People v Ferretti
2022 NY Slip Op 06030 [209 AD3d 1173]
October 27, 2022
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, November 30, 2022


[*1](October 27, 2022)
 The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Philip J. Ferretti, Appellant.

Noreen McCarthy, Keene Valley, for appellant.

Jonathan J. Miller, District Attorney, Malone (Jennifer M. Hollis of counsel), forrespondent.

Garry, P.J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Franklin County (DerekP. Champagne, J.), rendered December 10, 2018, convicting defendant upon his plea ofguilty of the crime of failure to report a change in Internet status.

In November 2017, defendant waived indictment and agreed to be prosecutedpursuant to a superior court information (hereinafter SCI) charging him with failing toreport a change in Internet status in violation of Correction Law § 168-f (4).The resulting plea agreement, which required defendant to waive his right to appeal,contemplated that defendant would be put on interim probation for one year. Ifsuccessful, defendant would receive a split sentence of six months in jail followed byfive years of probation; if unsuccessful, defendant would be sentenced to an unspecifiedterm of imprisonment. Defendant pleaded guilty in conformity with the agreement andwas placed on interim probation, and sentencing was adjourned. Defendant'sperformance on interim probation was ultimately unsuccessful, and County Court(Champagne, J.) thereafter sentenced him to a prison term of 1 to 3 years. This appealensued.

Initially, we reject defendant's assertion that his waiver of the right to appeal isinvalid. Defendant was apprised that an appeal waiver was a condition of the pleaagreement, and County Court (Richards, J.) both explained that the right to appeal wasseparate and distinct from the trial-related rights that defendant was forfeiting bypleading guilty and delineated the appellate rights that would survive the appeal waiver(see People v Dennis, 206AD3d 1369, 1370 [3d Dept 2022]; People v Hall, 204 AD3d 1228, 1228 [3d Dept 2022]).Additionally, defendant executed a written waiver in open court and confirmed that hehad read the waiver, understood its contents and had no questions relative thereto (seePeople v Hall, 204 AD3d at 1228; People v Lapoint, 201 AD3d 1258, 1258 [3d Dept 2022],lv denied 38 NY3d 1008 [2022]). Finally, although the written waiver containedsome overbroad language, both the oral colloquy and the written waiver itself made clearthat some appellate review survived (see People v Sims, 207 AD3d 882, 883 [3d Dept 2022]).Accordingly, we are satisfied that defendant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarilywaived his right to appeal. In light of the valid appeal waiver, any challenge to thefactual sufficiency of defendant's plea allocution is precluded and, further, is unpreservedfor our review in the absence of an appropriate postallocution motion (see id. at883-884; People v Brown,163 AD3d 1269, 1271 [3d Dept 2018]).

Defendant's contention that the SCI is jurisdictionally defective "is not precluded byeither his guilty plea or his waiver of the right to appeal . . . and further, isnot subject to the preservation requirement" (People v Coss, 178 AD3d 25, 27 [3d Dept 2019] [internalquotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v Mathis, 185 AD3d 1094, 1096 [3d Dept2020]).[FN*] AnSCI "is jurisdictionally [*2]defective only if it does noteffectively charge the defendant with the commission of a particular crime—forinstance, if it fails to allege that the defendant committed acts constituting every materialelement of the crime charged" (People v D'Angelo, 98 NY2d 733, 734-735[2002]; accord People vChaney, 160 AD3d 1281, 1283 [3d Dept 2018], lv denied 31 NY3d1146 [2018]). In this regard, "a charging instrument that incorporates by reference thestatutory provisions applicable to the crime charged has been held to allege the materialelements of the crime sufficiently to survive a jurisdictional challenge" (People vBrown, 163 AD3d at 1271 [internal quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted];see People v Edwards, 180AD3d 1111, 1111-1112 [3d Dept 2020], lv denied 35 NY3d 969 [2020]; People v Kamburelis, 100AD3d 1189, 1189 [3d Dept 2012])—provided such reference is not negated"by the inclusion of conduct that does not constitute the crime charged" (People v Boula, 106 AD3d1371, 1372 [3d Dept 2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1040 [2013]; see People v Hurell-Harring,66 AD3d 1126, 1128 n 3 [3d Dept 2009]).

