People v Dennis
2022 NY Slip Op 04054 [206 AD3d 1369]
June 23, 2022
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, August 3, 2022


[*1]
 The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Morris Dennis, Appellant.

Rural Law Center of New York, Castleton (Kristin A. Bluvas of counsel), for appellant.

Gary M. Pasqua, District Attorney, Canton (Matthew L. Peabody of counsel), forrespondent.

Egan Jr., J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of St. Lawrence County (Richards,J.), rendered September 23, 2019, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime ofattempted disseminating indecent material to minors in the first degree.

In June 2018, defendant was charged in a felony complaint with attempted disseminatingindecent material to minors in the first degree. Thereafter, in September 2018, defendant's thencounsel signed a waiver indicating that defendant was waiving his speedy trial rights under CPL30.30. The waiver provided, in relevant part, that if defendant or counsel wished to rescind thewaiver, the People would have "10 business days to [i]ndict" defendant (emphasis omitted).Counsel revoked the waiver in December 2018, and defendant was indicted and charged with onecount of attempted disseminating indecent material to minors in the first degree in February2019.

Following revocation of the waiver, a dispute arose as to the construction to be accorded tothe phrase "10 business days to [i]ndict," prompting newly-appointed defense counsel to move todismiss the indictment upon speedy trial grounds. County Court denied that motion and, afternew counsel again was appointed, defendant pleaded guilty to the charged crime with theunderstanding that County Court would sentence him as a second felony offender to a prisonterm of 21 to 42 months. The plea agreement also required defendant to waive his right to appeal.County Court imposed the contemplated sentence, and this appeal ensued.

We affirm. Initially, we reject defendant's claim that the waiver of the right to appeal isinvalid. County Court explained that the waiver of the right to appeal was separate and distinctfrom the trial-related rights that defendant was forfeiting by pleading guilty and expresslydelineated those rights that would survive the appeal waiver (see People v Champion-Barse, 201 AD3d 1255, 1255 [2022]; People v Christy, 200 AD3d 1322,1323 [2021]). Additionally, defendant executed a written waiver of appeal after conferring withcounsel and, in response to County Court's inquiries, defendant assured the court that he had readthe waiver, understood its contents and had no questions relative thereto (see People v Hall, 204 AD3d1228, 1228 [2022]; People vRivera, 201 AD3d 1132, 1133 [2022]). Under these circumstances, and as we otherwisediscern no infirmities in the combined oral and written waiver (compare People v Thomas, 34 NY3d545, 562-563 [2019]), we find that defendant's waiver of the right to appeal was knowing,intelligent and voluntary. In light of the valid appeal waiver, defendant's challenge to theperceived severity of his sentence is precluded (see People v Whitton, 201 AD3d 1259, 1260 [2022]; People vChristy, 200 AD3d at 1323).

Defendant's claim that he was denied his statutory right to a speedy trial is precluded by hisvalid appeal waiver (see People v Rivera, 201 AD3d at 1133-1134; People vLara-Medina, 195 [*2]AD3d 542, 542 [2021], lvdenied 37 NY3d 993 [2021]; Peoplev Votaw, 190 AD3d 1162, 1164 [2021], lv denied 36 NY3d 1101 [2021]) and, inany event, was forfeited by his guilty plea (see People v Forbes, 203 AD3d 949, 949 [2022], lv denied 38 NY3d 1032 [2022]; People v Lara-Medina, 195 AD3d at 542). Contrary to defendant'sassertion, the enactment of CPL 30.30 (6), which "provides that a statutory speedy trial claimshall be reviewable upon an appeal from an ensuing judgment of conviction notwithstanding thefact that such judgment was entered upon a plea of guilty" (People v George, 199 AD3d 831, 832 [2021] [internal quotationmarks and brackets omitted], lv denied 38 NY3d 927 [2022]), does not alter this result.The cited provision did not become effective until January 1, 2020, i.e., after defendant wassentenced in September 2019, and courts have consistently held that the statutory amendmentdoes not apply retroactively (see People v Forbes, 203 AD3d at 949; People vGeorge, 199 AD3d at 832; People v Lara-Medina, 195 AD3d at 542; People v Duggins, 192 AD3d 191,195 [2021], lv denied 36 NY3d 1096 [2021]). Moreover, although the amendment"unequivocally directs that appellate review of a [CPL] 30.30 claim shall no longer be forfeitedby a guilty plea, . . . neither that phrase, nor any other language in the statute,precludes a voluntary waiver" (People vPerson, 184 AD3d 447, 448 [2020], lv denied 35 NY3d 1069 [2020]). Hence,defendant's statutory speedy trial claim is precluded by his valid appeal waiver (see People vVotaw, 190 AD3d at 1164). Defendant's remaining arguments, to the extent not specificallyaddressed, have been examined and found to be lacking in merit.

Garry, P.J., Lynch, Reynolds Fitzgerald and McShan, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgmentis affirmed.


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