Matter of Calverton Manor, LLC v Town of Riverhead
2018 NY Slip Op 02610 [160 AD3d 838]
April 18, 2018
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, May 30, 2018


[*1]
 In the Matter of Calverton Manor, LLC,Appellant-Respondent,
v
Town of Riverhead et al.,Respondents-Appellants.

Certilman Balin Adler & Hyman LLP, Hauppauge, NY (John M. Wagner of counsel),for appellant-respondent.

Twomey, Latham, Shea, Kelley, Dubin & Quartararo LLP, Riverhead, NY (JenniferNigro of counsel), for respondents-appellants.

In a hybrid proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, inter alia, to review zoning resolutionsof the respondent/defendant Town Board of the Town of Riverhead dated October 21, 2004, ineffect, implementing a new rural corridor zoning district for the respondent/defendant Town ofRiverhead, and action for declaratory relief, the petitioner/plaintiff appeals from an order of theSupreme Court, Suffolk County (William B. Rebolini, J.), dated July 15, 2014, which denied itsmotion for summary judgment on the petition/complaint and denied so much of the petition assought to annul the resolutions dated October 21, 2004, and, in effect, dismissed that part of theproceeding, and the respondents/defendants cross-appeal from so much of the same order as didnot search the record and award them summary judgment and, in effect, make a declaration intheir favor, on the petitioner/plaintiff's second cause of action.

Ordered that the cross appeal is dismissed, without costs or disbursements; and it isfurther,

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs ordisbursements.

The petitioner/plaintiff (hereinafter the petitioner) submitted a site plan application in 2001to construct numerous commercial and residential buildings on an undeveloped parcel of [*2]land in the respondent/defendant Town of Riverhead (hereinafterthe Town). The petitioner worked with Town officials to revise the site plan application to bringit into compliance with then-applicable zoning rules. Meanwhile, since 1997, therespondent/defendant Town Board of the Town of Riverhead (hereinafter the Town Board) hadbeen in the process of developing a new Comprehensive Plan (hereinafter the ComprehensivePlan) for the Town. The "goals and policies" of the Comprehensive Plan included "protect[ing]open space and farmland, while concentrating development" into certain specified areas. TheComprehensive Plan proposed eliminating certain permitted uses on the petitioner's parcelcritical to the site plan application. The petitioner submitted its last revised site plan applicationin September 2003. While that application was still pending, the Town Board adopted theComprehensive Plan on November 3, 2003.

The petitioner commenced several related hybrid proceedings/actions against the Town andthe Town Board (hereinafter together the respondents) in the Supreme Court, Suffolk County.The instant hybrid proceeding/action challenges the Town Board's adoption of zoningamendments implementing the Rural Corridor component of the Comprehensive Plan(hereinafter the RLC law). The RLC law affected part of the property subject to the petitioner'ssite plan application.

The petitioner moved for summary judgment on the petition/complaint, arguing, among otherthings, that the Town Board failed to comply with General Municipal Law § 239-mand Town Law § 272-a, failed to comply with the procedural and substantiverequirements of the State Environmental Quality Review Act (see ECL art 8 [hereinafterSEQRA]), failed to comply with the Comprehensive Plan, violated the doctrine of legislativeequivalence, and exceeded its police powers. The petitioner's second cause of action sought adeclaration that "special facts" entitled it to have its site plan application reviewed in accordancewith the zoning designation in effect prior to the Town Board's adoption of the ComprehensivePlan.

The Supreme Court denied the motion. The court held that the respondents were entitled tothe entry of judgment in their favor declaring the zoning resolutions at issue to be a legal,constitutional, and valid exercise of the police and zoning powers of the Town Board. The courtfurther held that triable issues of fact existed with respect to the applicability of special facts. Thepetitioner appeals, and the respondents cross-appeal from so much of the order as did not searchthe record and award them summary judgment and, in effect, make a declaration in their favor,on the petitioner's second cause of action. We dismiss the cross appeal and affirm the orderinsofar as appealed from.

