CPLR 1015 [a]; 1021). As we have already noted, if the County is unable toidentify or locate the representative of the record owners' estates, it may secure the appointmentof one either in the Surrogate's Court (see SCPA 1002), or, if circumstances warrant, inthe Supreme Court (see Dieye v Royal Blue Servs., Inc., 104 AD3d at 726).

Accordingly, the situation presented in this case may be distinguished from cases where therecord owner no longer lives at the address on file, or has secretly conveyed his or her [*7]interest to another. In those situations, notice by posting andpublication was made necessary due to a lack of any alternative means to protect the interests ofthe record owners. In addition, the defendants in those situations are at least chargeable withnotice of the fact that they have an interest in the property at issue. By contrast, where the recordowners of property have died, the individuals who succeed to their interests may not be awarethat the record owners are dead or that they have any interest in the property.

Under the circumstances presented, it cannot be said that the "probably futile means ofnotification" that was undertaken here was "all that the situation permits" (Mullane v CentralHanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 US at 317). The availability of alternative means toprotect the due process interests of the unknown parties renders the notice provided hereconstitutionally deficient. Accordingly, even if principles of state law did not independentlyrequire the County to name and provide notice to the representative of the deceased owners'estates, the notice provided here was constitutionally insufficient to permit the Supreme Court toexercise personal jurisdiction over the record owners' successors in interest.

In reaching our conclusions, we are not unmindful of the important interest that the Countyhas in efficiently collecting delinquent taxes (see Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d at10-11). However, the interests of the County must be balanced with the property rights ofindividuals which may be extinguished forever if they default in a tax foreclosure proceeding(see RPTL 1131). As previously observed, a tax foreclosure proceeding permits theCounty to take title to privately-held property for the nonpayment of property taxes even wherethe taxes owing represent only a small fraction of the value of the land (see RPTL 1136[3]; 1166 [1]; Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d at 8). Thus, the County may realize asubstantial windfall if a landowner defaults in a tax foreclosure proceeding. Given the substantialproperty interests at stake, it is imperative for the courts to continue to safeguard the due processrights of those whose property is threatened by ensuring that notice is adequate to support theexercise of personal jurisdiction over them.

Under the circumstances, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination to deny theCounty's motion for summary judgment on the petition and to strike the answer, and, in effect,upon searching the record, to dismiss the petition. Rivera, Miller and LaSalle, JJ., concur.

Scheinkman, P.J., dissents, and votes to reverse the order, on the law, and grant thepetitioner's motion for summary judgment on the petition and to strike the answer, with thefollowing memorandum: The Supreme Court and my colleagues in the majority conclude thatthis in rem tax lien foreclosure proceeding is a nullity because the record owners of the propertywere deceased at the time it was commenced. I respectfully disagree.

On November 1, 2013, the County of Orange Department of Finance (hereinafter Departmentof Finance) filed with the Orange County Clerk a list of delinquent taxes pursuant to RealProperty Tax Law § 1122. The subject property, among others, was included on thislist of delinquent taxes for taxes that were not paid to the Town of Newburgh. Via a petition andnotice of foreclosure dated August 5, 2014, the County's Commissioner of Finance commencedproceedings to foreclose all of the outstanding tax liens set forth in the list of delinquenttaxes.

According to an affidavit of Kathlee A. DeRose, who was a Real Property Tax Supervisor inthe Department of Finance, on October 16, 2014, the County mailed the petition and notice offoreclosure to the record owners of the subject property, Thomas Dixon and Sharon Dixon(hereinafter together the Dixons), at the address in the Town's records, 5431 Route 9W,Newburgh, NY 12550, by certified and regular mail. The United States Postal Service returnedthe certified mailing with a legend stating "forward time exp[ired]" and listing a new address,P.O. Box 1195, Pine Bush, NY 12566. According to DeRose, the County mailed another copy ofthe petition and notice of foreclosure to the Dixons at the new address, by certified and regularmail. An individual [*8]named Stephanie Burton signed for thecertified mailing. The United States Postal Service did not return the regular mailing. Accordingto an affidavit of John I. McCarey, the Director of the Orange County Real Property Tax ServiceAgency, he and another member of the Agency affixed a notice of the proceeding to the frontdoor of the subject property on February 11, 2015.

