Matter of Haug v State Univ. of N.Y. at Potsdam
2017 NY Slip Op 02708 [149 AD3d 1200]
April 6, 2017
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, May 31, 2017


[*1]
 In the Matter of Benjamin Haug, Petitioner, v State Universityof New York at Potsdam et al., Respondents.

Carlisle Law Firm, PC, Ogdensburg (Lloyd G. Grandy II of counsel), for petitioner.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Brian D. Ginsberg of counsel), forrespondents.

Devine, J. Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of theSupreme Court, entered in St. Lawrence County) to review a determination of respondent StateUniversity of New York at Potsdam finding petitioner guilty of sexual misconduct in violation ofsaid respondent's code of conduct.

Petitioner was a freshman at respondent State University of New York at Potsdam(hereinafter SUNY) in September 2014. In the early morning hours of September 7, 2014, he raninto a female student (hereinafter the complainant) with whom he had been friends for severalyears, and the two had sex in her dormitory room. The complainant reported to campus policeshortly afterward that, while she had not declined to engage in sex and gave no "gesture sayingthat [the sexual encounter] wasn't welcome," she had been sexually assaulted. She refused toreveal the identity of her assailant or submit to a sexual assault examination, but an anonymoustip subsequently pointed to petitioner as the assailant.

SUNY thereafter charged petitioner with sexual misconduct in violation of SUNY's code ofstudent rights, responsibilities and conduct (hereinafter the student code of conduct). Following adisciplinary hearing at which the complainant did not appear, the Hearing Board found petitionerguilty of sexual misconduct and recommended that he be, among other things, suspended for theremainder of the semester and directed to complete an alcohol evaluation and treatment programand a reflective paper on appropriate sexual conduct and consent. Petitioner's appeal to SUNY'sAppellate Board resulted not only in his contentions being rejected out of [*2]hand, but an unexplained recommendation that the penalty beincreased to expulsion. Respondent Kristen Esterberg, as SUNY's president, was empoweredunder the student code of conduct to impose the sanction of expulsion and did so. Petitioner thencommenced the present CPLR article 78 proceeding.

To begin, after considering the significant impacts that the determination could have uponpetitioner's reputation as well as his educational and job prospects, many of the proceduresemployed by the Hearing Board give us pause. We cannot reach most of petitioner's argumentsregarding those procedures due to the absence of timely objection at the administrative level(see Matter of Khan v New York State Dept. of Health, 96 NY2d 879, 880 [2001]; Matter of Coleman v State of NewYork, 38 AD3d 1044, 1046-1047 [2007]). We can, however, consider whether thedetermination is supported by substantial evidence in the record, defined as "such relevant proofas a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact" (Matter of Ridge Rd. Fire Dist. vSchiano, 16 NY3d 494, 499 [2011]; accord Matter of Young v Village of Gouverneur, 145 AD3d 1285,1286 [2016]). It is not, and we therefore annul.

As set forth in the student code of conduct, consent to sexual activity cannot be inferred fromsilence and must flow from "spoken words or behavior that indicates, without doubt to eitherparty, a mutual agreement to" proceed. The complainant's account was set forth by others whohad conversed with her, with the Hearing Board considering written notes prepared byrespondent Annette Robbins, SUNY's director of student conduct and community standards, andthe hearing testimony of a campus police officer. The complainant told Robbins that petitionerwas a friend and that, after running into him on the night in question, she invited him to her dormroom. Petitioner tried in some manner to touch her once they got to the room, then locked thedoor and led her to bed. The two began "making out" on the bed and, while the complainantstated that she did not verbally consent when petitioner suggested that they have sex, she did takeher shirt off. Petitioner took the complainant's pants off and had relations with her withoutwearing protection. The complainant indicated that she "froze up" and did "not respond" topetitioner's advances, although the record does not reveal how this inner turmoil was manifestedor whether petitioner was or should have been aware of it. The Hearing Board found from thisthat the complainant did not affirmatively consent to having sex and that, as a result, petitionerengaged in sexual misconduct.

It is not clear to us that a reasonable person could find from these hearsay accounts anabsence of "behavior that indicate[d], without doubt to either party, a mutual agreement toparticipate in sexual intercourse," as to do so would require overlooking the complainant'sadmission that she removed her shirt when sex was suggested. Indeed, the only path to finding alack of consent under these circumstances would be to make inferences that do not reasonablyfollow from the hearsay accounts of what the complainant said, such as that petitionerintimidated her into agreeing to proceed or that the manner in which she "froze up" should havecaused petitioner to question her apparent willingness to engage in sex (see e.g. Matter ofRidings v Vaccarello, 55 AD2d 650, 651 [1976]). The complainant's subsequent report of asexual assault—in which she declined to give any details of the incident or identify themale involved and stated her lack of interest in getting the alleged perpetrator introuble—does nothing to remedy the dearth of proof as to a lack of affirmativeconsent.