A party is not aggrieved by an order which does not grant relief that the party did not request(see Spielman v Mehraban, 105AD3d 943, 943-944 [2013]; Schlecker v Yorktown Elec. & Light. Distribs., Inc., 94 AD3d855, 855 [2012]). The respondents are not aggrieved by so much of the order as did notsearch the record and award them summary judgment and, in effect, make a declaration in theirfavor, on the petitioner's second cause of action (see Schlecker v Yorktown Elec. & Light. Distribs., Inc., 94 AD3d855, 855 [2012]).

Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the Town Board made a proper referral of the RLClaw to the Suffolk County Planning Commission. " 'To facilitate regional review ofamendments to a local zoning ordinance, General Municipal Law § 239-m requiresthe local municipality to refer its proposed amendments to the county planning board' "(Matter of Village of Kiryas Joel, N.Y. vVillage of Woodbury, N.Y., 138 AD3d 1008, 1012 [2016], quoting Matter of Benson [*3]Point Realty Corp. v Town of E. Hampton, 62 AD3d 989,991 [2009]). Here, contrary to the petitioner's arguments, the Town Board made a "fullstatement" of its proposed RLC law in accordance with General Municipal Law§ 239-m (see General Municipal Law § 239-m [1] [c]). Therevisions made to the RLC law after referral were " 'embraced within the originalreferral' " (Matter of Village of Kiryas Joel, N.Y. v Village of Woodbury, 138AD3d at 1012, quoting Matter of Benson Point Realty Corp. v Town of E. Hampton, 62AD3d at 992; see Matter of Gernatt Asphalt Prods. v Town of Sardinia, 87 NY2d 668,679 [1996]).

We agree with the Supreme Court that the Town Board complied with the procedural andsubstantive requirements of SEQRA in adopting the RLC law. When a final genericenvironmental impact statement (hereinafter EIS) has been filed, no further SEQRA complianceis required if a subsequent proposed action will be carried out in conformance with theconditions and thresholds established for such actions in the generic EIS or its findings statement(see 6 NYCRR 617.10 [d] [1]; Matter of In Defense of Animals v Vassar Coll., 121 AD3d 991,994 [2014]). Here, the Town Board accepted a draft and a final generic EIS in connection withthe Comprehensive Plan. The RLC law faithfully implemented relevant portions of theComprehensive Plan and thereby satisfied the conditions and thresholds for future actions setforth in the generic EISs. The Town Board's reliance on the generic EISs prepared in connectionwith the Comprehensive Plan therefore satisfied the procedural and substantive requirements ofSEQRA (see 6 NYCRR 617.10 [d]; Matter of Eadie v Town Bd. of Town of N. Greenbush, 7 NY3d306, 319 [2006]; Matter of Danyla v Town Bd. of Town of Florida, 259 AD2d 850,851-853 [1999]). Moreover, the petitioner failed to identify a clear conflict between the RLC lawand the Comprehensive Plan (seeNicholson v Incorporated Vil. of Garden City, 112 AD3d 893, 894-895 [2013]).

"The doctrine of legislative equivalency requires that existing legislation be amended orrepealed by the same procedure as was used to enact it" (JEM Realty Co. v Town Bd. ofTown of Southold, 297 AD2d 278, 279 [2002]; see Naftal Assoc. v Town ofBrookhaven, 221 AD2d 423, 424-425 [1995]). "The doctrine applies to attempts to amend azoning code or ordinance by use of a resolution" (Matter of Brunswick Smart Growth, Inc. v Town Bd. of Town ofBrunswick, 51 AD3d 1119, 1120 [2008]; see Paradis v Town of Schroeppel, 289AD2d 1027, 1028 [2001]). The petitioner here failed to demonstrate that the Town Boardimproperly amended the zoning map using a different type of legislative action than it used toeffectuate its previous zoning map (see Matter of Miller v Kozakiewicz, 289 AD2d 494,495 [2001]).

