| Cook v Peterson |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 01950 [137 AD3d 1594] |
| March 18, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
[*1]
| Curtis Cook, Appellant, v Alyssa S. Peterson etal., Respondents. |
Law Office of Jacob P. Welch, Corning (Anna Czarples of counsel), forplaintiff-appellant.
Barth Sullivan Behr, Buffalo (Daniel K. Cartwright of counsel), fordefendant-respondent Alyssa S. Peterson.
Law Office of John Trop, Rochester (Tiffany L. D'Angelo of counsel), fordefendant-respondent Thomas M. Mike.
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Steuben County (Peter C. Bradstreet,A.J.), entered December 9, 2014. The order granted defendants' cross motions forsummary judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint.
It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously reversed on thelaw, the cross motions are denied, the complaint and cross claims are reinstated and thematter is remitted to Supreme Court, Steuben County, for further proceedings on themotion filed by defendant Thomas M. Mike.
Memorandum: In June 2009, plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle operated bydefendant Alyssa S. Peterson. The vehicle was struck by a vehicle operated by defendantThomas M. Mike, who was proceeding straight through an intersection when Petersonturned left in front of him. Plaintiff went directly to the hospital from the scene of theaccident, complaining of pain in his head, neck, lower back and right shoulder. In thetwo weeks following the accident, plaintiff treated with an orthopedist for right shoulderpain and "occipital type headaches." The orthopedist diagnosed plaintiff with a"[c]ervical strain sprain and occipital headaches- posttraumatic," "[b]ilateral paracervicalstrains- post[ ]traumatic," and right shoulder tendonitis. Plaintiff was prescribed variousmedications, and the orthopedist "recommend[ed] postural improvements which[plaintiff could] do in a self managed fashion and [the] specific exercise wasreviewed/demonstrated in the office" on July 8, 2009. Plaintiff did not see any physicianagain for complaints related to the accident until September 2010, when he soughttreatment for back pain. It was not until March 2011 that plaintiff presented to hisprimary care physician for complaints of debilitating headaches. From that point forward,plaintiff was diagnosed with occipital neuralgia, underwent numerous occipital nerveblock injections and ultimately, in July 2013, underwent surgery to have a permanentoccipital nerve stimulator implanted, resulting in five scars measuring 2.5 to 3 incheseach along the line of plaintiff's spine.
Plaintiff commenced this action in April 2012, i.e., before the stimulator surgery,alleging that he had sustained serious physical injuries in the motor vehicle accident andthat he had sustained an economic loss greater than the basic economic loss. In his initialbill of particulars, plaintiff alleged serious injuries under the categories of "permanentloss of use and/or permanent consequential limitations of use and/or significant limitationof use of his neck and hip," and he further alleged that he sustained a serious injury underthe 90/180-day category (see generally Insurance Law § 5102[d]).
[*2] On February 17, 2014, Mikemoved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and any cross claims against himon the ground that Peterson's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident.On May 19, 2014, Peterson cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing thecomplaint against her on the ground that plaintiff did not sustain a qualifying seriousinjury. On June 3, 2014, Mike cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing thecomplaint and cross claims based on plaintiff's failure to meet the serious injurythreshold, joining in Peterson's cross motion and incorporating all of the arguments andexhibits she submitted in support of her cross motion.
By amended verified bills of particulars dated May 30, 2014, i.e., before Mike's crossmotion for summary judgment, plaintiff claimed that he had sustained a serious injuryunder the significant disfigurement category. He based that new claim on the scars thatresulted from his stimulator surgery. Plaintiff opposed the motion and cross motions, butin his opposing papers he expressly withdrew his claim under the permanent loss of usecategory of serious injury.
Supreme Court granted the cross motions, awarding defendants summary judgmentdismissing the complaint, and implicitly the cross claims, on the ground that plaintiff didnot sustain a serious injury. The court found that defendants met their initial burden ofestablishing that plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury and that, even though there wereconflicting medical opinions on the issue of serious injury, the gaps in plaintiff'streatment interrupted the chain of causation. Based on its determination, the court foundthat there was no reason to rule on Mike's motion, in which he asserted that Peterson'snegligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident. We now reverse.
