| Matter of Village of Woodbury v Seggos |
| 2017 NY Slip Op 07512 [154 AD3d 1256] |
| October 26, 2017 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Village of Woodbury et al.,Appellants, v Basil Seggos, as Acting Commissioner of Environmental Conservation, etal., Respondents. (Proceeding No. 1.) In the Matter of Black Rock Forest Consortium et al.,Appellants, et al., Petitioners, v New York State Department of Environmental Conservation etal., Respondents. (Proceeding No. 2.) |
Feerick Lynch MacCartney & Nugent PLLC, South Nyack (Dennis E. A. Lynch ofcounsel), for Village of Woodbury and another, appellants.
Drake Loeb PLLC, New Windsor (Stephen J. Gaba of counsel), for Black Rock ForestConsortium and others, appellants.
Catania, Mahon, Milligram & Rider, PLLC, Newburgh (John W. Furst of counsel), forVillage of Cornwall-on-Hudson, appellant.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Philip Bein of counsel), for Basil Seggosand another, respondents.
Whiteman Osterman & Hanna LLP, Albany (Robert S. Rosborough IV of counsel), forVillage of Kiryas Joel and another, respondents.
Devine, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Zwack, J.), entered May 24, 2016in Albany County, which, among other things, in two combined proceedings pursuant to CPLRarticle 78 and actions for declaratory judgment, granted respondents' motions to dismiss theamended petition/complaint in proceeding No. 2.
Respondent Village of Kiryas Joel is located in Orange County and uses several wells for itsmunicipal water supply. Kiryas Joel has been building, in the face of legal challenges, a 13-milelong pipeline that would allow it to tap into an aqueduct owned and operated by the City of NewYork for additional water (see Administrative Code of City of NY § 24-360;Matter of County of Orange v Village ofKiryas Joel, 44 AD3d 765 [2007]; see also Matter of Town of Woodbury v County of Orange, 114 AD3d951, 952-953 [2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 903 [2014]). Authorization to withdrawwater from the aqueduct will not be granted unless Kiryas Joel demonstrates, among other things,that it has "an adequate backup water supply source" in the event water from the aqueduct isunavailable.
Kiryas Joel acquired property in Mountainville, Town of Cornwall, Orange County that wassuitable for a needed pump station along the pipeline route and provided access to a principalaquifer with "abundant potential water supply" (State Dept of Envtl Conservation, Division ofWater Technical and Operational Guidance Series [2.1.3]: Primary and Principal AquiferDeterminations at 2 [Oct. 23, 1990], available athttp://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/water_pdf/togs213.pdf [accessed Oct. 20, 2017]). Followingfavorable hydrogeological testing, Kiryas Joel applied to respondent Department ofEnvironmental Conservation (hereinafter DEC) for a permit to develop a well field at theMountainville site and withdraw water from the aquifer. Respondent Village of Kiryas JoelBoard of Trustees (hereinafter Village Board), a respondent in proceeding No. 1, then assumedlead agency status for the review of the well drilling conducted under the State EnvironmentalQuality Review Act (see ECL art 8 [hereinafter SEQRA]). The Village Board ultimatelymade a negative declaration under SEQRA, finding no significant adverse environmental impactflowing from the well field development, and a challenge to that determination was dismissed bySupreme Court (Lefkowitz, J.) in 2014.
The water supply permit application was reviewed by DEC while the SEQRA process andchallenge to it was ongoing, and DEC issued a draft permit in 2013 and conducted a legislativehearing to consider public comment. In 2015, DEC issued a final permit that consolidated all ofKiryas Joel's prior supply permits and allowed the monitored withdrawal of up to 612,000gallons of water a day from a well at the Mountainville site. These hybrid CPLR article 78proceedings and declaratory judgment actions followed.
Petitioners in proceeding No. 1 sought relief including annulment of the water withdrawalpermit, a declaration that the Village Board's SEQRA determination was void and an injunctionbarring the permitted water withdrawal from the Mountainville site. Petitioners in proceedingNo. 2 sought similar relief. A stipulation subsequently joined the two proceedings and the partiesagreed to rely upon a single record and filing schedule.
