| People v King |
| 2023 NY Slip Op 02409 [216 AD3d 1400] |
| May 5, 2023 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Alvin King, Appellant. (Appeal No.1.) |
Frank H. Hiscock Legal Aid Society, Syracuse (Susan M. Norman of counsel), fordefendant-appellant.
William J. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney, Syracuse (Bradley W. Oastler of counsel),for respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County (Gordon J. Cuffy,A.J.), rendered February 20, 2020. The judgment convicted defendant upon a jury verdictof assault in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree,endangering the welfare of a child (two counts), menacing in the second degree (twocounts), menacing a police officer or peace officer and resisting arrest.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is reversed on the law, thatpart of the motion dated January 27, 2020, seeking to dismiss the indictment pursuant toCPL 30.30 is granted, the indictment is dismissed, and the matter is remitted to SupremeCourt, Onondaga County, for proceedings pursuant to CPL 470.45.
Memorandum: In appeal No. 1, defendant appeals from a judgment convicting himupon a jury verdict of, inter alia, assault in the second degree (Penal Law§ 120.05 [2]), arising from a series of events during which defendant,among other things, stabbed his estranged wife several times. In appeal No. 2, defendantappeals by permission of this Court from an order denying his motion pursuant to CPL440.10 to vacate the judgment in appeal No. 1.
Defendant was initially charged by felony and misdemeanor complaints onSeptember 5, 2018, and later charged with various offenses by indictment filed March14, 2019, on which date the People first announced readiness for trial. The matter thenproceeded with pretrial discovery and plea negotiations, the latter of which wereultimately unsuccessful, and trial was eventually scheduled to commence on January 27,2020. In the meantime, the new discovery requirements embodied in CPL article 245 andother reforms related thereto became effective on January 1, 2020.
On the morning of the first day of trial as scheduled, defendant moved in writing foran order, inter alia, dismissing the indictment pursuant to CPL 30.30 on the ground thatthe People were not ready for trial within the applicable time period because, contrary toCPL 245.50 as then in effect, the People had failed to serve and file the requisitecertificate of compliance with their discovery obligations. The People thereafterpurportedly attempted to serve upon defendant, and may have sought to file withSupreme Court, a certificate of compliance. Following argument on the issue, the courtdenied that part of defendant's motion seeking to dismiss the indictment, reasoning thatthe People were not required to abide by the newly effective discovery obligations underCPL article 245 and related speedy trial requirements under CPL 30.30 because they hadalready announced readiness under the prior law and the statutory changes were not made"retroactive."
Defendant now contends in appeal No. 1 that the court erred in denying that part ofhis [*2]motion seeking to dismiss the indictment pursuantto CPL 30.30 because, upon the effective date of CPL article 245, the People werereturned to a state of unreadiness, and the People's subsequent attempt to serve and file acertificate of compliance did not occur until after the time to declare trial readiness hadexpired. We agree.
By way of relevant background, in April 2019, as part of a suite of criminal justicereforms, the legislature amended the speedy trial provisions of CPL 30.30 (see L2019, ch 59, § 1, part KKK) and repealed CPL former article 240 andreplaced it with CPL article 245 (see L 2019, ch 59, § 1, part LLL),all of which was made effective on January 1, 2020 (see generally People v Galindo, 38 NY3d 199, 203 [2022];People v Elmore, 211 AD3d1536, 1537 [4th Dept 2022]). Thus, "[d]iscovery in criminal actions is nowgoverned by the new CPL article 245, which . . . provides for 'automatic'disclosure by the People to the defendant of 'all items and information that relate to thesubject matter of the case' that are in the People's possession or control" (People v Bonifacio, 179 AD3d977, 977-978 [2d Dept 2020], quoting CPL 245.20 [1]). Following amendments notmaterial to our analysis, CPL article 245 currently provides that, "[w]hen the prosecutionhas provided the discovery required by [CPL 245.20 (1)]" with certain exceptions notrelevant here, the People must "serve upon the defendant and file with the court acertificate of compliance" (CPL 245.50 [1]). In the certificate of compliance, the Peopleare required to "state that, after exercising due diligence and making reasonable inquiriesto ascertain the existence of material and information subject to discovery, the prosecutorhas disclosed and made available all known material and information subject todiscovery" and to "identify the items provided" (id.). Critically, the statute ties thePeople's adherence to their discovery obligations and the corresponding certificate ofcompliance requirement to their trial readiness by providing that, "[n]otwithstanding theprovisions of any other law, absent an individualized finding of special circumstances inthe instant case by the court before which the charge is pending, the prosecution shall notbe deemed ready for trial for purposes of [CPL] 30.30 . . . until it has filed aproper certificate pursuant to [CPL 245.50 (1)]" (CPL 245.50 [3]; see 30.30[5]; People v Brown, 214AD3d 823, 824 [2d Dept 2023]).
