Matter of Town of Southampton v New York State Dept. of Envtl.Conservation
2021 NY Slip Op 03351 [194 AD3d 1310]
May 27, 2021
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Thursday, August 26, 2021


[*1]
 In the Matter of Town of Southampton et al., Appellants, et al.,Petitioner,
v
New York State Department of Environmental Conservation et al.,Respondents. County of Suffolk, Proposed Intervenor-Appellant.

Law Offices of Thomas M. Volz, PLLC, Nesconset (David H. Arntsen of counsel), for Townof Southampton, appellant.

Tooher & Barone, LLP, Albany (Meave M. Tooher of counsel) and Braymer Law,PLLC, Glens Falls (Claudia K. Braymer of counsel) and Lazer, Apthekar, Rosella & Yedid,PC, Melville (Zachary Murdock of counsel), for 101CO, LLC and others, appellants.

Dennis M. Cohen, County Attorney, Hauppauge (Elaine M. Barraga of counsel), for Countyof Suffolk, proposed intervenor-appellant.

Letitia James, Attorney General, Albany (Patrick A. Woods of counsel), for New York StateDepartment of Environmental Conservation, respondent.

Matthews Kirst & Cooley, PLLC, East Hampton (Brian E. Matthews of counsel), forSand Land Corporation and another, respondents.

Whiteman Osterman & Hanna LLP, Albany (John J. Henry of counsel), for Town ofEast Hampton and others, amici curiae.

Reynolds Fitzgerald, J. Appeals (1) from an order of the Supreme Court (Ferreira, J.), enteredSeptember 13, 2019 in Albany County, which, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78,denied a motion by the County of Suffolk to intervene, and (2) from a judgment of said court,entered September 3, 2020 in Albany County, which, among other things, dismissed petitioners'application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review two determinations ofrespondent Department of Environmental Conservation granting certain Mined LandReclamation permits to respondent Sand Land Corporation.

Respondent Sand Land Corporation is the owner and permittee[FN1] of a sand and gravel mine located on a 50-acreparcel of property in the Town of Southampton, Suffolk County, and respondent Wainscott Sandand Gravel Corporation operates the mine. In 2014, Sand Land and Wainscott Sand and Gravel(hereinafter collectively referred to as Sand Land) applied to respondent Department ofEnvironmental Conservation (hereinafter DEC) for a modification permit seeking, as relevanthere, a vertical and horizontal expansion of its mining operations. The proposed horizontalexpansion consisted of 4.9 acres—1.9 acres of previously unmined land and three acresknown as the "stump dump."[FN2] The vertical expansion sought to mine 40 feetdeeper to a level of 120 feet above mean sea level. In April 2014, pursuant to the StateEnvironmental Quality Review Act (see ECL art 8), DEC issued a negative declaration.A year later, DEC denied the permit.

Sand Land requested a hearing to challenge the denial of the 2014 permit application. Thehearing produced two decisions from the Administrative Law Judge—a January 2018ruling on a threshold procedural issue and a December 2018 ruling, among other things, denyingSand Land's motion to renew and reargue. Both rulings held that ECL 23-2703 prohibited DECfrom processing mining permits for mines located in an area with a population of over onemillion people that draws its primary drinking water from a designated sole sourceaquifer,[FN3] and thatpetitioner Town of Southampton has a local law prohibiting mining in the Town. In betweenthese two administrative decisions, DEC, in September 2018, issued a notice of intent to modifyto Sand Land, which stated that DEC was modifying the existing permit to require Sand Land tocease all mining activity other than reclamation.[FN4] Also, in October 2018, Sand Land submitted anapplication to renew its mining permit. This application specified that 31.5 acres were to beincluded in the life of the mine and sought an increase in the depth of the mine by 40 feet.

