Gottwald v Sebert
2021 NY Slip Op 02456 [193 AD3d 573]
April 22, 2021
Appellate Division, First Department
As corrected through Wednesday, June 2, 2021


[*1]
 Lukasz Gottwald, Professionally Known as Dr. Luke, et al.,Respondents/Counterclaim Defendants-Respondents,
v
Kesha Rose Sebert,Professionally Known as Kesha, Appellant/Counterclaim Plaintiff-Appellant, et al.,Defendants.

O'Melveny & Myers LLP, New York, (Anton Metlitsky, Leah Godesky, Yaira Dubinand Daniel M. Petrocelli and James M. Pearl of the bar of the State of California, admitted prohac vice, of counsel), for appellant.

Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp LLP, New York (Jeffrey M. Movit and Christine Leperaand David A. Steinberg of the bar of the State of California, admitted pro hac vice, of counsel),for respondents.

Carter Ledyard & Milburn LLP, New York (Alan S. Lewis and John J. Walsh ofcounsel), for Samuel D. Isaly, amicus curiae.

Holwell Shuster & Goldberg LLP, New York (Eileen Monaghan DeLucia, Brian T.Goldman and Prishika Raj and Eugene Volokh of the bar of the State of California, admitted prohac vice of counsel), for The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and 16 MediaOrganizations, amici curiae.

Orders, Supreme Court, New York County (Jennifer G. Schecter, J.), entered February 6,2020, which, to the extent appealed from, upon plaintiffs' and defendant Kesha Rose Sebert's(Kesha) motions for partial summary judgment, determined, in connection with the defamationclaims, that plaintiff Gottwald is not a general or limited public figure and that plaintiffs need notprove by clear and convincing evidence actual malice or "gross irresponsibility" on Kesha's part,that Kesha's lawyer and press agent acted as her agents for the purposes of this action, that noneof the alleged defamatory statements constitutes hyperbole or nonactionable opinion, and thatKesha's text message to Lady Gaga was defamatory per se, and, upon a search of the record,dismissed Kesha's breach-of-contract affirmative defense based on the implied covenant of goodfaith and fair dealing, affirmed, without costs.

The third amended complaint alleges that in 2005, plaintiff Gottwald, an established musicproducer at the time—known for his music, business acumen and the artists herepresents—expressed interest in working with Kesha who was then unknown. Keshaagreed to work with Gottwald, and in September 2005, she entered into an exclusive recordingagreement with Gottwald's music production company KMI. The KMI agreement obligatedKesha to provide exclusive recording services to KMI, that could be extended by KMI throughthe release of her sixth album and gave Gottwald the right to produce and receive royalties on atleast six songs per album.

The complaint further alleges that shortly after entering into the KMI agreement, Kesha wasfrustrated that her recording career was not progressing quickly. In late 2005 she retainedrepresentatives who, in order to pressure plaintiffs to release her from the KMI agreement,"threatened" to make public a false story that in October 2005, after attending a party togetherwhere Kesha had too much to drink, Gottwald had drugged her, took her back to his hotel roomand sexually abused her. Gottwald would not accede to the demands or compromise hiscontractual rights. Subsequently, Kesha and KMI executed multiple amendments to the KMIagreement. In November 2008 Kesha entered into a separate agreement with Prescription,agreeing to be bound by an agreement KMI entered into in 2009 with the RCA/JIVE record labelto release and promote her recordings.[FN1] Plaintiffs produced and promoted Kesha's verysuccessful 2010 debut and follow-up albums, which featured songwriting and productioncontributions from Gottwald.

The complaint alleges that in a 2010 action brought by Kesha's former managers against herand Gottwald, Kesha and her mother Pebe Sebert testified at their depositions that, contrary totheir earlier accusations about Gottwald in 2005, he had never drugged Kesha, never made anysexual advances towards her and never had a sexual relationship with her.