With respect to the applicability of the reforms to pending prosecutions, it is wellestablished that, when an action is "already pending," a newly enacted statute that effectsa procedural change "is applicable even then if directed to the litigation in future stepsand stages"; however, the statute "is inapplicable, unless in exceptional conditions, wherethe effect is to reach backward, and nullify by relation the things already done"(Matter of Berkovitz v Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 230 NY 261, 270 [1921]).Consequently, "while procedural changes are, in the absence of words of exclusion,deemed applicable to subsequent proceedings in pending actions . . ., it takes a clear expression of the legislative purpose to justify a retrospective applicationof even a procedural statute so as to affect proceedings previously taken in suchactions" (Simonson v International Bank, 14 NY2d 281, 289 [1964] [internalquotation marks omitted]; seePeople v McFadden, 189 AD3d 2086, 2087 [4th Dept 2020], lv denied36 NY3d 1099 [2021]). Applying those principles, courts, including this Court, havedetermined that "[t]he relevant provisions of CPL 30.30 and CPL article 245 constitutedsuch [procedural] changes and, as such, applied to proceedings taken in [pending]matter[s] after January 1, 2020" (People v Robbins, 206 AD3d 1069, 1071 [3d Dept2022], lv denied 39 NY3d 942 [2022]; see Elmore, 211 AD3d at 1537; People v Hewitt, 201 AD3d1041, 1042-1043 [3d Dept 2022], lv denied 38 NY3d 928 [2022]; seealso Brown, 214 AD3d at 824; People v Torres, 205 AD3d 524, 525-526 [1st Dept 2022],lv denied 39 NY3d 942 [2022]). Stated differently, "the procedures outlined inCPL article 245 became applicable to [pending] action[s] as soon as that article becameeffective" (Elmore, 211 AD3d at 1537).
The People and the dissent nonetheless assert, consistent with the court's reasoning indenying that part of defendant's motion seeking to dismiss the indictment, that the Peopledid not need to abide by the newly effective discovery obligations under CPL article 245and related speedy trial provisions under CPL 30.30—most prominently thecertificate of compliance requirement—because mandating compliance with thestatutory changes in pending actions would improperly require "retroactive" applicationof the reforms and nullify acts previously taken by the People. We reject thoseassertions.
First, contrary to the People's assertion, we conclude that the Court of Appeals'decision in Galindo does not govern the outcome here. There, "[t]he issuepresented on . . . appeal [was] whether CPL 30.30 (1) (e), added to thespeedy trial statute and made effective while [the] [*3]defendant's direct appeal was pending before the AppellateTerm, applie[d] to his case" (Galindo, 38 NY3d at 201). The subject amendmentto CPL 30.30 provided—in abrogation of the previous interpretation of the statutethat excluded traffic infractions from the criminal action subject to dismissal on statutoryspeedy trial grounds—that the maximum times for prosecutorial readiness wouldnow apply to accusatory instruments charging traffic infractions jointly with a felony,misdemeanor, or violation (see Galindo, 38 NY3d at 201-206). The Court ofAppeals concluded, however, that the Appellate Term had erred in applying theamendment retroactively on appeal to a prosecution that had been commenced and takento judgment several years before the effective date of the criminal justice reforms (seeid. at 201-202, 206-208). The Court of Appeals reasoned that the text of theamendment did not require retroactive application of the statute and that the legislativedelays in abrogating the prior decades-old rule and postponing the effective date of theamendment weighed against retroactive application (see id. at 207). In sum,"there [was] no indication of legislative urgency for CPL 30.30 (1) (e) to 'reach back' andimpose an immediate effect on pending matters and no basis to conclude that theamendment should be applied retroactively" (id.). The Court of Appeals thusconcluded that, "because the amended statute was not in effect when the criminal actionagainst [the] defendant was commenced, CPL 30.30 (1) (e) ha[d] no application to [the]defendant's direct appeal from that judgment of conviction" (id.; see id. at202, 206-207).
