| People v Francis |
| 2022 NY Slip Op 50655(U) [75 Misc 3d 1224(A)] |
| Decided on July 20, 2022 |
| Criminal Court Of The City Of New York, Bronx County |
| Licitra, J. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not bepublished in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on July 20, 2022
The People of theState of New York against Francis, Defendant. |
Docket No. CR-016475-21BX
For the People: Darcel Clark, District Attorney of Bronx County (by ADA MaritaWilliams)
For Mr. Francis: The Bronx Defenders (by Chloe Caban)
Wanda L. Licitra, J.
The People here did not meet their statutory duty to serve automatic discovery and file acertificate of compliance within 35 days of arraignments. Instead, the People violated thatdeadline more than twice over. Then, with only five days left on the 90-day "speedy-trial clock"for the entire case, the People submitted their "certificate" of discovery "compliance." However,on the first court date thereafter, the defense objected, arguing that the certificate was improper.They noted that they had not actually received some discovery the People claimed to havedisclosed.
By a motion that directly followed, the defense alleges that the People filed their certificateof discovery compliance without first actually producing several documents. These include: 911audio files and related documents; police misconduct records for NYPD officers Sybil Ramos,Earl Quinones, Robert Kosich, Heriberto Perez, and Gregory Thuesday; IDTU calibrationreports, gas chromatography reports, and simulator-solution reports; a memo book entry; IDTUcertifications; NYPD photographs of a witness' identification, car insurance, and registration; anda police report about the interrogation warnings in this case. The defense also claims the Peoplenever made diligent, good-faith efforts to ascertain the existence of and make available FDNYmembers' contact information relating to this case.
The People respond that they tried to disclose some documents through their OneDrivesystem on the 85th day after arraignments but failed due to a "technological error." They alsoargue that the NYPD photographs are not discoverable. And they argue that they have nodiscovery obligations regarding FDNY members' contact information.
For the following reasons, the defense's motion is GRANTED.
The procedural history is effectivelyuncontested.[FN1]On November 1, 2021, Bronx [*2]Criminal Court arraigned Mr.Francis. The top charge was V.T.L. § 1192[3], an unclassified misdemeanor punishable byup to 364 days in jail. At arraignment, the People were not ready for trial. The court adjournedthe case. On December 15, 2021, the next court date, the People again were not ready for trial.The court adjourned the case. On January 19, 2022, the next court date, the People yet again werenot ready for trial. The court adjourned the case. On January 25, 2022, off calendar, the Peoplefiled and served a certificate of discovery compliance and statement of readiness. This was the85th day after arraignments. The speedy-trial deadline would have been five days later.(See C.P.L. § 30.30[1][b]). On February 2, 2022, the next court date, the defenserequested a motion schedule, which resulted in the instant motion.
LEGAL DISCUSSION
I. The certificate of compliance was not proper.
a. First, the certificate was not proper because the People failed to actually produceautomatically discoverable material in their possession.
On the 85th day after arraignments, the People filed a certificate of discovery compliance("COC") even though they had committed what they call a "technological error" and an"inadvertent" "mishap." (Pr. Resp. at 4-6). The People did so on the 85th day after arraignmentseven though the discovery statute requires that they make these disclosures by the 35th day afterarraignments. (C.P.L. § 245.10). The People acknowledge that the result of this"technological error" was that the defense did not receive much of their discovery production.(Pr. Resp. at 4-6). This missing discovery "included" but was "not limited to": "911 audio files,""the Sprint Report," and "other items relating to the 911 call"; "Calibration Reports, GasChromatography Reports, DOH Intoxilyzer Affidavit, and the IDTU Officer's Memo Bookentry"; and police misconduct records. (Id.). The parties do not dispute that the People'sautomatic discovery obligations cover all this material (except for the police misconductrecords).[FN2]Nonetheless, the [*3]People argue they can file a COC even ifdiscovery is not "actually . . . disclosed" to the defense, so long as they exercise "goodfaith" and "due diligence." (Id.).