A document entitled "Verified Answer of Thomas O. Dixon and Sharon L. Dixon" wasinterposed in response to the County's petition. It was verified by Tammy Burton Goldman, aniece of the Dixons who resided in Nashville, Georgia, and signed by Robert M. Graubard ofGary Greenwald & Partners, P.C. (hereinafter the Greenwald firm), as Goldman's attorney.The answer alleged that the Dixons were the "fee owners" of the subject property, that ThomasDixon had died on August 10, 2002, and that Sharon Dixon had died on March 8, 2013. Theanswer further alleged that "no estate proceeding [had] been commenced on behalf of either ofthe decedents," and that the Greenwald firm was "in the process of being retained to open estateproceedings . . . naming an administrator for the estates of decedents who. . . passed away without wills." The only defense asserted in the answer was that "ifin fact . . . open taxes on this property are rightfully due and owing . . .the yet unnamed personal administrator of said estates would be the responsible party to benamed in the tax proceedings." Attached to the answer was a copy of Sharon Dixon's deathcertificate.

In December 2015, the County moved for a judgment of foreclosure as to each parcel in thetax foreclosure proceeding for which no payment was made and no answer was served. In ajudgment dated March 30, 2016, the Supreme Court, inter alia, severed the proceeding as to eachparcel for which an answer had been imposed, including the subject property, and directed theCounty to cause separate index numbers to be assigned to each such answer. The County thenapplied for an index number for this severed proceeding. In its application, the County listedGoldman as the respondent to the petition. The proceeding was subsequently assigned its ownSupreme Court index No., and the caption listed Goldman as the sole respondent.

By notice of motion dated August 16, 2016, the County moved for an order "strikingRespondent's Answer and granting the Petitioner a Judgment of foreclosure." In a supportingaffirmation, the County's attorney stated that he had reviewed the records of the Orange CountySurrogate and found no proceedings with respect to any estate of Thomas Dixon or SharonDixon. In support of its motion, the County asserted that the answer submitted by Goldman hadno merit, as the fact that no personal representative of the Dixons' estates had been appointeddoes not preclude the County from moving forward with the tax lien foreclosure proceeding. Noresponse to the motion was filed with the Supreme Court. After being served with the motion,the Greenwald firm wrote to the County to advise it that it did not represent Goldman in thiscase, and that it "represented her on an estate matter several years ago, but that matter iscomplete." The Greenwald firm noted that it tried contacting Goldman via phone numbers that ithad on file, but those numbers were disconnected or out of service. The County forwarded thisletter to the Supreme Court. The court denied the County's motion and, sua sponte, dismissed theproceeding, deeming the proceeding to have been a nullity because the record owners of theproperty were deceased at the time of the commencement of the proceeding.

My colleagues in the majority begin with the principle that the dead cannot be sued(see majority op at 1116, citing Marte v Graber, 58AD3d 1, 3 [2008]). I have no dispute with this proposition. It is axiomatic that a party maynot "commence a legal action or proceeding against a dead person" (US Bank N.A. v Cadeumag, 147 AD3d881, 881 [2017]; see Gorbaty vBrodsky, 142 AD3d 584, 585 [2016]; Krysa v Estate of Qyra, 136 AD3d 760 [2016]). However,respectfully, this principle simply does not apply here, where no individual person, dead or alive,is being sued. The land is what has been sued.