[*2] DEC and respondent Acting Commissioner ofEnvironmental Conservation served an answer in proceeding No. 1 that raised several objectionsin point of law, including that petitioners lacked standing to commence it. DEC moved to dismissproceeding No. 2 on various grounds, including standing, and the other respondents moved todismiss both proceedings. Further motion practice ensued that included a cross motion by theproceeding No. 1 petitioners for summary judgment. Supreme Court thereafter issued a judgmentholding that only petitioners Village of Woodbury, Town of Woodbury, Village ofCornwall-on-Hudson and Town of Cornwall in proceeding No. 1 (hereinafter the municipalities)had standing to bring suit. As for them, Supreme Court noted that the challenges to the SEQRAdetermination were barred by res judicata in some cases and untimely in all, as well as that theclaims relating to the grant of the water withdrawal permit were belied by "overwhelmingdocumentary evidence." Supreme Court accordingly dismissed the amended petitions/complaints in their entirety, prompting these appeals by all petitioners in proceeding No. 1 andpetitioners Storm King Art Center and Black Rock Forest Consortium in proceeding No.2.[FN1]
The issue of standing having been raised, petitioners were obliged to "establish[ ] both aninjury-in-fact and that the asserted injury is within the zone of interests sought to be protected bythe statute alleged to have been violated" (Matter of Association for a Better Long Is., Inc. v New York State Dept. ofEnvtl. Conservation, 23 NY3d 1, 6 [2014]; see Matter of Clean Water Advocates of N.Y., Inc. v New York State Dept.of Envtl. Conservation, 103 AD3d 1006, 1007 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 862[2013]). Petitioners must have more than "[g]eneralized environmental concerns" to satisfy thatburden and, unlike in cases involving zoning issues, "there is no presumption of standing to raisea SEQRA [or other environmental] challenge based on a party's close proximity alone"(Matter of Save Our Main St. Bldgs. v Greene County Legislature, 293 AD2d 907, 908[2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 609 [2002]; see Matter of Shapiro v Torres, 153 AD3d 835, 836 [2017]).Moreover, "[t]he injury in fact element must be based on more than conjecture or speculation"(Matter of Animal Legal Defense Fund,Inc. v Aubertine, 119 AD3d 1202, 1203 [2014]). Standing rules are not applied "in anoverly restrictive manner" that will "completely shield a particular action from judicial review"(Matter of Association for a Better Long Is., Inc. v New York State Dept. of Envtl.Conservation, 23 NY3d at 6), however, and we will "deem the allegations in thepetition[/complaint] to be true and construe them in the light most favorable to the petitioner[s]"in assessing whether a sufficiently precise injury has been articulated (Matter of Town of Amsterdam vAmsterdam Indus. Dev. Agency, 95 AD3d 1539, 1541 n 3 [2012]; see Matter of Powers v De Groodt, 43AD3d 509, 512 [2007]).
Supreme Court determined, and we agree, that petitioner Black Rock Fish and Game Club ofCornwall, Inc. in proceeding No. 1, as well as the proceeding No. 2 petitioners, lacked standing.All of those petitioners are organizations who alleged that the approved water withdrawal mightdeplete ground water in the area to the extent that "water-dependent natural resources," such asthe nearby Woodbury Creek, will be impacted. Accepting those allegations at facevalue—and assuming that these petitioners either did, or did not need to, articulategrounds for organizational standing (seeNew York State Assn. of Nurse Anesthetists v Novello, 2 NY3d 207, 211[2004])—the harm is "no different in kind or degree from that suffered by the generalpublic in the vicinity . . . and [does] not confer standing" (Matter of Powers v DeGroodt, 43 AD3d at 513; see Matterof Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v Planning Bd. of Town of Clifton Park, 50 AD3d 1296,1297-1298 [2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 716 [2008]; Matter of Buerger v Town ofGrafton, 235 AD2d 984, 985 [1997], lv denied 89 NY2d 816 [1997]). Accordingly,Supreme [*3]Court properly dismissed proceeding No. 1 withregard to Black Rock Fish and Game Club of Cornwall, Inc. and proceeding No. 2 in its entirety,on standing grounds.