Last year, in nearly the same circumstances, the Appellate Division squarely rejected thePeople's position here. (People ex rel.Ferro v. Brann, 197 AD3d 787, 788 [2d Dep't 2021]).[FN3]In Ferro, like here, the defense did not actually receive "approximately fifty items listedin the COC as 'e-shared through the QCDA Portal.'" (Pr. Br. at 7, People ex rel. Ferro v.Brann, A.D. Docket No. 2021-05850 [Aug. 18, 2021]). Also in Ferro, like here, thePeople argued that they exercised "good faith" and "due diligence." (See id. at 22-23).They believed they had shared all the files with the defense and later reshared any of the files thatwere not produced properly. (Id. at 9-10, 22-23). In all, the People in Ferro "sentand resent" over "900 files" of discoverable material to defense counsel after "counsel claimedthat she had not originally received that material." (Id. at 22). The People argued thatespecially given the "voluminous discovery" in that serious felony case, they exercised "duediligence" and acted "in good faith." (Id. at 9-10, 22-23). The Appellate Division heldthat "contrary to the People's contention," the COC "could not be deemed complete" until thediscovery "identified in the certificate" was "actually produced" to the defense.(Ferro, 197 AD3d at 788 [emphasis added]).
Ferro accords with the discovery statute's plain text. Criminal Procedure Law §245.50[1] defines a proper COC as one filed "[w]hen the prosecution has provided the discoveryrequired by subdivision one of section 245.20." Therefore, a "'good faith' certification of 'duediligence' does not make a COC proper" if discovery is not actually produced. (People v.Vargas, 2022 NY Slip Op. 50651[U], at *2 [Crim. Ct., Bronx County 2022]). Actuallyproducing "the discovery required by subdivision one of section 245.20" is a "necessarycondition" of a proper COC. (id.; see also C.P.L. § 245.50[1]).
Even if due diligence applied, however, the Court would not find it here. As an initial matter,the People did not attempt to disclose and certify discovery until the 85th day after arraignments,well after the statute's 35-day deadline. (C.P.L. § 245.10). In addition, while the statutemandates that the People "shall disclose" automatic discovery, it does not require that the Peoplepick a specific method to do so. (See C.P.L. §§ 245.20[1]. 245.50[1]). ThePeople may make their files available by any method—even simply opening their entirecase file to the defense for copying and inspection. The statute certainly does not require that thePeople disclose material, document by document, through OneDrive. Indeed, because thestatute's mandate "virtually constitute[s] 'open file' discovery, or least make[s] 'open file'discovery the far better course of action to assure compliance," such piecemeal methods mayinvite unnecessary risk. (See
The lack of due diligence aside, this Court follows Ferro. There, failing to actuallyproduce fifty out of 900 files in that serious felony case rendered the COC improper. Here,failing to actually produce several critical discovery folders in a garden-variety DWImisdemeanor case does the same. Just like in Ferro, the People's COC "could not bedeemed complete until all of the material and information identified in the certificate as subjectto discovery and electronically shared with the defendant was actually produced to thedefendant." (See Ferro, 197 AD3d at 788). That did not occur until well after the People's90-day speedy trial deadline. (See Pr. Resp. at 4). Therefore, the People's COC wasimproper, and the People did not validly answer ready for trial within the required 90 days fromarraignment.
b. Second, the certificate was not proper because the People failed to produceautomatically discoverable material in NYPD possession.
The People also failed to produce, this time intentionally, NYPD photographs relating to thiscase. The People concede this. (See Pr. Resp. at 6-7). The People's allegations in this caseinvolve a car accident between Mr. Francis and a "potential witness" named Mr. Sufian. (Seeid.). The defense claims that body-worn cameras depict NYPD officers photographing Mr.Sufian's "state ID, the insurance card for the vehicle, and . . . the car registration." (Def. Mot. at10).
