| Rosen v Mosby |
| 2017 NY Slip Op 01599 [148 AD3d 1228] |
| March 2, 2017 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| Steven Rosen, Respondent-Appellant, v Katherine Mosby,Appellant-Respondent. |
Cuddy & Feder, LLP, White Plains (Joshua E. Kimerling of counsel), forappellant-respondent.
Steven Rosen, New York City, respondent-appellant pro se.
Clark, J. Appeals (1) from an order of the Supreme Court (Zwack, J.), entered April 23, 2014in Columbia County, which denied defendant's motion for an order directing plaintiff to complywith outstanding discovery demands, (2) from an order of said court (Mott, J.), entered August 7,2014 in Columbia County, which, among other things, granted defendant's cross motion forpartial summary judgment, (3) from an order of said court (Mott, J.), entered October 6, 2014 inColumbia County, which, among other things, denied plaintiff's motion for reargument, (4) froman order of said court (Mott, J.), entered January 9, 2015 in Columbia County, which, amongother things, granted defendant's motion for partial summary judgment, and (5) from an order ofsaid court (Mott, J.), entered June 17, 2015 in Columbia County, which, among other things,denied plaintiff's motion for reargument.
The parties own adjoining properties located in the Town of Ancram, Columbia County.Plaintiff purchased his property in 1989 and his deed includes the grant of "the right of ingressand egress . . . over: A [50-]foot[-]wide roadway" that is particularly described bymetes and bounds. Plaintiff's deed further provides that the easement is "[s]ubject to a roadmaintenance agreement dated August 16, 1988." The duly recorded 1988 maintenance agreementwas a declaration by the owner of the subdivision that included plaintiff's property and itprovided—[*2]with reference to a subdivision mapdepicting the proposed 50-foot-wide roadway—that the cost of maintaining the privateroad would be shared by the property owners. The maintenance agreement expressly providedthat each owner of a deeded lot in the subdivision would have "an easement and right-of-way incommon over and across the private road depicted on the subdivision map for ingress or egressby motor vehicle or otherwise." By its terms, the maintenance agreement could be amended "by awritten agreement signed and acknowledged" by a requisite number of owners. The maintenanceagreement, however, provided that the "continuing easements in common in the private road"could be terminated, by an amendment to the maintenance agreement, only upon the unanimousconsent of all the subdivision lot owners.
In March 1990, the maintenance agreement was amended because "the roadway as actuallyconstructed and laid out on the ground varie[d] somewhat from the layout of the roadway asdepicted" on the map referenced in the maintenance agreement. Consequently, the amendment"deemed . . . the roadway as actually constructed and laid out on the ground" to bethe roadway that was the subject of the maintenance agreement. Further, the amendmentprovided that the easement referenced in the maintenance agreement was "the width of theroadway and drainage ditches adjacent thereto as . . . actually constructed" to be theroadway that was the subject of the maintenance agreement. In November 1990, after plaintiffagreed to and executed the amendment, it was recorded.
In 2011, defendant purchased her property, which is located across the road from plaintiff'sproperty. Defendant's deed also included and was subject to the "right of ingress and egress" asshown on the original subdivision map, the maintenance agreement and the 1990 amendment tothe maintenance agreement. In the spring of 2012, defendant cleared and graded an area locatedon the western edge of her property and installed a stockade fence along the private road.Plaintiff then commenced this action alleging six causes of action—the first four pursuantto the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law—arising from his claim that the fenceblocked his access to the right-of-way set forth in his deed. Defendant initially moved to dismissthe complaint, arguing that there was no encroachment because the maintenance agreement andthe amendment thereto modified the right-of-way by moving the easement to the road that wasbuilt. Supreme Court (Zwack, J.) denied the motion, and defendant filed an answer asserting 12affirmative defenses and two counterclaims.
