Matter of Bonacker Prop., LLC v Village of E. Hampton Bd. ofTrustees
2019 NY Slip Op 00432 [168 AD3d 928]
January 23, 2019
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, March 6, 2019


[*1]
 In the Matter of Bonacker Property, LLC, et al.,Appellants,
v
Village of East Hampton Board of Trustees et al.,Respondents.

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, New York, NY (Randy M. Mastro, Mylan L.Denerstein, Indraneel Sur, and Jerilin Buzzetta of counsel), for appellants.

Lamb & Barnosky, LLP, Melville, NY (Joel M. Markowitz of counsel), forrespondents.

In a hybrid proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and action, inter alia, for declaratoryrelief, the petitioners/plaintiffs appeal from (1) a decision of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County(Joseph Farneti, J.), dated September 2, 2016, and (2) a judgment of the same court datedNovember 2, 2016. The judgment, upon the decision, denied the amended petition, dismissed theproceeding/action, and declared that the challenged local laws are a legal, constitutional, andvalid exercise of the police and zoning powers of the respondent/defendant Incorporated Villageof East Hampton.

Ordered that the appeal from the decision is dismissed, as no appeal lies from a decision(see Schicchi v J.A. Green Constr. Corp., 100 AD2d 509 [1984]); and it is further,

Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, (1) by deleting the provisions thereofdismissing the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action, and (2) by deleting the provisionthereof declaring that the challenged local laws are a legal, constitutional, and valid exercise ofthe police and zoning powers of the respondent/defendant Incorporated Village of East Hampton;as so modified, the judgment is affirmed, without costs or disbursements, the fifth, sixth, seventh,and eighth causes of action are reinstated and severed, and the matter is remitted to the SupremeCourt, Suffolk County, for further proceedings on those causes of action.

The petitioners/plaintiffs (hereinafter the petitioners) are owners of residential real propertyin the Incorporated Village of East Hampton. They commenced this hybrid proceeding pursuantto CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory relief challenging five local laws amending theZoning Code of the Village of East Hampton (hereinafter the Zoning Code), which were adoptedby the Village Board of Trustees (hereinafter the Board of Trustees) on June 19, 2015. Three ofthe challenged amendments impact building on lots of 40,000 square feet or greater. Local LawNo. 13-2015 of the Village of East Hampton reduced the maximum allowable gross floor area forone- and two-family detached dwellings on such lots. Local Law No. 14-2015 reduced themaximum permitted coverage for all structures on such lots. Local Law No. 15-2015 reduced themaximum allowable gross floor area for all accessory buildings on all such lots. The other twoamendments impacted all lots in the Village—Local Law No. 16-2015 added to theVillage Zoning Code a definition of "story," which previously was not defined, and Local LawNo. 17-2015 modified the definition of "cellar" so as to restrict the permissible parameters of acellar.

In the amended petition/complaint (hereinafter the petition), the petitioners sought, inter alia,in effect, to annul the determination of the Board of Trustees that adopted a negative declarationunder the State Environmental Quality Review Act (hereinafter SEQRA) and approved theamendments to the Zoning Code on the grounds, among others, that (1) the amendments are notin accordance with the Village's comprehensive plan, (2) the Board of Trustees improperly reliedon the recommendation of the Village Planning and Zoning Committee (hereinafter the Planningand Zoning Committee) in adopting the subject amendments, and (3) the Board of Trustees failedto comply with the procedures mandated by SEQRA. The petition also sought certain declaratoryrelief, including a judgment declaring that the amendments constitute an unconstitutionalregulatory taking of the petitioners' respective property without just compensation under theTakings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I,§ 7, of the New York Constitution. The proceeding/action was commenced againstthe Board of Trustees, Paul F. Rickenbach Jr., in his official capacity as mayor of theIncorporated Village of East Hampton, the Planning and Zoning Committee, and theIncorporated Village of East Hampton (hereinafter collectively the Village). After the Villageanswered the petition, the Supreme Court denied the petition, dismissed the proceeding/action,and declared that the challenged local laws are a legal, constitutional, and valid exercise of thepolice and zoning powers of the Incorporated Village of East Hampton. The petitionersappeal.

Contrary to the Village's contention, the petitioners, all of whom own property affected bythe zoning amendments, have standing to challenge the subject amendments and the allegedfailure to comply with the procedures mandated by SEQRA (see Matter of Gernatt AsphaltProds. v Town of Sardinia, 87 NY2d 668, 687 [1996]; Matter of Sun-Brite Car Wash vBoard of Zoning & Appeals of Town of N. Hempstead, 69 NY2d 406, 413-414[1987]).