The complaint alleges that in 2012 and 2013 Kesha and her agents (Pebe, nonparties MarkGeragos and Kenneth Meiselas—her then attorneys—and Sunshine Sachs, hernewly retained public relations firm) sought to end her agreement with Gottwald so she couldderive a larger share of profits from any future records. She stopped delivering sound recordingsto Gottwald and refused to allow him to produce her work. Pebe and the rest of Kesha's agentsorchestrated a "press plan," that included a campaign of publishing "false and shocking"accusations against Gottwald in order to pressure him to release Kesha from the agreements and"blacklist" Gottwald from the music industry. The complaint cites several emails and letterspublished by Pebe and Kesha in 2013 and 2014 referring to Gottwald's abuse, which, plaintiffsallege were knowingly false. It is also alleged that they also forwarded false information to asocial media blogger, Michael Eisele (with whom Kesha was in direct communication), who rana campaign entitled "Free Kesha," to spread false allegations againstGottwald—insinuating he abused Kesha—across social media to garnersupport.

The complaint further alleges that on February 26, 2016, after this action was commenced,Kesha initiated a text message conversation with the recording artist professionally known as"Lady Gaga" in which Kesha falsely asserted that she had been raped by Gottwald and thatanother famous female recording artist (which Kesha named) "was raped by the same man."After the text message conversation, Lady Gaga also spread negative messages about Gottwald inthe press.[FN2]

After completion of discovery and filing of a note of issue, plaintiffs' moved for partialsummary judgment arguing that: (1) Kesha's text to Lady Gaga was defamation per se, (2) thestatements made by Pebe, Geragos, Meiselas, Sunshine Sachs and Eisele were made in theircapacity as Kesha's agents, and (3) Kesha's affirmative defenses to the defamation claims fail as amatter of law. Kesha opposed plaintiffs' motion and moved for partial summary judgmentarguing that: (1) Gottwald is a public figure and can only recover for defamation if the statementsasserting that he drugged, raped and sexually assaulted her were made with actual malice, (2) 27of the statements were made either during settlement discussions as pertinent to good-faithanticipated litigation (by Kesha in litigation filings, or by her or her attorneys to contextualizelitigation developments), (3) 18 of the statements constituted protected opinion or hyperbole thatcannot be actionable, and (4) Gottwald breached the KMI agreement's implied covenant of goodfaith and fair dealing.

Supreme Court granted, in part, Gottwald's motion for partial summary judgment and deniedKesha's motion for partial summary judgment. On this record, we now affirm.

The record demonstrates that, while Gottwald is an acclaimed and influential musicproducer, he does not occupy a position of "such pervasive fame or notoriety that he [has]become[ ] a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts" and that he did not "become[ ] apublic figure for a limited range of issues" by "voluntarily inject[ing] himself" into the publicdebate about sexual assault, or abuse of artists in the entertainment industry (Gertz v RobertWelch, Inc., 418 US 323, 351 [1974]).

A person can only be a general-purpose public figure if "he [or she] is a 'celebrity'[;] his [orher] name a 'household word' whose ideas and actions the public in fact follows with greatinterest"and " 'invite[s] attention and comment' " (Waldbaum v FairchildPubls., Inc., 627 F2d 1287, 1292 [DC Cir 1980], cert denied 449 US 898 [1980],quoting Gertz at 345).

"Absent clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the community, and pervasiveinvolvement in the affairs of society, an individual should not be deemed a public personality forall aspects of his life" (Gertz at 352). Contrary to the dissent, Gottwald's success in themusic business is not enough to bring him into the realm of a general-purpose public figure, evenif the music he produces is known to the general public or he is associated with famous orhousehold word musicians, especially where he has used his efforts as a producer to obtainpublicity not for himself, but for the artists that he represents (Krauss v Globe Intl., 251AD2d 191 [1st Dept 1998]). Although he is an acclaimed music producer and well known in theentertainment industry, he is not a household name.[FN3] His success in a high-profile career, withoutmore, does not warrant a finding that he is a general-purpose public figure (seeWaldbaum at 1299).