In other words, this tax lien foreclosure proceeding is not against the Dixons or anyother party individually, but rather, is an in rem proceeding brought against the subject propertyitself (see RPTL 1120; CPLR 214 [2]; Reichert v Stilwell, 172 NY 83, 88-89[1902]; Matter of Van Dorn, 225 AD2d 969, 970 [1996]; Rimelon DC, LLC vRobinson, 2010 WL 4626050, 2010 DC Super LEXIS 4, *20-21 [DC Super Ct, Oct. 20,2010, No. 2008 CA 529 L (RP)]; Siegel, NY Prac § 103 at 218-219 [6th ed 2018]).The petition does not seek a deficiency judgment against the property owners (see HSBC Bank USA [*9]v Ungar Family Realty Corp., 111 AD3d 673, 673-674[2013]; cf. American Airlines Fed.Credit Union v Costello, 161 AD3d 819, 819-820 [2018]).

The majority's citation to Matter ofCounty of Orange (Al Turi Landfill, Inc.) (75 AD3d 224, 232 [2010]) is, in my view,misplaced. The thoughtful summary of tax foreclosure procedure contained in that case simplydoes not state that a tax foreclosure proceeding is "commenced against the record owners"(majority op at 1117). Rather, what this Court in Al Turi observed is that there are several methods ofcollecting delinquent taxes. One method, not invoked here, is to hold the owners personallyliable and levy on their personal property (see Matter of County of Orange [Al Turi Landfill,Inc.], 75 AD3d at 232, citing RPTL 904 [4] and 926 [2]). Surely, resort to that method wouldrequire in personam jurisdiction. Another means of collection is, after filing a list of delinquenttaxes with the county clerk, to file a petition in foreclosure (see Matter of County of Orange[Al Turi Landfill, Inc.], 75 AD3d at 232, citing, inter alia, RPTL 1123 [1] and 1122 [8]).That a foreclosure proceeding is an in rem action, only against the land, is made clear in AlTuri by this Court's repeated references to the ability of the enforcing officer to withdraw"the parcel" from tax foreclosure—the parcel, not the individuals or entities that own theparcel (Matter of County of Orange [Al Turi Landfill, Inc.], 75 AD3d at 232-233).

Nor does NYCTL 2004-A Trust vArcher (131 AD3d 1213 [2015]) provide, in my view, support for the position taken bythe majority. True, that case was a tax foreclosure case. But the issue was not whether there wasjurisdiction to foreclose on the realty. The dispute was over who was entitled to the surplusproceeds from the sale of the foreclosed property, a matter of indifference to the taxing authority,and a matter involving a dispute between living persons for which personal jurisdiction wasrequired.

The other appellate authorities cited by the majority are cases involving actions at law inwhich personal jurisdiction over all parties is essential. Where personal jurisdiction is required, itis obtained by service on the person in the state or service on the person outside the state wherethere is constitutionally and statutorily sufficient nexus between the person and the state in whichthe action is commenced (see CPLR 301, 302). In contrast, here, jurisdiction in a taxforeclosure proceeding is dependent upon the presence of the real property in the state; whileconstitutionally adequate notice to persons interested in the property must be given, that is aconcept of due process, not a concept of judicial jurisdiction. I respectfully submit that mycolleagues have conflated these two distinct principles.

My colleagues perceive that my view is that "in rem proceedings may be properlycommenced and maintained against individuals who are known to be deceased" (majority op at 1118). That, I suggest respectfully, reflects a misunderstanding of both my position and theconcept of in rem jurisdiction. In rem proceedings are not "commenced and maintained againstindividuals" (id. at 1118), whether living or deceased. It is fundamental to an understanding of jurisdictionalconcepts that in rem jurisdiction is jurisdiction over a res—a thing (see Siegel, NYPrac § 101 at 215). Yes, notice of the case must be given in accordance with dueprocess requirements, but as long as the plaintiff is only seeking to affect the interests in the res,jurisdiction over the res provides all the jurisdiction that is required (see id.).

