| People v Elmore |
| 2022 NY Slip Op 07345 [211 AD3d 1536] |
| December 23, 2022 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Treamon Elmore, Appellant. |
Frank H. Hiscock Legal Aid Society, Syracuse (Philip Rothschild of counsel), fordefendant-appellant.
William J. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney, Syracuse (Kenneth H. Tyler, Jr., ofcounsel), for respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County (Gordon J. Cuffy,A.J.), rendered September 9, 2020. The judgment convicted defendant upon a juryverdict of murder in the first degree (two counts), conspiracy in the third degree, criminalpossession of a weapon in the second degree and criminal possession of a firearm.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimouslyaffirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a juryverdict of two counts of murder in the first degree (Penal Law § 125.27 [1][a] [vii]; [b]) and one count each of conspiracy in the third degree(§ 105.13), criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree(§ 265.03 [3]), and criminal possession of a firearm(§ 265.01-b [1]).
Initially, we agree with defendant that the procedures outlined in CPL article 245became applicable to this action as soon as that article became effective in January 2020.In 2019, the Governor signed into law a bill repealing CPL former article 240 andreplacing it with CPL article 245, effective January 1, 2020 (see L 2019, ch 59,§ 1, part LLL, §§ 1, 2, 14). Where an action is "alreadypending," a newly enacted statute that effects a procedural change "is applicable eventhen if directed to the litigation in future steps and stages . . . It isinapplicable, unless in exceptional conditions, where the effect is to reach backward, andnullify by relation the things already done" (Matter of Berkovitz v Arbib &Houlberg, Inc., 230 NY 261, 270 [1921]; see Simonson v International Bank,14 NY2d 281, 289 [1964]). Thus, "procedural changes are, in the absence of words ofexclusion, deemed applicable to subsequent proceedings in pending actions"(Simonson, 14 NY2d at 289 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Robbins, 206AD3d 1069, 1071 [3d Dept 2022], lv denied 39 NY3d 942 [2022]; People v Hewitt, 201 AD3d1041, 1042-1043 [3d Dept 2022], lv denied 38 NY3d 928 [2022]).
We nevertheless reject defendant's contention that the People violated CPL article245 by failing to provide defendant with the criminal history of his brother, an allegedaccomplice who testified for the People at trial pursuant to a plea agreement, until trialhad already commenced. As relevant here, the automatic discovery provisions of CPLarticle 245 require that the People provide the defense with "[a] complete record ofjudgments of conviction for . . . all persons designated as potentialprosecution witnesses" (CPL 245.20 [1] [p]), as well as, "[w]hen it is known to theprosecution, the existence of any pending criminal action against all persons designatedas potential prosecution witnesses" (CPL 245.20 [1] [q]). Each of the two instances ofprior criminal conduct allegedly committed by defendant's brother, who was only 13years old at the time the instant offenses were committed, would have been subject to thejurisdiction of Family Court, rather than the criminal courts (see Family Ct Act§ 301.2 [1]; CPL 1.20 [42]); consequently, any adjudication could not "bedenominated a conviction" and defendant's brother could not be "denominated a criminalby reason of such adjudication" (Family Ct Act § 380.1[*2][1]). Thus, the People were not required to disclose thatinformation pursuant to CPL 245.20 (1) (p) or (q).
To the extent that defendant contends that the prosecution's failure to provide acertificate of compliance in accordance with CPL 245.50 (former [1]) hampered hisability to present a defense, defendant failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by thelack of a certificate. He did not identify any evidence or information that he had notreceived or that he had received too late to use effectively. Thus, Supreme Court did notabuse its discretion in determining that no sanction was required (see generallyPeople v Jenkins, 98 NY2d 280, 284 [2002]; People v Sweet, 200 AD3d 1315, 1319-1320 [3d Dept2021], lv denied 38 NY3d 930 [2022]). Defendant's related contention that thecourt should have dismissed the case because the People, having failed to file acertificate of compliance, could not be ready for trial pursuant to CPL 30.30 isunpreserved for our review inasmuch as he did not move, in writing, for dismissal on thatground (see CPL 210.20 [1] [g]; 210.45 [1]; 470.05 [2]). We decline to exerciseour power to review that contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice(see CPL 470.15 [6] [a]).