Galindo thus involved a retroactivity analysis in a criminal prosecution thathad already gone to judgment years prior and was pending on appeal when theamendment to CPL 30.30 became effective, whereas the case currently before usinvolves the application of newly enacted procedural requirements that became effectivewhile the prosecution was pending before the trial court (see e.g. Brown, 214AD3d at 824; Elmore, 211 AD3d at 1537; Robbins, 206 AD3d at 1071).Consequently, the case before us is governed by the aforementioned legal principles forthe application of newly enacted procedural laws to pending actions (see e.g.Simonson, 14 NY2d at 289; Berkovitz, 230 NY at 270). Moreover, andcritical to the analysis in Galindo, "CPL 30.30 (1) (e) created a new speedy trialright" upon which a defendant could obtain dismissal of traffic infraction charges (People v Ali, 71 Misc 3d25, 27 [App Term, 1st Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 990 [2021]). Stateddifferently, the amendment to CPL 30.30 imposed upon the People a statutory speedytrial obligation with respect to traffic infractions charged jointly with a felony,misdemeanor, or violation that theretofore did not exist under applicable case law(see Galindo, 38 NY3d at 204-205, 207). Those circumstances explain the Courtof Appeals' conclusion that, in addition to not applying retroactively to cases pending onappeal, "the legislature intended that CPL 30.30 (1) (e) apply to criminal actionscommenced on or after the effective date of the amendment" (id. at 202), i.e., thatparticular statutory amendment also does not "impose an immediate effect on pendingmatters" (id. at 207). To hold otherwise would have allowed CPL 30.30 (1) (e) toimproperly "reach backward" and start the People's speedy trial time onalready-commenced prosecutions that included traffic infractions which, at the time ofcommencement, had no speedy trial obligation applicable to such infractions(Berkovitz, 230 NY at 270; see Galindo, 38 NY3d at 207). The Court ofAppeals was, in other words, concerned in Galindo that application of CPL 30.30(1) (e) in pending prosecutions would violate the retrospective component of the pendingcase analysis (see Simonson, 14 NY2d at 289), and thus linked the applicabilityof that particular new statutory provision to the commencement date of the criminalaction (see Berkovitz, 230 NY at 270). Inasmuch as the addition of the CPL30.30 (1) (e) speedy trial obligation is distinct from the forward-looking discoveryobligations required under CPL article 245 and the corresponding certificate ofcompliance requirement, we reject the People's assertion in the case before us that theGalindo Court's "analysis of the legislative intent [behind CPL 30.30 (1) (e)]applies equally to CPL article 245."
Second, with respect to the effect of CPL 245.50 (3) on pending prosecutions inwhich the People had previously announced readiness for trial, we agree with the courtsthat have concluded that the People "were placed in a state of nonreadiness on January 1,2020, the effective date of CPL article 245, as a matter of law, [where] no [certificate ofcompliance] had been filed as of that date" (People v Vasquez, 75 Misc 3d 49, 52 [App Term, 2d Dept,9th & 10th Jud Dists 2022], lv denied 39 NY3d 965 [2022]; see People v Dobrzenski, 69Misc 3d 333, 339 [Utica City Ct 2020]; People v Adrovic, 69 Misc 3d 563, 567-568 [Crim Ct,Kings County 2020]; People vVillamar, 69 Misc 3d 842, 849 [Crim Ct, NY County 2020]; People v Roland, 67 Misc 3d330, 335 [Crim Ct, Kings County 2020]; People v Nge, 67 Misc 3d 650, 654 [Crim Ct, KingsCounty 2020]). That interpretation flows directly from the text of the new statute. Thelegislature was clear in stating that, as of January 1, 2020, the service and filing of acertificate of [*4]compliance became a prerequisite fortrial readiness for purposes of CPL 30.30 "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of anyother law" (CPL 245.50 [3] [emphasis added]). In our view, "[t]he meaning of thestatute's notwithstanding clause is plainly understood and clearly supersedes anyinconsistent provisions of state law" (Matter of State of New York v John S., 23 NY3d 326, 341[2014] [internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted]). Consequently, notwithstandingcompliance with the provisions of any other law that would have rendered the Peopleready for trial, as of the effective date of CPL article 245, the People "reverted to a stateof unreadiness and could not be deemed ready until filing the certificate of compliancerequired by CPL 245.50" (Adrovic, 69 Misc 3d at 568).
