Matter of Town of Waterford v New York State Dept. of Envtl.Conservation
2020 NY Slip Op 06180 [187 AD3d 1437]
October 29, 2020
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, December 4, 2019


[*1]
 In the Matter of Town of Waterford et al.,Appellants,
v
New York State Department of Environmental Conservation et al.,Respondents. (Proceeding No. 1.) In the Matter of Town of Halfmoon et al., Appellants, v NewYork State Department of Environmental Conservation et al., Respondents. (Proceeding No.2.)

Miller, Mannix, Schachner & Hafner, LLC, Glens Falls (Mark Schachner of counsel),for Town of Waterford and others, appellants.

Nolan Heller Kauffman LLP, Albany (David A. Engel of counsel), for Town of Halfmoonand others, appellants.

Letitia James, Attorney General, Albany (Meredith G. Lee-Clark of counsel), for New YorkState Department of Environmental Conservation, respondent.

Bond, Schoeneck & King PLLC, Syracuse (Kevin M. Bernstein of counsel), for Townof Colonie and others, respondents.

Todd D. Ommen, Pace Environmental Litigation Clinic, White Plains, for Riverkeeper, Inc.,amicus curiae.

Devine, J. Appeals (1) from an order of the Supreme Court (Crowell, J.), entered July 16,2018 in Saratoga County, which, in two proceedings pursuant to CPLR article 78, granted amotion by respondent Department of Environmental Conservation to change venue, and (2) froma judgment of said court (Young, J.), entered January 25, 2019 in Albany County, which, in twoproceedings pursuant to CPLR article 78, dismissed the amended petitions.

Respondent Town of Colonie (hereinafter Colonie) owns a landfill, located near the banks ofthe Mohawk River in Albany County, that is currently operated by respondent Capital RegionLandfills, Inc. (hereinafter CRL) under the authority of a solid waste management facility permitissued by respondent Department of Environmental Conservation (hereinafter DEC) (seeECL 27-0703; 6 NYCRR former part 360). As the landfill was running out of space, Colonieapplied for modification of the DEC permit and other permits needed for the landfill to expandabove and next to the existing site. DEC assumed lead agency status and issued a positivedeclaration pursuant to the State Environmental Quality Review Act (see ECL art 8[hereinafter SEQRA]), after which it embarked upon a years-long review of the environmentalimpacts of the landfill expansion. At the conclusion of that process, DEC determined that thelandfill expansion would not have a significant negative environmental impact and granted thenecessary approvals with conditions intended to head off such impacts, including barringoperations within 500 feet of the river and capping the maximum height of the landfill.

Two Saratoga County municipalities on the far bank of the river and several of theirresidents—namely, petitioner Town of Waterford and 11 of its residents (hereinaftercollectively referred to as the Waterford petitioners) in proceeding No. 1 and petitioner Town ofHalfmoon and five of its residents (hereinafter collectively referred to as the Halfmoonpetitioners) in proceeding No. 2—commenced these CPLR article 78 proceedings againstvarious entities to, among other things, challenge DEC's SEQRA findings and the ensuingpermits. As is relevant here, Colonie and CRL answered the petitions and amended petitions andraised the objection that petitioners lacked standing to sue. DEC also joined issue but, beforedoing so, served demands to change the venue of both proceedings from Saratoga County toAlbany County. The rejection of those demands led to a motion by DEC to change venue thatwas granted by Supreme Court (Crowell, J.) in July 2018. Thereafter, Supreme Court (Young, J.)issued a January 2019 judgment in which it determined that petitioners lacked standing anddismissed the amended petitions. Petitioners appeal from the July 2018 order and the January2019 judgment.[FN1]