A limited-purpose public figure, more commonly, is an individual who has voluntarilyinjected himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy with a view toward influencingit. "[T]he [individual becomes] a public figure by virtue of his purposeful activity amounting to athrusting of his personality into the 'vortex' of an important public controversy" (Naantaanbuuv Abernathy, 816 F Supp 218, 222 [SD NY 1993] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Theindividual must attempt to have, or can be expected to have, a major impact on the resolution ofa specific public dispute that has foreseeable and substantial ramifications for persons beyond itsimmediate participants (Waldbaum at 1300). Here, contrary to the dissent's view, thespecific public dispute as framed by Kesha is sexual assault and the abuse of artists in theentertainment industry.

To determine whether a plaintiff is a limited purpose public figure the "defendant must showthe plaintiff has: (1) successfully invited public attention to his views in an effort to influenceothers prior to the incident that is the subject of litigation; (2) voluntarily injected himself into apublic controversy related to the subject of the litigation; (3) assumed a position of prominence inthe public controversy; and (4) maintained regular and continuing access to the media"(Lerman v Flynt Distrib. Co., Inc., 745 F2d 123, 136-137 [2d Cir 1984], certdenied 471 US 1054 [1985]). "A private individual is not automatically transformed into apublic figure just by becoming involved in or associated with a matter that attracts publicattention" (Wolston v Reader's Digest Assn., Inc., 443 US 157, 167 [1979]). "[I]n order tobe considered a public controversy . . . the subject matter must be more than simplynewsworthy . . . it must be a real dispute, the outcome of which affects the generalpublic or some segment of it in an appreciable way" (Krauss v Globe Intl., 251 AD2d at192 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

A person may generally not be made a public figure through the unilateral acts of another(United States v Sergentakis, 2015 WL 3763988, *6, 2015 US Dist Lexis 77719, *14 [SDNY, June 15, 2015, No. 15 Cr. 33(NSR)], affd 787 Fed Appx 51 [2d Cir 2019], citingChandok v Klessig, 648 F Supp 2d 449, 458 [ND NY 2009]). "[A]n individual canbecome a limited purpose public figure only through his own actions." The degree of voluntaryinvolvement in the public controversy is important (Biro v Conde Nast, 963 F Supp 2d255, 274 [SD NY 2013], affd 622 Fed Appx 67 [2d Cir 2015], cert denied 578US &mdash, 136 S Ct 2015 [2016]).

To be considered a limited purpose public figure Gottwald must have: (1) successfullyinvited public attention to his views in an effort to influence others prior to the incident inquestion, (2) voluntarily injected himself into a public controversy related to the subject of thecurrent litigation, (3) assumed a position of prominence in the public controversy, and (4)maintained a regular and continuing access to the media to influence the outcome of the publiccontroversy.

Gottwald cannot be found to be a limited-purpose public figure because he has not done anyof these things.

Although Gottwald has sought publicity for his label, his music and his artists—noneof which are subject of the defamation here—he never injected himself into the publicdebate about sexual assault or abuse of artists in the entertainment industry. Gottwald has onlyspoken out once regarding this litigation, on Twitter in 2016, and has limited his involvement towhat was necessary to defend himself (Wolston, 443 US at 167).

The dissent argues that "[t]he definition of limited purpose public figure is not so cramped asto only include individuals and entities that purposefully speak about the specific, narrow topic(in this case a protégé's sexual assault) upon which the defamation action is based,"but fails to acknowledge that a limited purpose public figure only holds that status with regardsto the particular public controversy they thrust themselves into.

