| Greenport Group, LLC v Town Bd. of the Town of Southold |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 08282 [167 AD3d 575] |
| December 5, 2018 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| Greenport Group, LLC, et al.,Appellants-Respondents, v Town Board of the Town of Southold,Respondent-Appellant. |
Wickham, Bressler & Geasa, P.C., Mattituck, NY (Janet Geasa of counsel), forappellants-respondents.
Smith, Finkelstein, Lundberg, Isler & Yakaboski, LLP, Riverhead, NY (Christopher B.Abbott of counsel), for respondent-appellant.
In an action, inter alia, for declaratory relief, the plaintiffs appeal and the defendantcross-appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Joseph A. Santorelli, J.),dated June 17, 2015, and (2) a partial judgment of the same court dated July 2, 2015. The order,insofar as appealed from, granted those branches of the defendant's motion which were forsummary judgment dismissing the second through sixth causes of action insofar as asserted bythe plaintiff Adrienne Solof and for summary judgment with respect to the third, fourth, and sixthcauses of action insofar as asserted by the plaintiff Greenport Group, LLC. The order, insofar ascross-appealed from, denied those branches of the defendant's motion which were for summaryjudgment with respect to the second and fifth causes of action insofar as asserted by the plaintiffGreenport Group, LLC. The partial judgment, insofar as appealed from, upon the order,dismissed the second through sixth causes of action insofar as asserted by the plaintiff AdrienneSolof and, in effect, dismissed the third, fourth, and sixth causes of action insofar as asserted bythe plaintiff Greenport Group, LLC.
Ordered that the appeal from the order is dismissed, as the portions of the order appealedfrom were superseded by the partial judgment; and it is further,
Ordered that the cross appeal from the partial judgment is dismissed, as the defendant is notaggrieved by the partial judgment; and it is further,
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as cross-appealed from, on the law, and thosebranches of the defendant's motion which were for summary judgment with respect to the secondand fifth causes of action insofar as asserted by the plaintiff Greenport Group, LLC, are granted;and it is further,
Ordered that the partial judgment is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof,in effect, dismissing the third, fourth, and sixth causes of action insofar as asserted by theplaintiff Greenport Group, LLC; as so modified, the partial judgment is affirmed insofar as [*2]appealed from, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court,Suffolk County, for severance of the second through sixth causes of action insofar as asserted bythe plaintiff Greenport Group, LLC, and for the entry of an appropriate judgment on those causesof action, inter alia, declaring that the subject Local Law changing the zoning designation of thesubject property is valid; and it is further,
Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendant.
In December 1998, the plaintiff Adrienne Solof acquired the subject property, a 31-acreparcel of land located in the Town of Southold. The property was largely undeveloped aside fromfour separate buildings, each containing two residential units, which were built in 1984 on aone-acre portion of the property, as well as a sewer substation and public water and sewer-linehook ups. Solof conveyed ownership of the property to the plaintiff Greenport Group, LLC(hereinafter Greenport Group), on December 18, 1999. At that time, the southerly portion of theproperty was zoned "Limited Business" and the northerly portion was zoned "Hamlet Density."The four buildings on the property were part of a larger project to build multiresidence seniorcitizen housing, which had been approved for construction of 140 additional units in 1986.However, no construction had taken place on the property since 1984.
In September 1999, the defendant, Town Board of the Town of Southold (hereinafter theBoard), considered a resolution to change the zoning designation of the entire parcel to alow-density residential zone known as R-80. Although the 1999 resolution was not approved, itwas re-presented on September 12, 2000, at which time it was approved by the Board, and thezoning designation of the entire parcel was changed to R-80 by the filing of Local Law No.20-2000 of the Town of Southold (hereinafter the Local Law) on October 2, 2000. The R-80zoning designation increased the minimum lot sizes to 80,000 square feet from 10,000 squarefeet under the prior zoning designations.
Greenport Group and Solof commenced this action against the Board, seeking, inter alia, ajudgment declaring that the Local Law changing the zoning designation of the property is nulland void. The plaintiffs alleged that the Board's actions were arbitrary and capricious (secondcause of action) and the rezoning was inconsistent with the goals of the Town's comprehensiveplan (fifth cause of action), that the rezoning subjected their property to disparate treatment ascompared to similarly situated properties and constituted unconstitutional reverse spot zoning(third cause of action), that they had vested rights in the prior zoning designations (fourth causeof action), and that the rezoning amounted to a regulatory taking of property without justcompensation (sixth cause of action).