In February 2019, DEC and Sand Land entered into a global settlement agreement settling allpending administrative proceedings. As relevant here, under the terms of the agreement, DECagreed to rescind its notice to modify and issue a "renewal" permit for an expanded life of themine boundaries and process Sand Land's October 2018 permit application to deepen [*2]the mine by 40 feet. The settlement was made expressly contingenton DEC's issuance of said permit, which it did. DEC issued the renewal permit in March 2019.Also, in March 2019, and relying on the prior 2014 negative declaration, DEC issued an amendednegative declaration with respect to the permit to deepen the mine. In June 2019, DEC issued themodification permit granting Sand Land the authority to deepen the mine by 40 feet.

In April 2019, petitioners—the Town, several civic organizations and threeneighboring landowners[FN5]—commenced this CPLR article 78proceeding seeking to annul the February 2019 settlement agreement, DEC's March 2019amended negative declaration and DEC's March 2019 issuance of a renewal permit. FollowingDEC's issuance of another modification permit, in June 2019, petitioners filed a supplementalpetition seeking to annul that permit. Meanwhile, in May 2019, the County of Suffolk moved tointervene and submitted a proposed petition asserting the same legal claims as the originalpetition. Respondents opposed the motion. In September 2019, Supreme Court denied theCounty's motion finding that the County lacked capacity to bring the claims set forth in theproposed petition against DEC as a subsidiary of the state. The County appeals from this order.In September 2020, Supreme Court dismissed the petition finding, as relevant here, no violationof ECL 23-2703 (3), as it does not apply to a modification application such as this one, whichproposes only mining deeper within its existing footprint. Petitioners appeal from thisjudgment.

Initially, Supreme Court did not err in denying the County's motion to intervene. The Countyargues that authorization to intervene can be inferred from ECL 23-2703 (3) and 23-2711 (3) inconjunction with the County's role in protecting and monitoring groundwater quality. However,these statutes refer to the municipality that enacts local zoning laws. As such, the Town ratherthan the County would have the capacity to sue DEC. Likewise, the County's assertion thatSuffolk County Charter § C16-2 confers capacity upon it is meritless, as "a genericgrant of authority to sue or be sued [is] insufficient" (Matter of World Trade Ctr. Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig., 30NY3d 377, 386 [2017] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Bethpage Water Dist. vDaines, 67 AD3d 1088, 1090-1091 [2009], lv denied 14 NY3d 707 [2010]).Although "[c]ourts may allow other interested persons to intervene in special proceedings,. . . this permissive determination lies within the court's discretion" (Matter of Pace-O-Matic, Inc. v New YorkState Liq. Auth., 72 AD3d 1144, 1145 [2010] [internal quotation marks and citationomitted]). We find no abuse of discretion in Supreme Court's decision.

Turning to substantive matters, the Mined Land Reclamation Law (see ECL 23-2701et seq.) grants DEC broad authority to regulate the mining industry in the state. The lawlooks to encourage [*3]a sound mining industry, provide for themanagement of depletable resources and assure the reclamation of mined land. The Legislaturesought to achieve these purposes through "the adoption of standard and uniform restrictions andregulations to replace the existing patchwork system of local ordinances" (Matter of Wallach v Town of Dryden,23 NY3d 728, 745 [2014] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). In order to assurethis uniformity, the law contains an express supersession clause, which provides that the MinedLand Reclamation Law shall supersede all "local laws relating to the extractive mining industry"(ECL 23-2703 [2]). However, the Mined Land Reclamation Law does not supersede all locallaws. In Matter of Frew Run Gravel Prods. v Town of Carroll (71 NY2d 126 [1987]), theCourt of Appeals clarified the applicability of this supersession clause and differentiated betweenlocal laws pertaining to the actual operation and process of mining, which were subject to theclause, and other local laws, which fell outside its preemptive orbit. In determining that zoningordinances are not subject to this clause, the Court stated that to do otherwise "would drasticallycurtail [a] town's power to adopt zoning regulations granted in [Statute of Local Governments§ 10 (6)] and in Town Law § 261. Such an interpretation wouldpreclude [a] town board from deciding whether a mining operation—like other usescovered by a zoning ordinance—should be permitted or prohibited in a particular zoningdistrict" (id. at 133 [citations omitted]).