As for notice, Real Property Tax Law § 1125 provides that personal notice ofthe commencement of a tax lien foreclosure proceeding must be mailed, by certified and ordinaryfirst class mail, to "each owner and any other person whose right, title, or interest was a matter ofpublic record as of the date the list of delinquent taxes was filed . . . whose nameand address are reasonably ascertainable from the public record, including the records in theoffices of the surrogate of the county" (RPTL 1125 [1] [a]; see RPTL 1125 [1] [b] [i]).Moreover, where an owner of real property moves and does not give a new address to thecollector of real property taxes, "due process requires taxing authorities to take reasonable stepsto track down the missing taxpayer before seizing and selling his or her property" (Mac Naughton v Warren County, 20NY3d 252, 255 [2012]; see Jones v Flowers, 547 US 220 [2006]; Kennedy vMossafa, 100 NY2d 1 [2003]). These are requirements of service imposed in themodern era to address concerns of due process. These are not matters which go to the jurisdictionof the court to entertain the action on its merits. As the Restatement (Second) of Conflict [*10]of Laws explains: "Sometimes the purpose of an action is not toimpose a personal liability or obligation upon anyone but to affect the interests of all persons in athing. If so, the state may render through its courts a valid judgment where it has jurisdiction overthe thing even though it may not have personal jurisdiction over the persons whose interests areaffected. In such a case the state is said to have jurisdiction in rem and the proceeding is said tobe a proceeding in rem. One example is a judgment rendered by a court of admiralty affecting theinterests of all persons in a vessel which is subject to the jurisdiction of the state. Anotherexample is a statutory proceeding brought to register title to certain land and which is designed toaffect the interests of all persons in the land. A third example is a statutory proceeding for theforfeiture to the government and the extinguishment of the interests of all persons in a thing usedin violation of the revenue or other laws" (Restatement [Second] of Conflict of Laws,Introductory Note).

Because a proceeding to foreclose a tax lien is against the property, it was long perceived thatservice upon the property (as by a posting of notice) was sufficient "notice to all those who haveany interest in the thing, and is reasonable because it is necessary, and because it is the part ofcommon prudence for all those who have any interest in it, to guard that interest by persons whoare in a situation to protect it" (The Mary, 9 Cranch [13 US] 126, 144 [1815, Marshall,Ch. J.]). Unlike cases in which a personal judgment is sought where service of process isnecessary to acquire jurisdiction, in rem jurisdiction depends, not on service, but on the presenceof the property in the state (see Tyler v Judges of Ct of Registration, 175 Mass 71, 77, 55NE 812, 815 [1900]). While it has always been agreed that notice need be given to personshaving an interest in the property, it was long thought that notice of the time and place of thecourt hearing through either a posting at the property or by publication was sufficient in taxforeclosure proceedings. The theory was that the form of notice used should not impede theefficient collection of taxes and, further, because property owners are aware that they are subjectto annual taxation, they should be assumed to have knowledge that the government will proceedagainst their property according to the prescribed statutory method should they becomedelinquent in the payment of taxes (see Note, Requirements of Notice in In RemProceedings, 70 Harv L Rev 1257, 1266-1267 [1957]). States were permitted to indulge inthe presumption that one who has left tangible property in the state either has abandoned it, inwhich case proceedings against the property take nothing away, or that the owner has left acaretaker under a duty to alert the owner that the property is in jeopardy (see Mullane vCentral Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 US 306, 316 [1950]).