The Board moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and declaring that theLocal Law is valid. In an order dated June 17, 2015, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied thosebranches of the Board's motion which were for summary judgment with respect to the second andfifth causes of action insofar as asserted by Greenport Group, and granted those branches of themotion which were for summary judgment with respect to the third, fourth, and sixth causes ofaction insofar as asserted by Greenport Group and for summary judgment dismissing the secondthrough sixth causes of action insofar as asserted by Solof. The court issued a partial judgment,which, upon the order, inter alia, dismissed the second through sixth causes of action insofar asasserted by Solof and, in effect, dismissed the third, fourth, and sixth causes of action insofar asasserted by Greenport Group. The plaintiffs appeal from the order and the partial judgment, andthe Board cross-appeals from the order.
We agree with the Supreme Court's dismissal of the second through sixth causes of actioninsofar as asserted by Solof on the ground that she lacked standing. Prior to the implementationof the Local Law that rezoned the property, Solof had transferred ownership of the property toGreenport Group (see Matter ofHumann, 136 AD3d 1036, 1037 [2016]; Saline v Saline, 106 AD3d 1072, 1074 [2013]) and, thus, lacked "alegally cognizable interest" that was or would be affected by the zoning determination (Matterof Sun-Brite Car Wash v Board of Zoning & Appeals of Town of N. Hempstead, 69NY2d 406, 413 [1987]; see generally Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk, 77NY2d 761, 774 [1991]).
[*3] We also agree withthe Supreme Court's determination that the Board was entitled to summary judgment with respectto the fourth cause of action insofar as asserted by Greenport Group, alleging that GreenportGroup had vested rights in the prior zoning classification. Vested rights can be acquired if therewere substantial expenditures made and substantial construction undertaken prior to the effectivedate of the ordinance (see Matter of Putnam Armonk v Town of Southeast, 52 AD2d 10,14-15 [1976]; Matter of Berman v Warshavsky, 256 AD2d 334, 335-336 [1998]; seealso Town of Orangetown v Magee, 88 NY2d 41, 47 [1996]). The landowner's actions inreliance on prior zoning "must be so substantial that the municipal action results in serious lossrendering the improvements essentially valueless" (Town of Orangetown v Magee, 88NY2d at 47-48). The Board demonstrated, prima facie, that neither Greenport Group nor itspredecessors had undertaken construction and expenditures so substantial as to render theimprovements on the property essentially valueless (see Berman v Warshavsky, 256AD2d at 335-336). In opposition, Greenport Group failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
With respect to the sixth cause of action insofar as asserted by Greenpoint Group, alleging aregulatory taking, to establish such a claim a property owner "must show by 'dollars and cents'evidence that under no use permitted by the regulation under attack would the properties becapable of producing a reasonable return; the economic value, or all but a bare residue of theeconomic value, of the parcels must have been destroyed by the regulations at issue" (de St.Aubin v Flacke, 68 NY2d 66, 77 [1986]; see Spears v Berle, 48 NY2d 254, 263[1979]; Briarcliff Assoc. v Town of Cortlandt, 272 AD2d 488, 490 [2000])." '[T]he mere diminution in the value of property, however serious, is insufficient todemonstrate a taking,' " as is " 'the fact that a regulation deprives the property ofits most beneficial use' " (Briarcliff Assoc. v Town of Cortlandt, 272 AD2d at490 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Matter of Gazza v New York State Dept. ofEnvtl. Conservation, 89 NY2d 603, 618-619 [1997]).
In opposition to the Board's prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment withrespect to the regulatory taking cause of action, Greenport Group failed to raise a triable issue offact. While the appraisals submitted by Greenport Group demonstrated that the rezoning hadreduced the value of the property, the extent of the diminution, standing alone, was insufficient toconstitute a regulatory taking (seeMatter of New Cr. Bluebelt, Phase 4, 122 AD3d 859, 862 [2014]; see generally deSt. Aubin v Flacke, 68 NY2d at 76-77). Furthermore, Greenport Group failed to raise atriable issue of fact as to whether the rezoning so "restrict[ed] [its] property that [it was]precluded from using it for any purpose for which it is reasonably adapted" (de St. Aubin vFlacke, 68 NY2d at 77). Although the total number of permissible units was reduced, theR-80 zoning designation still allowed for residential development of the property (see Putnam County Natl. Bank v City ofNew York, 37 AD3d 575, 577 [2007]). Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court'sdetermination that the Board was entitled to summary judgment with respect to the sixth cause ofaction insofar as asserted by Greenport Group.
