Matter of Sullivan Farms II, Inc. v Town of Mamakating PlanningBd.
2018 NY Slip Op 07023 [165 AD3d 1447]
October 18, 2018
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, November 28, 2018


[*1]
 In the Matter of Sullivan Farms II, Inc.,Appellant,
v
Town of Mamakating Planning Board et al., Respondents, et al.,Respondent.

Whiteman Osterman & Hanna LLP, Albany (Robert S. Rosborough IV of counsel), forappellant.

Jacobowitz and Gubits, LLP, Walden (J. Benjamin Gailey of counsel), for Town ofMamakating Planning Board and others, respondents.

Mulvey, J. Appeal from that part of a judgment of the Supreme Court (Mott, J.), enteredFebruary 14, 2017 in Ulster County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a combinedproceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment, to review adetermination of respondent Town of Mamakating Planning Board rescinding subdivision andsite plan approval for a development.

This dispute arises out of petitioner's development of Chestnut Ridge, a 396-unit townhousecomplex in the Village of Bloomingburg, Sullivan County. In 2010, the Planning Board forrespondent Village of Bloomingburg granted petitioner subdivision and site plan approval forChestnut Ridge, premised in part upon the Village Trustee's completion of a final environmentalimpact statement pursuant to the State Environmental Quality Review Act (see ECL art 8[hereinafter SEQRA]) and the related findings statement subsequently adopted by the VillagePlanning Board. According to the SEQRA findings statement, Chestnut Ridge was expected toincrease the Village's population by 810 people—approximately two persons perunit—including 110 school-aged children. In June 2014, respondent Town of Mamakatingand the Village entered into an intermunicipal agreement (hereinafter IMA) granting respondentTown of Mamakating Planning Board "the power, authority and responsibilities carried out bythe Village . . . Planning Board, which include, but are not limited to, review anddecision on applications for special use permits, site plans and subdivisions, preparation and/orreview of comprehensive plans, review and comment on proposed zoning amendments, and anyother powers, authority and responsibilities carried out by planning boards pursuant to the stateVillage Law and local law, and as those statutory and local law provisions may be amended"(see Village Law § 7-741). By its terms, this agreement could "beterminated by either party upon [60] days written notice to the other party."

In April 2016, as construction on Chestnut Ridge continued, documents about petitioner'sdevelopment plans became public during the course of federal litigation. These documentsindicated that petitioner intended to market Chestnut Ridge—which it referred to as phaseone of a more expansive project—to families having, on average, eight children each.Based upon these documents, the Town Planning Board issued a notice stating that it intended toconsider rescinding petitioner's 2010 subdivision and site plan approval. On July 13, 2016, theVillage notified the Town that it had adopted a resolution terminating the IMA and requested thatthe Town Planning Board cease any decision-making regarding real property located in theVillage. That same day, the Town Planning Board rescinded petitioner's 2010 subdivision andsite plan approval for Chestnut Ridge, except with respect to any dwelling units that were"completely constructed or to the roadways and other infrastructure required to service thosedwelling units."

Petitioner thereafter commenced this hybrid CPLR article 78 proceeding and declaratoryjudgment action seeking, among other things, an order annulling the Town Planning Board'srescission of petitioner's subdivision and site plan approvals, declaring that such approvalsremained in effect and that petitioner had a constitutional vested right to complete ChestnutRidge, and enjoining the Town from exercising authority over the development. Supreme Court,among other things, partially granted the petition/complaint by annulling that portion of theTown Planning Board's determination as prohibited the future issuance of building permits andcertificates of occupancy in connection with Chestnut Ridge, and otherwise dismissed thepetition/complaint. Petitioner now appeals, claiming that the Town Planning Board's rescissionof the prior subdivision and site plan approvals was arbitrary, capricious and in excess of itsauthority and that it has a vested right to complete the project.

All parties acknowledge that the Village Planning Board has since granted an application bypetitioner to reaffirm the subdivision and site plan approvals that had been rescinded by theTown Planning Board. It is well settled that "[t]he jurisdiction of this Court extends only to livecontroversies" (Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce v Pataki, 100 NY2d 801,810-811 [2003], cert denied 540 US 1017 [2003]) and, as such, an appeal will beconsidered "moot unless an adjudication of the merits will result in immediate and practicalconsequences to the parties" (Coleman vDaines, 19 NY3d 1087, 1090 [2012]; see Matter of Veronica P. v Radcliff A., 24 NY3d 668, 671 [2015];Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne, 50 NY2d 707, 714 [1980]). Where, as here, "a change incircumstances prevents a court from rendering a decision that would effectively determine anactual controversy, the claim must be dismissed" (Matter of Ballard v New York Safety Track LLC, 126 AD3d 1073,1075 [2015] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; accord Matter of Truscott v City of Albany Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 152AD3d 1038, 1039 [2017]; see Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne, 50 NY2d at 713-714;Matter of Czajka v Dellehunt, 125AD3d 1177, 1180 [2015]). By all accounts, the Village Planning Board's subsequentdetermination reaffirming the subdivision and site plan approvals supplanted, superseded andeffectively rescinded the determination of the Town Planning Board that is the subject of thisappeal.[FN*] Inasmuch aspetitioner's rights are no longer "actually controverted" and a determination of this appeal wouldnot affect the rights of the parties, the appeal must be dismissed as moot (Matter of HearstCorp. v Clyne, 50 NY2d at 713; see CPLR 5511; Matter of Truscott v City ofAlbany Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 152 AD3d at 1039; Matter of Ballard v New York SafetyTrack LLC, 126 AD3d at 1075; Matter of Brennan, 112 AD3d 1248, 1249 [2013]; Matter of NRG Energy, Inc. v Crotty,18 AD3d 916, 918-919 [2005]).

McCarthy, J.P., Lynch, Clark and Rumsey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the appeal is dismissed,as moot, without costs.

Footnotes


Footnote *:The Town, among others,subsequently commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging the Village Planning Board'sdetermination, and Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the merits. That separate and distinctproceeding is not before us on this appeal and, under the circumstances presented, does notimpact our mootness determination (see Matter of Truscott v City of Albany Bd. of ZoningAppeals, 152 AD3d at 1039; Matterof Ernest V. v State of New York, 150 AD3d 1434, 1436 [2017]; compare Matter of City of Glens Falls vTown of Queensbury, 90 AD3d 1119, 1120 [2011]).


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