With respect to the category of permanent consequential limitation of use, defendantsmet their initial burden on the cross motions by submitting, inter alia, the report of amedical expert concluding that the only injuries sustained by plaintiff in the accidentwere "[c]ervical and lumbar sprain/strain[s]," which would have "resolve[d] in weeks tomonths, but not years after the accident." We conclude, however, that plaintiff raisedtriable issues of fact by submitting the report of a medical expert who opined thatplaintiff's occipital neuralgia was causally related to the accident and limited plaintiff"from being functional or basically doing anything." Plaintiff's expert contended that thepermanent stimulator required to alleviate the pain caused from the occipital neuralgiaresulted in a permanent consequential limitation of use of plaintiff's musculoskeletalsystem and limited all of plaintiff's activities. Those conflicting expert opinions createtriable issues of fact requiring a trial (see DeAngelis v Martens Farms, LLC, 104 AD3d 1125,1126 [2013]; Pagels v P.V.S. Chems., 266 AD2d 819, 819 [1999]). Indeed, "[i]tis well established that 'conflicting expert opinions may not be resolved on a motion forsummary judgment' " (Corbett v County of Onondaga, 291 AD2d 886,887 [2002]).
Although Mike correctly contends that many of the medical reports and recordssubmitted by plaintiff in opposition to the cross motions were unsworn and uncertified,we may consider those reports and records that were "submitted by defendants. . . or were referenced in the reports of physicians who examined plaintiffon their behalf, and [defendants] submitted the reports of [those physicians]" (Feggins v Fagard, 52 AD3d1221, 1223 [2008]; seeSiemucha v Garrison, 111 AD3d 1398, 1399 [2013]). To the extent that plaintiffsubmitted unsworn and uncertified medical reports and records that were not submittedby defendants or relied upon by their expert, we may nevertheless rely on the medicalopinions of plaintiff's experts because "the various medical opinions relying on those. . . reports [and records] are sworn and thus competent evidence" (Brown v Dunlap, 4 NY3d566, 577 n 5 [2005]; seeHarris v Carella, 42 AD3d 915, 916 [2007]). We further agree with plaintiff thatthe court erred in discounting entirely the opinion of plaintiff's treating physician due toperceived errors in his report. "The court may not weigh the credibility of the affiants ona motion for summary judgment unless it clearly appears that the issues are not genuine,but feigned" (Glick & Dolleck v Tri-Pac Export Corp., 22 NY2d 439, 441[1968]). In any event, regardless of the opinion of plaintiff's treating physician, plaintiffalso submitted an expert affirmation from another medical professional that raises triableissues of fact.
We reject defendants' contention that the gaps in plaintiff's treatment are fatal to hisclaims (see generally Pommells v Perez, 4 NY3d 566, 574 [2005]). With respectto the 14-month gap in treatment following the July 2009 medical appointments, medicalrecords submitted by defendants in support of their cross motions provided theunrebutted explanation that plaintiff's [*3]treatingorthopedist had provided plaintiff with medication and an exercise regimen that was tobe performed "in a self managed fashion." In opposition to the cross motions, plaintiffcontended that he experienced only mild relief from that course of treatment and, as aresult, "sought a second opinion." We thus conclude that plaintiff provided a reasonableexplanation for the gap in treatment that is substantiated by the record, which is sufficientto defeat defendants' cross motions (see Ramkumar v Grand Style Transp. Enters. Inc., 22 NY3d905, 906 [2013]; Kellersonv Asis, 81 AD3d 1437, 1438 [2011]; cf. Smyth v McDonald, 101 AD3d 1789, 1790-1791[2012]; Thompson vAbbasi, 15 AD3d 95, 99 [2005]). With respect to two other alleged gaps intreatment, we conclude that "the record fails to establish that plaintiff in fact ceased alltherapeutic treatment" during those purported gaps inasmuch as plaintiff was still underthe care of physicians who had provided nerve block injections, he had received referralsfor other physicians and he was exploring alternative treatments to combat the paincaused by the occipital neuralgia (Endres v Shelba D. Johnson Trucking, Inc., 60 AD3d 1481,1483 [2009]; see Seecoomar vLy, 43 AD3d 900, 902 [2007]).