In Mullane, the United States Supreme Court ruled that notice by publication wasconstitutionally inadequate as to persons with interests in the property whose identities andaddresses are known. Critically, though, for the purposes of this case, the Court also ruled thatdue process did not require personal notice to those whose interests are unknown and whoselocation is unknown, even if such persons could be located through the exercise of due diligence:"This Court has not hesitated to approve of resort to publication as a customary substitute inanother class of cases where it is not reasonably possible or practicable to give more adequatewarning. Thus it has been recognized that, in the case of persons missing or unknown,employment of an indirect and even a probably futile means of notification is all that thesituation permits and creates no constitutional bar to a final decree foreclosing their rights. Thosebeneficiaries represented by appellant whose interests or whereabouts could not with duediligence be ascertained come clearly within this category. As to them the statutory notice issufficient. However great the odds that publication will never reach the eyes of such unknownparties, it is not in the typical case much more likely to fail than any of the choices open tolegislators endeavoring to prescribe the best notice practicable. Nor do we consider itunreasonable for the State to dispense with more certain notice to those beneficiaries whoseinterests are either conjectural or future or, although they could be discovered upon investigation,do not in due course of business come to knowledge of the common trustee. Whatever searchesmight be required in another situation under ordinary standards of diligence, in view of thecharacter of the proceedings and the nature of the interests here involved we think themunnecessary. We recognize the practical difficulties and costs that would be attendant on frequentinvestigations into the status of great numbers of beneficiaries, many of whose interests in thecommon fund are so remote as to be ephemeral; and we have no doubt that such impracticableand extended searches are not required in the name of due process. The expense of keepinginformed from day to day of substitutions among even current income beneficiaries andpresumptive [*11]remaindermen, to say nothing of the far greaternumber of contingent beneficiaries, would impose a severe burden on the plan, and would likelydissipate its advantages. These are practical matters in which we should be reluctant to disturbthe judgment of the state authorities" (id. at 317-318 [citations omitted]).

These important constitutional principles focus on the notice to be given to parties who mayhave an interest in the action. These principles have nothing to do with the jurisdiction of thecourt to hear the case, which is derived from the location of the real property in the state (seeRestatement [Second] of Conflict of Laws § 59). Nor do these principles haveanything to do with the concept of personal jurisdiction, as the court's authority over property inthe state is the basis for the court's jurisdiction; the court may proceed, if notice is given tointerested persons, even though no personal jurisdiction over them is obtained. The concept ofdue process precludes the state from exercising its jurisdiction to affect interests in propertyunless a reasonable method is employed to give notice to persons whose interest in the propertymay be affected and unless those persons are given a reasonable opportunity to be heard(see Restatement [Second] of Conflict of Laws § 57).

Mullane was applied to a tax lien foreclose case in Covey v Town of Somers(351 US 141 [1956]), where notice was given to an incompetent taxpayer by mail, by posting anotice at the post office, and by publication in two local newspapers (see id. at 144). TheUnited States Supreme Court held that the Town failed to provide due process where thetaxpayer was known by the Town officials to be without mental capacity to handle her ownaffairs and known to be unable to understand the meaning of any notices served upon her (seeid. at 146-147).

More recently, in Jones v Flowers (547 US 220 [2006]), the United States SupremeCourt held that while due process does not require that a property owner receive actual noticebefore the government can take his property, and notice is constitutionally sufficient when it isreasonably calculated to reach its intended recipient when sent, due process requires that thegovernment do more when it becomes aware that its attempt at notice has gone awry (seeid. at 226-234 ). In Jones, the Court held that notice of an impending tax sale of aresidence was constitutionally inadequate where the notice, sent by certified mail, was returnedby the post office "unclaimed" (id. at 224 [internal quotation marks omitted]). The Courtstated that there were several reasonable steps the State of Arkansas could have taken after itlearned that its notice went unclaimed: it could have resent the letter by regular mail (in this way,an occupant of the property could open it without needing to sign for it); it could have posted thenotice at the property; or it could have addressed the envelope containing the notice to anyoccupant of the property (see id. at 234-238).

