| People v Trotman |
| 2022 NY Slip Op 51181(U) [77 Misc 3d 1210(A)] |
| Decided on December 5, 2022 |
| Criminal Court Of The City Of New York, Queens County |
| Licitra, J. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not bepublished in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on December 5, 2022
The People ofthe State of New York against Trotman, Defendant. |
Docket No. CR-006754-22QN
For the People: Melinda Katz, District Attorney of Queens County (by ADA AlexanderBlisko)
For Mr. Trotman: Queens Defenders (by Ethan Lowens)
Wanda L. Licitra, J.
The People's discovery obligations are clear. Before stating ready for trial, they mustdisclose "all" items and information in their actual or constructive possession that "relateto the subject matter of the case." (C.P.L. §§ 245.20[1], 245.50[3], 245.50[1]).This mandate "virtually constitute[s] 'open file' discovery, or at least make[s] 'open file'discovery the far better course of action to assure compliance." (Hon. William C.Donnino, Practice Commentaries, C.P.L. § 245.10). "If something is in theprosecutor's file (or that of the police investigating agency) . . . it should invariably 'relateto the subject matter of the case' and will need to be disclosed." (People v. Lustig, 68 Misc 3d234, 239-40 [Sup. Ct., Queens County 2020] [Zayas, J.]).
Here, however, the People stated ready for trial without first complying with theseobligations. They chose to withhold police misconduct records, stating that it is their"practice" to do so "unless there is a court order." (Pr. Resp. at 4). They also did notdisclose some police reports that were listed on the police's own arrest index. (See id.at 3; Def. Mot. Ex. D). And then, months later, when they did disclose those reports,they first redacted information from them, unilaterally adjudicating it to be of "limited"relevance. (See Pr. Resp. at 3-4).
As a result, the certificate of discovery "compliance" claimed that the Peopleexercised "due diligence" and turned over "all known material and information" eventhough the People had "not actually turn[ed] over all known material and information."(People v. Quinlan, 71 Misc3d 266, 271 [Crim. Ct., Bronx County 2021]). The People could not claim to haveturned over "all known material and information" while at the same time makingunilateral policy or value judgments to withhold material. (See generally People v. Best,76 Misc 3d 1210[A], at *1 [Crim. Ct., Queens County 2022]; People v. Spaulding, 75 Misc3d 1219[A], at *3 [Crim. Ct., Bronx County 2022]; People v. Payne, 75 Misc 3d1224[A], at *3-*4 [Crim. Ct., Bronx County 2022]; People v. Demonia, 74 Misc 3d752, 759 [County Ct., Ulster County 2022]). And they could not have claimed tohave exercised "due diligence" when they failed to ascertain and disclose police reportsexplicitly referenced on the police's own index. (See People v. Guzman, 75 Misc 3d 132[A], at *4-*5 [App.Term, 2d Dep't 2022]; People v.Ajunwa, 76 Misc 3d 1217[A], at *2 [Crim. Ct., Bronx County 2022]).
Because the People's certificate of discovery compliance did not genuinely certifycompliance, it could not support a valid statement of readiness. Therefore, becausePeople failed to validly state ready for trial within the entire speedy-trial period, the courtmust grant the defense's motion to dismiss.
I. Automatic discovery under Article 245
Article245 requires that the People "actually produce[]" automatic discovery to the defense. (People ex rel. Ferro v. Brann,197 AD3d 787, 787-88 [2d Dep't 2021]; C.P.L. §§ 245.20[1], 245.20[2]).Automatic discovery includes "all" items and information in the People's possession that"relate to the subject matter of the case." (C.P.L. § 245.20[1]). The People's"possession" also includes discoverable material that is in the possession of the police,(C.P.L. § 245.20[2]), and favorable information that is "known to police," (C.P.L.§ 245.20[1][k]).[FN1]
Under Article 245, the People's "obligations to provide discovery" are "so broad" asto "virtually constitute 'open file' discovery, or at least make 'open file' discovery the farbetter course of action to assure compliance." (Hon. William C. Donnino, PracticeCommentaries, C.P.L. § 245.10). Indeed, the "opening language" of the statute"itself points towards an 'open file' discovery policy." (Id.). It requires the Peopleto disclose "all" items and information in their possession that "relate to the subjectmatter of the case." (Id.). It then lists a non-exhaustive set of items that are"includ[ed]" under that standard, but do not "limit[]" it. (Id.).