Gottwald, a successful music producer, has not attracted media attention for his relationshipwith his clients or his treatment of artists in the entertainment industry but for his work as amusic producer on behalf of, and the fame of, the artists he represents. Unlike the cases cited bythe dissent, where the plaintiffs sought publicity regarding the public controversies which werethe subject of their litigation (Winklevoss v Steinberg, 170 AD3d 618, 619 [1st Dept 2019],appeal dismissed 33 NY3d 1043 [2019] [the plaintiffs attracted public attention tothemselves as investors in start-ups, voluntarily injected themselves into the world of investingthrough conferences, interviews and a radio broadcast, and sought to establish their reputation asauthorities in the field]; Maule v NYM Corp., 54 NY2d 880, 883 [1981] [where theplaintiff's books, articles and personal appearances were designed to project his name andpersonality to establish his reputation as a leading authority on professional football, and activelysought publicity for his views and professional writings, which were the subject of the litigation];Park v Capital Cities Communications, 181 AD2d 192, 197 [4th Dept 1992], appealdismissed 80 NY2d 1022 [1992], lv dismissed in part, denied in part 81 NY2d 879[1993] [where Dr. Park stepped outside the private realm of his practice, actively sought publicityregarding his performance of eye surgery by appearing on television shows, found to be a publicfigure for purposes of the "Park Probe," an expose on unnecessary eye surgery]), Gottwald hasnot.

Gottwald has appeared in articles in mainstream media for his contributions to pop music, hisdiscovery and development of talent, his rise in the music industry and his talent as both abusinessman and music producer.[FN4] However, he has not injected himself into thedebate about sexual assault or abuse of artists in the entertainment industry, which is the subjectof the defamation. That fact distinguishes this case from those cited by the dissent.

Plaintiffs are not required and, even assuming this were a matter of public concern would notbe required, to show that Kesha acted in a "grossly irresponsible" manner, since Kesha is not amedia publication, broadcaster or journalist responsible for observing "the standards ofinformation gathering and dissemination ordinarily followed by responsible parties"(Chapadeau v Utica Observer-Dispatch, 38 NY2d 196, 199 [1975]; see Huggins vMoore, 94 NY2d 296, 302 [1999]). The gross irresponsibility standard focuses on thejournalist's satisfaction of objective professional standards (Khan v New York Times Co.,269 AD2d 74, 76 [1st Dept 2000]). Chapadeau dealt with news media publishing and isapplicable to media publications and journalists. The court looks to see if the media defendant"has met the standards of basic reporting . . . in the context of the medium'slimitations and the topic's continuing newsworthiness. Pressures of time, staff and budget,self-created or otherwise, are some of the factors which must be considered" (Greenberg vCBS, Inc., 69 AD2d 693, 710-711 [2d Dept 1979]; see McGill v Parker, 179 AD2d98, 108 [1st Dept 1992]). None of these factors apply to Kesha.

Issues of fact exist as to the applicability of the litigation privilege to statements made inKesha's California action, since a jury could find that Kesha commenced that action, in which shealleged that Gottwald drugged and raped her, to pressure Gottwald into renegotiating hercontracts or to release her from her contracts with plaintiffs (see Flomenhaft v Finkelstein, 127 AD3d 634, 637 [1st Dept 2015]).The litigation privilege provides that a statement that is pertinent to litigation is privileged andcannot be the basis of a defamation action. To determine if a statement is pertinent to litigation orcan be the basis for a defamation action, the offending statement must have been "outrageouslyout of context" (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]). The litigation privilege "will notbe conferred where the underlying lawsuit was a sham action brought solely to defame thedefendant" (id. at 638, citing Lacher v Engel, 33 AD3d 10 [1st Dept 2006]). Here, Kesha arguesthat she commenced her California action in good faith and not to defame or pressure plaintiffsinto renegotiating her contracts. The record shows that there are factual issues as to whetherKesha's public relations team, Sunshine Sachs, created a press plan to pressure plaintiffs intorenegotiating or releasing Kesha from her contracts. That record supports plaintiffs' allegationand creates an issue of fact as to whether the California complaint was a "sham" precluding thegrant of summary judgment.

