| People v Dazzo |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 01268 [92 AD3d 796] |
| February 14, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Robert Dazzo, Appellant. |
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Kathleen M. Rice, District Attorney, Mineola, N.Y. (Yael V. Levy and Joseph Mogelnicki ofcounsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Grella, J.),rendered January 13, 2010, convicting him of assault in the second degree and assault in the thirddegree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying, without ahearing, the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea of guilty. A motion to withdraw a plea ofguilty is addressed to the sound discretion of the Supreme Court, and its determination generallywill not be disturbed absent an improvident exercise of discretion (see People v Seeber, 4 NY3d 780[2005]; People v Caruso, 88 AD3d809 [2011]; People v Amanze,87 AD3d 1159 [2011]; People vPerez, 83 AD3d 738, 739 [2011]). "When a defendant moves to withdraw a guilty plea,the nature and extent of the fact-finding inquiry 'rest[s] largely in the discretion of the Judge towhom the motion is made' and a hearing will be required only in rare instances" (People v Brown, 14 NY3d 113,116 [2010], quoting People v Tinsley, 35 NY2d 926, 927 [1974]; see People vCaruso, 88 AD3d at 809).
Here, the record supports the Supreme Court's determination that the defendant's plea wasentered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently (see People v Fiumefreddo, 82 NY2d536, 543 [1993]; People v Harris, 61 NY2d 9, 16-17 [1983]). The defendant's postpleaassertions regarding his innocence and the defense of justification contradicted the admissions hemade under oath at his plea allocution, and were insufficient to warrant withdrawal of his plea ora hearing (see People v Dixon, 29 NY2d 55, 57 [1971]; People v Douglas, 83 AD3d 1092,1093 [2011]; People v Perez, 83 AD3d at 739; People v Bunn, 79 AD3d 1143 [2010]; People v Duncan, 78 AD3d 1193[2010]).
The defendant's claim that his attorney coerced him to plead guilty is belied by his statementsunder oath acknowledging that he was voluntarily pleading guilty, and that nobody had made anythreats or forced him to enter his plea (see People v Caruso, 88 AD3d at 810; People v Jackson, 87 AD3d 552,553 [2011]; People v Douglas, 83 AD3d at 1093; People v Perez, 83 AD3d at739). Moreover, the statements allegedly made by the defendant's attorney do not raise an issueas to the [*2]voluntariness of the defendant's plea (see People v Cruz, 88 AD3d 498[2011]; People v Chimilio, 83AD3d 537 [2011]; People vElting, 18 AD3d 770, 771 [2005]; People v Charles, 256 AD2d 472, 473 [1998];People v Samuel, 208 AD2d 776, 777 [1994]). Further, the defendant acknowledged thathe was satisfied with the representation he had received from his attorney, who negotiated ahighly advantageous plea agreement on his behalf, and there is nothing in the record which castsdoubt on the apparent effectiveness of the defendant's attorney (see People v Caruso, 88AD3d at 810; People v Watt, 82AD3d 912, 913 [2011]; People v Bunn, 79 AD3d at 1143).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit. Mastro, A.P.J., Angiolillo, Eng andCohen, JJ., concur.