People v Jackson
2022 NY Slip Op 04257 [207 AD3d 1080] [207 AD3d 1080]
July 1, 2022
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, August 31, 2022


[*1]
 The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Torrence Jackson, Appellant.

Frank H. Hiscock Legal Aid Society, Syracuse (Philip Rothschild of counsel), fordefendant-appellant.

William J. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney, Syracuse (Kenneth H. Tyler, Jr., ofcounsel), forrespondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County (Gordon J. Cuffy,A.J.),rendered August 12, 2020. The judgment convicted defendant upon his plea of guilty ofcriminalpossession of a weapon in the second degree (two counts), criminal possession of acontrolledsubstance in the third degree (two counts) and criminally using drug paraphernalia in theseconddegree (two counts).

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimouslyaffirmed.

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of,interalia, two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law§ 265.03 [3]), defendant contends that Supreme Court erred in denying hismotionto dismiss the indictment on statutory speedy trial grounds (see CPL 30.30). Werejectthat contention.

Initially, we note that, as of January 1, 2020 (see L 2019, ch 59,§ 1, partKKK, § 1), "[a]n order finally denying a motion to dismiss pursuant to[CPL 30.30(1)] shall be reviewable upon an appeal from an ensuing judgment of convictionnotwithstandingthe fact that such judgment is entered upon a plea of guilty" (CPL 30.30 [6]; cf.People vO'Brien, 56 NY2d 1009, 1010 [1982]; People v Butler, 170 AD3d 1496, 1496-1497 [4th Dept2019]).Here, defendant's challenge to the denial of his statutory speedy trial motion isreviewable onappeal inasmuch as the judgment on appeal was rendered after the effective date of thatstatute(cf. People v George, 199AD3d831, 832 [2d Dept 2021], lv denied 38 NY3d 927 [2022]; People v Lara-Medina, 195AD3d542, 542 [1st Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 993 [2021]; People v Duggins, 192 AD3d191,194-195 [3d Dept 2021], lv denied 36 NY3d 1096 [2021]).

Nevertheless, we conclude that defendant's challenge to the denial of his motionlacks merit."Where, as here, a felony is included in an indictment, the People must be ready for trialwithinsix months, after subtracting excludable time" (People v Barden, 27 NY3d 550, 553 [2016]; seeCPL 30.30[1] [a]). "The statutory period is calculated by 'computing the time elapsed between thefiling ofthe first accusatory instrument and the People's declaration of readiness, subtracting anyperiodsof delay that are excludable under the terms of the statute and then adding to the resultanypostreadiness periods of delay that are actually attributable to the People and areineligible for anexclusion' " (People vBarnett, 158 AD3d 1279, 1280 [4th Dept 2018], lv denied 31 NY3d1078[2018], quoting People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 208 [1992], rearg denied81NY2d 1068 [1993]). " '[P]ostreadiness delay may be charged to the People whenthedelay is attributable to their inaction and directly implicates their ability to proceed totrial' " (People vFulmer, 87AD3d 1385, 1385 [4th Dept 2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 994 [2012],quotingPeople v Carter, 91 NY2d 795, 799 [1998]).

[*2] Here, the People announced their readiness for trial within one month of thecommencement of the statutory period. Nevertheless, defendant contends that thepostreadinessperiod from March 18, 2019, to December 9, 2019, is chargeable to the People becausethat delaywas caused by adjournments necessitated by the People's inability to obtain certain newevidence,i.e., his fingerprints in a useable form, and thus the statement of readiness was illusory.Weconclude, however, that "[a]lthough the People acquired new evidence . . .after theyannounced their readiness for trial, the People's statement of readiness was not illusorybecausethe People could have proceeded to trial without the [new] evidence" (People v Hewitt, 144 AD3d1607,1607-1608 [4th Dept 2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 1185 [2017]; see People v Huddleston, 196AD3d1098, 1100 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 1060 [2021]; People v Pratt, 186 AD3d1055,1057 [4th Dept 2020], lv denied 36 NY3d 975 [2020]). In any event, all excepttwoweeks of that time "is not chargeable to the People because it was the result of '. . .continuance[s] granted by the court at the request of . . . defendant or hiscounsel' " (Hewitt, 144 AD3d at 1608, quoting CPL 30.30 [4] [b]; seePeoplev Yampierre, 300 AD2d 419, 419 [2d Dept 2002], lv denied 99 NY2d 634[2003]; cf. generally People v Liotta, 79 NY2d 841, 843 [1992]).

The sentence is not unduly harsh or severe. Present—Whalen, P.J., Smith,Peradottoand Winslow, JJ.


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