Therefore, "[i]f something is in the prosecutor's file (or that of the policeinvestigating agency) . . . it should invariably 'relate to the subject matter of the case' andwill need to be disclosed," unless it is attorney work-product or subject to a protectiveorder. (Lustig, 68 Misc 3d at 239-40; see also C.P.L. § 245.20[7][establishing a statutory presumption favoring disclosure]; Payne, 75 Misc 3d1224[A], at *3 ["The Court strains to imagine a situation where material containedwithin records in the People's case file would somehow not 'relate' to thecase."]).
After the People have exercised "due diligence" and made "reasonable inquiries toascertain the existence of material" subject to discovery—and after they have"actually turn[ed] over all known material and information"—they must certify it.(Quinlan, 71 Misc 3d at 271; People v. Adrovic, 69 Misc 3d 563, 574 [Crim. Ct., KingsCounty 2020] [same]). They must do so by filing a "proper" certificate of compliance("COC"). (C.P.L. §§ 245.50[3], [1]).
The statute defines a "proper" certificate as one filed "[w]hen the prosecution has[*2]provided the discovery required by subdivisionone of section 245.20," except for materials that are lost, destroyed, or under a protectiveorder. (C.P.L. § 245.50[1] [emphasis added]). Indeed, that is precisely what thestatute directs the People to do in their certificate of compliance. Theymust certify that they have complied—that "after exercisingdue diligence and making reasonable inquiries to ascertain the existence of material andinformation subject to discovery, the prosecutor has disclosed and made availableall known material and information subject to discovery." (Id. [emphases added]).Therefore, a certificate "[can]not be deemed complete" until discovery is "actuallyproduced" to the defense. (Ferro, 197 AD3d at 787-88; see also Quinlan,71 Misc 3d at 271 [requiring that the People file a COC only after they "actually turn[ed]over all known material and information"]; Adrovic, 69 Misc 3d at 574[same]).
A "proper" COC is a prerequisite to a valid statement of readiness. (C.P.L.§§ 245.50[3]; 245.50[1]). As a result, "a prosecutor who fails to engage in'open file' discovery (except for 'work product' and information subject to a protectivemandate of a statute or court order) may do so at his or her professional peril while alsojeopardizing the viability of a prosecution." (Hon. William C. Donnino, PracticeCommentaries, C.P.L. § 245.10).
Contrary to the People's contention, there is no analysis of "prejudice" in a C.P.L.§ 30.30 speedy-trial motion. "Prejudice" is a consideration for C.P.L. § 245.80sanctions—situations where the People only violate the 20- or 35-day discoverydeadlines, not where they fail to validly state ready within an entire 90-day speedy-trialtimeframe. (Adrovic, 69 Misc 3d at 574; People v. Darren, 75 Misc 3d 1208[A], at *5 [Crim. Ct.,NY County 2022]; People v.Diaz, 75 Misc 3d 314, 320 & n.3 [Crim. Ct., Bronx County 2022]; People v. Pierna, 74 Misc 3d1072, 1089-90 [Crim. Ct., Bronx County 2022]; Quinlan, 71 Misc 3d at272]). "[T]he People's obligation to provide discovery, and to certify compliance withthat obligation, is not relieved by an absence of prejudice to the defendant."(Adrovic, 69 Misc 3d at 574). "Therefore, while a defendant must show someprejudice in order to obtain a sanction against the People under C.P.L. 245.80, theburden is not lifted from the People to comply with their obligation in the first instance."(Id.; see also Hon. Barry Kamins, Bail and Discovery Reform: TheThird Round, N.Y.L.J. [June 6, 2022] ["One must distinguish this discretionary typeof dismissal [in C.P.L. § 245.80], however, from a dismissal under C.P.L. §30.30, which is mandatory when based on a failure of the prosecutor to file a validcertificate of compliance."]).
Nonetheless, the discovery statute is not impracticable. Should the People face anyburdens in producing discovery, the statute provides them numerous opportunities topetition a court for relief. For instance, the People may ask a court to modify thediscovery periods for "good cause." (C.P.L. § 245.70[2]). Or they may ask a courtfor permission to state ready on an improper COC because of "special circumstances."(C.P.L. § 245.50[3]). Or they may ask for a protective order to withhold somematerials entirely. (C.P.L. § 245.70).