Although a review of the record evidences that the Town's local zoning laws prohibit mining,because Sand Land's predecessor began operating in the 1950s—prior to the zoningrestrictions now in place—mines such as Sand Land's are generally considered to be alegal prior nonconforming use and will be "permitted to continue, notwithstanding the contraryprovisions of the ordinance" (GlacialAggregates LLC v Town of Yorkshire, 14 NY3d 127, 135 [2010] [internal quotationmarks and citation omitted]). At the same time, although "prior nonconforming uses in existencewhen a zoning ordinance is adopted are, generally, constitutionally protected[,] . . .the law . . . generally views nonconforming uses as detrimental to a zoning scheme,and the overriding public policy of zoning in [this s]tate and elsewhere is aimed at theirreasonable restriction and eventual elimination" (Buffalo Crushed Stone, Inc. v Town of Cheektowaga, 13 NY3d 88,97 [2009] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]). Crucially, with respect tothe case at bar, in 1991, the Legislature amended the Mined Land Reclamation Law to includethe following provision: "No agency of this state shall consider an application for a permit tomine as complete or process such application for a permit to mine pursuant to this title, withincounties with a population of one million or more which draw their primary source of drinkingwater for a majority of county residents from a designated [*4]sole source aquifer, if local zoning laws or ordinances prohibitmining uses within the area proposed to be mined" (ECL 23-2703 [3]). The amendment is anoutlier in a statute whose purpose is to promote uniformity, as it articulates a mandate directed ata specific geographic area—Long Island, where the Town is located and where zoninglaws prohibit mining.

Respondents argue that per DEC's interpretation, ECL 23-2703 (3) applies only to newpermits or permits seeking substantial modifications. They contend that the matter beforeSupreme Court, wherein Sand Land sought a 40-foot vertical expansion within the existingfootprint of the mine, was not a material change, as it did not request any horizontal expansion;as such, respondents contend that input from the Town was not required. Supreme Court agreed,characterizing an alternate interpretation would be "nonsensical."[FN6] We disagree.

When interpreting a statute, we turn first to its text as the best evidence of the Legislature'sintent. As a general rule, a statute's plain language is dispositive (see Riley v County ofBroome, 95 NY2d 455, 463 [2000]). Here, ECL 23-2703 (3) provides that, in the event thatan application for a permit is received from an applicant whose mine falls within an areadescribed in the statute, the agency may not process the application if the local zoning lawsprohibit same. ECL 23-2703 (3) is not vague or ambiguous; it is concise and clear. Contrary toall other permit applications received by DEC, an application received from an area protectedunder ECL 23-2703 (3) must be put on hold until the status of the local laws is determined(see Matter of Valley Realty Dev. Co. v Jorling, 217 AD2d 349, 354 [1995]). There is noqualification on what type of permit applications must be put on hold; rather, by its certainlanguage, the statute applies to all applications. " '[A] court cannot amend a statute byinserting words that are not there' " (Matter of Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Assn. vJorling, 85 NY2d 382, 394 [1995], quoting McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes§ 363; accord Ronkese vTilcon N.Y., Inc., 153 AD3d 259, 263 [2017]; see McKinney's Cons Laws ofNY, Book 1, Statutes § 94, Comment at 190 [1971 ed] ["new language cannot beimported into a statute to give it a meaning not otherwise found therein"]). In keeping with thishornbook rule of construction, this Court declines to furnish modifiers. If the Legislature hadintended to limit the type of permit applications to which it applied, it would have done so (see Matter of Marian T. [Lauren R.], 36NY3d 44, 51-52 [2020]). After all, it very precisely limited the geographic area to which itapplies. Given this unambiguous text, "deference to an administrative agency's specialcompetence or expertise does not come into play where, as is the case here, we are called upon todecide a question of pure statutory reading and analysis, dependent only on accurateapprehension of legislative intent" (Matter of Polan v [*5]State of N.Y. Ins.Dept., 3 NY3d 54, 58 [2004] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

ECL 23-2703 (3) clearly recognizes that the local laws of the municipality are determinativeas to whether an application can be processed. Here, where it is unchallenged that the Town'slaws prohibit mining, DEC cannot process the application, let alone issue the permit. It cannot doby fiat what is prohibited under the law. Therefore, the act of issuing the permits here, incontravention of ECL 23-2703 (3), was arbitrary and capricious.