The remaining proceeding No. 1 petitioners—including, contrary to the conclusion ofSupreme Court, petitioners Henry N. Christensen Jr., Susan Webber Christensen and SevinchBridges—had standing. An impact upon a nearby landowner's water supply constitutes aninjury specific enough to confer standing to challenge the action that caused it (see ECL15-1503 [2] [c], [f]; Matter of HumaneSocy. of U.S. v Empire State Dev. Corp., 53 AD3d 1013, 1017 [2008], lv denied12 NY3d 701 [2009]; Matter of Many v Village of Sharon Springs Bd. of Trustees, 218AD2d 845, 845-846 [1995]), and that is precisely the type of injury the neighbors allege theMountainville well will cause to their private wells. They further submitted the affidavit of ahydrogeologist in support of their claims, who opined that there was not "sufficient dataavailable" to justify DEC's lack of concern as to the "potential" threat. The neighbors therefore"asserted a concrete interest in the matter [DEC] is regulating, and a concrete injury from theagency's failure to follow procedure" sufficient to confer standing (Matter of Association for aBetter Long Is., Inc. v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 23 NY3d at 7). Themunicipalities made similar allegations that the approved use of the Mountainville well willeither affect the use of ground water in that area for municipal water supplies or impact residentswho may suffer impacts to their private wells as a result of the withdrawal. Inasmuch as theseallegations show "how [the municipalities'] personal or property rights, either personally or in arepresentative capacity, will be directly and specifically affected apart from any damage sufferedby the public at large, and [how they] will suffer an injury that is environmental and not solelyeconomic in nature," they also have standing (Matter of Town of Amsterdam v AmsterdamIndus. Dev. Agency, 95 AD3d at 1541 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Village of Canajoharie vPlanning Bd. of Town of Florida, 63 AD3d 1498, 1501 [2009]).
As the bulk of the proceeding No. 1 petitioners have standing, we turn to the merits of thearguments therein.[FN2]Initially, while we do not agree with its stated rationale, Supreme Court was correct in dismissingthe claims in proceeding No. 1 relating to the SEQRA determination rendered by the VillageBoard. There is no question that a challenge to the SEQRA determination itself is time-barredsince it was issued in 2012 and, regardless of how the proceeding No. 1 petitioners style theirclaims, "[a] four-month statute of limitations is applicable to allegations of SEQRA violations"(Matter of Eadie v Town Bd. of Town ofN. Greenbush, 22 AD3d 1025, 1027 [2005], affd 7 NY3d 306 [2006];see CPLR 217 [1]; Chase v Board of Educ. of Roxbury Cent. School Dist., 188AD2d 192, 195 [1993]). The proceeding No. 1 petitioners attempt to avoid this problem byarguing that they are not challenging the initial 2012 SEQRA determination, but rather the laterrefusal to reopen the SEQRA review process when changes in circumstances gave rise topotential significant adverse environmental impacts arising from the development of theMountainville site (see 6 NYCRR 617.7 [f]). Kiryas Joel made clear no later than July15, 2015 that it perceived nothing that would require "further re-consideration" under [*4]SEQRA, however, and proceeding No. 1 was not commenced untilNovember 27, 2015. Therefore, to the extent that refusal constituted a new determination capableof review (see Matter of Boyles v Town Bd. of Town of Bethlehem, 278 AD2d 688, 691[2000]), the attacks against it were untimely.
As for the arguments surrounding the issuance of the water withdrawal permit, DEC did notabuse its discretion in concluding that an adjudicatory hearing on the permit application wasunnecessary. Kiryas Joel retained a groundwater and environmental engineering firm to assessthe Mountainville site and conduct a 72-hour water pumping test. The test was conducted in 2011and found "stabilized yield and water-level drawdown at [the] pumping rate" sought in the permitapplication. DEC then conducted a legislative hearing where it heard public comments on thepermit application, after which it expressly found that the pump test had complied with therecommended procedures and that the proposed well would "safely yield the proposed. . . withdrawal amount . . . without interference impacts on sources ofother users." DEC further found that many of the concerns raised in the public commentsinvolved issues irrelevant to the permitting process and that relevant concerns, includingpotential impacts on nearby surface waters and other users of the aquifer, were either entirelyillusory or could be addressed if monitoring disclosed them. Indeed, DEC addressed the concernsof commenters without placing any major restrictions on the permitted water withdrawal,ensuring that any negative impacts of the water withdrawal would be detected by monitoring andaddressed (see ECL 70-0119 [1]; 6 NYCRR 621.8 [b]; 624.4 [c] [3]; Matter of Riverkeeper, Inc. v New YorkState Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 152 AD3d 1016, 1018 [2017]).[FN3] Therefore, mindful that "our roleis not to 'reweigh the factors and substitute [our] judgment for that of' " DEC, we cannotsay that its refusal to conduct an adjudicatory hearing was arbitrary and capricious (Matter of Eastern Niagara Project PowerAlliance v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 42 AD3d 857, 861 [2007],quoting Matter of Gallo v State of N.Y.,Off. of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities, 37 AD3d 984, 985 [2007]; seeMatter of Riverkeeper, Inc. v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 152 AD3d at1018).[FN4]
[*5] DEC was authorized to grant a permit after analyzing thefactors set forth in ECL 15-1503 and "suitably explained" that analysis in a written response tocomments by the public and rejoinders by Kiryas Joel made after the legislative hearing on thepermit application (Matter of Hudson Riv. Fisherman's Assn. v Williams, 139 AD2d 234,240 [1988]). After reviewing the record ourselves, we are satisfied that a rational basis supportedthe issuance of the permit (see id. at 238). DEC reviewed the significant documentationsubmitted with the application, conducting a public hearing and considered both the submittedcomments and the responses offered by Kiryas Joel. DEC largely agreed with Kiryas Joel'sresponses and, indeed, "accept[ed] and incorporate[d]" the bulk of them into its ownresponses.
