| Matter of Christopher H. |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 08434 [123 AD3d 713] |
| December 3, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Christopher H., a Person Alleged to bea Juvenile Delinquent, Appellant. |
Seymour W. James, Jr., New York, N.Y. (Tamara A. Steckler and Judith Waksbergof counsel; Asha Sairah George on the brief), for appellant.
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Benjamin Welikson andFrancis F. Caputo of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (Terrence J.McElrath, J.), dated September 30, 2013. The order adjudicated the appellant a juveniledelinquent and placed him on probation for a period expiring on January 6, 2015. Theappeal brings up for review a fact-finding order of the same court dated May 21, 2013,which, after a hearing, found that the appellant had committed acts which, if committedby an adult, would have constituted the crimes of robbery in the third degree and criminalpossession of stolen property in the fifth degree.
Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The appellant's challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence is unpreserved forappellate review (see Matter ofRani Z., 120 AD3d 824, 825 [2014]; Matter of Tori S., 119 AD3d 697 [2014]; Matter of Robert M., 71 AD3d896, 897 [2010]). In any event, "[t]he evidence supporting a fact-finding in ajuvenile delinquency proceeding is legally sufficient if, viewing that evidence in the lightmost favorable to the presentment agency, any rational trier of fact could have found theappellant's commission of all the elements of the charged crimes beyond a reasonabledoubt" (Matter of DanielleB., 94 AD3d 757, 758 [2012]; see Matter of Chakelton M., 111 AD3d 732, 733 [2013];Matter of Imani Mc., 78AD3d 705, 706 [2010]). Mindful of these principles, we find that the evidenceadduced at the fact-finding hearing was legally sufficient to support the determinationsmade in the order of fact-finding.
Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of theweight of the evidence (seeMatter of Dashawn R., 120 AD3d 1250 [2014]; Matter of Kaseem R., 113AD3d 779, 780 [2014]; Matter of Racheal M., 108 AD3d 770, 771 [2013]), wenevertheless accord great deference to the opportunity of the factfinder to view thewitnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see Matter of Dajahn M., 110AD3d 812, 813 [2013]; Matter of Danielle B., 94 AD3d at 758; Matter of Jamel C., 92 AD3d782, 782-783 [2012]; Matter of Kalexis R., 85 AD3d 927, 928-929 [2011]), andthe Family Court's credibility determinations should not be disturbed unless clearlyunsupported by the record (seeMatter of Dashawn R., 120 AD3d 1250 [2014]). Upon reviewing the record, weare satisfied that the determination of the Family Court was not against the weight of theevidence.
[*2] "The Family Court has broaddiscretion in entering dispositional orders, and its determination is accorded greatdeference" (Matter of IsaiahC., 118 AD3d 780, 780 [2014]; see Matter of Shyquan M., 115 AD3d 747, 747-748 [2014];Matter of Thomas N., 113AD3d 778, 779 [2014]). Contrary to the appellant's contentions, the Family Courtdid not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying his request for an adjournment incontemplation of dismissal and instead imposing a period of probation (see Matter of Antoine H., 81AD3d 646, 646 [2011]). Balkin, J.P., Hall, Austin and Barros, JJ., concur.