Kesha can be held liable for any defamatory statements made by her lawyer and her pressagent, since they acted as her agents in making the statements. However, issues of fact existwhether Kesha's mother and Michael Eisele, the blogger, were her agents.

A person authorizing others to speak on their behalf can be held vicariously liable fordefamatory statements made by its agents (National Puerto Rican Day Parade, Inc. v Casa Publs., Inc., 79 AD3d592, 594-595 [1st Dept 2010]). However, a person is not responsible for therecommunication of their original defamatory statement if the recommunication was donewithout the person's authority or request over another whom the person has no control(Hoffman v Landers, 146 AD2d 744, 747 [2d Dept 1989]).

Geragos and Sunshine Sachs were acting as Kesha's agents. Geragos was Kesha's lawyer whoheld authority to speak on her behalf. He filed the complaint in California and hired SunshineSachs as the public relations agency responsible for the publicity surrounding the Californiacomplaint. Sunshine Sachs was hired for the sole purpose of managing Kesha's publicity and toformulate a press plan on how to interact and disseminate information, with the press.

While Geragos and Sunshine Sachs were acting as Kesha's agents, there are issues of fact asto whether Pebe and Eisele's statements about Gottwald were made as Kesha's agents. It isunclear if Pebe's statements about Gottwald were made as Kesha's agent or as her mother, withan independent purpose, and if Eisele's statements were made as Kesha's fan, or under Kesha'sdirection in order to help the publicity around her California complaint.

Kesha's statements that Gottwald drugged her, that he raped her, and that he abused her donot constitute hyperbole or nonactionable opinions (see Thomas H. v Paul B., 18 NY3d 580, 585-586 [2012]). Thedetermination whether a statement is opinion or objective fact is a question of law (Mann v Abel, 10 NY3d 271, 276[2008], cert denied 555 US 1170 [2009]). An opinion cannot be proven false andtherefore does not give rise to liability for defamation purposes (Thomas H. at 585-586).Kesha's statements assert that Gottwald drugged and raped her. These statements are not opinionor hyperbole because they can be found to be factual as a matter of law. They are notexaggerations, assert a literal event that is alleged to have occurred, are not protected opinion orhyperbole and can be actionable for defamation.

Kesha's text message to Lady Gaga, that Gottwald had raped another singer, was defamatoryper se (see e.g. Torati v Hodak, 147AD3d 502 [1st Dept 2017]).

Supreme Court correctly dismissed Kesha's affirmative defense to the breach of contractclaim, upon a search of the record (CPLR 3212 [b]). All contracts contain an implied covenant ofgood faith and fair dealing (511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co., 98 NY2d144, 153 [2002]). In New York, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing "cannot beconstrued so broadly as effectively to nullify other express terms of a contract, or to createindependent contractual rights" (Fesseha v TD Waterhouse Inv. Servs., 305 AD2d 268,268 [1st Dept 2003]).

Supreme Court properly determined that Gottwald had no contractual duty to renegotiate anyof his agreements with Kesha. Kesha's music industry expert claims that it is the custom andpractice of the music industry to renegotiate initial contracts with new artists if the artists achievesome degree of commercial success. The duty of good faith and fair dealing does not implyobligations inconsistent with contractual provisions (Chase Equip. Leasing Inc. v Architectural Air, L.L.C., 84 AD3d439 [1st Dept 2011], citing 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co., 98NY2d at 153). Therefore, Supreme Court properly dismissed Kesha's affirmative defense suasponte because plaintiffs were under no obligation to renegotiate any of the agreements they hadwith her. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing could not impose upon plaintiffs anobligation to renegotiate Kesha's contracts that is not found in the contracts (see Fessehaat 268).

We have considered Kesha's remaining arguments and find them unavailing.Concur—Acosta, P.J., Kennedy, Mendez, JJ.