In April 2014, Supreme Court denied defendant's motion for an order directing plaintiff tocomply with certain discovery demands. Thereafter, by order entered in August 2014, SupremeCourt (Mott, J.) denied plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and granted defendant'scross motion dismissing plaintiff's first four causes of action, finding that there was no disputethat plaintiff's rights of ingress and egress over the actual road were unimpeded by the fence thatdefendant had constructed on her own land. After twice granting plaintiff leave to amend hiscomplaint to add causes of action for, as relevant here, indemnification, conversion anddeclaratory judgment, Supreme Court, by order entered January 2015, granted defendant's motionfor partial summary judgment dismissing these causes of action as well. Defendant appeals fromthe April 2014 order, and plaintiff appeals from the August 2014 and January 2015 ordersgranting defendant partial summary judgment, as well as from two orders entered in October2014 and June 2015 denying his motions for reargument.[FN1]
[*3] We first turn to Supreme Court's dismissal of plaintiff's first four causes of action, inwhich plaintiff essentially alleged that defendant interfered with his deeded easement rights,delineated in the 50-foot-wide easement area for a period of 25 years, and that the fence erectedby defendant blocked that right-of-way. "It is well settled that the extent and nature of aneasement must be determined by the language contained in the grant, aided where necessary byany circumstances tending to manifest the intent of the parties" (Boice v Hirschbihl, 128 AD3d1215, 1216 [2015] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; see Shelmerdine v Myers, 143 AD3d1200, 1200 [2016]). "[W]here the intention in granting an easement is to afford only a rightof ingress and egress, it is the right of passage, and not any right in a physical passageway itself,that is granted to the easement holder" (Lewis v Young, 92 NY2d 443, 449 [1998]; accord Thibodeau v Martin, 119 AD3d1015, 1016 [2014]; Sullivan vWoods, 70 AD3d 1286, 1287 [2010]). If " 'an easement is definitively located,by grant or by use, its location cannot be changed by either party unilaterally' " (Estate Ct., LLC v Schnall, 49 AD3d1076, 1077 [2008], quoting Clayton v Whitton, 233 AD2d 828, 829 [1996]). Forexample, unilateral relocation is not permitted where there is "an indication that the partiesintended to permanently fix the easement's location, such as the inclusion of a metes and boundsdescription in the agreement creating the easement" (MacKinnon v Croyle, 72 AD3d 1356, 1357 [2010]; see EstateCt., LLC v Schnall, 49 AD3d at 1077).
Here, in support of his claim that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his first fourcauses of action, plaintiff relied on the language in his deed, defendant's deed and a survey map.In opposition, defendant relied on the deeds, the maintenance agreement and the amendment tothe maintenance agreement. Defendant further submitted affidavits by the subdivision developerand former property owners to establish that the originally proposed private roadway wasrerouted in response to field conditions and that the maintenance agreement was amended toreflect the actual location of the easement for ingress and egress. Defendant's submissionsconfirm that the proposed road followed a relatively straight route through the subdivision andended at a cul-de-sac, while the actual road follows the proposed road for a distance beforeveering to the west, away from defendant's property and onto plaintiff's parcel.[FN2]
Plaintiff's deed grants a right of ingress and egress over a 50-foot-wide roadway identifiedwith a metes and bounds description and with reference to proposed subdivision map number9951 (see Marsh v Hogan, 56 AD3d1090, 1092 [2008]). However, plaintiff's deed is expressly subject to the maintenanceagreement, which references a proposed subdivision map number 10423 that depicts the sameroadway as described in plaintiff's deed.[FN3] Accordingly, by accepting the deed, plaintiffagreed to be "bound by and considered as having accepted and agreed to [the] protectivecovenants and restrictions" set forth in the maintenance agreement. In [*4]addition, when he executed the amendment to the maintenanceagreement, plaintiff agreed that the as-built private roadway was "deemed" to be the location ofthe easement for ingress and egress.
In our view, plaintiff's deed clearly evinces that the intent of the easement was to provide aright of ingress and egress. Although plaintiff correctly argues that his deed fixed the location ofthe easement (see MacKinnon v Croyle, 72 AD3d at 1357), this does not resolve the issuepresented. The plain language of plaintiff's deed incorporates the maintenance agreement, whichwas duly amended so as to "deem[ ]" the location of the easement for ingress and egress tofollow the private road that was actually constructed. Accordingly, the easement was notrelocated unilaterally, but with plaintiff's express consent, and we decline to construe thedocuments as creating a new easement in 1990. We further agree with Supreme Court'sconclusion that, because plaintiff did not allege that defendant's fence impeded his right toingress and egress between his property and the public road, defendant was entitled to partialsummary judgment dismissing plaintiff's first four causes of action (see Guzzone v Brandariz, 57 AD3d481, 482-483 [2008]).
It follows that Supreme Court also properly dismissed plaintiff's fourteenth cause of actionseeking a declaratory judgment that he may modify the easement to bar access to his property todefendant, her invitees, agents and guests. By this cause of action, plaintiff alleged that he agreedto the private roadway easement burdening his property because he believed that he maintained aright to access defendant's property. Plaintiff asserts that if defendant can build a fence to blockhis access, he should have the authority to modify the existing private roadway easement toprevent defendant from using that portion of the roadway that burdens his property. "[A]neasement created by grant, express or implied, can only be extinguished by abandonment,conveyance, condemnation, or adverse possession" (Gerbig v Zumpano, 7 NY2d 327,330 [1960] [emphasis omitted]; seeDutcher v Allen, 93 AD3d 1101, 1103 [2012]). Contrary to his assertions, plaintiffcannot unilaterally change the location of the existing private roadway easement—thelocation of which was fixed by the deed, the maintenance agreement and the amendment to themaintenance agreement (see Estate Ct., LLC v Schnall, 49 AD3d at 1077). Thus,defendant was entitled to summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's fourteenth cause ofaction.
