| People v Best |
| 2022 NY Slip Op 50859(U) [76 Misc 3d 1210(A)] |
| Decided on September 13, 2022 |
| Criminal Court Of The City Of New York, Queens County |
| Gershuny, J. |
| As corrected in part through January 31, 2023; it will not bepublished in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on September 13, 2022
The People of theState of New York against James Best, Defendant. |
Docket No. CR-020333-21QN
Queens Defenders, Forest Hills (Michael Sheftman, of counsel), for defendant
Melinda Katz, District Attorney, Kew Gardens (Brianna M. White, of counsel) forplaintiff
Jeffrey Gershuny, J.
The defendant moves to invalidate the People's certificate of discoverycompliance (CPL 245.50 [1]) and to dismiss on speedy trial grounds (CPL 170.30 [1] [e]; 30.30).At issue is whether the People have provided all evidence and information required pursuant toCPL 245.20 (1) (k).
The principles of automatic disclosure and openness in the discovery process are hamperedby the unilateral, self-serving, and incomplete Queens District Attorney's Office practice ofwithholding and redacting police officer witness disciplinary records without leave of court orprotective order. The Law Enforcement Officer Witness (LEOW) letters filed and served by thePeople are mere summaries without any substantive underlying documentation. To hold theseLEOW letters as compliant with the prosecutorial discovery statute mandates would be to ignorethe plain letter, spirit, and meaning of the statutory language "all evidence and information." Bynot requiring the People to turn over ALL underlying disciplinary documentation in theirpossession, the court would be giving no force and effect to the clear and unequivocal languageused by the legislature and would thus be arbitrarily determining that "all evidence andinformation" as codified in CPL 245.20 (1) (k) is satisfied going forward with summaries. Thecourt finds that "all evidence and information" cannot be satisfied by mere summary letters bythe District Attorney — it must include all underlying documentation whether the policedepartment disciplinary action was substantiated or unsubstantiated by the investigatingagencies.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 8, 2022, this court held the decision in abeyance for the People to addressthe following factual issues:
(1) What date did the Queens District Attorney's Office ask for and obtain the"CCRB Officer History," "NYPD Central Personnel Index Round Robin Report," and summaryof all civil lawsuits?
(2) When did the Queens District Attorney'sOffice provide defense counsel with the "CCRB Officer History," "NYPD Central PersonnelIndex Round Robin Report," and summary of all civil lawsuits?
(3) Isthe "CCRB Officer History," "NYPD Central Personnel Index Round Robin Report," andsummary of all civil lawsuits, all of the underlying documents? That is, "[a]ll evidence andinformation, including that which is known to police or other law enforcement agenciesacting on the government's behalf in the case" that is in the possession of the NYPD, or other lawenforcement agencies, and the Queens District Attorney's Office.
The Responses
On July 20, 2022, the assigned Assistant District Attorney provided answers to theseissues:
(1) As to what date the Queens District Attorney's Office asked for and obtained the"CCRB Officer History," "NYPD Central Personnel Index Round Robin Report," and summaryof all civil lawsuits, the People responded:
"The CCRB was not affirmatively requested by QDA. Rather, the CCRBdocuments received by QDA have been provided to QDA without request on an approximatelyquarterly basis beginning in March of 2020. If nothing has changed in an officer's CCRBAllegation History then CCRB does not provide a new document for that officer. The documentdate on the top right of the CCRB document, October 13, 2020, denotes the approximate date thedocument was run/created by CCRB. The CCRB documents are typically received by QDAwithin a week of being run and then require uploading en masse. The NYPD Central PersonnelIndex file similarly contains a run date on the top right corner of the document and is typicallyreceived from NYPD by QDA the same date that it is run. In this case that date was January 4,2022. The civil suits summary is typically requested by QDA the same date that the NYPDCentral Personnel Index is requested."
