Eastview Mall, LLC v Grace Holmes, Inc.
2020 NY Slip Op 02447 [182 AD3d 1057]
April 24, 2020
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, June 3, 2020


[*1]
 Eastview Mall, LLC, Respondent,
v
GraceHolmes, Inc., Doing Business as J. Crew, et al., Appellants.

Morrison Cohen LLP, New York City (Danielle C. Lesser of counsel), fordefendants-appellants.

Weaver Mancuso Frame PLLC, Rochester (John A. Mancuso of counsel), forplaintiff-respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Ontario County (Matthew A.Rosenbaum, J.), entered September 6, 2018. The order, inter alia, granted that part of themotion of plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is reversed on the law withoutcosts, the motion is denied and the preliminary injunction is vacated.

Memorandum: Defendants entered into a 10-year lease agreement with plaintiff, theowner and operator of a mall. The lease provides, inter alia, that if defendants' annual"gross sales"—a term specifically defined by the lease—were less than acertain threshold amount during the lease's fifth year, defendants could terminate thelease before its natural expiration date. Five years after the commencement of the lease,defendants informed plaintiff that their annual gross sales had failed to equal or exceedthe threshold amount. Rather than terminating the lease at that time, the parties executeda lease modification agreement that reduced the amount of rent owed by defendants andextended the termination option for another year.

One year later, defendants again informed plaintiff that their annual gross sales didnot equal or exceed the threshold amount and that they were thus exercising their optionto terminate the lease. In response, plaintiff asserted that it had learned, via an auditor'sreports, that defendants had wrongly excluded certain sales from their calculation ofgross sales and were thus precluded from exercising the option to terminate thelease.

Plaintiff thereupon commenced this action seeking a declaratory judgment andasserting causes of action for, inter alia, breach of contract and anticipatory repudiation.Defendants appeal from an order that, among other things, granted that part of plaintiff'smotion seeking a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from ceasing businessoperations or otherwise taking steps to terminate the lease. We reverse.

"[T]o prevail on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the moving party has theburden of demonstrating, by clear and convincing evidence, (1) a likelihood of successon the merits, (2) irreparable injury in the absence of injunctive relief, and (3) a balanceof equities in its favor" (Eastman Kodak Co. v Carmosino, 77 AD3d 1434, 1435[4th Dept 2010]; see generallyNobu Next Door, LLC v Fine Arts Hous., Inc., 4 NY3d 839, 840 [2005]).Whether a party is entitled to a preliminary injunction is a determination entrusted to thesound discretion of the motion court (see Doe v Axelrod, 73 NY2d 748, 750[1988]; Destiny USA Holdings,LLC v Citigroup Global Mkts. Realty Corp., 69 AD3d 212, 216 [4th Dept2009]). It is well settled that "[p]reliminary injunctive relief is a drastic remedy [that] isnot routinely granted" (DelphiHospitalist Servs. LLC v Patrick, 163 AD3d 1441, 1441 [4th Dept 2018][internal quotation marks omitted]).

Even assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff demonstrated a likelihood of success on themerits, we conclude that plaintiff did not establish that it would sustain irreparable injurywithout a preliminary injunction (see Kolodziej v Martin, 249 AD2d 941, 942[4th Dept 1998], lv dismissed 92 NY2d 919 [1998]) or that a balance of theequities favors plaintiff.

It is an anodyne proposition that "[i]rreparable injury, for purposes of equity,. . . mean[s] any injury for which money damages are insufficient" (Di Fabio v OmnipointCommunications, Inc., 66 AD3d 635, 636-637 [2d Dept 2009] [internalquotation marks omitted]). Thus, where "any loss of sales [caused] by the allegedlyimproper conduct of [the] defendant can be calculated," a plaintiff has an adequateremedy in the form of money damages and is not entitled to injunctive relief (EastmanKodak Co., 77 AD3d at 1436; see Di Fabio, 66 AD3d at 637).