Kiryas Joel described the efforts it had made to conserve water, efforts that had resulted inmajor reductions in water usage and which it intended to continue, but it simply would not havean adequate municipal water supply without developing a new source of water (see ECL15-1503 [2] [e], [g]). Kiryas Joel explained that, notwithstanding the spectral suspicions ofperfidy on the part of the proceeding No. 1 petitioners, it intended to complete construction of theaqueduct pipeline and use water from the aqueduct. DEC acknowledged the existence of theaqueduct as required under ECL 15-1503 (2) (a), but noted that it did not have jurisdiction overKiryas Joel's connection to that source. Even if Kiryas Joel had abandoned that plan, however, itprovided data showing how, in conjunction with its already permitted wells elsewhere, drawingwater from the Mountainville site could satisfy the maximum peak daily demand for municipalwater for the foreseeable future (see ECL 15-1503 [2] [a], [b]; 6 NYCRR 601.11 [c] [1],[2]). The limits placed on the daily water withdrawal ensured that the needs of Kiryas Joel, whichit detailed, would be met without excess (see ECL 15-1503 [2] [e]). DEC further cited thepump test—which it noted had been "conducted and reported in a scientifically rigorousmanner" that produced valid conclusions—to determine that the proposed maximum dailywater withdrawal would have no impact upon the water supply of others and would not harm theaquifer or other natural resources (see ECL 15-1503 [2] [c], [f]).
Kiryas Joel lastly represented, and DEC found no reason to doubt, that the proposed usewould comply with other applicable agreements and laws (see ECL 15-1503 [2] [h]). Theproceeding No. 1 petitioners and others submitted evidence in an effort to call the data and expertanalysis provided by Kiryas Joel into question, but we accord "great weight and judicialdeference" to the technical and factual judgment of DEC that the latter was reliable (Flacke vOnondaga Landfill Sys., 69 NY2d 355, 363 [1987]; see Matter of Gracie Point Community Council v New York State Dept. ofEnvtl. Conservation, 92 AD3d 123, 129 [2011], lv denied 19 NY3d 807 [2012]).DEC accordingly determined, and rationally so, that the statutory factors supported granting thewater withdrawal permit with conditions. We, as a result, will not disturb its decision to doso.
To the extent that petitioners' remaining arguments are not academic in light of the foregoing,we have examined them and found them to be meritless.
McCarthy, J.P., Egan Jr. and Lynch, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed,without costs.
Footnote 1:This Court granted a preliminaryinjunction pending the outcome of these appeals (2017 NY Slip Op 74402[U]).
Footnote 2:The proceeding No. 1 petitionerscross-moved for summary judgment before Kiryas Joel and the Village Board served an answerand, having "charted their own procedural course," they will not be heard to complain thatSupreme Court erred in reaching the merits of their claims (Becher v Feller, 64 AD3d 672, 676-677 [2009] [internal quotationmarks and citation omitted]; see ErieIns. Group v National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 63 AD3d 1412, 1414 n 2 [2009]).
Footnote 3:Kiryas Joel was required toimplement a "monitoring and action plan" for the Woodbury Creek and have approved mitigationmeasures ready in the event that the water withdrawal caused "a significant lowering ofWoodbury Creek water levels." It was further directed to "provide an adequate supply of water"to any "residents whose private drinking water wells are significantly diminished or renderednon-productive by the" approved withdrawal.
Footnote 4:According deference to theconclusion of DEC that none of the public comments raised "substantive and significant issues"that might "result in denial of the permit application, or the imposition of significant conditionsthereon" (6 NYCRR 621.8 [b]), there was no legal requirement to hold an adjudicatory hearing.The legislative hearing provided a sufficient opportunity to be heard under these circumstances,and an adjudicatory hearing was not required as a matter of due process (see Matter ofScherbyn v Wayne-Finger Lakes Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 77 NY2d 753, 757 [1991];Matter of Akshar v Mills, 249 AD2d 786, 787-788 [1998], lv dismissed 92 NY2d962 [1998]).