II. The People's failures to discloseA. Police misconduct records
There is no longerambiguity over whether the People may only disclose mere summaries of their testifyingpolice witnesses' prior misconduct records. The Appellate Division has held that suchsummaries are insufficient to meet what C.P.L. § 245.20[1][k][iv] requires. (Matter of Jayson C., 200 AD3d447, 448-49 [1st Dep't 2021]; see also People v. Polanco-Chavarria, 74 [*3]Misc 3d 1210[A], at *4 [County Ct., Rockland County2021] [analyzing Jayson C.]; Best, 76 Misc 3d 1210[A], at *5; People v. Goggins, 76 Misc 3d898 [Crim. Ct., Bronx County 2022]; People v. Martinez, 75 Misc 3d 1212[A], at *3 [Crim. Ct.,NY County 2022]). That decision is uncontested amongst the Appellate Division'sdepartments and is therefore controlling on all trial courts throughout the state, includingthis one. (See Mountain View Coach Lines v. Storms, 102 AD2d 663, 664 [2dDep't 1984] [where another department's decision is the only authority "on point," then atrial court must understand that decision "to be binding authority"]).
It is worth reviewing what Jayson C. held. There, in a juvenile delinquencyproceeding, the defense, relying on C.P.L. § 245.20[1][k][iv], sought impeachmentinformation about several police officers involved in the case. (Jayson C., 200AD3d at 448). The presentment agency—which acts like the prosecution in ajuvenile delinquency proceeding—responded by sending summary "disclosureletters" to the defense. (Id.). The lower court held that these disclosure letterswere sufficient because it believed that C.P.L. § 245.20[1][k][iv] was"inapplicable" to juvenile delinquency cases. (Id. at 448-49). But the AppellateDivision unanimously reversed, holding that "the denial of records available underC.P.L. § 245.20[1][k][iv], which broadly requires disclosure of all impeachmentevidence deprived appellant equal protection of the laws." (Id. at 449). "Asimilarly situated defendant in a criminal proceeding," it wrote, "would be entitled toaccess the impeachment materials requested by appellant." (Id. [emphasisadded]).
This predicate conclusion in Jayson C. was "not dicta," as it was "necessaryto the resolution of the issue presented." (See Matter of Report of April, 1979 GrandJury of Montgomery County, 80 AD2d 654, 655 [3d Dep't 1981] [where a court'sstatements are "necessary to the resolution of the issue presented," they are "notdicta"]).[FN2] If a "similarly situated defendant in a criminal proceeding" were not entitled to anythingmore than disclosure summaries, then the Appellate Division could not have held that thejuvenile appellant was entitled to anything more, either.
Jayson C.'s conclusion follows straight from the text of the discovery statute.Criminal Procedure Law § 245.20[1][k][iv] requires the disclosure of "[a]llevidence and information, including that which is known to police or other lawenforcement agencies acting on the government's behalf in the case, that tends to . . .impeach the credibility of a testifying prosecution witness." Evidence of "a policewitness's prior bad act . . . can be proper fodder" for impeaching that witness. (People v. Smith, 27 NY3d652, 661 [2016]). Therefore, at minimum, the People must disclose "[a]ll evidenceand information" regarding a testifying police witness's prior bad acts in their possessionor the possession of police. "All means all." (People v. Francis, 75 Misc 3d 1224[A], at *2 n.2 [Crim.Ct., Bronx County 2022]).
Following the law, several judges in this borough have found certificates ofdiscovery compliance improper where the People only disclosed mere summaries ofpolice misconduct. (E.g., People v. Dowling, Ind. 01123-2021 [Sup. Ct.,Queens County 2022] [Gopee, J.]; People v. Belle, CR-002627-22QN [Crim. Ct.Queens County 2022] [Gershuny, J.]; People v. Bravo, [*4]CR-002662-22QN [Crim. Ct., Queens County 2022][Johnson, J.]). As Judge Gershuny summarized in People v. Best:
The principles of automatic disclosure and openness in the discoveryprocess are hampered by the unilateral, self-serving, and incomplete Queens DistrictAttorney's Office practice of withholding and redacting police officer witnessdisciplinary records without leave of court or protective order. The Law EnforcementOfficer Witness (LEOW) letters filed and served by the People are mere summarieswithout any substantive underlying documentation. To hold these LEOW letters ascompliant with the prosecutorial discovery statute mandates would be to ignore the plainletter, spirit, and meaning of the statutory language "all evidence andinformation."(76 Misc 3d 1210[A], at *1).