Garry, P.J., Egan Jr. and Colangelo, JJ., concur.

Pritzker, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although I agree with the majority'sopinion relative to the denial of the County of Suffolk's motion to intervene, I respectfully dissentbecause it is my opinion that ECL 23-2703 (3) and 23-2711 (3) are inapplicable and do notprovide a basis to grant the petition.

Initially, ECL 23-2711 (3) is inapplicable to the modification permit at issue here as thisparticular subsection applies to properties "not previously permitted pursuant to this title"(see Joan Leary Matthews, Siting Mining Operations in New York—TheMined Land Reclamation Law Supersession Provision, 4 Alb L Envtl Outlook 9, 12 [Spring1999]). As to ECL 23-2703 (3), this statute provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o agency of thisstate shall consider an application for a permit to mine as complete or process such applicationfor a permit to mine pursuant to this title, within counties with a population of one million ormore which draw their primary source of drinking water for a majority of county residents from adesignated sole source aquifer, if local zoning laws or ordinances prohibit mining useswithin the area proposed to be mined" (emphasis added). It is undisputed that petitionerTown of Southampton is within the protected area and that the Town's zoning laws generallyprohibit mining within its borders. Nevertheless, respondent Sand Land Corporation andrespondent Wainscott Sand and Gravel (hereinafter collectively referred to as Sand Land) have aconstitutionally protected prior nonconforming use "within the area proposed to be mined" (ECL23-2703 [3]; see generally Matter of Syracuse Aggregate Corp. v Weise, 51 NY2d 278[1980]).[FN1] This has beenrecognized not only by the Second Department (see Matter of Sand Land Corp. v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town ofSouthampton, 137 AD3d 1289, 1292 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 906 [2016]),but also by the Town, generally, in its local law, and, specifically, by virtue of its issuance ofnonconforming use certificates of occupancy in 2011 and 2016. Simply stated, although theTown prohibits new mining operations within its borders, it has both recognized andpermitted mining within "the area proposed to be mined" (ECL 23-2703 [3]) as alegitimate prior nonconforming use.[FN2]

The interpretation of ECL 23-2703 (3) by petitioners and the amici as applying to all permitsis too broad [*6]and could render the law unconstitutional.Specifically, if this statute applies to all mining permits, including those based on priornonconforming uses, then a municipality within the statutorily protected areas could effectivelyzone out the active and permitted mines throughout covered areas by simply legislating that nomining is permitted. Although a municipality can do so for new mines, and could evenreasonably curtail and amortize prior nonconforming uses, it cannot terminate these uses in awholesale fashion without running afoul of the Takings Clause (see Matter of SyracuseAggregate Corp. v Weise, 51 NY2d at 287; Philip Weinberg, Practice Commentaries,McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 171/2, ECL 23-2703 at 351-355). Overall,this statute achieves its remedial environmental goal while still recognizing and protecting vestedconstitutional rights. For example, although respondent Department of EnvironmentalConservation (hereinafter DEC) would not be prohibited from processing a modification permitrelative to a mine operating within its prior nonconforming use, it would be prohibited fromprocessing a permit for a new mine, or one seeking to expand outside of a prior nonconforminguse, within a protected area.