The SCI issued here incorporated by reference the provisions of Correction Law§ 168-f (4), which provides, in relevant part, that a sex offender is requiredto register with the Division of Criminal Justice Services (hereinafter DCJS) "no laterthan [10] calendar days after any change of address, [I]nternet accounts with [I]nternetaccess providers belonging to such offender [or] [I]nternet identifiers that such offenderuses." An Internet identifier, in turn, is defined as "electronic mail addresses anddesignations used for the purposes of chat, instant messaging, social networking or othersimilar [I]nternet communication" (Correction Law § 168-a [18]).

The felony complaint and supporting deposition allege that defendant created aFacebook account in January 2017 under the name Joseph James and thereafter utilizedthe messenger feature associated therewith to send harassing and threatening messages tohis ex-girlfriend. "[T]he name one uses to interact with other users onFacebook—such as a screen name, pseudonym or alias—may be an Internetidentifier that must be disclosed . . . if it is a 'designation used for thepurposes of chat, instant messaging, social networking or other similar [I]nternetcommunication' " (People v Ellis, 33 NY3d 582, 585 [2019] [bracketsomitted], quoting Correction Law § 168-a [18]; accord People v Weeks, 188AD3d 1420, 1423 [3d Dept 2020], lv denied 36 NY3d 1060 [2021]).Accordingly, the alias that defendant allegedly created and used to message hisex-girlfriend on Facebook would constitute an Internet identifier within the meaning ofCorrection Law § 168-a (18), and his corresponding failure to register suchidentifier with DCJS within 10 days would place him in violation of Correction Law§ 168-f (4).

However, the SCI did not charge defendant with failing to register or report a changein an Internet identifier[*3]; instead, defendant was solelycharged with failing to report a change in Internet status in violation of Correction Law§ 168-f (4). Even assuming, without deciding, that the generalized languageemployed—failing to report a change in Internet status—coupled with thestatutory reference otherwise would be sufficient to allege the material elements of thecrime charged (see People v Chaney, 160 AD3d at 1283; People v Dubois, 150 AD3d1562, 1564 [3d Dept 2017]), such reference was effectively negated "by theinclusion of conduct that [did] not constitute the crime charged" (People v Boula,106 AD3d at 1372; see People v Iannone, 45 NY2d 589, 600[1978])—namely, "establishing a Facebook account."

The governing statutes were written, and have been interpreted, narrowly. It has beenclearly established "that the existence of a Facebook account—as opposed to theInternet identifiers a sex offender may use to access Facebook or interact with other userson Facebook—need not be disclosed to DCJS pursuant to Correction Law§ 168-f (4)" (People v Ellis, 33 NY3d at 586). Hence, the mere factthat defendant established a Facebook account was not an occurrence that defendant wasrequired to report to DCJS, and his failure to do so did not constitute a violation ofCorrection Law § 168-f (4) (see id.).

The People argue that Ellis is distinguishable because the defendant in thatcase used his real name to interact with other Facebook users (see id. at 585),whereas defendant here allegedly used an alias to create his Facebook account. Thelegitimacy of the name used is not dispositive. Regardless of the name employed bydefendant in creating the Facebook account, the People did not charge defendant withfailing to register an Internet identifier; they charged him with failing to report a changein Internet status, i.e., "establishing a Facebook account." Stated differently, instead of"correctly alleg[ing] that the omission constituting the offense was [defendant's] failureto register an Internet identifier used by him to access and identify himself on theFacebook account that he created and maintained, [the SCI] improperly premise[d] thecharge on his failure to register the Facebook account itself" (People v Weeks,188 AD3d at 1423). As the SCI failed to charge defendant with conduct that constituteda crime, it must be dismissed (see People v Ellis, 33 NY3d at 586; cf. Peoplev Boula, 106 AD3d at 1372-1373; compare People v Weeks, 188 AD3d at1423). Defendant's remaining arguments, to the extent not specifically addressed, havebeen examined and found to be lacking in merit.

Egan Jr., Lynch, Clark and Ceresia, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isreversed, on the law, and superior court information dismissed.

Footnotes


Footnote *:To the extent thatdefendant challenges the factual sufficiency of the SCI, this nonjurisdictional claim isforeclosed by defendant's guilty plea (see People v Edwards, 180 AD3d 1111, 1112 [3d Dept2020], lv denied 35 NY3d 969 [2020]).


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