The Supreme Court should have granted the Board's motion for summary judgment withrespect to the second and fifth causes of action insofar as asserted by Greenport Group, alleging,respectively, that the rezoning of the property was arbitrary and was not consistent with acomprehensive plan. The Legislature has empowered the Board to enact zoning regulations(see Town Law § 261), although this power is limited to the extent that suchregulations "shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan" (Town Law§ 263). A party challenging a zoning ordinance bears the heavy burden ofcountering "the strong presumption of validity accorded the enactment" (Taylor vIncorporated Vil. of Head of Harbor, 104 AD2d 642, 645 [1984]; see Matter of Town ofBedford v Village of Mount Kisco, 33 NY2d 178, 186 [1973]). Such a party must show thatthe ordinance " 'is not justified under the police power of the state by any reasonableinterpretation of the facts' " (Matter of Town of Bedford v Village of MountKisco, 33 NY2d at 186, quoting Shepard v Village of Skaneateles, 300 NY 115, 118[1949]). If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes is even "fairlydebatable," the classification must be sustained upon judicial review (Matter of Town ofBedford v Village of Mount Kisco, 33 NY2d at 186 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Hart v Town Bd. of Town ofHuntington, 114 AD3d 680, 683 [2014]).
The Board demonstrated, prima facie, that the rezoning was not arbitrary and was [*4]consistent with a comprehensive plan (see Matter of Hart vTown Bd. of Town of Huntington, 114 AD3d at 683). The Board demonstrated that, beforeSolof obtained the property, the Town's planning consultant performed a comprehensive study ofa certain corridor of land that included the property and identified certain planning objectives forthat area. Those objectives included preservation of the rural character and natural environmentof the corridor. The Board further established that the rezoning of the property, which wasrecommended by the planning consultant, was reasonably related to these legitimate objectives,inter alia, since most of the property was uncleared woodlands and wetlands, was bordered byland zoned as parkland, and was across the street from a nature preserve (see Nicholson v Incorporated Vil. ofGarden City, 112 AD3d 893, 894-895 [2013]).
In opposition, Greenport Group failed to raise a triable issue of fact, including, contrary tothe Supreme Court's conclusion, as to "whether the stated intent of the re-zoning was in fact theactual purpose for [the] re-zoning." While "the courts must satisfy themselves that the rezoningmeets the statutory requirement that zoning be 'in accordance with [the] comprehensive plan' ofthe community," this does not entail "examin[ing] the motives of local officials" (Udell vHaas, 21 NY2d 463, 471 [1968]).
We agree with the Supreme Court's determination that the Board was entitled to summaryjudgment with respect to the third cause of action insofar as asserted by Greenport Group,alleging unconstitutional reverse spot zoning. The Board demonstrated, prima facie, that theproperty "was not arbitrarily singled out for different, less favorable treatment than neighboringproperties in a manner that was inconsistent with a well-considered land-use plan, as would berequired to sustain a finding of unconstitutional reverse spot zoning" (Nicholson vIncorporated Vil. of Garden City, 112 AD3d at 895; see generally Penn Central Transp.Co. v New York City, 438 US 104, 132 [1978]). Rather, the Board demonstrated that therezoning of the property was consistent with "a well-considered land-use plan" (Nicholson vIncorporated Vil. of Garden City, 112 AD3d at 895; see Matter of C/S 12th Ave. LLC v City of New York, 32 AD3d 1,9 [2006]; Peck Slip Assoc. LLC v CityCouncil of City of N.Y., 26 AD3d 209, 210 [2006]). In opposition, Greenport Groupfailed to raise a triable issue of fact.
Since this is, in part, an action for a declaratory judgment, instead of, in effect, dismissing thethird, fourth, and sixth causes of action insofar as asserted by Greenport Group, the SupremeCourt should have declared the rights of the parties (see 200 Genesee St. Corp. v City of Utica, 6 NY3d 761, 762[2005]; Lanza v Wagner, 11 NY2d 317, 334 [1962]). Accordingly, we remit the matter tothe Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for severance of the second through sixth causes of actioninsofar as asserted by Greenport Group and for the entry of an appropriate judgment on thosecauses of action, inter alia, declaring that the Local Law changing the zoning classification of theproperty is valid. Balkin, J.P., Austin, Sgroi and LaSalle, JJ., concur. [Prior Case History:2015 NY Slip Op 31100(U).]