Here, the lease contains a liquidated damages provision that entitles plaintiff tocertain money damages if defendants prematurely vacate the premises and ceaseoperations. The lease also contains an integration clause stating that the lease is "theentire and only agreement between the parties." Thus, because the lease specificallyprovides that plaintiff is entitled to certain money damages in the event that defendantsvacate the premises in breach of the agreement—the very injury that serves as thepredicate for plaintiff's action—we conclude that plaintiff has an adequate remedyat law and, moreover, that plaintiff has not suffered irreparable harm because theliquidated damages clause was intended as the sole remedy for such a breach (cf.Karpinski v Ingrasci, 28 NY2d 45, 52-53 [1971]; Picotte Realty v Gallery ofHomes, 66 AD2d 978, 979 [3d Dept 1978]).

We disagree with our dissenting colleagues that plaintiff established a likelihood ofirreparable injury from the loss of goodwill that would occur if defendants were to ceaseoperations by prematurely terminating the lease. The "loss of goodwill and damage tocustomer relationships, unlike the loss of specific sales, is not easily quantified orremedied by money damages" (Marcone APW, LLC v Servall Co., 85 AD3d 1693, 1697[4th Dept 2011]) and may warrant a finding of irreparable injury in cases such as thoseinvolving unfair competition tort claims (see e.g. id.; FTI Consulting, Inc. vPricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 8 AD3d 145, 146 [1st Dept 2004]), the proposeddemolition or alteration of the premises (see e.g. Barbes Rest. Inc. v ASRR Suzer 218, LLC, 140 AD3d430, 432 [1st Dept 2016]; Second on Second Café, Inc. v Hing Sing Trading, Inc.,66 AD3d 255, 272-273 [1st Dept 2009]), or the issuance of a Yellowstoneinjunction, in which it is a tenant, not the landlord, who seeks to enjoin thetermination of a lease (see Waldbaum, Inc. v Fifth Ave. of Long Is. RealtyAssoc., 85 NY2d 600, 607 [1995]; Zaid Theatre Corp. v Sona Realty Co., 18 AD3d 352, 355[1st Dept 2005]). No such scenario is implicated here and, moreover, as already noted,the specific injury complained of by plaintiff was accounted for by the terms of the leaseagreement.

We further conclude that the balance of the equities tips in favor of defendants. Inconsidering this element when "ruling on a motion for a preliminary injunction, thecourts must weigh the interests of the general public as well as the interests of the partiesto the litigation" (Destiny USA Holdings, LLC, 69 AD3d at 223 [internalquotation marks omitted]). In balancing the equities, a court must inquire into whether"the irreparable injury to be sustained . . . is more burdensome [to theplaintiff] than the harm caused to defendant through imposition of the injunction" (Felix v Brand Serv. GroupLLC, 101 AD3d 1724, 1726 [4th Dept 2012] [internal quotation marksomitted]). Here, we conclude that the harm defendants will suffer if forced to keep their6,000-square-foot store open against their will is greater than the injury plaintiff willsuffer from the loss of one tenant in the mall, especially because plaintiff may still recoupits loss via the liquidated damages provision.

In light of our determination, we do not address defendants' remainingcontentions.

All concur except Smith and Winslow, JJ., who dissent and vote to affirm in thefollowing memorandum.

Smith and Winslow, JJ. (dissenting). We respectfully dissent. It is well establishedthat "[a] motion for a preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of thetrial court[,] and the decision of the trial court on such a motion will not be disturbed onappeal, unless there is a showing of an abuse of discretion" (Destiny USA Holdings, LLC vCitigroup Global Mkts. Realty Corp., 69 AD3d 212, 216 [4th Dept 2009][internal quotation marks omitted]; see Doe v Axelrod, 73 NY2d 748, 750[1988]). It is also well settled that a moving party's entitlement to preliminary injunctiverelief "depends upon probabilities, any or all of which may be disproven when the actionis tried on the merits" (J. A. Preston Corp. v Fabrication Enters., 68 NY2d 397,406 [1986]). We conclude that Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in determiningthat plaintiff established its entitlement to a preliminary injunction (see Destiny USAHoldings, LLC, 69 AD3d at 224-225; see also Tucker v Toia, 54 AD2d 322,325-326 [4th Dept 1976]). We therefore would affirm the order.