To begin, inasmuch as the issue of petitioners' standing to challenge DEC's actions wasraised, they were obliged to show an actual stake in the controversy by "establishing both aninjury-in-fact and that the asserted injury is within the zone of interests sought to be protected bythe statute alleged to have been violated" (Matter of Association for a Better Long Is., Inc. v New York State Dept. ofEnvtl. Conservation, 23 NY3d 1, 6 [2014]; see Matter of New York State Bd. of Regents v State Univ. of N.Y., 178AD3d 11, 17 [2019], lvs denied 35 NY3d 912 [2020]; Matter of Village of Woodbury vSeggos, 154 AD3d 1256, 1258 [2017]). As petitioners correctly note, the fact that theindividual petitioners reside some distance away from the landfill did not preclude them fromhaving standing to challenge the determinations permitting its expansion (see Matter of Save the Pine Bush, Inc. vCommon Council of City of Albany, 13 NY3d 297, 304-305 [2009]; Matter of Hohman v Town ofPoestenkill, 179 AD3d 1172, 1173-1174 [2020]). That said, many of the impacts allegedwere either economic impacts that do not afford standing to challenge a SEQRA determination(see Matter of Association for a Better Long Is., Inc. v New York State Dept. of Envtl.Conservation, 23 NY3d at 8-9; Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk, 77NY2d 761, 777 [1991]; Matter ofVillage of Canajoharie v Planning Bd. of Town of Florida, 63 AD3d 1498, 1501-1502[2009]) or amounted to displeasure with the sights and smells of the landfill that would notordinarily be "specific to the individuals who allege it, and . . . 'different in kind ordegree from the public at large' " so as to afford standing (Matter of Sierra Club v Village of PaintedPost, 26 NY3d 301, 311 [2015], quoting Society of Plastics Indus. v County ofSuffolk, 77 NY2d at 778; see Matter of Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v Common Council ofCity of Albany, 13 NY3d at 306; Matter of Finger Lakes Zero Waste Coalition, Inc. v Martens, 95 AD3d1420, 1422 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 811 [2012]; Matter of Save Our Main St.Bldgs. v Greene County Legislature, 293 AD2d 907, 908 [2002], lv denied 98 NY2d609 [2002]).

It nevertheless appears that at least some of the petitioners will suffer distinct environmentalharm under the circumstances presented in these proceedings. For instance, although one mightexpect the visual impact of the landfill expansion to be widespread, DEC specifically found thatthe impact would be limited and that the areas where the individual petitioners live and/ormaintain recreation facilities would be among the few having a "generally unobstructed" view ofthe landfill. Many of the individual petitioners confirmed that they can see the landfill from theirresidences, explained how they are personally impacted by the sights, sounds, smells and dustgenerated by operations there, and further articulated how those impacts will worsen if thelandfill expansion goes forward (see Matter of Sierra Club v Village of Painted Post, 26NY3d at 311; Matter of Cady v Town ofGermantown Planning Bd., 184 AD3d 983, 985-986 [2020]; Matter of Humane Socy. of U.S. v EmpireState Dev. Corp., 53 AD3d 1013, 1017 [2008], lv denied 12 NY3d 701 [2009];compare Matter of Finger Lakes Zero Waste Coalition, Inc. v Martens, 95 AD3d at1422-1423). Moreover, the Halfmoon petitioners alleged that those impacts will impair the useand enjoyment of Halfmoon's public park, trails and boat launches across the river, while one ofthe individual Halfmoon petitioners described how she was intimately involved in thedevelopment of a trail system and boat launch along the river and was similarly concerned bythose impacts (see Matter of Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v Common Council of City ofAlbany, 13 NY3d at 306). Standing rules are not to be applied in a manner so restrictive thatagency actions are insulated from judicial review and, in our view, the foregoing was sufficient toestablish that at least some of the petitioners in each proceeding will suffer environmentalimpacts different from those experienced by the general public so as to afford standing to sue(see Matter of Sierra Club v Village of Painted Post, 26 NY3d at 311; Matter of Savethe Pine Bush, Inc. v Common Council of City of Albany, 13 NY3d at 306; Matter ofVillage of Woodbury v Seggos, 154 AD3d at 1259-1260; Matter of Town of Amsterdam v Amsterdam Indus. Dev. Agency, 95AD3d 1539, 1541-1542 [2012]). Accordingly, although not every petitioner may haveestablished standing (see Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce v Pataki, 100 NY2d801, 813 [2003], cert denied 540 US 1017 [2003]), Supreme Court (Young, J.) erred indismissing either proceeding on standing grounds.

