| Matter of Micklas v Town of Halfmoon Planning Bd. |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 02408 [170 AD3d 1483] |
| March 28, 2019 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Joseph J. Micklas Jr. et al.,Appellants, v Town of Halfmoon Planning Board et al.,Respondents. |
Miller, Mannix, Schachner & Hafner, LLC, Glens Falls (Jacquelyn P. White ofcounsel), for appellants.
Lyn A. Murphy, Halfmoon, for Town of Halfmoon Planning Board and another,respondents.
Whiteman Osterman & Hanna LLP, Albany (John J. Henry of counsel), for TheFairways of Halfmoon, LLC, respondent.
Devine, J. Appeals (1) from an order of the Supreme Court (Buchanan, J.), entered December1, 2017 in Saratoga County, which, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, deniedpetitioners' motion for a preliminary injunction, and (2) from a judgment of said court, enteredFebruary 5, 2018 in Saratoga County, which, among other things, dismissed petitioners'application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of respondentTown of Halfmoon Planning Board granting a request by respondent The Fairways of Halfmoon,LLC for a special use permit.
Respondent The Fairways of Halfmoon, LLC (hereinafter Fairways) operates a golf coursewith a building containing its clubhouse and pro shop, as well as a restaurant, bar and banquethouse, in the Town of Halfmoon, Saratoga County. By 1999, Fairways had secured fromrespondent Town of Halfmoon Planning Board the special use permit and site plan approval forthose uses demanded by chapter 165 of the Code of the Town of Halfmoon (hereinafter zoningcode). In 2017, Fairways applied for an amendment to the existing site plan and a special usepermit to, as is relevant here, build an addition to the existing bar and restaurant where beerwould be brewed for patrons' purchase and consumption. Petitioners own and/or reside onproperty nearby, and two of them, Joseph J. Micklas Jr. and James Frederick Hopeck, opposedthe applications on the grounds that the proposed brewpub was not a permitted use in the subjectAgriculture-Residence (hereinafter A-R) zoning district and that a brewpub would negativelyaffect the character of the neighborhood. The Planning Board issued the permit and amended thesite plan with conditions in May 2017.
Following that determination, Micklas wrote letters to the Town of Halfmoon Director ofCode Enforcement (hereinafter Director) asking whether any brewpub could be built in an A-Rdistrict "in accordance with the Town of Halfmoon Building Code." The Director responded thatthe building code did not speak to where a building could be constructed, then added in a secondletter that his office did not deal with zoning issues and that such questions must be directed tothe Planning Board. In September 2017, respondent Town of Halfmoon Zoning Board ofAppeals (hereinafter ZBA) upheld the Director's interpretation.
Petitioners commenced two CPLR article 78 proceedings, one challenging the PlanningBoard's determination and the other challenging the ZBA's determination. They unsuccessfullymoved for a preliminary injunction barring construction of the approved addition, and the matterswere consolidated. Supreme Court then dismissed the consolidated proceeding. Petitionersappeal from the order denying a preliminary injunction as well as the final judgment.
Initially, petitioners' appeal from the order denying their motion for a preliminary injunctionmust be dismissed, as no appeal lies as of right from a nonfinal order in a CPLR article 78proceeding (see CPLR 5701 [b] [1]; Matter of Fischer v Nyack Hosp., 140 AD3d 1264, 1265 n 2[2016]; Matter of Ballard v New YorkSafety Track LLC, 126 AD3d 1073, 1074 n 2 [2015]). Petitioners could have advancedany issues regarding that order on their appeal from the final judgment (see Matter of Fischerv Nyack Hosp., 140 AD3d at 1265 n 2), but failed to brief those issues and have thereforeabandoned them (see Board of Trusteesof the Vil. of Groton v Pirro, 152 AD3d 149, 153 n 1 [2017]).