In any event, hearsay must be "sufficiently relevant and probative [if it is] to constitutesubstantial evidence" (Matter of King v New York State Dept. of Health, 295 AD2d 743,744 [2002]) and, "when the hearsay evidence is seriously controverted, common sense andelemental [*3]fairness suggest that it may not constitute thesubstantial evidence necessary to support the [challenged] determination" (Matter of McGillicuddy's Tap House, Ltd. vNew York State Liq. Auth., 57 AD3d 1052, 1052-1053 [2008] [internal quotation marksand citation omitted]; see Matter of 125 Bar Corp. v State Liq. Auth. of State of N.Y., 24NY2d 174, 179 [1969]; Matter of GeraldHH. v Carrion, 130 AD3d 1174, 1176 [2015]). Petitioner testified at the hearing and,while the broad contours of his account matched those of the complainant, their accounts differedon the critical issue of consent. Petitioner specifically stated that they began kissing after talkingand that, after a while, the complainant took off both of their shirts. Petitioner then removed therest of their clothing and asked the complainant if she had any condoms, to which she replied thatshe did not but that it was "fine" and no reason to worry. The complainant then straddledpetitioner from above while they had sex and, after it was over, asked petitioner if he had fun.Simply put, petitioner's testimony seriously controverted the hearsay evidence indicating that thecomplainant had not given affirmative consent to sexual relations and, as a result, that hearsayproof did not constitute substantial evidence to support the determination (see Matter of 125Bar Corp. v State Liq. Auth. of State of N.Y., 24 NY2d at 180; Matter of Gerald HH. vCarrion, 130 AD3d at 1176).

Lastly, although we need not reach the propriety of the penalty in light of our determination,we feel the need to comment on the circumstances leading to its imposition. Upon petitioner'sappeal from the decision of the Hearing Board, the Appellate Board, sua sponte and without anyexplanation, recommended enhancing the penalty to expulsion. We acknowledge that, in theprofessional disciplinary context, due process does not preclude a reviewing body from using theoccasion of a disciplined professional's appeal to sua sponte increase the severity of a sanctionimposed (see Matter of Kabnick v Chassin, 89 NY2d 828, 830 [1996]; Matter ofSarfo v DeBuono, 235 AD2d 938, 939 [1997]). While nothing in the student code of conductexpressly prohibits the Appellate Board from recommending, and SUNY's president fromultimately imposing, a more severe sanction upon a disciplined student's appeal, nor does thestudent code of conduct explicitly advise an appealing student that such a consequence may inureas a result of an appeal. We are troubled by the absence of any such clear articulation that anenhanced penalty may result from a student's choice to appeal the underlying determination andbelieve that, in this context, fairness warrants a clear and conspicuous advisement to thateffect.

Peters, P.J., and Aarons, J., concur.