Furthermore, the Supreme Court properly determined that the respondents were entitled to ajudgment declaring that the RLC law was a constitutional and valid exercise of the Town Board'spolice powers. "Legislative enactments are entitled to an 'exceedingly strong presumption ofconstitutionality' " (Nicholson vIncorporated Vil. of Garden City, 112 AD3d 893, 894 [2013], quoting LighthouseShores v Town of Islip, 41 NY2d 7, 11 [1976]). "A local law is cloaked with the same strongpresumption of constitutionality as a statute" (Nicholson v Incorporated Vil. of GardenCity, 112 AD3d at 894; see Town of Huntington v Park Shore Country Day Camp of DixHills, 47 NY2d 61, 65 [1979]). "With the police power as the predicate for the State'sdelegation of municipal zoning authority, a zoning ordinance will be struck down if it bears nosubstantial relation to the police power objective of promoting the public health, safety, morals orgeneral welfare" (Trustees of Union Coll. in Town of Schenectady in State of N.Y. vMembers of Schenectady City Council, 91 NY2d 161, 165 [1997]; see Berenson v Townof New Castle, 38 NY2d 102, 107-108 [1975]).

Here, the stated purpose of the RLC law was "to allow a very limited range of [*4]roadside shops and services that are compatible with theagricultural and rural setting along major arterial roads, such as New York State Route 25,leading into Downtown Riverhead and areas zoned Hamlet Center (HC) or Village Center (VC)."Contrary to the petitioner's arguments, the RLC law's designation of property along New YorkState Route 25 a few miles west of the hamlet of Riverhead as a rural corridor zone bore arational relationship to its stated objective.

Although the general rule is that a court should apply the zoning provisions in effect at thetime it renders its decision (see Matterof Jul-Bet Enters., LLC v Town Bd. of Town of Riverhead, 48 AD3d 567, 567-568[2008]; Matter of D'Agostino Bros.Enters., Inc. v Vecchio, 13 AD3d 369, 370 [2004]), pursuant to the "special facts"exception, a court may apply the law in effect at the time the landowner's application was made.The special facts exception may be applied where the landowner "establishes entitlement as amatter of right to the underlying land use application," and "extensive delay[ ] indicative of badfaith . . . unjustifiable actions by the municipal officials . . . or abuse ofadministrative procedures" (Rocky PointDrive-In, L.P. v Town of Brookhaven, 21 NY3d 729, 736-737 [2013] [internal quotationmarks omitted]; see Matter of Alscot Inv. Corp. v Incorporated Vil. of Rockville Ctr., 64NY2d 921, 922 [1985]; Matter of Pokoik v Silsdorf, 40 NY2d 769, 772-773 [1976]; Matter of c/o Hamptons, LLC vRickenbach, 98 AD3d 736, 737 [2012]).

The record contains inconsistencies as to whether the petitioner's application was a"completed application" when it submitted the last revised version of its proposal in September2003. There is evidence in the record that the petitioner needed to make additional revisionsbefore the application could be treated as a "completed application" under the Town's rules,meaning that the petitioner was not entitled as a matter of right to the underlying land useapplication (see Rocky Point Drive-In, L.P. v Town of Brookhaven, 21 NY3d at736-738). However, there is evidence in the record that the Town Board had determined theapplication to be a "completed application" when it was submitted in September 2003, meaningthe Town Board may have delayed processing the petitioner's application in a manner indicativeof bad faith (see Matter of c/o Hamptons, LLC v Rickenbach, 98 AD3d at 736-738).Thus, triable issues of fact exist as to the applicability of special facts.

The petitioner's remaining contentions are without merit. Dillon, J.P., Leventhal, LaSalle andBrathwaite Nelson, JJ., concur.


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