Matter of Lavender v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the Town ofBolton
2016 NY Slip Op 05599 [141 AD3d 970]
July 21, 2016
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, August 31, 2016


[*1]
 In the Matter of John A. Lavender, II,Appellant,
v
Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Bolton, Respondent, etal., Respondents.

John A. Lavender, II, Bolton Landing, appellant pro se.

Muller, Mannix & Reichenbach, PLLC, Glens Falls (Michael J. Muller ofcounsel), for Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Bolton, respondent.

Peters, P.J. Appeals (1) from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Krogmann, J.),entered June 20, 2013 in Warren County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in aproceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of respondent ZoningBoard of Appeals of the Town of Bolton interpreting the Town's zoning ordinance as excluding petitioner's use of his property as an event venue, and (2) from anorder of said court, entered September 21, 2015 in Warren County, which, among otherthings, denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner owns a parcel of real property overlooking Lake George in the Town ofBolton, Warren County. Known as Highlands Castle, the property is situated within alow-density residential zoning district and is improved by, among other things, atwo-bedroom residence. Beginning in 2010, petitioner advertised Highlands Castle onthe Internet as a venue for weddings, corporate meetings, social gatherings and otherspecial events. In its online media, the property was described as a "perfect setting for aspecial gathering with family and friends" or "any other meaningful 'experience' you canenvision." Highlands Castle's website also set forth a list of preferred wedding planners,caterers, photographers, videographers, florists and other [*2]similar vendors to be used in connection with the venuerental.[FN*]

In response to complaints from neighboring homeowners regarding petitioner's useof the property, the Town's Zoning Administrator issued a determination in March 2012finding that petitioner's rental activities did not violate the Town's zoning ordinance. An appeal ensued and, following a public hearing in June 2012,respondent Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Bolton (hereinafter the ZBA)overturned the determination. Petitioner thereafter commenced this proceeding seekingto annul the ZBA's determination. Supreme Court, finding the record inadequate topermit meaningful review, remanded the matter to the ZBA for a written determinationas to the specific findings made and relied upon in reaching its determination. Thereafter,the ZBA set forth the reasons for its prior determination which included, as relevant here,its finding that the activities conducted at Highlands Castle are commercial in nature andare not customarily associated with the use of a single-family dwelling. In June 2013,Supreme Court, finding such reasons sufficiently supported by the record, dismissed thepetition.

Undaunted, petitioner continued his rental activities, prompting the issuance of atemporary restraining order prohibiting him from using the property contrary to theZBA's determination. Petitioner then moved by order to show cause to vacate thetemporary restraining order, raising various challenges to both the ZBA's determinationas well as Supreme Court's June 2013 order. After that motion was denied, petitionerfiled a motion seeking, among other things, reconsideration and to consolidate thisproceeding with a prior enforcement action brought by the Town. By order entered inSeptember 2015, Supreme Court denied that aspect of the motion seeking to consolidatethe matters and, treating his application to reconsider as one to renew or reargue, deniedthat relief as well. Petitioner now appeals from this order as well as the June 2013judgment dismissing his petition.

We first address petitioner's challenges to the ZBA's determination that his rentalactivities violated the Town's zoning ordinance. The Town's zoning ordinance generally limits the use of propertysituated in the relevant RL-3 district to "single-family residence[s]" and "[a]ccessoryuses" (Town of Bolton Zoning Ordinance ch 200, Attachment 4). "Single-familydwelling" is defined as "[a] detached building (not including a mobile home) of one ormore stories in height, above grade level, which is designed or used exclusively as livingquarters for one family or household" (Town of Bolton Zoning Ordinance§ 200-8 [A]). An "accessory use" is "[a]ny use of a structure, lot or portionthereof, that is customarily incidental and subordinate to and does not change thecharacter of a principal land use" (Town of Bolton Zoning Ordinance§ 200-8 [A]). There is no dispute that the physical structure situated onpetitioner's property falls squarely within the definition of single-family dwelling. Thus,the issue distills to whether petitioner's use of the property as a venue for weddings,receptions and other events constitutes an "accessory use" within the meaning of theTown's zoning ordinance.