Clark, J. (dissenting). We respectfully dissent. Initially, many of petitioner's argumentschallenging whether respondent State University of New York at Potsdam (hereinafter SUNY)complied with the notice and due process provisions of its code of student rights, responsibilitiesand conduct (hereinafter the student code of conduct) are unpreserved, as petitioner failed to raisethem during his disciplinary hearing or on administrative appeal (see Matter of Lampert v State Univ. ofN.Y. at Albany, 116 AD3d 1292, 1294 [2014], lv denied 23 NY3d 908 [2014];compare Matter of Monnat v State Univ.of N.Y. at Canton, 125 AD3d 1176, 1177 [2015]). To the extent that petitionerpreserved, by raising them on administrative appeal, his claims that SUNY failed to providewritten notice of the hearing to the female student (hereinafter the complainant) or require thecomplainant to attend the hearing (see Matter of Monnat v State Univ. of N.Y. at Canton,125 AD3d at 1177; but [*4]see Matter of Shaffer vLeonardo, 179 AD2d 980, 980 [1992], lv denied 79 NY2d 758 [1992]), such claimsare lacking in merit. The record establishes that the complainant "chose[ ]" not to attend thedisciplinary hearing and, thus, that SUNY substantially complied with the requirement that thecomplainant be notified in writing of the date and time of the hearing (see Matter of Glenn vState Univ. of N.Y., Purchase Coll., 243 AD2d 712, 712-713 [1997]; see also Matter ofSchuman v Westchester County Health Care Corp., 304 AD2d 585, 585 [2003], lvdenied 100 NY2d 511 [2003]). Further, principles of due process do not require SUNY tocompel the complainant's attendance or to present nonhearsay evidence at the disciplinaryhearing (see Matter of Budd v StateUniv. of N.Y. at Geneseo, 133 AD3d 1341, 1343-1344 [2015], lv denied 26NY3d 919 [2016]; Boykins v Fairfield Bd. of Ed., 492 F2d 697, 701 [5th Cir 1974],cert denied 420 US 962 [1975]). Moreover, even when afforded an opportunity tochallenge the hearsay evidence against him, petitioner declined to question the individuals whointerviewed the complainant after the incident. Accordingly, we are satisfied that SUNYsubstantially complied with the provision of its student code of conduct requiring that petitionerhave the "right to offer witnesses and to challenge evidence and/or witnesses against him."Despite the majority's statement to the contrary, an evaluation of the merits of petitioner'sprocedural arguments should not include a consideration of any potential effects that a finding ofresponsibility may have on his reputation or education or job prospects.

Petitioner also argues that substantial evidence does not support SUNY's determination thathe committed sexual misconduct in violation of the student code of conduct. Substantialevidence is a relatively "low" or "minimal" evidentiary standard, requiring less proof than apreponderance of the evidence (Matter of FMC Corp. [Peroxygen Chems. Div.] vUnmack, 92 NY2d 179, 188 [1998]; see Matter of Ridge Rd. Fire Dist. v Schiano, 16 NY3d 494, 499[2011]; 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176, 180-181[1978]). The standard of substantial evidence has been defined as "such relevant proof as areasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact" (300Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d at 180; accord Matter ofRidge Rd. Fire Dist. v Schiano, 16 NY3d at 499), and it "demands only that a giveninference is reasonable and plausible, not necessarily the most probable" (Matter of Miller vDeBuono, 90 NY2d 783, 793 [1997] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted];accord Matter of Ridge Rd. Fire Dist. v Schiano, 16 NY3d at 498; see Matter of Rauschmeier v Village ofJohnson City, 91 AD3d 1080, 1082 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 802 [2012]).Where, as here, substantial evidence exists to support SUNY's disciplinary determination, madeafter a hearing, this Court must uphold such determination, "irrespective of whether a similarquantum of evidence is available to support other varying conclusions" (Matter of Collins vCodd, 38 NY2d 269, 270 [1976]; accord Matter of Ridge Rd. Fire Dist. v Schiano,16 NY3d at 503; see Matter ofSchwarzmueller v State Univ. of N.Y. at Potsdam, 105 AD3d 1117, 1120 n[2013]).

The student code of conduct requires that there be affirmative consent, that is "spoken wordsor behavior that indicates, without doubt to either party, a mutual agreement to participate," tosexual intercourse or other sexual activity. Here, because petitioner conceded at the hearing thatthe complainant did not verbally consent to sexual intercourse, her actions had to indicate topetitioner without a doubt that she had agreed to participate in sex.

The complainant maintained, in her account to the campus police officer hours after theencounter and in her subsequent account to respondent Annette Robbins, SUNY's director ofstudent conduct and community standards, that she did not consent to having sexual intercoursewith petitioner. She stated that petitioner "tried touching her all over" and then proceeded to"g[e]t up," "lock[ ] her [dormitory] room door" and "lead her to her bed." The complainantreported that petitioner "began making out with her" and suggested that they have sex, but that[*5]petitioner did not ask for, nor did she give, her consent.Although the complainant acknowledged that she took off her shirt, she stated that petitionertook off her pants and that she thereafter "froze" and " 'let things happen' from that pointon."[FN*] This evidencereasonably demonstrated that the complainant did not affirmatively consent, verbally or throughher actions, to sexual intercourse. To be clear, taking off one's own shirt is not, in and of itself,consent to sexual intercourse. Moreover, the majority's unfortunate commentary concerning thecomplainant's "inner turmoil" is misguided. The operative word "froze" is enough to indicate thatclaimant physically stopped responding to petitioner's advances, conduct that would have andshould have been readily apparent to petitioner. Under the student code of conduct, as well asprinciples of common sense, silence is not a sufficient "indicator[ ] of consent."