Moving on to the appeal from the final judgment, we reject respondents' threshold contentionthat it is either moot or barred by laches. The fact that Fairways has substantially completed thebrewpub does not render the appeal moot, as the addition could still be razed or the brewingoperations within it enjoined (see Townof N. Elba v Grimditch, 131 AD3d 150, 156 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 903[2015]; Matter of Kowalczyk v Town ofAmsterdam Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 95 AD3d 1475, 1477 [2012]). Petitioners promptlychallenged the approvals issued by the Planning Board and moved for preliminary injunctiverelief after Fairways obtained a building permit and began construction work (see Matter of Citineighbors Coalition ofHistoric Carnegie Hill v New York City Landmarks Preserv. Commn., 2 NY3d 727, 729[2004]; Matter of Dreikausen v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of City of Long Beach, 98 NY2d165, 172-173 [2002]). Supreme Court did not grant the requested preliminary injunction, but alsomade clear that injunctive relief remained a possibility if petitioners ultimately prevailed and thatFairways had "every incentive to limit its construction activity" in the meantime. Fairways wasaccordingly "on notice that completion was undertaken at its own risk," and we cannot say thatthis appeal, which petitioners perfected in a timely fashion, is moot (Matter of Hart Family, LLC v Town ofLake George, 110 AD3d 1278, 1278 n 1 [2013]; see Town of N. Elba vGrimditch, 131 AD3d at 157; Matter of Defreestville Area Neighborhood Assn., Inc. v Planning Bd. ofTown of N. Greenbush, 16 AD3d 715, 717-718 [2005]; compare Matter of Weeks WoodlandsAssn., Inc. v Dormitory Auth. of the State of N.Y., 95 AD3d 747, 747-748 [2012],affd 20 NY3d 919 [2012]). The above circumstances further fail to reflect a prejudicial"neglect in promptly asserting a claim" by petitioners that would warrant applying the doctrine oflaches (Matter of Stockdale v Hughes, 189 AD2d 1065, 1067 [1993]; see Town of N.Elba v Grimditch, 131 AD3d at 158; Matter of Letourneau v Town of Berne, 89 AD3d 1202, 1203[2011]).
Turning to the merits, petitioners assert that the Planning Board failed to meet its obligationsunder the State Environmental Quality Review Act (see ECL art 8 [hereinafter SEQRA]).The Town Engineer characterized Fairways' proposal as a "type II action for which no SEQRAreview was required," and the Planning Board used the same characterization throughout theapplication review process (Matter ofAssociation for the Protection of the Adirondacks, Inc. v Town Bd. of Town of Tupper Lake,64 AD3d 825, 827 [2009]; see 6 NYCRR 617.5 [a], [former (c) (4), (7)]; 617.6 [a][1] [i]). The Planning Board nonetheless denoted the project as an unlisted action for SEQRApurposes and issued a negative declaration in its resolution amending the site plan and grantingthe special use permit (see 6 NYCRR 617.6 [a] [3]). Respondents suggest that theSEQRA language in the resolution was the result of a clerical error but, even if it was not, thePlanning Board had before it a short form environmental assessment form that gave no reason forconcern and the opinion of its Town Engineer that no further environmental review was needed.It conducted a review process in which it solicited input from neighbors, public safety officialsand other interested agencies, and that review established that the project was limited in scopeand confined to already disturbed areas around the clubhouse. Moreover, the few potentialenvironmental impacts arising from the brewpub were addressed, including parking and accessissues and concerns as to the disposal of brewing byproducts. The Planning Board thereafterdetermined in writing that there would be no significant adverse environmental impacts if theproject went forward and adopted the resolution containing a negative declaration. In our view,although it might have been better for the Planning Board to "set forth more of a reasonedelaboration for the basis of its determinations, this particular record is adequate for us to exerciseour supervisory review to determine that the [Planning] Board strictly complied with SEQRAprocedures" applicable to unlisted actions, and the negative declaration it made is supported by arational basis in the record (Matter ofEllsworth v Town of Malta, 16 AD3d 948, 950 [2005]; see 6 NYCRR 617.7; Matter of Friends of the Shawangunks, Inc.v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Gardiner, 56 AD3d 883, 884-885 [2008]).