This conclusion does not change even though the permit at issue is seeking a 40-foot verticalincrease because such an increase may be reasonably viewed as a constitutionally protectedexpansion. As to mining, prior nonconforming uses may be expanded through exploitation ofreserves (see Matter of Syracuse Aggregate Corp. v Weise, 51 NY2d at 285-286; see also Buffalo Crushed Stone, Inc. vTown of Cheektowaga, 13 NY3d 88, 98 [2009]). Of course, this does not mean that thepermit had to be approved (see generally ECL 23-2711; art 70), but rather that ECL23-2703 does not prevent review by DEC. Nor does it mean that ECL 23-2703 (3) only applies tonew mines. To the contrary, it also applies to expansions that exceed the established priornonconforming use of an existing mine. As such, DEC's interpretation as to the statute'sapplicability is correct, as the requested expansion is within the existing footprint and clearlywithin the existing vertical reserves (see Buffalo Crushed Stone, Inc. v Town ofCheektowaga, 13 NY3d at 100; Matter of Syracuse Aggregate Corp. v Weise, 51NY2d at 285-286; compare Matter of Dolomite Prods. Co. v Kipers, 23 AD2d 339, 342[1965], affd 19 NY2d 739 [1967]).

Finally, contrary to the amici's suggestions, the holding in Matter of Frew Run GravelProds. v Town of Carroll (71 NY2d 126 [1987]) does not compel a different result, nor doesit support the proposition that DEC's actions somehow impaired the Town's municipal home ruleauthority. Matter of Frew Run Gravel Prods. holds that the Mined Land Reclamation Lawdoes not totally preempt town zoning laws (id. at 133). If, for example, the Town wantedto eliminate all sand mining—current and grandfathered—within its borders vialocal law[*7], it could do so "provided that termination isaccomplished in a reasonable fashion" (Matter of Syracuse Aggregate Corp. v Weise, 51NY2d at 287). But here, the Town has not done so. Certainly, a municipality's right to home ruleauthority is not compromised by holding it accountable to its own law.[FN3] Accordingly, as neither ECL 23-2703 (3) nor23-2711 (3) applies, Supreme Court's judgment should be affirmed on this ground.

Given this determination, I must reach petitioners' remaining contentions. To that end, I alsofind that Supreme Court correctly held that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge(hereinafter ALJ) to deny the 2014 application was not binding relative to the instant permitapplication. "[A] decision of an administrative agency which neither adheres to its own priorprecedent nor indicates its reasons for reaching a different result on essentially the same facts isarbitrary and capricious" (Matter of Tall Trees Constr. Corp. v Zoning Bd. of Appeals ofTown of Huntington, 97 NY2d 86, 93 [2001] [internal quotation marks, brackets andcitations omitted]). Here, among the multiple differences between the applications, the 2014application before the ALJ sought both a vertical and horizontal mining expansion while the2018 application, which is subject to the permit at issue, involved solely a verticalexpansion.[FN4]Accordingly, the ALJ's prior decision was not final and binding since it could not have logicallyreached a "definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury" (Matter ofEssex County v Zagata, 91 NY2d 447, 453 [1998] [internal quotation marks and citationsomitted]), namely, whether ECL 23-2703 (3) or 23-2711 (3) was triggered by the verticalexpansion uncoupled from the horizontal expansion also sought in 2014. Thus, the ALJ's priordecision on the 2014 modification application "did not constitute a precedent from which the[ALJ] was required to explain a departure" (Matter of Davydov v Mammina, 97 AD3d 678, 679-680 [2012][internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of Iskalo 5000 Main LLC v Town of Amherst Indus. Dev.Agency, 147 AD3d 1414, 1416 [2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 919 [2017]).Moreover, because no final decision on the 2014 permit application had been entered by theALJ—rather, the matter had been adjourned and not appealed to the Commissioner ofEnvironmental Conservation—no precedential value resulted therefrom (see generally Matter of Circle T Sterling,LLC v Town of Sterling Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 187 AD3d 1542, 1543-1544 [2020]; Matter of Harry's Nurses Registry, Inc.[Commissioner of Labor], 171 AD3d 1410, 1411-1412 [2019], lv denied 34NY3d 907 [2020]).