The People argue that these NYPD photographs are not discoverable because they "do nothave any bearing on the issues presented in this case." (Pr. Resp. at 7). They argue that "Mr.Sufian is not the defendant." (Id.). And they assert that, in their view, these photographsdo not contain "any information" that would be "relevant to the charges." (Id.).
The People's argument misapprehends the law. NYPD photographs taken at the scene of theincident are automatically discoverable. Criminal Procedure Law § 245.20[1][h] mandatesthat the People disclose "[a]ll photographs . . . made or completed by a public servant engaged inlaw enforcement activity" that "relate to the subject matter of the case." Criminal Procedure Law§ 245.20[2] deems any discoverable material in the possession of law enforcement to be inthe possession of the People. Here, the People accuse Mr. Francis of driving while intoxicatedand causing an accident with Mr. Sufian's car. NYPD photographs taken at the scene of thataccident are clearly "photographs . . . made by a public servant engaged in law enforcementactivity" that "relate to the subject matter of the case."
The People conflate whether an item is "relevant to the charges" with the discovery standardof whether an item "relate[s] to the subject matter of the case." (Compare Pr. Resp. at 7with C.P.L. § 245.20[1]). The discovery statute does not ask the People tounilaterally determine what they believe would be "relevant to the charges." "[I]t is not for thePeople to determine whether a particular item might be admissible" or relevant. (See People v. Soto, 72 Misc 3d1153, 1160 [Crim. Ct., NY County 2021] [rejecting the People's determination in that casethat some impeachment evidence was not relevant to credibility]).
The People should not be "making their own determination" about what NYPD photographsin a case are discoverable. (See id. at 1162; see also People v. Williams, 72 Misc 3d 1214[A], at *5 [Crim. Ct.,NY County 2021]; People v.Spaulding, 75 Misc 3d 1219[A], at *3 [Crim. Ct., Bronx County 2022]). All of them arediscoverable. (C.P.L. § 245.20[1][h]). The list [*5]ofcategories in C.P.L. § 245.20[1] "relieves the People of having to define what is or is notdiscoverable." (Williams, 72 Misc 3d 1214[A], at *5). The People's most basic duty is todisclose all discoverable material on that list in their possession or in the possession of lawenforcement. (C.P.L. §§ 245.20[1], 245.50[1]). Here, the People did not discloseNYPD photos taken in this case before filing their COC. Therefore, their COC was improper,and the People did not validly state ready for trial within 90 days of arraignment.
c. Third, the certificate was not proper because the People failed to establish thatthey made diligent, good faith efforts to ascertain the existence of FDNY contact information andto make it available for discovery.
The defense alleges that "body worn camera footage shows that there were at least 5 FDNYmembers" at the scene of the incident in this case. (Def. Mot. at 10). They allege that thesemembers "assessed the medical necessities of [Mr.] Francis and [Mr.] Sufian." (Id.). Andthey claim that the People did not make diligent, good faith efforts to ascertain the existence ofthe FDNY members' contact information and to make it available for discovery.(Id.).
The People do not contest any of this. (See generally Pr. Resp. at 6-8). Instead, theyargue that because the FDNY is not "an entity within the People's custody or control," FDNYcontact information "is not to be considered automatic discovery." (Id. at 7). Theyconclude that "there is no discovery violation" for their nondisclosure. (Id.).
The People's conclusion misapprehends their duties. To be sure, the FDNY members' contactinformation is not "automatic discovery" as defined under C.P.L. § 245.20[1]. Butautomatic discovery is not the People's only discovery duty. Under C.P.L. §245.20[2]—entitled "[d]uties of the prosecution"—where discoverable materialexists "but is not within the prosecutor's possession, custody or control," the People must make"a diligent, good faith effort to ascertain [its] existence" and "to cause [it] to be made availablefor discovery." (C.P.L. § 245.20[2]). Thereafter, in their COC, the People must certify ingood faith that they "exercis[ed] due diligence and [made] reasonable inquiries to ascertain theexistence of material and information subject to discovery" and disclosed it. (C.P.L. §245.50[1]). Upon a challenge, it is incumbent on the People to articulate what efforts they madeto ascertain the existence of the challenged discoverable material and to make it available fordiscovery.
