| Williams v New York City Tr. Auth. |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 02747 [171 AD3d 990] |
| April 10, 2019 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| Ira C. Williams, Jr., Respondent-Appellant, v NewYork City Transit Authority et al., Appellants-Respondents. |
James B. Henly, Brooklyn, NY (Robert K. Drinan of counsel; Ryan Persad on the brief), forappellants-respondents.
Irene Donna Thomas, New York, NY, for respondent-appellant.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for employment discrimination on the basis ofrace and age in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law§ 290 et seq.) and the New York City Human Rights Law (AdministrativeCode of City of NY § 8-107), the defendants appeal, and the plaintiff cross-appeals,from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Lara J. Genovesi, J.), dated January 26,2017. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied that branch of the defendants' motion whichwas pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) to dismiss the causes of action alleging violations of the NewYork City Human Rights Law. The order, insofar as cross-appealed from, granted that branch ofthe defendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) to dismiss the causes of actionalleging violations of the New York State Human Rights Law.
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, and that branch of thedefendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) to dismiss the causes of actionalleging violations of the New York City Human Rights Law is granted; and it is further,
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as cross-appealed from; and it is further,
Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendants.
The plaintiff is an employee of the defendant New York City Transit Authority (hereinafterNYCTA). In 2009 to 2010, the plaintiff sought a job promotion. The plaintiff alleges, inter alia,that he was initially informed by a supervisor that he would be awarded the promotion, but that,after a second round of interviews, another NYCTA superior, the defendant Sally Librera, thenrecommended a different candidate for the position. The plaintiff alleges that the candidate whowas selected lacked the plaintiff's qualifications and experience. The plaintiff further alleges thathe was discriminated against based on his race (African-American) and age (age 59 at therelevant time). The plaintiff ultimately was awarded the promotion following a third series ofinterviews and a 10-month delay.
In March 2010, the plaintiff commenced an action against the defendants in the United StatesDistrict Court for the Eastern District of New York. In that action, the plaintiff allegeddiscrimination in employment based on race and age, in violation of title VII of the Civil RightsAct of 1964 (42 USC, ch 21, § 2000e et seq. [hereinafter title VII]) and theAge Discrimination in Employment Act (29 USC, ch 14, § 621 et seq.[hereinafter ADEA]). The plaintiff also asserted causes of action pursuant to the New York StateHuman Rights Law (Executive Law § 290 et seq. [hereinafter NYSHRL])and pursuant to the New York City Human Rights Law (Administrative Code of City of NY§ 8-107 [hereinafter NYCHRL]). The District Court granted the defendants' motionfor summary judgment dismissing the federal causes of action, and declined to exercisesupplemental jurisdiction over the NYSHRL and NYCHRL causes of action (see Williams vNew York City Tr. Auth., 2014 WL 11474810, 2014 US Dist LEXIS 186940 [ED NY, Aug.28, 2014, No. 10-cv-882 (ENV) (CLP)]). That order was subsequently affirmed by the UnitedStates Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (see Williams v New York City Tr. Auth.,620 Fed Appx 63 [2d Cir 2015]).
In the instant action, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants engaged in discriminatoryactions in violation of the NYSHRL and NYCHRL.
We agree with the Supreme Court's determination that, based on the prior federaldetermination, the plaintiff is collaterally estopped from asserting the NYSHRL causes of action.The doctrine of collateral estoppel "precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action orproceeding an issue clearly raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party orthose in privity, whether or not the tribunals or causes of action are the same" (Ryan v NewYork Tel. Co., 62 NY2d 494, 500 [1984]). The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies when:" '(1) the issues in both proceedings are identical, (2) the issue in the prior proceedingwas actually litigated and decided, (3) there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the priorproceeding, and (4) the issue previously litigated was necessary to support a valid and finaljudgment on the merits' " (Conason v Megan Holding, LLC, 25 NY3d 1, 17 [2015], quotingAlamo v McDaniel, 44 AD3d149, 153 [2007]). "Where a federal court declines to exercise jurisdiction over a plaintiff'sstate law claims, collateral estoppel may still bar those claims provided that the federal courtdecided issues identical to those raised by the plaintiff's state claims" (Milione v City Univ. of N.Y., 153AD3d 807, 808-809 [2017]; seeKarimian v Time Equities, Inc., 164 AD3d 486, 488 [2018]; Clifford v County of Rockland, 140AD3d 1108, 1110 [2016]).
Here, the factual determinations made by the District Court with respect to the causes ofaction alleging discrimination in violation of title VII and the ADEA were determinative of thecause of action asserted in this action pursuant to the NYSHRL (see Milione v City Univ. ofN.Y., 153 AD3d at 809; Peterkin vEpiscopal Social Servs. of N.Y., Inc., 24 AD3d 306, 307-308 [2005]; see also Singh v Covenant Aviation Sec.,LLC, 131 AD3d 1158, 1159-1160 [2015]). Further, the plaintiff was afforded a full andfair opportunity to litigate those issues in the federal action. Accordingly, we agree with theSupreme Court's determination directing dismissal of the NYSHRL causes of action (seeMilione v City Univ. of N.Y., 153 AD3d at 809; Peterkin v Episcopal Social Servs. ofN.Y., Inc., 24 AD3d at 307-308).
However, we disagree with the Supreme Court's determination that the District Courtdetermination lacks preclusive effect with respect to the NYCHRL causes of action.Administrative Code of the City of New York § 8-107 (1) (a) (2) and (3) provide, asrelevant: "It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice . . . [f]or an employer or anemployee or agent thereof, because of the actual or perceived age, race, creed, color, nationalorigin, gender, disability, marital status, partnership status, . . . sexual orientation. . . or alienage or citizenship status of any person, . . . [t]o refuse tohire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such person; or . . . [t]odiscriminate against such person in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges ofemployment."
The NYCHRL is construed "broadly in favor of discrimination plaintiffs, to the extent thatsuch a construction is reasonably possible" (Albunio v City of New York, 16 NY3d 472, 477-478 [2011]; see Bennett v Health Mgt. Sys., Inc., 92AD3d 29, 34 [2011]). Thus, where an adverse employment action is shown to be "motivatedby racial or ethnic animus, even in part, the defendant may be held liable" under the NYCHRL(Singh v Covenant Aviation Sec., LLC, 131 AD3d at 1161; see Nelson v HSBC Bank USA, 87AD3d 995, 999 [2011]). The NYCHRL has been interpreted as requiring "that unlawfuldiscrimination play 'no role' in an employment decision" (Singh v Covenant Aviation Sec.,LLC, 131 AD3d at 1161, quoting Bennett v Health Mgt. Sys., Inc., 92 AD3d at 40;see Nelson v HSBC Bank USA, 87 AD3d at 999).
Here, the District Court determined that the defendants had legitimate, nondiscriminatoryreasons for their employment actions; that the defendants were not motivated by retaliatoryanimus; that the reasons for the defendants' employment actions were not a pretext fordiscrimination; and that the plaintiff was not treated differently from other employees. Thus,even under the broader standard of the NYCHRL, those determinations nonetheless requiredismissal of the plaintiff's causes of action (see Milione v City Univ. of N.Y., 153 AD3dat 809; Simmons-Grant v QuinnEmanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, 116 AD3d 134, 139 [2014]). Accordingly, theSupreme Court also should have granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was todismiss the causes of action alleging violations of the NYCHRL. Scheinkman, P.J., Rivera,Hinds-Radix and Barros, JJ., concur.