It is also my opinion that Supreme Court properly relied upon the affidavit of CatherineDickert in reaching its decision. A respondent may submit supporting affidavits with an answerin a CPLR article 78 proceeding (see CPLR 7804 [c]; see also 4520) to allow thecourt "to both discern the rationale [*8]for the administrativeaction taken and undertake intelligent appellate review thereof" (Matter of Molloy v New York StateWorkers' Compensation Bd., 146 AD3d 1133, 1134 [2017] [internal quotation marksand citation omitted]). Nevertheless, such affidavits must be "furnished by individuals havingfirsthand knowledge of the decision-making process" (id. at 1134 [internal quotationmarks and citations omitted]). Here, Dickert, who serves as the supervising official within theDivision of Mineral Resources, was authorized to supply an affidavit explaining the rationale forthe action of DEC as to issuing the relevant permit herein (see CPLR 4520, 7804 [c]).Moreover, the affidavit itself and the administrative record demonstrate that Dickert had personalknowledge of the policies at issue herein and, further, was directly responsible for those issuingpermits (see 6 NYCRR 550.2; Matter of Molloy v New York State Workers'Compensation Bd., 146 AD3d at 1134; Matter of Friends of Hammondsport v Village of Hammondsport PlanningBd., 11 AD3d 1021, 1022 [2004]).

Finally, I find that Supreme Court correctly determined that DEC met its obligations underthe State Environmental Quality Review Act (see ECL art 8 [hereinafter SEQRA]) bytaking the requisite hard look at the potential environmental impacts of the renewal. "Judicialreview of an agency determination under SEQRA is limited to whether the agency identified therelevant areas of environmental concern, took a hard look at them, and made a reasonedelaboration of the basis for its determination. In conducting its review, this Court may notsubstitute its judgment for that of the lead agency, and may annul its decision only if it isarbitrary, capricious or unsupported by the evidence" (Matter of Troy Sand & Gravel Co., Inc. v Town of Sand Lake, 185AD3d 1306, 1310 [2020] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], appealdismissed 36 NY3d 943 [2020], lvs denied 36 NY3d 913 [2021]; seeMatter of Van Dyk v Town of Greenfield Planning Bd., 190 AD3d 1048, 1049 [2021])."While the judicial review must be genuine, the agency's substantive obligations under SEQRAmust be viewed in light of a rule of reason[,] and the degree of detail with which eachenvironmental factor must be discussed will necessarily vary and depend on the nature of theaction under consideration" (Matter of Gernatt Asphalt Prods. v Town of Sardinia, 87NY2d 668, 688 [1996] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). "A degree of finality andstability is properly created once a permitted activity has successfully met the initial SEQRArequirements. In the absence of a material change in conditions or a violation of the terms of apermit, a renewal should be granted without undue burdens imposed upon the applicant"(Matter of Village of Hudson Falls v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 158AD2d 24, 30 [1990] [citations omitted], affd 77 NY2d 983 [1991]; see Matter ofAtlantic Cement Co. v Williams, [*9]129 AD2d 84, 88[1987]).

In support of its 2018 renewal application, Sand Land submitted its predecessor's applicationfrom the initial permit application in 1980, as well as the permit issued thereto in 1985. Further,Sand Land submitted the certificate of occupancy issued in 2011 by the Town, as well as theapproved site plan and permit that had been issued to Sand Land in 2013. Sand Land alsosubmitted the modification application from 2014, the negative declaration that had been issuedthereto, a letter from the Town as to this application detailing the applicable zoning ordinanceand DEC's denial of this application. Additionally, the administrative record contains a reportcompleted by the Suffolk County Department of Health as to the effect that the subject mine hadon the groundwater in the area and an assessment of this report, which detailed that the"conclusory statements" contained therein "are not supportable and are in fact disproven by [the]on-site investigation."