Initially, we conclude that plaintiff met its burden of demonstrating, by clear andconvincing evidence, a likelihood of success on the merits of its causes of action fordeclaratory judgment and breach of contract (see Nobu Next Door, LLC v Fine ArtsHous., Inc., 4 NY3d 839, 840 [2005]; Eastman Kodak Co. v Carmosino, 77 AD3d 1434, 1435[4th Dept 2010]). On a motion for a preliminary injunction, a prima facie showing of themovant's right to relief is sufficient (see Gambar Enters. v Kelly Servs., 69 AD2d297, 306 [4th Dept 1979]), and the actual proving of the case "should be left to the fullhearing on the merits" (Tucker, 54 AD2d at 326).

The parties' 10-year lease for retail space contains an early termination optionapplicable if defendants' annual "gross sales," as defined in the lease, are less than acertain threshold amount during a specified measuring period. After plaintiff determinedthrough its auditor that defendants had improperly excluded more than $900,000 in salesfrom their certified calculation of gross sales, plaintiff commenced this action andthereafter moved for a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from taking steps toexercise their option to terminate the lease. The crux of the parties' dispute is whetherpromotional discounts are to be included in the calculation of gross sales. In defendants'view, gross sales means the amount actually received by defendants, and thuspromotional and other discounts are not to be included in the calculation of grosssales. In plaintiff's view, however, defendants' interpretation of gross sales to mean"gross cash or credit actually received" conflates gross sales with net sales. Gross sales,in plaintiff's view, means the grand total of the sales transactions before thededuction of sales allowances, discounts, or returns. Thus, all amounts attributable to thetotal selling price of the merchandise are to be included in the initial calculation of grosssales, which is then adjusted by the amount of the exclusions and deductions specified inthe lease.

The determination of the parties' dispute "rests solely on matters of contractualinterpretation," and "[t]he interpretation of an unambiguous contractual provision is afunction for the court" (Destiny USA Holdings, LLC, 69 AD3d at 218 [internalquotation marks omitted]). Here, the lease broadly defines gross sales to include "thetotal gross sales prices of any and all merchandise . . . in all cases whethersaid sales . . . are for cash or credit or otherwise, and without reserve ordeduction for inability or failure to collect." That expansive definition is followed by alist of 17 specific exclusions and deductions, such as sums collected for taxes, returns,and refunds. The term "promotional discounts" is not mentioned in the broad definitionof gross sales, nor is it listed among the itemized exclusions and deductions (seegenerally Two Guys from Harrison-N.Y. v S.F.R. Realty Assoc., 63 NY2d 396,403-404 [1984]). Thus, pursuant to the unambiguous language of the lease, promotionaldiscounts must be included in the calculation of defendants' gross sales.

In support of its motion, plaintiff submitted evidence establishing that defendantsfailed to substantiate all of the exclusions and deductions from gross sales that theyclaimed, despite the requirement in the lease for them to do so. Plaintiff's experts opinedthat, when those unsubstantiated exclusions and deductions were added to the calculationof defendants' gross sales, defendants' actual gross sales for the measuring periodexceeded the threshold amount and, thus, defendants were not entitled to exercise theiroption to terminate the lease prior to its natural expiration. We therefore conclude thatplaintiff established a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of its causes ofaction for breach of contract and declaratory judgment.

Plaintiff also demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of its cause of actionfor anticipatory repudiation by submitting evidence establishing that defendants hadunequivocally expressed their intent not to perform the remainder of the lease (seeTenavision, Inc. v Neuman, 45 NY2d 145, 150 [1978]). " 'An anticipatorybreach of contract by a promisor is a repudiation of [a] contractual duty before the timefixed in the contract for . . . performance has arrived' " (Princes Point LLC v Muss Dev.L.L.C., 30 NY3d 127, 133 [2017], quoting 10-54 Corbin on Contracts§ 54.1 [2017]). "[W]hen a party repudiates contractual duties prior to thetime designated for performance and before all of the consideration has been fulfilled,the repudiation entitles the nonrepudiating party to claim damages for total breach"(Norcon Power Partners v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 92 NY2d 458,462-463 [1998] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