In addition, many of the details that the complainant gave to the campus police officer andRobbins were corroborated by petitioner's testimony. Indeed, petitioner testified that hekissed the complainant, that the complainant removed her shirt and that he removed thecomplainant's bra and pants. Moreover, petitioner's own testimony revealed that he had doubts asto whether the complainant consented to engaging in sexual intercourse. Petitioner testified that,after receiving a campus-wide rape alert, he sent the complainant a text message about the alertbecause he was "worried" and "didn't know if she had reported [him.]" Petitioner's testimony inthis regard was indicative of a consciousness of guilt (see Matter of Franklin v D'Amico, 117 AD3d 1432, 1433[2014]).

Although not revealed by the majority, petitioner repeatedly stated at the hearing that he hadconsumed a "ridiculous" amount of alcohol on the night in question, going so far as to state thathe had been "intoxicated," "unable to decide what was smart" and not "fully aware of. . . the situation." He admitted that his memories of the night were clouded by hisintoxication and that he "d[id not] remember everything," only "parts." He stated that he did notremember locking the door to the complainant's room and that his testimony was the result ofhim "piec[ing] . . . together" those parts of the night that he did remember.However, he stated that he was able to recall that the complainant told him not to "worry aboutit" when he stated that he did not have a condom and that the complainant had straddled himfrom above during intercourse. When challenged by a member of SUNY's Hearing Board on hisinconsistent testimony that the complainant had said "yes" to sex, petitioner immediatelyconceded that such testimony was inaccurate, thereby giving rise to an inference that otherportions of petitioner's testimony may have also been inaccurate, particularly in light of his hazymemory of the night. Moreover, petitioner's self-serving testimony that the complainant hadgiven him indications of consent was inconsistent with his testimony that he was "worried" thatthe complainant had reported him for rape.

In short, SUNY was presented with competing versions of events, each of which couldreasonably support conflicting conclusions. In such cases, the duty of weighing the evidence and" 'making the choice' " between conflicting inferences lies exclusively within theprovince of SUNY (Matter of Collins v Codd, 38 NY2d at 270-271, quoting Matter ofStork Rest. v Boland, 282 NY 256, 267 [1940]; see Matter of Lambraia v State Univ. of N.Y. at Binghamton, 135 AD3d1144, 1145-1146 [2016]; Matter of Lampert v State Univ. of N.Y. at Albany, 116AD3d at 1294). This Court "may not weigh the evidence or reject the choice made by" SUNYsimply because it prefers a different conclusion (Matter of Stork Rest. v Boland, 282 NYat 267; accord [*6]Matter of Berenhaus v Ward, 70 NY2d436, 444 [1987]; Matter of Collins v Codd, 38 NY2d at 270-271; see Matter of Axel vDuffy-Mott Co., 47 NY2d 1, 6 [1979]). This Court may only assess whether SUNY's"choice" is supported by substantial evidence (see CPLR 7803 [4]; Matter ofLambraia v State Univ. of N.Y. at Binghamton, 135 AD3d at 1146; Matter ofSchwarzmueller v State Univ. of N.Y. at Potsdam, 105 AD3d at 1120 n). To that end, wefind that the complainant's version of events set forth by the campus police officer and Robbinsand petitioner's corroboration of those events, together with petitioner's statements indicating aconsciousness of guilt and his concession that some of his earlier testimony was inaccurate,provided substantial evidence for SUNY's determination that the complainant did notaffirmatively consent to sexual intercourse with petitioner and, thus, that he committed sexualmisconduct (see Matter of Lambraia v State Univ. of N.Y. at Binghamton, 135 AD3d at1145-1146; Matter of King v New York State Dept. of Health, 295 AD2d 743, 744[2002]). Consequently, SUNY's finding of responsibility should be upheld.