There is nothing in any of these cases that even remotely suggests that the taxing authority isrequired to undertake an investigation to ascertain the whereabouts of missing taxpayers or toidentify and locate the relatives of deceased or absent taxpayers, such as by conducting anInternet search or searching the public records of all of the counties or other places where anabsent, missing, or deceased taxpayer may have lived (see id. at 235-236; MacNaughton v Warren County, 20 NY3d at 258; Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d at 10).To the contrary, where the true owner of the property is not apparent from the public record, a taxlien foreclosure sale is not rendered invalid by virtue of the fact that the true owner was nevergiven personal notice of the proceeding, or named as a respondent therein (see CongregationYetev Lev D'Satmar v County of Sullivan, 59 NY2d 418, 421, 425-427 [1983] [holding thatthe Appellate Division erroneously concluded that a tax lien foreclosure proceeding wasdefective by virtue of the fact that the County failed to give personal notice of the tax sale to theplaintiff, whom the Appellate Division found to have acquired ownership of the property at issueby adverse possession]; Matter of Cityof Hudson, 114 AD3d 1106, 1107 [2014] [holding that although a deed conveying theproperty at issue from a religious corporation to Godfrey Forbes was invalid pursuant toReligious Corporations Law § 12, a subsequent deed resulting from a tax lienforeclosure proceeding was not invalid on the ground that the religious corporation, the actualowner of the property, was not given personal notice of the tax lien foreclosure proceeding]; Maple Tree Homes, Inc. v County ofSullivan, 17 AD3d 965, 965-967 [2005] [holding that the County was not required togive notice of a tax lien foreclosure proceeding to the true owner of property that had beenpurportedly conveyed by a deed which ultimately proved to have been fraudulentlyexecuted]).

[*12] As observed previously, RealProperty Tax Law § 1125 provides that personal notice of the commencement of atax lien foreclosure proceeding must be mailed, by certified and ordinary first class mail, to "eachowner and any other person whose right, title, or interest was a matter of public record as of thedate the list of delinquent taxes was filed . . . whose name and address arereasonably ascertainable from the public record, including the records in the offices of thesurrogate of the county" (RPTL 1125 [1] [a]; see RPTL 1125 [1] [b] [i]). There is noassertion that this statute offends the constitution. Nevertheless, my colleagues in the majority areinsisting, without any positive authority, that the enforcing taxing jurisdiction must undertake aninvestigation and, apparently, commence a separate proceeding to secure the appointment of anestate representative. Ironically, the majority posits that this is not a case "where the record ownerno longer lives at the address on file" (majority op at 1122), suggesting that if the owner had moved perhaps they would find jurisdiction to be present.But, in this case, the owners most certainly can be said to have moved, albeit in a morepermanent sense than that phrase would usually connote.

Here, there is no assertion that the taxing authority knew, or even that it should have known,that the property owners were deceased at the time the proceeding was brought. Notice was givenby both certified and regular mail directed to the address in the Town's records. When thecertified mailing was returned due to the forwarding time having expired, rather than doingnothing (as is what happened in Jones), the County promptly resent the papers, bycertified and regular mail, to the new address that was set forth on the returned certified mailing.The regular mail was not returned, and the certified mailing was signed for. The County alsoposted notice on the front door of the premises. These measures amply meet the constitutionalrequirement of reasonableness.

The answer purportedly filed by an attorney on behalf of Goldman, the niece of the deceasedtaxpayers, was a nullity because Goldman lacked standing to represent their interests. That said,the answer did provide the County with notice that the taxpayers were deceased, that they weresurvived by a niece, and that the niece was in the process of commencing a proceeding for theadministration of their estates. The County then acted reasonably by serving a copy of its motionfor a judgment of foreclosure upon the attorney who had appeared for the niece. It would bereasonable for the County to rely on the representation that the niece was taking charge of theestate matters and wholly unreasonable to expect, or require, the County to initiate an estateproceeding where a relative said she was going to do so.

The Supreme Court, and my colleagues in the majority, require the County, in order toenforce its right to collect the unpaid taxes from the property, to seek the appointment of anadministrator for the estates of the Dixons. In my view, it would be unduly burdensome torequire taxing authorities, upon becoming aware that the property owner of record is deceased, tocommence a proceeding in the Surrogate's Court for the appointment of an administratorpursuant to SCPA 1002 (see Rimelon DC, LLC v Robinson, 2010 WL 4626050, 2010DC Super LEXIS 4, *26-30 [DC Super Ct, Oct. 20, 2010, No. 2008 CA 529 L(RP)]), particularlywhere the decedents' relative represented that she intended to do so.