Oing and Scarpulla, JJ., dissent in part in a memorandum by Scarpulla, J., as follows: Irespectfully dissent from the portion of the majority's decision which determines that plaintiffLukasz Gottwald is not a general purpose public figure or, at a minimum, a limited purposepublic figure, in connection with analyzing his defamation claims.

This action concerns the claim of a well-known music producer that one of hisprotégés falsely accused him of sexual assault to be released from an exclusiverecording contract with his label. In October 2005, defendant Kesha Rose Sebert (Kesha) ateenage recording artist, signed an agreement which, among other things, granted plaintiff,known professionally and world-wide as "Dr. Luke" (Dr. Luke), exclusive rights to produce hermusic. Shortly thereafter Dr. Luke and Kesha attended a party at a night club. There, they bothdrank, and Kesha alleges that Dr. Luke gave her a roofie. Thereafter, Dr. Luke and Kesha went toan afterparty, where Kesha continued drinking, became ill, and was ultimately removed frompremises. Dr. Luke then took Kesha to his hotel, where she spent the night. Kesha alleges thatDr. Luke sexually assaulted her that night. Dr. Luke's defamation claims in this action relate toKesha's allegation that Dr. Luke sexually assaulted her.

Despite the fact that Dr. Luke has had a well-documented, successful musical career for morethan two decades and Kesha is one of his famous protégés, Dr. Luke has maintainedthroughout this litigation that he is a private figure, and that Kesha's sexual assault allegationsagainst him should not be subject to a heightened standard of defamation review. However, asthe Court of Appeals stated in James v Gannett Co., the "category of 'public figures' is ofnecessity quite broad" and that performing artists, like Dr. Luke "have not necessarily taken anactive part in debates on public issues, they remain, nevertheless, persons in whom the public hascontinuing interest" (40 NY2d 415, 422 [1976]).

The record here amply demonstrates that Dr. Luke was, at the relevant time, a "public figure"for purposes of reviewing Kesha's allegedly defamatory statements that he sexually assaulted her.Dr. Luke was (and is) a widely acclaimed and influential music producer who actively soughtpublicity for himself, his label, his music, and the artists that he represents (see Gertz vRobert Welch, Inc., 418 US 323 [1974]; James, 40 NY2d at 421-422 ["(P)ublicfigures . . . invite attention and comment" (internal quotation marks omitted)];see also Garfinkel v Twenty-First Century Publ. Co., 30 AD2d 787, 787-788 [1st Dept1968] ["owner and publisher of a high school basketball scouting report" considered publicfigure because "(b)asketball and basketball scouting are matters of general public interest,particularly in light of the great attraction the game has for the public"]).

Throughout his career, Dr. Luke has promoted and publicized his contributions to the successof the recording artists contractually attached to his label, and, in particular, up and comingfemale artists. Dr. Luke has co-written and/or co-produced numerous hit songs for variousprominent female artists, for which he is also well known. Dr. Luke has received numerousaccolades: he was named one of the top music producers of the 2000's by Billboard; theAmerican Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers named him Producer of the Year from2009-2011; he has been nominated for the Grammy award, Producer of the Year; and, in 2010,he was named #33 in Fast Company's "100 Most Creative People in Business" list. In 2010, Dr.Luke was selected by the Grammy and Recording Academy, and participated in, in acongressional roundtable. In 2013, Dr. Luke was selected to be an American Idol judge,and in 2014, Dr. Luke was selected to receive a star on the Hollywood Walk of Fame.

Moreover, Dr. Luke has actively sought out publicity. He has hired public relations agents,and he has been interviewed, profiled, photographed, and mentioned by numerous periodicals,including the New Yorker, New York Magazine, The Guardian, Rolling Stone, and Billboard. Heparticipated in interviews on prime-time television and on the red carpet at several awards shows.Dr. Luke has also been active on social media. For example, he has more than 200,000 followerson his verified Twitter account,[FN*] which he uses to talk about his professional andpersonal life to his followers, including his relationships with the artists whom he represents.