Inasmuch as the record before us permits an assessment of the merits of petitioners'arguments, we choose to address them in the interest of judicial economy rather than remit forSupreme Court to do so (see Matter ofTorres v Stanford, 173 AD3d 1537, 1538 [2019]). In the absence of a need for remittal,petitioners' arguments regarding the appropriate venue of these proceedings are academic.Petitioners' challenges to DEC's determinations are, more importantly, unpersuasive.

Pursuant to the regulations then in effect, the application by Colonie to modify its solid wastemanagement facility permit was to be treated as a "new" application "[f]or the purposes of" theuniform procedures set forth in 6 NYCRR part 621 (6 NYCRR former 360-1.8 [e] [1];see ECL 70-0115 [2] [d]; 6 NYCRR 621.11 [h]). DEC did so, but the Waterfordpetitioners argue that such a "new" application should have also been treated as one for an "initialpermit to construct and operate a landfill" subject to the requirements of 6 NYCRR former360-2.3.[FN2] DEC declinedto do so upon the grounds that the application related to the expansion of an already permittedlandfill rather than the initial construction of one—thereby removing it from the ambit of 6NYCRR former 360-2.3—and that 6 NYCRR former 360-1.8 only required theapplication to be treated as "new" for purposes of the review procedures set forth in 6 NYCRRpart 621. This interpretation finds support in the regulatory language and, according deference toDEC's reading of its own regulations, we perceive no reason to disturb it (see e.g. Matter of Gracie Point CommunityCouncil v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 92 AD3d 123, 129 [2011],lv denied 19 NY3d 807 [2012]). It is accordingly irrelevant whether the application wascomplete within the meaning of 6 NYCRR former 360-2.3.

Petitioners further argue, with the support of amicus curiae, that DEC should have conductedan adjudicatory hearing on issues raised during the SEQRA review. An adjudicatory hearing isrequired in the absence of disagreement between DEC and the project applicant where, as isrelevant here, comments submitted during the review process disclose "substantive andsignificant issues relating to any [necessary] findings or determinations . . . ,including the reasonable likelihood that a permit . . . will be denied or can begranted only with major modifications to the project" (6 NYCRR 621.8 [b]; see Matter of Catskill Heritage Alliance,Inc. v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 161 AD3d 11, 18-19 [2018], lvdenied 32 NY3d 904 [2018]; Matterof Riverkeeper, Inc. v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 152 AD3d 1016,1018 [2017]). During its review, DEC examined its potential environmental impacts andreceived a multitude of comments from petitioners and others on issues that included theoffensive sights, smells and sounds of the landfill as well as the possibility that its expansionwould disturb a nearby hazardous waste site.[FN3] DEC responded to those concerns by citing areport finding that the landfill expansion would not impair the monitorability of the hazardouswaste site or any future remediation efforts and determining that whatever new aesthetic impactswould arise from the landfill expansion had already been studied and addressed throughmodifications, such as increasing the landfill expansion's setback from the Mohawk River andlimiting its eventual height. DEC is entitled to deference on those technical assessments (seeMatter of Catskill Heritage Alliance, Inc. v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation,161 AD3d at 19) and, in our view, rationally determined that petitioners had not shown theexistence of ongoing "substantive and significant issues" regarding the landfill expansion thatwould require an adjudicatory hearing to address (6 NYCRR 621.8 [d]; see Matter of Villageof Woodbury v Seggos, 154 AD3d at 1261; Matter of Eastern Niagara Project Power Alliance v New York State Dept.of Envtl. Conservation, 42 AD3d 857, 861 [2007]).