These decisions accord withthe overwhelming weight of authority throughout trial courts in the city. (See,e.g., People v. Goggins,76 Misc 3d 898 [Crim. Ct., Bronx County 2022] [Morales, J.]; People v. Martinez, 75 Misc 3d1212[A] [Crim. Ct., NY County 2022] [Rosenthal, J.]; People v.Mohammed, CR-026662-21NY [Crim. Ct., NY County 2022] [Wang, J.]; Peoplev. Salaam, CR-019124-21NY [Crim. Ct., NY County 2022] [Maldonado-Cruz, J.];People v. Spaulding, 75Misc 3d 1219[A] [Crim. Ct., Bronx County 2022] [Licitra, J.]; People v. Castellanos, 72 Misc3d 371 [Sup. Ct., Bronx County 2021] [Clancy, J.]; People v. Perez, 71 Misc 3d1214[A] [Crim. Ct., Bronx County 2021] [Johnson, J.]; People v. Sozoranga-Palacios,73 Misc 3d 1214[A] [Crim. Ct., NY County 2021] [Stein, J.]; People v. Edwards, 74 Misc 3d433 [Crim. Ct., NY County 2021] [Weiner, J.]). "Courts have ruled time and againthat case summaries prepared by the People are insufficient to satisfy the mandatesimposed by C.P.L. § 245.20, as such evidence and information, which mayultimately be employed by the defense to impeach the credibility of the People'stestifying witness, should not be filtered through the prosecution." (Goggins, 76Misc 3d at 901).
Despite these decisions, the People here have only disclosed mere summaries of theofficers' misconduct—precisely what the Appellate Division found insufficient inJayson C. Nonetheless, the People ask that their failure be excused because it istheir "practice" to withhold disciplinary records "unless there is a court order."(See Pr. Resp. at 4-5). This position is untenable. The statutory text of C.P.L.245.20[1][k][iv] has "the force and effect of a court order." (C.P.L. § 245.20[5]).The People may not simply ignore it until a judge explicitly tells them to comply. Makingthat choice does what Justice William C. Donnino warns prosecutors in his commentariesto the discovery statute: it "jeopardize[es] the viability of a prosecution." (Hon. WilliamC. Donnino, Practice Commentaries, C.P.L. § 245.10). And it has done so here byinvalidating the People's statement of readiness, which requires a "certification of goodfaith compliance" with automatic discovery. (C.P.L. § 30.30[5]). "Good faithcompliance" finds no footing in the willful disobedience of controlling authority.
B. The police accident and damage reports, Z-Finestreport, and subsequent unilateral redactions
The People also concede thatthey did not disclose some police reports before filing their certificate of compliance. (Pr.Resp. at 3). Specifically, they failed to disclose accident and damage reports and a reportfrom the NYPD's "Z-Finest" system. (Id.). After the defense pointed [*5]out that these reports were missing, the People disclosedthem four months later. (Id. at 12-13).
Again, there is appellate caselaw on point. In People v. Guzman, the Peoplefiled a certificate of discovery compliance despite failing to first disclose a policedashcam video. (75 Misc 3d 132[A], at *1 [2d Dep't App. Term. 2022]). Six monthslater, the defense pointed out that the video was missing. (See id. at *2, *4-*5).Two months after that, the People filed a supplemental certificate and disclosed thevideo, saying their initial failure "was an unintentional oversight." (Id. at *2). TheAppellate Term found that the original certificate could not support a valid statement ofreadiness. (Id. at *3-*4). It did so because "the People were in possession ofpolice documents which indicated the existence of the video" and the People provided"no explanation as to why they did not check the items sent to them . . . against the policereports they sent to the defense." (Id. at *3). The Appellate Term wrote that thePeople's "office failure" did not "amount to special circumstances," which would benecessary to validate the People's readiness despite a failure to disclose.(Id.).