Defendant further contends that the court erred in denying his request that theindictment be dismissed, or that other sanctions be imposed, on the ground thatunauthorized audio recordings were made of the grand jury proceeding. Initially,defendant did not ask for any sanction other than dismissal and, therefore, his contentionwith respect to sanctions other than dismissal of the indictment is unpreserved(see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Manigualt, 125 AD3d 1480, 1480 [4th Dept2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1074 [2015]; People v Pena, 259 AD2d 350,350 [1st Dept 1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 1005 [1999]). We reject defendant'scontention that the court erred in denying his request that the indictment be dismissed. Adefendant may move to dismiss an indictment pursuant to CPL 210.20 on the ground thatthe "grand jury proceeding was defective, within the meaning of section 210.35" (CPL210.20 [1] [c]). Of the five bases for dismissal in CPL 210.35, the only one that couldapply here is the final basis, which provides that a grand jury proceeding is defectiveunder CPL 210.20 when "[t]he proceeding otherwise fails to conform to the requirementsof [CPL article 190] to such degree that the integrity thereof is impaired and prejudice tothe defendant may result" (CPL 210.35 [5]). The "demanding test" for invoking thatprovision "is met only where the prosecutor engages in an 'over-all pattern of bias andmisconduct' that is 'pervasive' and typically willful, whereas isolated instances ofmisconduct, including the erroneous handling of evidentiary matters, do not meritinvalidation of the indictment" (People v Thompson, 22 NY3d 687, 699 [2014], reargdenied 23 NY3d 948 [2014], quoting People v Huston, 88 NY2d 400, 408[1996]). Here, there was no misconduct by the prosecutors. Unbeknownst to the grandjury stenographers, their new machines automatically recorded audio files in addition tothe stenographer's shorthand. It was discovered by happenstance when the prosecutioninquired of a stenographer in this case about a possible inaccuracy in the transcript. Therewas no evidence that the recordings were intentionally created or concealed, and theprosecution disclosed them immediately and without prompting. Thus, defendant did notmeet the "demanding test" for establishing that the integrity of the grand jury proceedingwas impaired by the inadvertent recordings (id.).
Defendant further contends that the court erred in denying his request for a missingwitness charge. We reject that contention. Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant methis initial burden with respect to his request (see People v Hawkins, 84 AD3d 1736, 1737 [4th Dept2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 806 [2011]), we conclude that the prosecutionestablished that the testimony of the witness in question would have been cumulative(see People v Ortiz, 83 NY2d 989, 990 [1994]; People v White, 265AD2d 843, 843-844 [4th Dept 1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 868 [1999]).
We further conclude that the court did not err in permitting a police detective totestify regarding certain software that he used to analyze cell phone location data. Here,the detective testified that he obtained data from cell phone companies, which he theninputted into the software to create a report. Contrary to defendant's contention, thedetective testified to factual matters within his knowledge and did not provide an expertopinion (see People vCarducci, 143 AD3d 1260, 1261 [4th Dept 2016], lv denied 28 NY3d1143 [2017]; cf. People vOrtiz, 168 AD3d 482, 483 [1st Dept 2019], lv denied 33 NY3d 979[2019]; see also People vBox, 181 AD3d 1238, 1242 [4th Dept 2020], lv denied 35 NY3d 1025[2020], cert denied 592 US &mdash, 141 S Ct 1099 [2021]).
[*3] Viewing the evidence in light of the elements of thecrimes as charged to the jury (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]), weconclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see generallyPeople v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]).
Defendant's sentence is not unduly harsh or severe. We have reviewed defendant'sremaining contentions and conclude that they do not warrant modification or reversal ofthe judgment. Present—Smith, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Winslow and Montour,JJ.