In addition to the 2018 renewal application itself, the permit issued to Sand Land and thenegative declaration, the administrative record contains the ALJ's ruling on the 2014 applicationto modify Sand Land's permit as well as a February 2019 settlement agreement entered intobetween Sand Land and DEC. Further, the administrative record contains the Mined Land UsePlan completed in 2019 on behalf of Sand Land related to the instant renewal permit applicationand the full environmental assessment related to same. Notably, as to the issuance of this permit,DEC received a multitude of comments that were considered by DEC and responded thereto.Through the public commenting period, DEC received various affidavits and related scientificmaterials.

Given the extensive administrative record, DEC satisfied its requirements under SEQRA andtook the requisite hard look at the relevant areas of environmental concern (see Matter of VanDyk v Town of Greenfield Planning Bd., 190 AD3d at 1050; Matter of Town of Waterford v New YorkState Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 187 AD3d 1437, 1443 [2020]). Notably, a fullenvironmental assessment was conducted, which established that no threat was posed togroundwater. Further, the groundwater study upon which petitioners rely, as well as theassessment that calls into question the validity of this report, were included in the administrativerecord. Finally, given the nature of the environmental impact herein, specifically that such actionensures reclamation of the entire mined area, the issuance of the negative declaration was notarbitrary and capricious (see generally Matter of Gernatt Asphalt Prods. v Town ofSardinia, 87 NY2d at 690). "The mere fact that petitioners' concerns regarding certain aspectsof the project were not resolved in their favor does not mean that DEC failed to discharge itsstatutory obligations under SEQRA" (Matter of Save Easton Envt. v Marsh, 234 AD2d616, 618 [1996], lv denied 90 NY2d 802 [1997]). [*10]Ihave reviewed petitioners' remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Accordingly,I would affirm the judgment of Supreme Court.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs. Ordered that the judgment is modified, onthe law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as dismissed the petition; petition grantedand determinations of respondent Department of Environmental Conservation granting certainMined Land Reclamation permits annulled; and, as so modified, affirmed.

Footnotes


Footnote 1:"Permittee" is defined as "anyperson who holds a valid mining permit from the department for the boundaries of the landidentified in the mined land-use plan" (ECL 23-2705 [11]).

Footnote 2:A "stump dump" is a landfill siteconsisting of wood waste, such as tree stumps.

Footnote 3:It is undisputed that SuffolkCounty, the location of the Sand Land mine, is an area with a population of over one million thatdraws its primary drinking water from a sole source aquifer.

Footnote 4:"Reclamation" is "theconditioning of the affected land to make it suitable for any productive use" (6 NYCRR 420.1[q]).

Footnote 5:Fred W. Thiele Jr. was also anamed petitioner but Supreme Court found that he lacked standing. This issue is not beingchallenged on the appeal.

Footnote 6:Although Matter of SyracuseAggregate Corp. v Weise (51 NY2d 278 [1980]) recognizes that "quarrying contemplates theexcavation and sale of the corpus of the land itself" and "constitutes the use of land as adiminishing asset" (id. at 285 [internal quotation marks omitted]), the case at bar is easilydistinguishable because Sand Land's mine is located in an area with a population of over onemillion reliant on a sole source aquifer.

Footnote 1:Although the majoritydistinguishes Matter of Syracuse Aggregate Corp. v Weise (supra) because themine at issue in that case was not located in an area covered by ECL 23-2703 (3), the statuteneither overrules nor even addresses these well-settled and constitutionally protected propertyrights.

Footnote 2:There are six other minesoperating within the Town under prior nonconforming use certificates.

Footnote 3:In their brief, the amiciinadvertently make this point by noting that different local zoning laws, such as those of theTowns of East Hampton and Riverhead in Suffolk County, specifically limit expansion orchanges to nonconforming uses.

Footnote 4:Other than the difference inthe expansion sought, the applications also differed in a number of significant ways, includingthat the 2014 application provided for further processing of vegetative organic waste materialsand the continued use of the part 360 registration (see 6 NYCRR 360.16), while the laterpermit called for quarterly groundwater testing, and included an agreement never to go below120 feet above mean sea level and limiting the current life of the mine for no more than eightyears.


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