Contrary to the dissent's assertion, application of the certificate of compliancerequirement where the People had previously announced readiness for trial does notviolate the principle that a newly enacted procedural law may not "nullify. . . things already done" (Berkovitz, 230 NY at 270). "[T]hechanges in the law effective as of January 1, 2020, do not invalidate the People'sprevious statements of readiness"—i.e., those previous statements, so long as notillusory, remain effective to stop the speedy trial calculation during the pre-amendmentperiod (Adrovic, 69 Misc 3d at 567-568; see e.g. Villamar, 69 Misc 3d at846-847). But, as of January 1, 2020, "the legislature . . . reset the People'sreadiness status by tying it to the fulfillment of their obligations under the new discoverylaws" (Villamar, 69 Misc 3d at 847). Consequently, as of the effective date ofCPL article 245, the People had no longer "done all that [was] required of them to bringthe case to a point where it may be tried" (People v England, 84 NY2d 1, 4[1994], rearg denied 84 NY2d 846 [1994]) until they filed a proper certificate ofcompliance (see CPL 245.50 [3]; Vasquez, 75 Misc 3d at 52).
In this case, inasmuch as the record establishes that the People were not timely readyfor trial, the court erred in denying that part of defendant's motion to dismiss theindictment pursuant to CPL 30.30. " 'CPL 30.30 (1) . . . correlatesthe applicable time period to the highest grade of offense charged in a criminalaction' " (Galindo, 38 NY3d at 205, quoting People v Cooper, 98NY2d 541, 546 [2002]). Thus, "[i]n felony cases such as this one, CPL 30.30 requiresthe People to be ready for trial within six months of the commencement of the criminalaction (CPL 30.30 [1] [a]). Whether the People have satisfied this obligation is generallydetermined by computing the time elapsed between the filing of the first accusatoryinstrument and the People's declaration of readiness, subtracting any periods of delay thatare excludable under the terms of the statute and then adding to the result anypostreadiness periods of delay that are actually attributable to the People and areineligible for an exclusion" (People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 208 [1992], reargdenied 81 NY2d 1068 [1993]). "[A] defendant bears the initial burden of allegingthat the People were not ready for trial within the statutorily prescribed time period" (People v Allard, 28 NY3d41, 45 [2016]). The People then "bear the burden of demonstrating sufficientexcludable time" (People v Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331, 338 [1985]; seeAllard, 28 NY3d at 45).
Here, the criminal action was commenced on September 5, 2018, when the felonyand misdemeanor complaints were filed (see CPL 1.20 [17]; People vOsgood, 52 NY2d 37, 43 [1980]; People v Harrison, 171 AD3d 1481, 1482 [4th Dept2019]). Inasmuch as defendant's charges included felonies, the People were permitted nomore than six calendar months of delay or, in this case, 181 days (see CPL 30.30[1] [a]; Cortes, 80 NY2d at 207 n 3; People v Session, 206 AD3d 1678, 1680 [4th Dept 2022];see also People v Chavis, 91 NY2d 500, 504 n 3 [1998]; People v Stiles,70 NY2d 765, 767 [1987]).
Regarding the first period of prereadiness delay, we conclude that the People shouldbe charged with 189 days. Defendant was charged by felony and misdemeanorcomplaints on September 5, 2018, and the People announced readiness for trial on March14, 2019, when the indictment was filed. The day the felony and misdemeanorcomplaints were filed is excluded from the time calculations (see Stiles, 70 NY2dat 767; Harrison, 171 AD3d at 1482), and thus the first period of prereadinessdelay is 189 days (see Session, 206 AD3d at 1680). With respect to the secondperiod of prereadiness delay—i.e., after the People reverted to a state ofunreadiness upon the effective date of CPL article 245—we conclude that thePeople should be charged with 26 days. The People were placed in a state of unreadinesson January 1, 2020 (see e.g. Vasquez, 75 Misc 3d at 52), and even assuming,arguendo, that the People thereafter filed a proper certificate of compliance on January27, 2020, and validly stated readiness for trial at that time (see CPL 30.30 [5]),we conclude that the second period of prereadiness delay amounted to 26 days (seee.g. Villamar, 69 Misc 3d at 848).
[*5] Consequently, the total amount of prereadiness delay chargeable to the People is215 days. Even assuming, arguendo, that the People established that the 15-day periodinclusive of February 21, 2019, through March 7, 2019, was chargeable to defendant onthe ground that he waived his speedy trial rights pursuant to CPL 30.30 with respect tothat period in exchange for which the People agreed to postpone their grand jurypresentation in order to accommodate defendant's request to testify (see People v Waldron, 6 NY3d463, 467-468 [2006];People v Lewis, 177 AD3d 1351, 1352-1353 [4th Dept 2019], lv denied34 NY3d 1130 [2020], denied reconsideration 35 NY3d 971 [2020]) and furtherthat the 15-day period inclusive of January 1, 2020, through January 15, 2020, wasexcludable as a reasonable period of delay to comply with the new statutory equivalent ofa demand to produce (see CPL 30.30 [4] [a]) or an exceptional circumstancearising from the change in the discovery requirements (see CPL 30.30 [4] [g]),we conclude that the total excludable time of 30 days would mean that the People wereready for trial at 185 days, several days beyond the 181 days allowable in this case(see CPL 30.30 [1] [a]; Session, 206 AD3d at 1680). The People thusviolated defendant's statutory right to a speedy trial.