A zoning board's interpretation of a local zoning ordinance is afforded deference andwill only be disturbed if irrational or unreasonable (see Matter of Meier v Village of Champlain [*3]Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 129 AD3d 1364, 1365[2015]; Matter of AlbanyBasketball & Sports Corp. v City of Albany, 116 AD3d 1135, 1137 [2014],lv denied 23 NY3d 907 [2014]). While there is a well-recognized exception tothis rule where the issue presented is one of pure legal interpretation of the underlyingzoning law or ordinance in question (see Matter of Fruchter v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the Town ofHurley, 133 AD3d 1174, 1175 [2015]; Matter of Salton v Town of Mayfield Zoning Bd. of Appeals,116 AD3d 1113, 1113-1114 [2014]), "this exception does not apply in the instantcase, as the analysis of whether the proposed accessory use is incidental to andcustomarily found in connection with the principal use of the property is, to a greatextent, fact-based" (Matter ofEast Hampton Indoor Tennis Club, LLC v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of E.Hampton, 83 AD3d 935, 937 [2011]; see Matter of Incorporated Vil. of Atl.Beach v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Hempstead, 94 NY2d 842, 843 [1999];Matter of New York Botanical Garden v Board of Stds. & Appeals of City ofN.Y., 91 NY2d 413, 420-421 [1998]). Further, "[t]he rule that a zoning ordinance isto be strictly construed in favor of the property owner is subject to the limitation thatwhere[, as here,] it is difficult or impractical for a legislative body to lay down a rulewhich is both definitive and all-encompassing, a reasonable amount of discretion in theinterpretation of the legislative direction may be delegated to an administrative body orofficial" (Matter of Frishman v Schmidt, 61 NY2d 823, 825 [1984] [internalcitations omitted]; see Matter ofLa Russo v Neuringer, 105 AD3d 743, 743 [2013]; Matter of Sanantonio vLustenberger, 73 AD3d 934, 935 [2010]). "Whether a proposed accessory use is. . . incidental to and customarily found in connection with the principal usedepends on an analysis of the nature and character of the principal use of the land inquestion in relation to the accessory use, taking into consideration the over-all characterof the particular area in question" (Matter of New York Botanical Garden v Board ofStds. & Appeals of City of N.Y., 91 NY2d at 420 [citation omitted]).

The ZBA found that, given the manner in which petitioner utilized and marketedHighlands Castle as a venue for weddings and other large social gatherings, thechallenged use was neither subordinate nor customarily incidental to the primarysingle-family residential use of the property. On this record, we cannot say that suchdetermination is either irrational or unreasonable. Petitioner insists that Highlands Castleis held out merely for residential rental use, yet the record belies such a claim. In offeringHighlands Castle for rent, petitioner emphasized its availability for weddings, largeparties and other social receptions. Notably, the property was marketed as available on adaily or even a "half-day" basis and was advertised upon a pricing structure specific tothe type of event that may be of interest to the consumer and, in some instances, to thenumber of individuals that will be attending. The marketing of Highlands Castle thusevinces a clear intent to target a rental audience that sought more than just residential useof the property and, indeed, no evidence was presented that Highlands Castle had everbeen rented out for use as a single-family residence. To the contrary, the evidence showsthat Highlands Castle was rented eight times over the course of a roughly two-yearperiod for large-scale events—including three weddings and an American BarAssociation function. Further, given that the property is advertised for rent on ayear-round basis without restriction as to availability, nothing prevents its regular use asan event venue on a more frequent basis than that which has previously occurred.

In light of this proof, the ZBA could rationally conclude that petitioner's activities inpromoting and renting Highlands Castle as an event venue were neither incidental norsubordinate to the property's residential use (see Burton v Glynn County, 297 Ga544, 547, 776 SE2d 179, 182 [2015]; DiGiovanni v Pope, 2012 WL 259977,*13, *15, 2012 Mass LCR LEXIS 1, *37, *41-42 [Jan. 30, 2012, No. 08 MISC 380468GHP]). In other words, the record supports the finding that "the business tail is waggingthe residential dog" (Keseling v Baltimore, 220 Md 263, 269, 151 A2d 726, 729[1959]), rather than vice versa. Furthermore, during the public hearing, neighboringproperty owners testified that events held at [*4]Highlands Castle generated increased traffic, createdovercrowded private roadways and often involved amplified music and announcements,which interfered with their enjoyment of their own nearby homes. These adverseimpacts, which extended well beyond the boundaries of petitioner's property, furthersupport the ZBA's finding that the large-scale events hosted at Highlands Castle were notmerely incidental (see 7 Rohan, Zoning and Land Use Controls§ 40A.03 [2] [a] [the purpose of the "incidental" requirement is clear; solong as the use "is a secondary one, conducted on a small scale relative to the principaluse, it will presumably not harm—or inflict only minimal harm upon—otherresidential users"]).

