| Domingo v Avis Budget Group, Inc. |
| 2023 NY Slip Op 04463 [219 AD3d 964] |
| August 30, 2023 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| Stacia Domingo, Appellant, v Avis BudgetGroup, Inc., et al., Respondents. |
Derek Smith Law Group, PLLC, New York, NY (Daniel S. Kirschbaum of counsel),for appellant.
Littler Mendelson, P.C., New York, NY (A. Michael Weber and Miguel A. Lopez ofcounsel), for respondents.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for employment discrimination andretaliation in violation of the New York City Human Rights Law, the plaintiff appealsfrom an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Donna-Marie E. Golia, J.), enteredMarch 19, 2021. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted those branches of thedefendants' motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to dismiss the causes ofaction alleging hostile work environment, retaliation, interference, and aiding andabetting.
Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provisions thereofgranting those branches of the defendants' motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the causes of action alleging hostile work environment and aiding andabetting, and substituting therefor provisions denying those branches of the motion; as somodified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs to the plaintiff.
In or about September 2018, the plaintiff commenced an action in the United StatesDistrict Court for the Eastern District of New York (hereinafter the District Court)against her former employers, Avis Budget Group, Inc., Avis Budget Car Rental, LLC,and AB Car Rental Service, Inc. (hereinafter collectively the Avis defendants), andindividual employees of the Avis defendants. In that action, the plaintiff alleged, interalia, employment discrimination and hostile work environment based on gender andretaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC, ch 21,§ 2000e et seq. [hereinafter Title VII]), the New York State HumanRights Law (Executive Law § 296 [hereinafter NYSHRL]), and the NewYork City Human Rights Law (Administrative Code of City of [*2]NY § 8-107 [hereinafter NYCHRL]). Thedefendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The District Courtgranted the defendants' motion, dismissed the federal and state claims, and declined toexercise supplemental jurisdiction over the local claims.
The plaintiff then commenced this action in the Supreme Court, Queens County,against the defendants, alleging, among other things, hostile work environment,retaliation, interference, and aiding and abetting under NYCHRL. The defendants movedpursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) and (7) to dismiss the complaint. In an order enteredMarch 19, 2021, the court granted the defendants' motion, determining that the causes ofaction under NYCHRL were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The plaintiffappeals from so much of the order as granted those branches of the defendants' motionwhich were to dismiss the causes of action alleging hostile work environment, retaliation,interference, and aiding and abetting.
"The doctrine of collateral estoppel, a narrower species of res judicata, precludes aparty from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue clearly raised in aprior action or proceeding and decided against that party or those in privity, whether ornot the tribunals or causes of action are the same" (Ryan v New York Tel. Co., 62NY2d 494, 500 [1984]). Collateral estoppel only applies when: " '(1) the issuesin both proceedings are identical, (2) the issue in the prior proceeding was actuallylitigated and decided, (3) there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the priorproceeding, and (4) the issue previously litigated was necessary to support a valid andfinal judgment on the merits' " (Williams v New York City Tr. Auth., 171 AD3d 990,991-992 [2019] [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Conason v Megan Holding,LLC, 25 NY3d 1, 17 [2015]). " 'Where a federal court declines toexercise jurisdiction over a plaintiff's state law claims, collateral estoppel may still barthose claims provided that the federal court decided issues identical to those raised by theplaintiff's state claims' " (Williams v New York City Tr. Auth., 171AD3d at 992, quoting Milione vCity Univ. of N.Y., 153 AD3d 807, 808-809 [2017]).
"The provisions of NYCHRL must be 'construed liberally for the accomplishment ofthe uniquely broad and remedial purposes thereof,' regardless of whether similarlyworded federal or New York State civil and human rights laws have been so construed"(Karimian v Time Equities,Inc., 164 AD3d 486, 488 [2018], quoting Administrative Code of City of NY§ 8-130 [a]; seeMakinen v City of New York, 30 NY3d 81, 87 [2017]). Thus, "a cause of actionasserted pursuant to NYCHRL must be analyzed independently from similar or identicalcauses of action asserted pursuant to Title VII and/or NYSHRL" (Karimian v TimeEquities, Inc., 164 AD3d at 488-489). Nevertheless, "where a prior factualdetermination rendered with regard to a Title VII or NYSHRL cause of action isdeterminative of a cause of action asserted pursuant to NYCHRL in a subsequent action,the NYCHRL cause of action may be barred pursuant to the doctrine of collateralestoppel" (id. at 489; see Williams v New York City Tr. Auth., 171 AD3dat 993; Milione v City Univ. of N.Y., 153 AD3d at 809).
Here, the factual determinations made by the District Court with regard to the causeof action alleging retaliation under Title VII and NYSHRL were determinative of thecauses of action alleging retaliation and interference asserted in this action pursuant toNYCHRL (see Williams v New York City Tr. Auth., 171 AD3d at 993;Karimian v Time Equities, Inc., 164 AD3d at 489; Milione v City Univ. ofN.Y., 153 AD3d at 809).
However, the Supreme Court erred in granting dismissal of the cause of actionalleging hostile work environment pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5). The District Courtanalyzed the [*3]hostile work environment claims underthe standards set by Title VII and NYSHRL, and determined that those claims wereneither "pervasive" nor "extraordinarily severe." Under NYCHRL, a claimant must onlyprove that they were "treated less well than other employees" because of their gender (Nelson v HSBC Bank USA, 87AD3d 995, 999 [2011]). As the plaintiff's allegations of sexual harassment andimproper touching could constitute "more than petty slights and trivial inconveniences"without rising to the level of being severe and pervasive, Supreme Court should not havegranted dismissal of this cause of action pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel(id. at 1000).
Furthermore, the factual determinations of the District Court were not determinativeof the cause of action alleging aiding and abetting, and the plaintiff sufficiently allegedthis cause of action to survive a motion to dismiss (see Administrative Code ofCity of NY § 8-107 [6]).
Accordingly, we modify the order so as to deny those branches of the defendants'motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to dismiss the causes of action alleginghostile work environment and aiding and abetting. Barros, J.P., Maltese, Ford andDowling, JJ., concur.