Other courts—including this one—have drawn similar conclusions. InPeople v. Valentine, for instance, a court held that if "defense counsel examinesthe prosecution's discovery materials and points to clear references that otherundisclosed discoverable items exist, the Court cannot find that the prosecution actedreasonably and diligently." (2019BX030896, at *9 [Crim. Ct., Bronx County 2021]). InPeople v. Ajunwa, this court agreed, holding that the People could not claim tohave exercised due diligence where they failed to disclose a police report that was"referenced in an NYPD Omniform System complaint report, a basic case document ofwhich the People were in possession." (76 Misc 3d 1217[A], at *2).
Here, like in Guzman, the People were plainly on notice that the accident andZ-Finest reports existed. The complaint alleges that officers responded "to the scene of amotor vehicle accident." (Def. Mot. Ex. A). The NYPD arrest checklist from thiscase—a police index disclosed by the People—indicates that the policeprepared a "Z-Finest" report and accident and damage reports. (Def. Mot. Ex. D). Like inGuzman, the People here do not provide any specific reasons as to why thesereports were not disclosed before they certified that they had exercised due diligence inascertaining and disclosing all known material from the police. (See Pr. Resp. at3, 12-13). Instead, like in Guzman, they disclosed it months later and now simplystate that their failure "at best, was an oversight." (Id. at 3). ApplyingGuzman, their claimed certificate of "compliance" was therefore invalid. Andsince "there were no special circumstances presented, the [statement of readiness] wasalso invalid." (Guzman, 75 Misc 3d 132[A], at *3).
Yet even when the People finally did disclose these reports, they still failed todischarge their discovery obligations. Instead of disclosing the full reports, they insteadtook a black marker to them, redacting information of persons they unilaterally deemedto be of "limited" involvement. (See Pr. Resp. at 3-4). The People had noauthority to do so. Disclosure of police reports must be "automatic, absolute, and withoutredaction, adulteration, or censorship by the People." (See Best, 76 Misc 3d1210[A], at *5; see alsoPayne, 75 Misc 3d 1224[A] [same]). The discovery statute grants only specificand limited exceptions to this rule. (See, e.g., C.P.L. § 245.20[1][c][allowing the People to withhold physical addresses and the identities of 911 callers andconfidential informants "without need for a motion"]; C.P.L. § 245.20[1][d] [samefor [*6]materials relating to undercoverpersonnel]).[FN3]
If the People nonetheless believe that some NYPD materials contain information thatshould not be disclosed, the statute provides a "process" to "follow." (Best, 76Misc 3d 1210[A], at *7; Payne, 75 Misc 3d 1224[A] [same]). "[P]rior to filingthe certificate of compliance," they must "seek a protective order" and ask a court to "ruleas to whether the People may withhold" the information. (Best, 76 Misc 3d1210[A], at *7). But aside from the statute's specific and limited exceptions, "it is not forthe People alone to make this determination." (Demonia, 74 Misc 3d at 759).
Here, the People did not follow any of these processes. They never sought a"determination and ruling of the court" as to whether any of this information could bewithheld. (C.P.L. § 245.10[1][a]; see also Best, 76 Misc 3d 1210[A],at *7 [same]; Payne, 75 Misc 3d 1224[A], at *4 [same]; Demonia, 74Misc 3d at 759 [same]). Instead, they made unilateral determinations on their own,without permission from any court.
In any event, this court also rejects the People's position that this information neednot be disclosed just because, in their view, it relates to individuals of "limited"involvement. The standard for whether information should be disclosed is whether it"relate[s]" to the case. (C.P.L. § 245.20[1]). "The People's opinion that materialwould not be useful for the defense's investigation or relevant to proving guilt at trial isnot the same as whether the material relates to the case." (Payne, 75 Misc 3d1224[A], at *3). This is a case in which the People accuse Mr. Trotman of driving whileintoxicated. Part of the People's evidence of intoxication is that he crashed into variousparked cars. The People intimate that the redacted information relates to the individualswho own these cars. (See Pr. Resp. at 3-4). Therefore, theseindividuals—and their redacted information—obviously "relate" to thecase.[FN4]
As a result, the People to this day have still not complied with the statute in goodfaith or with diligence. They have still not yet exercised "due diligence" and "disclosedand made available all known material and information subject to discovery." (C.P.L.§ 245.50[1]). In fact, they do not even properly claim otherwise, as they have notyet filed a supplemental certificate of compliance. (See People v. Aguayza, 2022NY Slip Op. 22333, at *5 [Sup. Ct., Queens County 2022] [Johnson, J.] ["Although thePeople [have now] disclosed the requisite Grand Jury [*7]minutes, they failed to file a supplemental COC and/orSOR containing the requisite affirmations of 'good faith compliance' . . . . This means thespeedy trial clock continues ticking subject only to the applicable exclusions underC.P.L. § 30.30[4]."]).