Perhaps most critically, petitioner failed to proffer any evidence demonstrating thathis use of Highlands Castle is consistent with the customary use of residential propertyby other homeowners in the Town (compare Matter of New York Botanical Garden vBoard of Stds. & Appeals of City of N.Y., 91 NY2d at 421-422, 424). Noshowing has been made that the rental of residential single-family dwellings forweddings and large gatherings is a common occurrence or, if so, that such events are ofsimilar frequency, size and intensity as those at issue here (see Burton v GlynnCounty, 297 Ga at 548, 776 SE2d at 183; Forster v Town of Henniker, 167NH 745, 759, 118 A3d 1016, 1027 [2015]; DiGiovanni v Pope, 2012 WL259977, *15, 2012 Mass LCR LEXIS 1, *42-43). Thus, the determination that theproposed accessory use is not customarily found in connection with the principal use ofthe property is, too, supported by a rational basis in the record.

This is not to say that the occasional use of a residential property for a wedding orsimilar large-scale event would not be permissible as an accessory use to the principalsingle-family residential use permitted in an RL-3 district. On an isolated basis, it wouldbe difficult to conclude that the hosting of such an event would not be incidental andsubordinate to the permitted residential use of a single-family dwelling. However, theZBA found that there was something "inherently different" about petitioner's use of hisproperty that transgressed that expected or customary for a single-family dwelling in aresidential low density district and "justif[ied] treating it differently" (Matter of NewYork Botanical Garden v Board of Stds. & Appeals of City of N.Y., 91 NY2d at421). Inasmuch as that determination is both rational and reasonable, it will not bedisturbed.

Petitioner's remaining contentions do not require extended discussion. Hisconstitutional claims and procedural challenges to the ZBA's determination were notraised in his CPLR article 78 petition and, therefore, are unpreserved for our review (see Matter of Town of Rye v NewYork State Bd. of Real Prop. Servs., 10 NY3d 793, 795 [2008]; Gregory vTown of Cambria, 69 NY2d 655, 656-657 [1986]; Matter of Meyer v Zoning Bd. ofAppeals of City of Utica, 139 AD3d 1406, 1407 [2016]). To the extent thatpetitioner's motion for "reconsideration" was deemed one to reargue, the denial thereof isnot appealable (see Schillaci vSarris, 122 AD3d 1085, 1087 [2014]). If viewed as one to renew, the motionwas properly denied inasmuch as petitioner did not offer a reasonable justification for hisfailure to submit the new facts in the initial motion to vacate or demonstrate that suchfacts would have changed the prior determination (see CPLR 2221 [e] [2], [3]; Leonard v Planning Bd. of Townof Union Vale, 136 AD3d 873, 874-875 [2016]; Tibbits v Verizon N.Y., Inc.,40 AD3d 1300, 1303 [2007]). Finally, Supreme Court providently exercised itsdiscretion in denying petitioner's motion to consolidate (see CPLR 602 [a]; Fidelity Natl. Tit. Ins. Co. vAltshuler Shaham Provident Funds Ltd., 120 AD3d 1135, 1136 [2014], lvdismissed 25 NY3d 1036 [2015]).

Lahtinen, Egan Jr., Rose and Clark, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment and orderare affirmed, without costs.

Footnotes


Footnote *:Notably, while petitionerasserts that he only recommends but does not engage vendors, one of his advertisementsoffers that "[o]ur professional photographs will capture the memories you share" andstates that, "whatever you can imagine, we can provide." In that same advertisement,wedding ceremonies were offered with or without an hor d'oeuvre hour and receptiondinner.


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