In sum, over many years Dr. Luke has received broad and extensive press coverage as amusic producer and, in particular, as a discoverer and developer of female music talent. He haspervasively sought out this publicity. Dr. Luke's protestations that he was not well known at thetime of the alleged defamatory statements is thoroughly belied by the record. Under thesecircumstances, Dr. Luke must prove actual malice in order to prevail on his defamation anddefamation-dependent claims.

The majority acknowledges that Dr. Luke is an acclaimed music producer but posits that heis not a general purpose public figure because he is not a "household name." Dr. Luke, however,has achieved a level of fame and notoriety sufficient to be considered a general purpose publicfigure. He is a household name to those that matter. For this reason, he should be considered ageneral purpose public figure in connection with analyzing the alleged defamatory statements atissue (see Winklevoss v Steinberg,170 AD3d 618, 619 [1st Dept 2019] ["The individual plaintiffs are also general purposepublic figures, famous by virtue of their participation in the Olympics, their portrayal in (a) film. . . , and routine coverage in popular media, coverage in which they willinglyparticipate"], appeal dismissed 33 NY3d 1043 [2019]).

The majority's assertion—that Dr. Luke "used his efforts as a producer to obtainpublicity not for himself, but for the artists that he represents" is belied by the record. Moreover,the majority's reliance on Krauss v Globe Intl. (251 AD2d 191 [1st Dept 1998]) ismisplaced. There, the "plaintiff used his efforts as producer and ghostwriter to obtain publicityfor his wife's career as a television personality, including publicity about her life as wife andmother. However, there is no basis to find that he ever sought, or achieved, a meaningful level ofpublic attention for himself" (Krauss, 251 AD2d at 193). Unlike the plaintiff inKrauss, who "was not famous in his own right" (id. at 192), the record containsnumerous evidentiary bases to find that Dr. Luke sought and achieved a meaningful level ofpublic attention for himself, not simply for his protégés.

Even assuming that Dr. Luke is not a general purpose public figure, at a minimum, Dr. Lukeshould be treated as a limited purpose public figure in connection with the dynamics of hisrelationship to the artists with whom he works and upon which he has built his well-knownprofessional reputation (see Daniel Goldreyer, Ltd. v Dow Jones & Co., 259 AD2d353, 353 [1st Dept 1999] ["Plaintiff is an art restorer, controversial and well-known in theprofession, but not outside of it."]). Limited purpose public figures are "those who 'have thrustthemselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolutionof the issues involved' " (Huggins v Moore, 94 NY2d 296, 301-302 [1999],quoting Gertz, 418 US at 345; accord Krauss, 251 AD2d at 192-193).

Dr. Luke argues, and the majority accepts, that Dr. Luke is not a limited purpose publicfigure because he never sought out publicity or spoke publicity about Kesha's allegations ofsexual assault or on the issue of sexual assault. That Dr. Luke has not spoken publicly aboutKesha's allegations of sexual assault is not surprising, is not relevant, and does not preclude afinding that he is a limited purpose public figure. The definition of limited purpose public figureis not so cramped as to only include individuals and entities that purposefully speak about thespecific, narrow topic (in this case a protégé's sexual assault) upon which thedefamation claim is based.

