| Matter of R.B. v New York State Off. of Children & FamilyServs. |
| 2021 NY Slip Op 06063 [199 AD3d 429] |
| November 4, 2021 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of R.B. et al., Petitioners, v New YorkState Office of Children and Family Services et al., Respondents. |
Andrew Citron, New York, for petitioners.
Letitia James, Attorney General, New York (Ari J. Savitzky of counsel), for New York StateOffice of Children and Family Services and another, respondents.
Georgia M. Pestana, Corporation Counsel, New York (Rebecca L. Visgaitis of counsel), forNew York City Administration for Children's Services, respondent.
Determination of respondent New York State Office of Children and Family Services(OCFS), dated November 13, 2019, which, after a hearing, denied petitioners' request to amendas unfounded an indicated report finding abuse of their teenage daughter by the father andmaltreatment by both parents, unanimously confirmed, the petition denied, and this proceedingbrought pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by amended order of SupremeCourt, New York County [Eileen A. Rakower, J.], entered August 20, 2020) dismissed, withoutcosts.
The determination that petitioner father committed sexual abuse and that both father andmother provided inadequate guardianship is supported by substantial evidence in the record(CPLR 7803 [4]; 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d176, 179-182 [1978]). The investigative notes of respondent New York City Administration forChildren's Services (ACS), the ACS caseworker's testimony, and medical records from thesubject child's pediatrician constituted credible evidence of sexual abuse, as shown by thedetailed descriptions by the child of the father touching her intimate areas, both over and underher clothing (see Matter of Riel v Stateof N.Y. Off. of Children & Family Servs., 175 AD3d 1166, 1167 [1st Dept 2019],quoting Matter of Borenstein v New York City Employees' Retirement Sys., 88 NY2d756, 760 [1996]; Social Services Law § 371 [4-b] [iii]; 18 NYCRR 432.1 [a] [3];see also Penal Law §§ 130.00 [3]; 130.52 [1]; 130.55). Theadjournment in contemplation of dismissal in Family Court, in related proceedings accusing thefather of abuse, does not "create a presumption that there is a lack of a fair preponderance of theevidence to prove that a child has been abused or maltreated" (18 NYCRR 434.10 [f]; see e.g. Matter of Stephen FF. vJohnson, 23 AD3d 977, 978 [3d Dept 2005]).
There is also credible evidence that the father failed to "exercise a minimum degree of care"(Social Services Law § 371 [4-a] [i]), impairing the subject child's emotionalcondition by causing her to become depressed and have suicidal thoughts (18 NYCRR 432.1 [b][1] [ii]). Similarly, there is credible evidence that the mother was told of the alleged abuse, buturged the child to listen to family and community members who told her to recant, and themother waited six weeks to secure a mental health evaluation and treatment for the child, despitehaving agreed to do so within 24 hours, or as soon as possible (Social Services Law§ 371 [4-a] [i]; 18 NYCRR 432.1 [b] [1] [ii]).
Given petitioners' occupations in the education field and their denials of any wrongdoing,their behavior is "relevant and reasonably related to" childcare work, adoption, or the provisionof foster care (Social Services Law § 422 [8] [a] [ii]).
Contrary to petitioners' contention, the medical records were properly certified as a "record ofany condition, act, transaction, occurrence or event relating to a child in a child abuse [case]. . . made in the regular [*2]course of business" at ornear the time of the event (18 NYCRR 434.10 [c]).
Nor was the hearsay evidence proffered by ACS inadequate, simply because petitionerscontend it was "seriously controverted" by their own testimony, and documents showing that thesubject child recanted, and, weeks later, began accusing one of her medical providers ofinappropriate behavior.
"It is well-settled that hearsay is admissible in administrative proceedings, that it may be thebasis for an administrative determination and—if sufficiently relevant andprobative—may constitute substantial evidence alone" (Matter of Rosa v New York City Hous.Auth., Straus Houses, 160 AD3d 499, 500 [1st Dept 2018]). This is true "even ifcontradicted by live testimony on credibility grounds" (Matter of Haug v State Univ. of N.Y. at Potsdam, 32 NY3d 1044,1046 [2018]).
OCFS was not required to credit the child's recantation, since "it is accepted that such areaction is common among abused children" (Matter of Dayannie I.M. [Roger I.M.], 138 AD3d 747, 749 [2dDept 2016]; see Matter of N. & G. Children, 176 AD2d 504, 505 [1st Dept 1991]).Indeed, the "repetition of phrasing" used by the subject child and her younger sister duringinterviews conducted by ACS showed signs of coaching (see Matter of Kimberly CC. v Gerry CC., 86 AD3d 728, 730 [3dDept 2011]). Moreover, the child's initial description of abuse was sufficiently detailed toconstitute substantial evidence (compareMatter of Veronica C. v Carrión, 55 AD3d 411, 412 [1st Dept 2008]).
Finally, we reject the contention that petitioners were deprived of their right to due processbecause their request to have the subject child testify was denied. They were allowed to presentevidence in their favor that included the child's denials and alternative narratives given to ACS(see 18 NYCRR 434.8 [d]; see also Scott v Kelly, 962 F2d 145, 147 [2d Cir1992]). We find no grounds to require the subject child's testimony, given the admissibility of herprevious statements and the policy considerations of avoiding re-traumatization and coaching byfamily members (see Matter of CharlotteMM. v Commissioner of Children & Family Servs., 159 AD3d 1081, 1082-1083[3d Dept 2018]; 18 NYCRR 434.10 [d]). Concur—Gische, J.P., Mazzarelli, Shulman, Pitt,Higgitt, JJ.