With respect to the significant limitation of use category, we conclude thatdefendants failed to meet their initial burden with respect to that category (see Tourev Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345, 353 [2002]). Defendants' own submissionsestablished that plaintiff sustained, at the very least, "[c]ervical and lumbarsprain[s]/strain[s]," which resulted in a "moderately limited" range of motion. "[A]nyassessment of the significance of a bodily limitation necessarily requires considerationnot only of the extent or degree of the limitation, but of its duration as well" (Downie v McDonough, 117AD3d 1401, 1403 [2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 906 [2014] [internal quotationmarks omitted]; see Vasquez vAlmanzar, 107 AD3d 538, 539-540 [2013]). Here, defendants failed to establishas a matter of law that the limitations sustained by plaintiff from the cervical and lumbarsprains and strains were not significant (see Clark v Aquino, 113 AD3d 1076, 1077-1078 [2014];Feggins, 52 AD3d at 1223-1224; Brown v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp., 33 AD3d 832,832 [2006]). In any event, as with the permanent consequential limitation of usecategory, we agree with plaintiff that he raised triable issues of fact whether the occipitalneuralgia was caused by the accident and, if so, whether that injury caused a significantlimitation of use of plaintiff's musculoskeletal system.
We further agree with plaintiff that defendants did not meet their burden ofestablishing that plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury under the 90/180-day category.Inasmuch as we have held that a " 'whiplash injury to [plaintiff's] cervical spineand [a] lumbosacral sprain/strain' " can constitute a qualifying injury under the90/180-day category (Bowen v Dunn, 306 AD2d 929, 929 [2003]; see Zeigler v Ramadhan, 5AD3d 1080, 1081 [2004];cf. Heatter v Dmowski, 115 AD3d 1325, 1326 [2014]), defendants wererequired to "establish as a matter of law that plaintiff was not curtailed from performing[his] usual activities to a great extent rather than some slight curtailment" during therelevant time period (Winslow v Callaghan, 306 AD2d 853, 854 [2003] [internalquotation marks omitted]). Defendants failed to do so (see Crewe v Pisanova, 124AD3d 1264, 1265-1266 [2015]; Suazo v Brown, 88 AD3d 602, 602 [2011];Winslow, 306 AD2d at 853-854), and thus the burden never shifted to plaintiff toraise an issue of fact (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324[1986]).
With respect to the final category of serious injury, i.e., significant disfigurement,Peterson contends that plaintiff improperly attempted to rely on that category of seriousinjury in opposing the cross motions because it was first recited in the amended verifiedbills of particulars that postdated Peterson's cross motion. Peterson's contention is notproperly before us inasmuch as it is raised for the first time on appeal and is an issue that"could have been obviated or cured by factual showings or legal countersteps in the trialcourt" (Smith v Besanceney,61 AD3d 1336, 1336 [2009] [internal quotation marks omitted]). In any event, evenif we were to agree with Peterson that the significant disfigurement category of seriousinjury should not have been addressed by the motion court, that category of serious injurywas properly asserted in the amended verified bills of particulars (see CPLR 3042[b]), and thus would have "remained intact" following the decision on the previouslyasserted categories of serious injury (O'Brien v Bainbridge, 89 AD3d 1511, 1511-1512[2011]).
On the merits, to the extent that there is an issue of fact whether the occipitalneuralgia was caused by the accident, there is likewise an issue of fact whether thescarring sustained by plaintiff as a result of the surgery necessitated by the occipitalneuralgia was caused by the accident (see Schader v Woyciesjes, 55 AD3d 1292, 1293 [2008]; Chmiel v Figueroa, 53 AD3d1092, [*4]1093 [2008]; see generally Baez vRahamatali, 6 NY3d 868, 869 [2006]; Kilmer v Strek, 35 AD3d 1282, 1283 [2006]).
Finally, we agree with plaintiff that the claim for economic loss in excess of basiceconomic loss should be reinstated. We note that the court did not expressly address thisclaim in granting the cross motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint onthe ground that plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury, and it is well settled, however,that a plaintiff may recover for economic loss in excess of basic economic loss "withoutproof of serious injury" (Colvinv Slawoniewski, 15 AD3d 900, 900 [2005]; see Barnes v Kociszewski, 4 AD3d 824, 825 [2004];see generally Montgomery v Daniels, 38 NY2d 41, 47-48 [1975]). Here,"plaintiff[ ] made a sufficient showing that [he] sustained economic loss in excess ofbasic economic loss to warrant submission of the issue to the jury" (Barnes, 4AD3d at 825). Present—Whalen, P.J., Centra, Lindley, Troutman and Scudder,JJ.