Although not raised by petitioner, the majority attacks the complainant's hearsay accounts,presented by the campus police officer and Robbins, as having been "seriously controverted" bypetitioner's testimony and, thus, unable to constitute substantial evidence. Courts have long heldthat hearsay evidence may properly form the basis for an administrative determination, providedthat such hearsay evidence is "sufficiently relevant and probative or sufficiently reliable and. . . not otherwise seriously controverted" (Matter of Doctor v New York State Off. of Alcoholism & SubstanceAbuse Servs., 112 AD3d 1020, 1022 [2013] [internal quotation marks and citationsomitted]; see Matter of Sookhu vCommissioner of Health of State of N.Y., 31 AD3d 1012, 1013-1014 [2006]; Matterof Giles v Schuyler-Chemung-Tioga Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 199 AD2d 613, 614 [1993]).Here, the complainant and petitioner were the only witnesses to the encounter and, thus, thecomplainant's hearsay accounts were certainly relevant and probative as to whether sheaffirmatively consented to sex with petitioner. Further, the hearsay evidence was not unreliable orseriously controverted by petitioner's testimony. To the contrary, as previously discussed,petitioner's testimony was in large part consistent with the accounts given by the complainant tothe campus police officer and Robbins. While petitioner gave conflicting evidence as to whetherthe complainant's behavior indicated consent to sex, such testimony simply presented acredibility issue for SUNY to resolve. His testimony did not, as the majority concludes, seriouslycontrovert the complainant's competing version of events (compare Matter of McGillicuddy's Tap House, Ltd. v New York State Liq.Auth., 57 AD3d 1052, 1052-1053 [2008]; Matter of Hayes v New York State Liq.Auth., 39 AD2d 482, 484 [1972]). Thus, because substantial evidence supports SUNY'sdetermination to credit the complainant's account over that of petitioner, such determinationshould not be disturbed (see Matter of Collins v Codd, 38 NY2d at 270-271).

As to the sanction imposed, we are unpersuaded by petitioner's assertion that the penalty ofexpulsion was so disproportionate to the offense of sexual misconduct so as to be shocking toone's sense of fairness (see Matter ofIdahosa v Farmingdale State Coll., 97 AD3d 580, 581 [2012], lv denied 19NY3d 813 [2012]; Matter of Beilis v Albany Med. Coll. of Union Univ., 136 AD2d 42,44 [1988]; see generally Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 ofTowns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222, 233 [1974]),particularly given SUNY's obligation to protect the safety and well-being of all of its students,including the complainant (see Matter of Lampert v State Univ. of N.Y. at Albany, 116AD3d at 1294; Matter of Quercia v NewYork Univ., 41 AD3d 295, 297 [2007]), and its overall goal of "creating andmaintaining an educational environment free from . . . sexual misconduct." Nor isthe penalty unlawful because SUNY's Appellate Board recommended, without providing itsreasons, the enhanced penalty of expulsion to the President of SUNY. As the majorityrecognizes, an administrative appellate body does not offend principles of due process by [*7]enhancing, sua sponte, the severity of a disciplinary penalty (seeMatter of Kabnick v Chassin, 89 NY2d 828, 830 [1996]; Matter of Wahba v New YorkState Dept. of Health, 277 AD2d 634, 636 [2000]) and, in doing so, it need not identify itsreasons (see Matter of Stolz v Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y., 4 AD2d 361,365 [1957]; compare Matter of McCarthy v Board of Regents of State of N.Y., 177 AD2d889, 890 [1991]).

While the majority does not find the penalty to be unlawful, it nevertheless states thatfairness requires a discussion of, what our colleagues in the majority perceive as, "the absence ofa[ ] . . . clear articulation [in the student code of conduct] that an enhanced penaltymay result from a student's choice to appeal." Upon review of relevant sections of the studentcode of conduct, we disagree. In a section entitled "[t]he Appellate Board," SUNY's sexualmisconduct policy expressly states that the Appellate Board has the authority to "impose any ofthe sanctions" listed in the student code of conduct and may, upon appeal, "alter the sanctionsimposed below." Further, the student code of conduct makes clear that SUNY's director ofstudent conduct and community standards may oppose any student appeal and that the AppellateBoard may consider the reasonableness of the recommended sanction and, if deemed necessary,"alter" such sanction. In our view, this language is sufficient to alert a reasonablereader—indeed, a college student—to the possibility that the Appellate Board couldfind the initial penalty to be unreasonably lenient and, consequently, impose a harsher one.Moreover, it bears noting that, under the student code of conduct, only the President, or herdesignee, can impose a sanction of suspension or expulsion and that, had the Appellate Boardagreed with the Hearing Board's recommended penalty of, among other things, a one-semestersuspension, SUNY's President conceivably could have rejected such penalty as too lenient.

Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we would confirm the determination and dismiss thepetition.

Lynch, J., concurs. Adjudged that the determination is annulled, without costs, petitiongranted and respondent State University of New York at Potsdam is directed to expunge allreferences to this matter from petitioner's school record.

Footnotes


Footnote *:The complainant indicated toRobbins that she had been involved in a prior "traumatic" incident that caused her to freeze inresponse to petitioner's unwanted advances.


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