| People v Gaskin |
| 2023 NY Slip Op 01415 [214 AD3d 1353] |
| March 17, 2023 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Jaquan Gaskin, Appellant. |
Easton Thompson Kasperek Shiffrin LLP, Rochester (Brian Shiffrin of counsel), fordefendant-appellant.
Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Merideth H. Smith of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Thomas E. Moran,J.), rendered July 25, 2022. The judgment convicted defendant upon a plea of guilty ofcriminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (two counts), criminal possessionof a controlled substance in the third degree, and criminal possession of a controlledsubstance in the fourth degree.
It is hereby ordered that the case is held, the decision is reserved and the matter isremitted to Supreme Court, Monroe County, for further proceedings in accordance withthe following memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him uponhis plea of guilty of two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree(Penal Law § 265.03 [1] [b]; [3]), one count of criminal possession of acontrolled substance in the third degree (§ 220.16 [1]), and one count ofcriminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree (§ 220.09[1]). Defendant contends that Supreme Court erred in denying his motion to dismiss theindictment on statutory speedy trial grounds (see CPL 30.30). We conclude thatthe court applied the wrong standard in determining defendant's motion.
Where, as here, a defendant is charged with a felony, the People must announcereadiness for trial within six months of the commencement of the action (see CPL30.30 [1] [a]; People v England, 84 NY2d 1, 4 [1994], rearg denied 84NY2d 846 [1994]). "The statutory period is calculated by 'computing the time elapsedbetween the filing of the first accusatory instrument and the People's declaration ofreadiness, subtracting any periods of delay that are excludable under the terms of thestatute and then adding to the result any postreadiness periods of delay that are actuallyattributable to the People and are ineligible for an exclusion' " (People v Barnett, 158 AD3d1279, 1280 [4th Dept 2018], lv denied 31 NY3d 1078 [2018]). There aretwo elements to the People's readiness for trial: (1) " 'a statement of readiness bythe prosecutor in open court . . . or a written notice of readiness' "and (2) "the People must in fact be ready to proceed at the time they declare readiness"(People v Chavis, 91 NY2d 500, 505 [1998]; see People v Hill, 209 AD3d 1262, 1264 [4th Dept 2022],lv denied 39 NY3d 986 [2022]). As applicable here, "[w]henever. . . a prosecutor states or otherwise provides notice that the people are readyfor trial, the court shall make inquiry on the record as to their actual readiness. If, afterconducting its inquiry, the court determines that the people are not ready to proceed totrial, the prosecutor's statement or notice of readiness shall not be valid" (CPL 30.30 [5])."A statement of readiness [made] at a time when the People are not actually ready isillusory and [is] insufficient to stop the running of the speedy trial clock"(England, 84 NY2d at 4).
As relevant here, "[a]ny statement of trial readiness must be accompanied orpreceded by a certification of good faith compliance with the disclosure requirements of[CPL] 245.20" (CPL 30.30 [5]; see 245.50 [1]). A certificate of compliance muststate that, "after exercising due diligence and making reasonable inquiries to ascertain theexistence of material and information subject to discovery, the prosecutor has disclosedand made available all known material and [*2]information subject to discovery" and must also "identifythe items provided" (CPL 245.50 [1]; see generally People ex rel. Ferro v Brann, 197 AD3d 787,788 [2d Dept 2021], lv denied 38 NY3d 909 [2022]). Notwithstanding theprovisions of any other law, absent an individualized finding of special circumstances bythe court before which the charge is pending, the prosecution will not be deemed readyfor trial for purposes of CPL 30.30 until it has filed a "proper certificate" of compliancepursuant to CPL 245.50 (1) (CPL 245.50 [3]). However, "[n]o adverse consequence tothe prosecution or the prosecutor shall result from the filing of a certificate of compliancein good faith and reasonable under the circumstances," although "the court may grant aremedy or sanction for a discovery violation" under CPL 245.80 (CPL 245.50 [1]).
Here, the criminal action was commenced on June 9, 2021 (see CPL 1.20[17]). The People filed their certificate of compliance and statement of readiness onAugust 6, 2021. On February 12, 2022, defendant moved to dismiss the indictment onspeedy trial grounds, arguing that the People's failure to provide all of the discoveryrequired by CPL 245.20 rendered the certificate of compliance improper and thestatement of readiness illusory. Defendant argued that the People should be charged withthe entire eight month period and that the indictment should be dismissed (seeCPL 30.30 [1] [a]). The court denied defendant's motion, concluding that the People'scertificate of compliance was proper because defendant had not been prejudiced by thePeople's belated disclosure of certain required discovery and that the statement ofreadiness therefore was not illusory.
We agree with defendant that the court's use of a prejudice-only standard forevaluating the propriety of the certificate of compliance was error because the clear andunambiguous terms of CPL 245.50 establish that a certificate of compliance is properwhere its filing is "in good faith and reasonable under the circumstances" (CPL 245.50[1]; see generally People vRodriguez, 77 Misc 3d 23, 25 [App Term, 1st Dept 2022]). On a CPL 30.30motion, the question is not whether defendant was prejudiced by an improper certificateof compliance (see People vTrotman, 77 Misc 3d 1210[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 51181[U] [Crim Ct, QueensCounty 2022]; People vAdrovic, 69 Misc 3d 563, 574 [Crim Ct, Kings County 2020]). Indeed, itappears that the court, in evaluating whether defendant was prejudiced by the People'sfailure to disclose certain items, conflated the standard applicable to requests forsanctions under CPL 245.80—which does involve a prejudiceanalysis—with the standard for evaluating the propriety of a certificate ofcompliance for purposes of determining whether the People's statement of readiness wasvalid (see CPL 30.30 [5]; 245.50). In light of the court's failure to considerwhether the People's certificate of compliance was filed in "good faith and reasonableunder the circumstances" despite the belated discovery, we hold the case, reservedecision, and remit the matter to Supreme Court to determine whether the People'scertificate of compliance was proper under the terms of CPL 245.50 and thus whether thestatement of readiness was valid. Present—Smith, J.P., Lindley, Curran, Ogdenand Greenwood, JJ.