SCPA 1002 provides that a person interested in the estate of an intestate, a publicadministrator, the chief fiscal officer of the county, or a person interested in an action brought inwhich the intestate would be a proper party may present a petition to the Surrogate's Court for adecree granting letters of administration to him or herself or to another person upon the estate ofthe intestate. Here, if the County's chief fiscal officer were to be appointed the administrator ofthe Dixons' estate, that appears to impose a fiduciary duty upon her in favor of the estatebeneficiaries that would be in conflict with her interest in enforcing the tax lien on behalf of theCounty.

In Matter of Zaharia (243 AD2d 926 [1997]), the decedent died owningapproximately 80 parcels of real property located within Sullivan County, all of which becametax delinquent during his lifetime or within the years since he died (see id. at 926). Due tothe renunciation of the executor named in the decedent's will and the failure of any interestedparty to file a petition for appointment as fiduciary, the Surrogate's Court appointed Daniel L.Briggs, the Treasurer and chief fiscal officer of Sullivan County, as public administrator of thedecedent's estate (see id.). Briggs, in turn, moved to be relieved of his appointment basedupon an alleged conflict of interest existing by virtue of his status as County Treasurer (seeid.). The Appellate Division, Third Department, held that it was [*13]appropriate for the Surrogate's Court to deny Briggs's motion to berelieved in view of the fact that the court, mindful of the outstanding tax liabilities attached to theparcels comprising the estate, imposed a prohibition on the sale, foreclosure, or encumbrance ofsuch property as a condition of its order of appointment (see id. at 927). If the chief fiscalofficer of the County here were to similarly be precluded from foreclosing on the tax lien byvirtue of her appointment as the administrator of the Dixons' estates, it would be highlyprejudicial to the County. In short, the County's commencement of an estate proceeding couldresult in the imposition of a stay on its ability to prosecute its foreclosure proceeding, whichwould defeat the very object for which the County would have filed the estate proceeding.Moreover, implicit in the imposition in Zaharia of a prohibition against the sale,foreclosure, or encumbrance of the tax-deficient properties at issue is the recognition that, absentsuch a prohibition, the County was free to prosecute its lien enforcement procedures, somethingthat the Supreme Court and the majority hold is not permissible.

Further, even putting aside the issue of conflict of interest, the County's chief fiscal officer, ifappointed estate administrator, would be obligated to undertake a considerable number ofdifficult and time-consuming tasks, including, but not limited to: searching for and marshalingassets; identifying, validating, and paying claims; identifying and authenticating the identity ofrelatives who have a beneficial interest in the estate; and preparing accountings and other courtfilings.

I submit that if heirs of a deceased property owner wish to contest a tax lien foreclosure, it isincumbent upon them to either commence a proceeding in the Surrogate's Court for theappointment of a personal representative, or to file a declaration of interest pursuant to RealProperty Tax Law § 1126, which would entitle them to copies of all noticesrequired in tax lien foreclosure proceedings. Here, despite receiving notice of the foreclosureproceeding and asserting in her answer that she intended to commence a proceeding for theappointment of an administrator for the estates of the Dixons, Goldman, the decedents' niece,failed to do so, and did not submit any opposition to the County's motion for summary judgmenton the petition and to strike her answer. Thus, despite due mailing of the papers to the address forthe owners on the public record, the due mailing of the papers to the address given by the niece,and despite due posting of notice at the subject property itself, no one came forward to claim aninterest in this property. The County's methods of service were reasonable; there is norequirement that the court obtain subject matter jurisdiction over any heirs.

Even assuming that Goldman's answer was viable in spite of the fact that it was purportedlyinterposed on behalf of the deceased record owners of the property, for the foregoing reasons, theCounty demonstrated that the only defense asserted in the answer was without merit. Since theCounty otherwise established its entitlement to summary judgment, and since no opposition tothe motion was filed, the Supreme Court should have granted it.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent and vote to reverse the order appealed from.


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