The Waterford petitioners finally challenge the SEQRA determination itself, which we willnot disturb so long as DEC identified the pertinent areas of environmental concern, took a hardlook at them and advanced a reasoned elaboration of the grounds for its determination (see Matter of Friends of P.S. 163, Inc. vJewish Home Lifecare, Manhattan, 30 NY3d 416, 430 [2017]; Matter of Chinese Staff & Workers'Assn. v Burden, 19 NY3d 922, 924 [2012]; Matter of Troy Sand & Gravel Co., Inc. v Town of Sand Lake, 185AD3d 1306, 1310 [2020]). Under this deferential standard of review, "it is not the role of thecourts to weigh the desirability of any action or choose among alternatives, but to assure that theagency itself has satisfied SEQRA, procedurally and substantively" (Matter of Jackson v NewYork State Urban Dev. Corp., 67 NY2d 400, 416 [1986]; accord Matter of Friends ofP.S. 163, Inc. v Jewish Home Lifecare, Manhattan, 30 NY3d at 430).

The primary complaint in this regard is that DEC failed in its obligation to adequatelyexplore alternatives to the landfill expansion and the impact if no action at all were taken(see ECL 8-0109 [2]; Matter ofKeil v Greenway Heritage Conservancy for the Hudson Riv. Val., Inc., 184 AD3d 1048,1051-1052 [2020]). DEC discussed the available alternatives at length in the SEQRA findingsstatement, however, noting that a landfill would be needed regardless of the waste disposaltechnologies deployed and that alternative sites and development scenarios for the Colonielandfill were impossible or impractical for various economic and environmental reasons. DECalso explicitly explored what would occur if no action were taken and the landfill allowed toclose when it ran out of space, which DEC determined would have negative environmentalimpacts for the simple reason that waste would continue to be generated and need to be placedsomewhere. The record provides support for DEC's findings that, in the event of the Colonielandfill's closure, local landfill options would be unable to handle the volume of waste generatedand that there would be both increased waste hauling costs borne by localities and environmentalimpacts to all in the form of increased greenhouse gas emissions generated by the vehiclesneeded to haul the waste to other landfills hundreds of miles away. Petitioners find theseexplanations to be unpersuasive and suggest that DEC overlooked other alternatives, but wecannot substitute our "judgment of the facts and alternatives for that of [DEC]," nor can werequire that DEC go beyond the dictates of SEQRA to explore "every conceivable environmentalimpact, mitigating measure or alternative" (Matter of Keil v Greenway Heritage Conservancyfor the Hudson Riv. Val., Inc., 184 AD3d at 1051 [internal quotation marks and citationsomitted]; see Matter of Friends of P.S. 163, Inc. v Jewish Home Lifecare, Manhattan, 30NY3d at 430). Suffice it to say, the foregoing reflects that DEC adequately consideredalternatives to the proposed landfill expansion and, overall, we are satisfied that DEC took a hardlook at the proposed landfill expansion. Thus, DEC's determination to approve it with mitigatingconditions was rational.

Garry, P.J., Clark, Pritzker and Colangelo, JJ., concur. Ordered that the appeals from theorder are dismissed, without costs. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

Footnotes


Footnote 1:No appeal as of right lies from anonfinal order in a CPLR article 78 proceeding and we therefore dismiss petitioners' appealsfrom the July 2018 order (see CPLR 5701 [b] [1]; Matter of Robinson v DiNapoli, 172 AD3d 1513, 1515 n [2019],lv dismissed and denied 34 NY3d 1144 [2020]; Matter of Micklas v Town of Halfmoon Planning Bd., 170 AD3d1483, 1484-1485 [2019]). Arguments relating to such an order may be raised on the appealsfrom the final judgment (see Matter of Robinson v DiNapoli, 172 AD3d at 1515 n).

Footnote 2:The environmental analyst whoreviewed Colonie's permit applications averred that the requirements for an "initial permit" setforth by 6 NYCRR former 360-2.3 were satisfied, implying that they needed to be. DEC madeclear in its responses to comments during the SEQRA review, however, that it was "not requiredto consider [Colonie's] expansion application as an initial application for a new solid wastemanagement facility and has not done so."

Footnote 3:Notwithstanding the complaintsof the Waterford petitioners, the alleged impacts of the landfill expansion upon the hazardouswaste site were properly investigated and addressed as required by 6 NYCRR former 360-1.9 (g).


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