With respect to the second prong of the test for a preliminary injunction, we likewiseconclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that plaintiffestablished, by clear and convincing evidence, a danger of irreparable injury in theabsence of injunctive relief (see generally Nobu Next Door, LLC, 4 NY3d at 840;Eastman Kodak Co., 77 AD3d at 1435). Assuming, arguendo, that defendants'gross sales during the measuring period did not fall below the threshold amount and thusthat defendants are not entitled to exercise their option to terminate the lease, we agreewith the majority that the liquidated damages provision in the lease entitles plaintiff tocollect certain monetary damages if defendants breach the lease by prematurely vacatingthe premises and ceasing to conduct business operations. We disagree with the majority'sdetermination, however, that the court abused its discretion in considering, for thepurpose of determining whether provisional relief is warranted, if plaintiff will sufferirreparable injury not adequately remedied by monetary compensation if preliminaryinjunctive relief is not granted. We reject the view of the majority that the court erred indetermining that defendants' breach would cause irreparable injury to plaintiff in theform of a loss of goodwill and damage to customer relationships under thosecircumstances.

Plaintiff submitted evidence establishing that defendants' store is a premier retailer inthe mall and that their tenancy impacts the leases of other tenants of the mall. Defendants'store is included in an exclusive list of "Named Retail Tenants" defined in co-tenancyprovisions of some leases, and other leases refer to defendants' store as a "Suitable orSuccessor Replacement Anchor Store," as a "Required Tenant," or as an "UpscaleTenant" for purposes of plaintiff maintaining business operations with those othertenants. Unless anchor stores or suitable or successor replacements for those anchorstores, such as defendants' store, continue to occupy a certain amount of leaseable spacewithin the mall, other tenants are not required to continue to operate under their leaseagreements. Thus, the potential injury to plaintiff is not limited to the loss of rentalincome from one of approximately 150 tenants in the mall, a loss that is easily quantifiedand remedied by monetary compensation pursuant to the lease. Here, the potential injuryto plaintiff includes a domino effect involving other tenants in the mall. Stated simply, ifdefendants breach the lease by vacating the mall prior to the expiration of their leaseterm, plaintiff will be entitled to recover liquidated damages based on that breach.Plaintiff's other tenants in the mall whose co-tenancy provisions in their leases depend ondefendants' continued occupancy in the mall throughout its lease term, however, willhave the ability to terminate their leases based on defendants' premature departure,thereby causing irreparable harm to plaintiff. In our view, plaintiff sufficientlydemonstrated that the premature termination of defendants' lease will cause a loss ofgoodwill and damage to plaintiff's customer relationships that will not be remedied by anaward of liquidated damages and thus that temporary injunctive relief is appropriate.

Although we agree with the majority that the lease provides for certain monetarydamages to plaintiff in the event of defendants' breach, we reject the implication by themajority that the lease's liquidated damages clause and integration clause somehowpreclude plaintiff from seeking intervention by the court in order to prevent, or at leastmitigate, their damages by attempting to enjoin defendants from breaching the lease.Nothing in the lease prevents plaintiff from seeking to hold defendants to the terms of thelease agreement or from protecting its own interests by attempting to prevent abreach.

Finally, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in determining thatplaintiff met its burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, a balance ofequities in its favor (see generally Nobu Next Door, LLC, 4 NY3d at 840;Eastman Kodak Co., 77 AD3d at 1435). Contrary to the determination of ourcolleagues that the injury to be sustained by plaintiff will be remedied by defendants'payment of liquidated damages and is limited to "the loss of one tenant in the mall," weconclude that "the irreparable injury to be sustained . . . is more burdensome[to the plaintiff] than the harm caused to defendant through imposition of the injunction"(Felix v Brand Serv. GroupLLC, 101 AD3d 1724, 1726 [4th Dept 2012] [internal quotation marksomitted]).

As discussed above, the denial of a preliminary injunction will cause additional harmto plaintiff beyond the loss of defendants' store as a tenant in the mall. Although theinjunction requires defendants to continue to operate under the terms of their existinglease and prohibits them from vacating the mall while the action is pending, defendants'employees keep their jobs and defendants' internal accounting records show thatdefendants continue to generate a profit from their sales in the mall. Thus, we concludethat the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the equities tip in favor ofplaintiff obtaining a preliminary injunction to maintain the status quo during thependency of the action (seeAJMRT, LLC v Kern, 154 AD3d 1288, 1290 [4th Dept 2017]).Present—Whalen, P.J., Smith, DeJoseph, Curran and Winslow,JJ.


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