III. The 30.30 calculation
The People had90 days from commencing this case to validly state ready for trial. (C.P.L. §30.30[1][b]). The People commenced this case on March 20, 2022. The People'sstatement of readiness on April 14, 2022, was not valid, as it was not preceded by aproper certificate of discovery compliance. (C.P.L. §§ 245.50[3], 30.30[5]).The case was adjourned several times until September 21, 2022, when the defenserequested a motion schedule.
It is the People's burden to prove that any of these time periods "should beexcluded." (E.g., Peoplev. Wearen, 98 AD3d 535, 537 [2d Dep't 2012]). Other than arguing that theirstatements of readiness were valid, the People point to no exclusions. (Seegenerally Pr. Resp.). The defense, however, concedes that their request for a motionschedule on September 21, 2022, tolled the speedy trial clock. (C.P.L. §30.30[4][a]).
Nonetheless, the People failed to abide by the court deadline for their response to theensuing motion, filing it 13 days late without permission or justification. Accordingly, 13days of delay is also attributable to them there. (See, e.g., Ferro, 197AD3d at 788 ["Thus, the People are chargeable with the time between the court-imposeddeadline to respond to the omnibus motion and the date on which the People actuallyfiled a response."]).
Therefore, time accrued from March 20, 2022, to September 21, 2022. That is 186days. Time again accrued from the court-imposed deadline of November 2, 2022, to thedate on which the People actually filed a response, November 15, 2022. That is 13 days.In total, the People caused 199 days of delay in this matter. That is more than the 90 daysthat the People are allowed. (See C.P.L. § 30.30[1][b]). As a result, the casemust be dismissed.
The defense's remaining arguments are moot.
The foregoing constitutes the order and decision of the court.
Dated: December 5, 2022
Queens, NY
Wanda L. Licitra, J.C.C.
Footnote 1: By explicitly includingimpeachment material that is "known to police," Article 245 abrogates earlierconstitutional law that drew an exception for extrinsic impeachment material that was"known only to police." (See generally People v. Payne, 75 Misc 3d 1224[A], at*2 [Crim. Ct., Bronx County 2022] ["[T]he Constitution provides a floor, not a ceiling . .. constitutional analysis is not applicable here."]; People v. McKinney, 71 Misc 3d 1221[A], at *5-*6 [Crim.Ct., Kings County 2021] ["Article 245 does away with that distinction."]; see also People v. Darren, 75Misc 3d 1208[A], at *4 n.1 [Crim. Ct., NY County 2022]; People v. Rosario, 70 Misc 3d753, 766-69 [County Ct., Albany County 2020]; cf. People v. Garrett, 23 NY3d 878, 887-88 [2014][excluding impeachment information "known only to police" from the People'sconstitutional disclosure obligations]).
Footnote 2: See also JohnBourdeau et al., 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 520 [2022] ["In addition, mattersin the opinion of a higher court which are not decisive of the primary issue presented butwhich are germane to that issue, such as aspects of the reasoning by which the courtreached its conclusion, are not dicta, but binding decisions of the court."].
Footnote 3: While the papers alludethat some of the redacted information may refer to a 911 caller, it does not appear thatall the redacted information relates to that individual. (See Pr. Resp. at3-4). The People state that the redacted information relates to individuals whose"involvement is limited to their cars being hit," not solely to a 911 caller. (Id.).And the People's "Notice of Non-Disclosure" states that "personal contact informationhas been redacted as not related to the case," not merely because it relates to a911 caller's identity. (Def. Mot. Ex. B at 14 [emphasis added]).
Footnote 4: It is also worth notingthat the People's opinion that this information is of limited use is wrong. It could beworthwhile for a defense attorney to interview the individuals whose cars appeareddamaged. For example, as the defense attorney here points out, speaking to theindividuals who own these cars could reveal whether any of the damage visible at thetime of the arrest pre-dated the alleged events in this case. The discovery statute does notask the People to only disclose information that they foresee will be useful to the defense.That the People here fail to foresee an avenue of possible defense investigation isprecisely why that is so.