As for the essence of the Planning Board's determination, the zoning code permits "[p]rivateor public recreation or playground area[s], golf club[s], country club[s], or other open recreationuses," but not "commercial facilities or amusement parks," as special uses in an A-R district(Code of Town of Halfmoon § 165-9 [B] [4]). Fairways has held a special usepermit authorizing it to operate a restaurant, bar and banquet house attendant to its golf clubsince the 1990s, and the time in which to challenge the propriety of those uses has long sinceexpired. Fairways sought an amended site plan and special use permit that allowed for theoperation of a brewpub as "an extension" of the bar and restaurant subject to its liquor license,albeit with an addition to make room for it. Fairways represented that its restaurant brewer'slicense limited retail sales of its beer to customers on site and that, although the amount brewedwould be dictated by customer demand, it would not exceed 400 kegs of beer a year. Inasmuch asthe clubhouse bar selling alcohol to customers is a permissible special use under the zoning codeas an attendant use to a golf club, the Planning Board had no obligation to, sua sponte, refer thematter to the ZBA for a superfluous interpretation as to whether an affiliated brewpub makingsimilar sales of its own beer at the same site under the same liquor license was a prohibited"commercial facilit[y]" (Code of Town of Halfmoon § 165-9 [B] [4]; see Matter of Thorne v Village ofMillbrook Planning Bd., 83 AD3d 723, 726 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 711[2011]; Matter of East Moriches Prop.Owners' Assn., Inc. v Planning Bd. of Town of Brookhaven, 66 AD3d 895, 897 [2009];see also Code of Town of Halfmoon § 165-79 [A]).[FN*] The Planning Board conducted a reviewprocess in which it considered the factors set forth by the zoning code, and ultimately allowed theproposed brewpub with conditions intended to minimize its negative impact on neighbors andensure that it would function as a permitted amenity of the golf club rather than a "stand alonebusiness" (see Code of Town of Halfmoon § 165-83). This was a rationaldetermination "that the proposed project complied with any legislatively imposed conditions onan otherwise permitted use so as to warrant the issuance of a special use permit and site planapproval," and it will not be disturbed (Matter of Catskill Heritage Alliance, Inc. v Crossroads Ventures, LLC,161 AD3d 1413, 1417 [2018] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted];see Matter of Retail Prop. Trust v Board of Zoning Appeals of Town of Hempstead, 98NY2d 190, 195 [2002]).
As for that part of the appeal dealing with the determination of the ZBA, "[c]ourts aregenerally prohibited from issuing advisory opinions or ruling on hypothetical inquiries. . . [and] an appeal is moot unless an adjudication of the merits will result inimmediate and practical consequences to the parties" (Coleman v Daines, 19 NY3d 1087, 1090 [2012] [citation omitted];see Matter of New York State Commn.on Jud. Conduct v Rubenstein, 23 NY3d 570, 576 [2014]). The challenged ZBAdetermination arose from a vague question, posed by Micklas to the Director, as to whether ageneric brewpub could ever be built in an A-R zoning district "in accordance with the Town ofHalfmoon Building Code." The Director replied that the building code did not speak to theproper location of a brewpub—adding that zoning questions regarding the siting of aspecific building could be addressed by the Planning Board—and the ZBA agreed with hisassessment. Inasmuch as the ZBA's determination had no connection to either the prior approvalof the Fairways brewpub by the Planning Board or the building permit issued thereafter,addressing it would not have any "immediate and practical consequences" for the parties(Coleman v Daines, 19 NY3d at 1090). Thus, Supreme Court correctly declined to ruleon it.
Garry, P.J., Egan Jr., Lynch and Rumsey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the appeal from the orderis dismissed, without costs. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.
Footnote *:Petitioners additionally failed torequest that the Planning Board seek an interpretation of the zoning code from the ZBA on thispoint and cannot be heard to argue about the absence of one now (see Matter of Harvey v Zoning Bd. ofAppeals of the City of Kingston, 166 AD3d 1149, 1152 [2018]; Matter of Klingamanv Miller, 168 AD2d 856, 857-858 [1990]).