On the merits, we agree with the Supreme Court that the challenged amendments areconsistent with the comprehensive plan of the Village. Village Law § 7-722 (11) (a)provides that where, as here, a village has adopted a formal comprehensive plan, the village'szoning decisions must be in accordance with that plan. Compliance with the statutoryrequirement is measured, however, in light of the long-standing principle that, as legislative acts,zoning ordinances carry a presumption of validity (see Matter of Town of Bedford v Villageof Mount Kisco, 33 NY2d 178, 186 [1973]). "[E]ven if the validity of a provision is 'fairlydebatable,' the municipality's judgment as to its necessity must control" (Stringfellow's ofN.Y. v City of New York, 91 NY2d 382, 396 [1998], quoting Matter of Town of Bedfordv Village of Mount Kisco, 33 NY2d at 186; see Matter of Hart v Town Bd. of Town of Huntington, 114 AD3d680, 683 [2014]; InfinityConsulting Group, Inc. v Town of Huntington, 49 AD3d 813, 814 [2008]). "Thus, whena plaintiff fails to establish a 'clear conflict' with a formal comprehensive plan, a zoningclassification may not be annulled for incompatibility with the comprehensive plan" (Nicholson v Incorporated Vil. of GardenCity, 112 AD3d 893, 894 [2013], quoting Infinity Consulting Group, Inc. v Town ofHuntington, 49 AD3d at 814; see Matter of Hart v Town Bd. of Town of Huntington,114 AD3d at 683; Bergstol v Town ofMonroe, 15 AD3d 324, 325 [2005]).

The petitioners failed to establish that any of the challenged amendments are inconsistentwith the comprehensive plan of the Village. The comprehensive plan, adopted in 2002, includeda statement of the importance for the Village to ensure that new development or redevelopmentof residential properties was compatible with the character of the existing neighborhood in whichit occurs. It noted that at that time, the Village accomplished this goal by limiting the gross floorarea for all homes in relation to lot size and the total coverage of the residential lot. Thecomprehensive plan recommended further limiting the maximum gross floor area and coveragefor residential lots, including accessory structures, so that new residential development would bemore responsive and compatible with the scale of existing development. The subjectamendments are entirely consistent with the comprehensive plan.

We disagree with the petitioners' contention that the Board of Trustees improperly relied onthe advice of the Planning and Zoning Committee and thereby denied the petitioners the noticeand opportunity to comment required under Village Law §§ 7-706 and 7-708,and under the open meetings provisions of the Public Officers Law. The record supports theSupreme Court's determination that the Planning and Zoning Committee was advisory in nature,did not perform governmental functions, and, therefore, was not a public body subject to theopen meetings provisions of the Public Officers Law, even though the Planning and ZoningCommittee contained at least one member of the Board of Trustees (see Matter of Thomas v New York CityDept. of Educ., 145 AD3d 30, 35 [2016]; Matter of Jae v Board of Educ. of Pelham Union Free School Dist., 22AD3d 581, 584 [2005]; Goodson Todman Enters. v Town Bd. of Milan, 151 AD2d642, 643 [1989]; Matter of Poughkeepsie Newspaper Div. of Gannett Satellite Info. Networkv Mayor's Intergovernmental Task Force on N.Y. City Water Supply Needs, 145 AD2d 65,67 [1989]).

We agree with the Supreme Court's determination that the Board of Trustees complied withthe requirements of SEQRA in issuing negative declarations and approving the subjectamendments to the Zoning Code. Judicial review of SEQRA findings "is limited to whether thedetermination was made in accordance with lawful procedure and whether, substantively, thedetermination 'was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse ofdiscretion' " (Akpan v Koch, 75 NY2d 561, 570 [1990], quoting CPLR 7803 [3];see Friends of P.S. 163, Inc. v JewishHome Lifecare, Manhattan, 30 NY3d 416, 430 [2017]; Matter of Chinese Staff & Workers'Assn. v Burden, 19 NY3d 922, 924 [2012]). This review is deferential, for "it is not therole of the courts to weigh the desirability of any action or choose among alternatives, but toassure that the agency itself has satisfied SEQRA, procedurally and substantively" (Matter ofJackson v New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 67 NY2d 400, 416 [1986]; see Friends ofP.S. 163, Inc. v Jewish Home Lifecare, Manhattan, 30 NY3d at 430). The relevant questionbefore this Court is "whether the agency identified the relevant areas of environmental concern,took a 'hard look' at them, and made a 'reasoned elaboration' of the basis for its determination"(Matter of Jackson v New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 67 NY2d at 417, quotingAldrich v Pattison, 107 AD2d 258, 265 [1985]; see Matter of Riverkeeper, Inc. v Planning Bd. of Town of Southeast, 9NY3d 219, 232 [2007]; Matter of Gernatt Asphalt Prods. v Town of Sardinia, 87NY2d at 688).

