Murnane Bldg. Contrs., LLC v Cameron Hill Constr., LLC
2018 NY Slip Op 02107 [159 AD3d 1602]
March 23, 2018
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, May 2, 2018


[*1]
  Murnane Building Contractors, LLC, Appellant, v CameronHill Construction, LLC, et al., Defendants, and Syracuse University,Respondent.

Couch White, LLP, Albany (Jeremy M. Smith of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant.

Hancock Estabrook, LLP, Syracuse (John G. Powers of counsel), fordefendant-respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County (Donald A. Greenwood, J.),entered June 24, 2016. The order granted the pre-answer motion of defendant SyracuseUniversity to dismiss the complaint against it and to vacate a mechanic's lien.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the lawwithout costs, the motion is denied, the mechanic's lien is reinstated, and the complaint isreinstated against defendant Syracuse University.

Memorandum: This action arises from a construction project in which Syracuse University(defendant) entered into a series of contracts with a number of entities, including defendantCameron Hill Construction, LLC (Cameron). Plaintiff was a subcontractor of Cameron on theproject, which was to culminate in the construction of a building that was located on propertyowned by defendant. Defendant would lease the land to Cameron via a ground lease, Cameronand other entities would construct a building on that land pursuant to defendant's specifications,and defendant would then lease back certain parts of the building through several intermediateleases. The ground lease between defendant and Cameron provided, inter alia, that "[n]othing inthis [l]ease shall be construed as the consent or request of [defendant], express or implied, byinference or otherwise, to any contractor, subcontractor, laborer or materialman for theperformance of any labor or the furnishing of any material for any improvement, alteration, orrepair of the [p]remises, the [i]mprovements, or any part of either." Construction was delayed,and defendant and Cameron eventually entered into a right of entry agreement and then amodified right of entry agreement (collectively, rights of entry), which permitted certain specifiedconstruction work on the property to go forward. The rights of entry included a provisionrequiring that Cameron obtain a mechanic's lien waiver from plaintiff. To comply with thatrequirement, plaintiff executed a document indicating that plaintiff "waives and releases all liensor rights of lien now existing for work, labor, or materials furnished to 4/30/2014" (lienwaiver). Plaintiff later filed a mechanic's lien on the property based on allegations that plaintiffwas not paid for work performed pursuant to the rights of entry, and plaintiff commenced thisaction seeking, inter alia, to foreclose on the mechanic's lien.

Defendant made a pre-answer motion to vacate the mechanic's lien and dismiss the complaintagainst it pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and (7), on the grounds that, inter alia, documentaryevidence established that defendant did not consent to the improvements within the meaning ofthe Lien Law, and that plaintiff released the lien. We agree with plaintiff that Supreme Courterred in granting the motion, and we therefore reverse the order, deny the motion, reinstate themechanic's lien, and reinstate the complaint against defendant.

[*2] It is well settled that, in the context of a motion to dismissthe complaint, we must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiff[ ] thebenefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fitwithin any cognizable legal theory" (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]). Amotion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) will be granted if the plaintiff does not have a cause ofaction (see id. at 88), and a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) will be granted if "thedocumentary evidence resolves all factual issues as a matter of law, and conclusively disposes ofthe [plaintiff's] claim[s]" (BaumannRealtors, Inc. v First Columbia Century-30, LLC, 113 AD3d 1091, 1092 [4th Dept2014] [internal quotation marks omitted]). The court may "freely consider affidavits submitted bythe plaintiff to remedy any defects in the complaint" (Leon, 84 NY2d at 88; see Sargiss v Magarelli, 12 NY3d527, 531 [2009]).

The Lien Law provides in relevant part that a "subcontractor . . . who performslabor or furnishes materials for the improvement of real property with the consent or at therequest of the owner thereof . . . shall have a lien for the principal and interest, ofthe value, or the agreed price, of such labor . . . or materials upon the real propertyimproved or to be improved and upon such improvement, from the time of filing a notice of suchlien as prescribed in this chapter" (§ 3). "The term 'consent' within the meaning ofLien Law § 3 is not mere acquiescence and benefit, but [it is] some affirmative actor course of conduct establishing confirmation . . . Such consent may be inferredfrom the . . . conduct of the owner[ ] . . . Therefore, the owner[ ] musteither be an affirmative factor in procuring the improvement to be made, or having possessionand control of the premises assent to the improvement in the expectation that [the owner] willreap the benefit of it" (Tomaselli vOneida County Indus. Dev. Agency, 77 AD3d 1315, 1316-1317 [4th Dept 2010][internal quotation marks omitted]).