Here, the People fail to articulate any efforts whatsoever to ascertain the existence of theFDNY members' contact information and to make it available for discovery. Instead, the Peopleonly claim, incorrectly, that they have no obligations regarding this material at all, simplybecause it was not in their control. However, such material is discoverable, as it "relate[s] to thesubject matter of the case." (C.P.L. § 245.20[1]). Accordingly, since it was not in theircontrol, the People had to make diligent, good-faith efforts to ascertain its existence and make itavailable. (C.P.L. § 245.20[2]). The People's COC was not proper for this failure, as well,and so the People did not validly state ready for trial within 90 days of arraignment.
C.P.L. § 30.30 CALCULATION
Mr. Francis' top charge is driving while intoxicated, a violation of V.T.L. § 1192[3].That charge is an unclassified misdemeanor, punishable by up to 364 days in jail. Accordingly,the [*6]People had 90 days from arraignment to validly stateready for trial on this case. (See C.P.L. § 30.30[1][b]).
November 1, 2021 — January 25, 2022= 85 days
The People did not state ready until January 25, 2022. This was 85 days after theycommenced the case against Mr. Francis on November 1, 2021. There is nothing in theprocedural history described by the parties to justify any C.P.L. § 30.30[4] exclusions.
January 25, 2022 — February 3, 2022 = 9days
On January 25, 2022, off calendar, the People filed their COC and stated ready for trial.However, as described above, their COC was not proper. The People have not established any"special circumstances" that would allow them to state ready on an improper COC. (SeeC.P.L. § 245.50[3]). Therefore, their statement of readiness was illusory. On February 3,2022, the defense requested a motion schedule to challenge the COC. This tolls speedy-trial time.(See C.P.L. § 30.30[4][a]).
CONCLUSION
In sum, 94 days passed from arraignment without a valid statement of readiness from thePeople. This amount of time exceeds the People's 90-day speedy trial period. (C.P.L. §30.30[1][b]). Therefore, the defense's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
The defense's remaining motions are moot.
The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.
Bronx, NY
July 20, 2022
Wanda L. Licitra, J.C.C.
Footnote 1:The People claim that Mr.Francis was arraigned on November 11, 2021. (Pr. Resp. at 2). The defense alleges that he wasarraigned on November 1, 2021. (Def. Mot. at 3). A hearing is not necessary to resolve thisfactual dispute. The Court may take judicial notice of public records. (Siwek v. Mahoney,39 NY2d 159, 163 n.2 [1976]). And it may do so "at any stage of the litigation." (Assoc. Gen.Contractors of Am. v. Lapardo Bros. Excavating Contractors Inc., 43 Misc 2d 825, 826 [Sup.Ct., Albany County 1964]). Here, the Court takes judicial notice of the court file in this matter. Inso doing, the Court concludes that Mr. Francis was arraigned on November 1, 2021.
Footnote 2:The Court rejects the People'sargument that they are not required to disclose all misconduct records for their police witnesses.The People must disclose "all items and information" about police misconduct by the officerswhom the People seek to call as witnesses, so long as those items or information are in thepossession of the People or the NYPD. (C.P.L. § 245.20[1][k]). This is mandated by theplain text of the discovery statute, as well as the Appellate Division, First Department's decisionin Matter of Jayson C., 200 AD3d447 [1st Dep't 2021]. (See alsoPeople v. Polanco-Chavarria, 74 Misc 3d 1210(A), at *4 [County Ct., Rockland County2021] [analyzing Jayson C.]). "All" means all.
Footnote 3:The Appellate Division, SecondDepartment's decision in Ferro is controlling on this court. (See People v. Shakur,215 AD2d 184, 185 [1st Dep't 1995] [noting that unless there is contrary authority from the FirstDepartment, trial courts "must follow the determination of the Appellate Division in anotherDepartment"]).