The record supports the Supreme Court's determination that the Board of Trustees compliedprocedurally and substantively with SEQRA. Contrary to the petitioners' contention, the Board ofTrustees' conclusion that the proposed amendments to the Village Code constituted "unlisted"actions, rather than "Type I" actions more likely to require the preparation of an environmentalimpact statement (see 6 NYCRR 607.4), was not arbitrary or capricious nor affected byan error of law. Further, in the environmental assessment forms prepared in connection with theproposed zoning code amendments, no adverse environmental effects were identified. The recordreflects that the Board of Trustees identified the relevant areas of environmental concern asrelated to the proposed action, took the requisite "hard look" at them in its negative declaration,and made a reasoned elaboration of the basis for its determination. Given the nature of theproposed action here, which would have only beneficial environmental effect, and the focus ofthe assessment form, which is to identify negative environmental effects of the proposed action,the rapid review and completion of the environmental assessment form was not arbitrary orcapricious (see Matter of Gernatt Asphalt Prods. v Town of Sardinia, 87 NY2d at 690; Matter of Wells v Board of Trustees of Inc.Vil. of Northport, 40 AD3d 652, 653 [2007]; Matter of Philger Realty Corp. v TownBd. of Town of E. Hampton, 262 AD2d 564, 565 [1999]).

In light of the above, we agree with the Supreme Court's denial of those branches of thepetition, set forth in the first, second, third, and fourth causes of action, which were, in effect,pursuant to CPLR article 78 to annul the determination of the Board of Trustees adopting anegative declaration under SEQRA and approving the subject amendments to the ZoningCode.

Nevertheless, in the absence of a dispositive motion addressed to the fifth, sixth, seventh, andeighth causes of action, which sought declaratory relief and damages not in the nature of CPLRarticle 78 relief, the Supreme Court should not have, in effect, dismissed those causes of action."In a hybrid proceeding and action, separate procedural rules apply to those causes of actionwhich are asserted pursuant to CPLR article 78, on the one hand, and those to recover damagesand for declaratory relief, on the other hand. The Supreme Court may not employ the summaryprocedure applicable to a CPLR article 78 cause of action to dispose of causes of action torecover damages or seeking a declaratory judgment" (Matter of Alltow, Inc. v Village of Wappingers Falls, 94 AD3d879, 882 [2012]; see Matter of LakeSt. Granite Quarry, Inc. v Town/Village of Harrison, 106 AD3d 918, 920 [2013]; Matter of Rosenberg v New York State Off.of Parks, Recreation, & Historic Preserv., 94 AD3d 1006, 1007-1008 [2012]; Matter of 24 Franklin Ave. R.E. Corp. vHeaship, 74 AD3d 980, 980 [2010]). "Thus, where no party makes a request for asummary determination of the causes of action which seek to recover damages or declaratoryrelief, it is error for the Supreme Court to summarily dispose of those causes of action"(Matter of Rosenberg v New York State Off. of Parks, Recreation, & HistoricPreserv., 94 AD3d at 1008; seeMatter of East W. Bank v L & L Assoc. Holding Corp., 144 AD3d 1030, 1033[2016]; Matter of Lake St. Granite Quarry, Inc. v Town/Village of Harrison, 106 AD3d at920; Matter of Alltow, Inc. v Village of Wappingers Falls, 94 AD3d at 882). Here, sinceno party made such a motion, the court should not have summarily disposed of the causes ofaction which sought to recover damages and declaratory relief, and the matter must be remitted tothe Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for further proceedings on those causes of action. Weexpress no opinion as to the merits of those causes of action.

The petitioners' remaining contentions are without merit. Scheinkman, P.J., Dillon,Brathwaite Nelson and Iannacci, JJ., concur. [Prior Case History: 2016 NY Slip Op32172(U).]


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