We reject defendant's contention that the documentary evidence that it submitted is sufficientto establish as a matter of law that it did not consent to the improvements that were performed byplaintiff and that gave rise to the mechanic's lien. Defendant relies upon a clause in the groundlease, which provides that defendant did not consent to any work done on the project. We havepreviously stated that "a 'requirement in a contract between . . . landlord and tenant[] that the . . . tenant shall make certain improvements on the premises is a sufficientconsent of the owner to charge his property with claims which accrue in making thoseimprovements' " (Ferrara vPeaches Caffe LLC, 138 AD3d 1391, 1393 [4th Dept 2016], lv granted 29 NY3d917 [2017], quoting Jones v Menke, 168 NY 61, 64 [1901]; cf. e.g. Tri-North Bldrs. vDi Donna, 217 AD2d 886, 887 [3d Dept 1995]). The "consent [for purposes of Lien Law§ 3] may be inferred from the terms of the lease and the conduct of the owner" (J.K. Tobin Constr. Co., Inc. v David J.Hardy Constr. Co., Inc., 64 AD3d 1206, 1208 [4th Dept 2009] [internal quotation marksomitted]). In addition, after owners, tenants, lessors and others with an interest in the property"have given their consent to an improvement, they cannot by any arrangement among themselvescut off the rights of lienors" (McNulty Bros. v Offerman, 221 NY 98, 105 [1917]; seeGrassi & Bro. v Lovisa & Pistoresi, Inc., 259 NY 417, 423 [1932]; seegenerally West-Fair Elec. Contrs. v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 87 NY2d 148, 156-159[1995]).

Here, it is clear from the terms of the ground lease and the rights of entry that the entirepurpose of those agreements was to construct a building, of which defendant would obtain thebenefit. In addition, the record establishes that defendant was aware that plaintiff would beperforming work on the project. Indeed, in the ground lease, defendant specifically "agrees thatMurnane Building Contractors Inc. [i.e., plaintiff] is an acceptable contractor," and the originalright of entry provides, inter alia, that "Cameron . . . will . . . deliver[ ]. . . a payment and performance bond for the Project Work provided by MurnaneBuilding Contractors, Inc." Thus, based on the inconsistencies in the documents submitted bydefendant with respect to whether defendant consented to plaintiff performing work on theproject within the meaning of the Lien Law, we cannot conclude that "the allegations in thecomplaint, taken as true, fail to state any cognizable cause of action against [defendant],. . . or that the documentary evidence submitted by . . . defendant[ ]conclusively disposes of . . . plaintiff['s] causes of action" (Clement v Delaney Realty Corp., 45AD3d 519, 521 [2d Dept 2007]; see generally Ferrara, 138 AD3d at1393-1394).

We also reject defendant's contention that the complaint was properly dismissed based on thelien waiver. Of paramount importance, the lien waiver by its terms applied only to claimsaccruing prior to April 30, 2014, and the allegations in the complaint include claims accruing[*3]after that date. Thus, the plain language of the lien waiverdoes not release those later claims. Moreover, "[w]here a waiver form purports to acknowledgethat no further payments are owed, but the parties' conduct indicates otherwise, the instrumentwill not be construed as a release" (Leonard E. Riedl Constr., Inc. v Homeyer, 105 AD3d 1391, 1392[4th Dept 2013] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, plaintiff submitted affidavitsindicating that the parties' actions and course of dealing demonstrate that the lien waiver shouldnot be construed as a release (see generally Apollo Steel Corp. v Sicolo & Massaro,300 AD2d 1021, 1022 [4th Dept 2002]) and, therefore, "the documentary evidence warranted thedenial of [the] pre-answer motion to dismiss" (Dienst v Paik Constr., Inc., 139 AD3d 607, 608 [1st Dept2016]).

Finally, it is well settled that contentions that are raised for the first time in a reply brief arenot properly before us (seeBecker-Manning, Inc. v Common Council of City of Utica, 114 AD3d 1143, 1144 [4thDept 2014]; Stubbs v Capellini, 108AD3d 1057, 1059 [4th Dept 2013]; Turner v Canale, 15 AD3d 960, 961 [4th Dept 2005], lv denied5 NY3d 702 [2005]). We therefore do not review plaintiff's contentions that the lien waiveris merely a receipt, and that the lien waiver is invalid because plaintiff never received thepayment reflected in the lease. Present—Whalen, P.J., Smith, Lindley, NeMoyer andTroutman, JJ.


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