The public controversy at issue here is a self-promoting, powerful music industry person'suse of his financial leverage over a person whose career he controls to allegedly commit anunpunished sexual assault (see generally Daniel Goldreyer, Ltd., 259 AD2d at 353). Dr.Luke is a limited purpose public figure because he has purposefully and continuously publicizedand promoted his business relationships with young, female music artists, like Kesha, to continueto attract publicity for himself and new talent for his label (see generally James, 40 NY2dat 421-422). The allegedly defamatory statements at issue—that Dr. Luke drugged andsexually assaulted Kesha when she was a teenage artist, who was signed to an exclusive contractwith his record label—directly relate to Dr. Luke's self-publicized professional andpersonal relationships with his clients, his integrity in business practices, and in attracting newtalent (Winklevoss, 170 AD3d at 619; see also Maule v NYM Corp., 54 NY2d880, 883 [1981] ["plaintiff not only welcomed but actively sought publicity for his views andprofessional writing and by his own purposeful activities thrust himself into the public eye"];Park v Capital Cities Communications, 181 AD2d 192, 197 [4th Dept 1992] [plaintiff"was not involuntarily thrust into an unwanted limelight, but rather, invited favorable publicityfor his practice"], appeal dismissed 80 NY2d 1022 [1992], lv dismissed in part,denied in part 81 NY2d 879 [1993]).

Because Dr. Luke is, at a minimum, a limited purpose public figure, Dr. Luke was "requiredto show by clear and convincing evidence that defendant[ ] published the statements at issue withactual malice" (Perez v ViolenceIntervention Program, 116 AD3d 601, 601 [1st Dept 2014], lv denied 25 NY3d915 [2015]), and the "grossly irresponsible" standard—set forth in Chapadeau v UticaObserver-Dispatch (38 NY2d 196, 199 [1975]) and upon which the majority relies—isinapplicable (see Khan v New York Times Co., 269 AD2d 74, 76 [1st Dept 2000] ["(T)hecourt mistakenly applied an objective standard of gross irresponsibility, which is only applicableto private figures, rather than applying the subjective actual malice standard applicable to a'limited-purpose public figure' such as plaintiff"]). [Prior Case History: 2020 NY Slip Op30347(U).]

Footnotes


Footnote 1:The RCA/JIVE agreement wassubsequently assigned to a subsidiary of Sony Music Entertainment (Sony) whose GeneralCounsel Kesha's attorney is alleged to have threatened with a similar lawsuit.

Footnote 2:That famous female recordingartist testified unequivocally that Gottwald never raped her.

Footnote 3:Gottwald was named one of ahundred most creative people in business but was not selected as a judge in American Idol anddid not receive a star in Hollywood's walk of fame.

Footnote 4:John Seabrook, The Doctor isIn: A Technique for Producing No. 1 Songs, The New Yorker, Oct. 7, 2013, available athttps://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/10/14/the-doctor-is-in (last accessed Feb. 14, 2021);Adam Sternbergh, The Hit Whisperer, NY Mag, June 16, 2010, available athttps://nymag.com/guides/summer/2010/66784/ (last accessed Feb. 14, 2021); Chris Willman,Dr. Luke: The Billboard Cover Story, Billboard, Sept. 3, 2010, available athttps://www.billboard.com/articles/news/956518/dr-luke-the-billboard-cover-story (last accessedFeb. 14, 2021); Dr. Luke: The Man Behind Pop's Biggest Hits, NPR, Sept. 20, 2010),https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=129956645 (last accessed Feb. 14, 2021);Luke Lewis, Meet Dr. Luke, The Producer Behind Smash Hits for Katy Perry and Kesha,The Guardian, Aug. 13, 2010,https://www.theguardian.com/music/2010/aug/14/dr-luke-katy-perry-gottwald (last accessed Feb.14, 2021); Matt Popkin, Dr. Luke: A Pop Star's Best Friend, American Songwriter, 2010,https://americansongwriter.com/songwriter-u-dr-luke-a-pop-stars-best-friend/ (last accessed Feb.14, 2021).

Footnote *:Verified twitter accounts "let[ ]people know that an account of public interest is authentic," and to be verified, a user's "accountmust be notable and active" (Verification FAQ, Twitter, Inc.,https://help.twitter.com/en/managing-your-account/twitter-verified-accounts [last accessed Feb.19, 2021]).


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