Next, we find that Supreme Court properly dismissed plaintiff's twelfth cause of action forconversion, in which he alleges that defendant removed a wooden signpost, identifying her lotnumber, that has been posted at the foot of her driveway, but on his property, for "ten years ormore." A cause of action for conversion exists where the plaintiff has a "possessory right orinterest in the property" and the defendant has "dominion over the property or interfere[s] with it,in derogation of [the] plaintiff's rights" (Pappas v Tzolis, 20 NY3d 228, 234 [2012] [internal quotationmarks omitted]). In support of her motion for partial summary judgment dismissing plaintiff'sconversion claim, defendant asserted in an affidavit that she did not remove the signpost. Shealso submitted an affidavit by her predecessor in title who averred that he built and installed thesignpost, believed that he installed the signpost either on his own property or on his drivewayeasement, and did not know or care what happened to the signpost because it had no monetaryvalue. In our view, defendant's submissions were sufficient to meet her initial burden. Inopposition, plaintiff failed to submit evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact with regardto his ownership or possessory right or interest in the signpost. Accordingly, we find thatSupreme Court properly granted defendant's motion for partial summary judgment dismissingplaintiff's twelfth cause of action (seeKomolov v Segal, 144 AD3d 487, 488 [2016]; Reeves v Giannotta, 130 AD3d 1444 [2015]; compare Miller v Marchuska, 31 AD3d949, 950 [2006]).
[*5] We reject plaintiff's argumentthat the order entered in August 2014 violated the law of the case doctrine. First, "[t]he doctrineapplies only when the prior ruling directly passed upon a question of law that is essential to thedetermination of the matter" (Karol vPolsinello, 127 AD3d 1401, 1402 [2015]; see Scofield v Trustees of UnionColl., 288 AD2d 807, 808 [2001]). The observation that defendant did not have a viabledefense "as a matter of law" was not necessary to the court's ruling on defendant's motion tocompel discovery and, thus, Supreme Court was not required to give preclusive effect to suchlanguage. Nor does the doctrine apply where, as here, a motion for summary judgment follows amotion to dismiss that was not converted to a motion for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR3212 (c) (see Moses v Savedoff, 96AD3d 466, 468 [2012]; 191Chrystie LLC v Ledoux, 82 AD3d 681, 682 [2011]). Supreme Court was not required togive preclusive effect to the court's initial denial of defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's firstfour causes of action, and, importantly, based its determination on the fact that plaintiff did notclaim that the fence in any way impeded his access over the as-built private roadway.
Finally, plaintiff's arguments with regard to "paper streets," raised for the first time on appeal,is not preserved for our review (seeMatter of Regan v DiNapoli, 135 AD3d 1225, 1228 [2016], lv denied 27 NY3d913 [2016]; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. vVasiliou, 127 AD3d 1351, 1352 [2015]). We have considered the parties' remainingarguments and find that they are either without merit or not necessary to resolve in light of thefindings herein.
McCarthy, J.P., Egan Jr. and Mulvey, JJ., concur; Lynch, J., not taking part. Ordered that theappeals from the orders entered October 6, 2014 and June 17, 2015 are dismissed. Ordered thatthe orders entered April 23, 2014, August 7, 2014 and January 9, 2015 are affirmed, with costs todefendant.
Footnote 1:As no appeal lies from the denialof a motion to reargue, the appeals from said orders must be dismissed (see Borst v International Paper Co.,121 AD3d 1343, 1345 n 2 [2014]; Brown v Reinauer Transp. Cos., LLC, 67 AD3d 106, 109 n 1[2009], lv dismissed and denied 14 NY3d 823 [2010], cert denied 564 US 1052[2011]).
Footnote 2:Although it is not clear from therecord precisely when the private roadway was built, it has existed and been in use since at least1990.
Footnote 3:Defendant's deed similarlyincludes the right of ingress and egress over the 50-foot-wide roadway shown on subdivisionmap 10423, expressly subject to both the maintenance agreement and the amendment, and itdescribes the as-built private roadway by metes and bounds.