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the judgment in appeal No. 1, grant that part ofdefendant's motion seeking to dismiss the indictment pursuant to CPL 30.30, and dismissthe indictment (see People vJohnson, 174 AD3d 1510, 1512 [4th Dept 2019]; Harrison, 171 AD3d at1484). In light of our determination in appeal No. 1, we do not address defendant'sremaining contentions therein, and we dismiss as moot defendant's appeal from the orderin appeal No. 2 (see People vWilson, 5 NY3d 778, 779 n [2005]; People v Tucker, 139 AD3d 1399, 1401 [4th Dept2016]; People v Dealmeida,124 AD3d 1405, 1407 [4th Dept 2015]).
All concur except Ogden, J., who dissents and votes to modify in accordance withthe following memorandum.
Ogden, J. (dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the majority's conclusion in appealNo. 1 that Supreme Court erred when it denied that part of defendant's January 27, 2020motion seeking to dismiss the indictment. In my view, the statutory amendments to CPL30.30 and article 245 should not be applied in a manner that renders illusory the People'sreadiness for trial or takes their case out of a postreadiness posture. Where a proceedingis "already pending," a newly enacted statute that effects a procedural change "isapplicable . . . if directed to the litigation in future steps and stages. . . It is inapplicable, unless in exceptional conditions, where the effect is toreach backward, and nullify by relation the things already done" (Matter of Berkovitzv Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 230 NY 261, 270 [1921]; see Simonson vInternational Bank, 14 NY2d 281, 289 [1964]). Consistent with Berkovitz, incases in which the People had not yet announced their readiness for trial at the time thestatutory amendments became effective, the People could not do so unless or until theycomplied with the new discovery obligations and the filing of a certificate of compliance(see CPL 30.30 [5]; 245.50 [1], [3]). Here, however, the People complied withtheir obligations to be ready for trial as required under the prior version of CPL 30.30when they announced their trial readiness on March 14, 2019. Because this case was,therefore, in a postreadiness posture at that time, any new legislation affecting thePeople's readiness would have the effect of reaching backward. The effect of themajority's conclusion then, i.e., that the statutory amendments upon taking effect therebytook pending, trial-ready cases out of a postreadiness posture, rendering the Peopleunready for trial, is to improperly nullify a "thing[ ] already done" (Berkovitz,230 NY at 270).
In my view, the Court of Appeals' analysis in People v Galindo (38 NY3d 199 [2022]) applies andcontrols. I simply do not agree with the majority that, because the legislature included thelanguage "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of any other law," the legislature intended tohave the People revert to a state of unreadiness in cases such as the one before us (CPL245.50 [3]). The Court of Appeals has been very clear. "It is a fundamental canon ofstatutory construction that retroactive operation is not favored by courts and statutes willnot be given such construction unless the language expressly or by necessary implicationrequires it" (Galindo, 38 NY3d at 207 [internal quotation marks omitted]; seeMatter of Thomas v Bethlehem Steel Corp., 63 NY2d 150, 154 [1984]). To be sure,"[t]he primary consideration of courts in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and giveeffect to the intention of the [l]egislature" (Galindo, 38 NY3d at 203 [internalquotation marks omitted]), and I am not convinced that the legislature intended to havethe statutory amendments applied retroactively to those cases where, as here, the Peoplelegally declared their readiness for trial prior to the effective date of thoseamendments.
[*6] I have considereddefendant's remaining contentions in appeal No. 1 and conclude that, except with respectto defendant's sentence, they do not require reversal or modification of the judgment.With respect to defendant's sentence, although I reject defendant's contention that thesentence is unduly harsh and severe, I agree with defendant that the court erred indirecting that the definite sentences imposed on counts 4 and 5 of the indictment, whichwere misdemeanor counts of endangering the welfare of a child, shall run consecutivelyto the remaining sentences (see Penal Law § 70.35). I wouldtherefore modify the judgment by directing that the definite sentences imposed on counts4 and 5 shall run concurrently with the remaining sentences, and otherwise affirm.Finally, I have considered defendant's contentions with respect to appeal No. 2 and,inasmuch as I conclude that they do not warrant reversal or modification of the order inthat appeal, I would affirm that order. Present—Peradotto, J.P., Lindley, Bannister,Montour and Ogden, JJ.