(2) As to when the Queens District Attorney's Office provided defense counsel with the"CCRB Officer History," "NYPD Central Personnel Index Round Robin Report," and summaryof all civil lawsuits, the People responded:
"The Queens District Attorney's Officer [sic], through Assistant District AttorneyBrianna White, provided defense counsel with the CCRB Officer History, NYPD CentralPersonnel Index Round Robin Report, and the summary of all civil lawsuits on January 18, 2022.Online usage receipts show that these documents were opened and viewed on that samedate."
(3) Finally, as to the question of whether the "CCRB Officer History," "NYPD CentralPersonnel Index Round Robin Report," and summary of all civil lawsuits, are all of theunderlying documents (i.e. "[a]ll evidence and information, including that which is known topolice or other law enforcement agencies acting on the government's behalf in the case" that is inthe possession of the NYPD, or other law enforcement agencies, and the Queens DistrictAttorney's Office), the People responded:
"The answer to this inquiry requires more information to determine what "allevidence [*2]and information["] means. As this Court is wellaware there are differing interpretations and no appellate authority. The People hold that theirdefinition is the most reasonable, because the opening clause of CPL 245.20 (1) states that whatmust be turned, must that which 'relate to the subjection [sic] matter of the case'. That the Peoplerely on an interpretation most internally consistent with the statute, and one which is alsoconsistent with both the Supreme Court of the United States in Kyles v Whitley, and theNew York Court of Appeals in People v Garrett. Following that guiding interpretation,the People have turned over all materials or information tending to impeach the officer'scredibility that arise from the investigation or prosecution of the case. Furthermore, the Peopleare not aware of the existence of any other information that has yet to be provided to thedefendant."
On July 26, 2022, defense counsel responded in part:
"The People have turned over one LEOW letter relating to this case. That was forPolice Officer Robert O'Neil, who was the investigating and arresting officer in this case. HisLEOW letter indicates that after an NYPD internal investigation, there was a substantiatedfinding as to allegations from an incident on January 6, 2019. . . . The People have failed to turnover the underlying documents for this internal investigation, and they have failed to detail anddiligent good faith efforts they may have made to obtain these materials. Upon information andbelief, on similar investigations within the NYPD pertaining to different law enforcementpersonnel, underlying reports regarding internal investigations are generated, and on someoccasions, have been turned over by the People to the defense.
"ThePeople have failed to detail any steps they may have taken to obtain these reports. Thesedocuments would clearly be within the control of the NYPD. If any steps were taken the Peoplefailed to detail them in their COC, their Response to defense counsel's Motion to Dismiss, ortheir Response to the Court's Interim Order."
On January 18, 2022, thePeople served and filed the certificate of compliance; this was 65 days after arraignment and 30days after the CPL 245.10 (1) (a) (ii) deadline.[FN2]In their certificate of compliance, the People provided a Law Enforcement Officer as a Witness(LEOW) Letter. The People define a "LEOW Letter" as "summaries of disciplinarymatters in which police officers have been involved throughout their careers with the New YorkPolice Department" [emphasis added]. In addition to the LEOW Letter, the People claimed thatthey "provided underlying documents in their possession" as it relates to Detective O'Neil, theonly witness who will testify at trial. These documents included:
• "CCRB Officer History";
• "NYPD Central Personnel Index Round Robin Report"; and
• Summary of all civil lawsuits.
The People maintained that the disclosure of these materials, in conjunction with the LEOWletter, satisfied their obligations under CPL 245.20 (1) (k) (iv).
The court directed the People to produce the underlying documents that they provided todefense counsel. Since the new discovery article was enacted in 2020, a recurrent issue with[*3]many pleadings is their reference to electronic files anddocuments by title without providing the documents themselves. This leaves the courthandicapped as to what the People actually provided to the defense.
In response, the People provided a document on Queens County District Attorney letterhead.This document, provided to the court on July 27, 2022, and later identified in a July 29, 2022email as a "Central Personnel Index Report," states information was "obtained from the files ofthe Queens County District Attorney's Office as well as from data maintained by the New YorkCity Police Department."
"DISCIPLINARY MATTER(S):
"After an NYPDinternal investigation, PO O'Neil substantiated allegations of the following specification: Whileassigned to the 107th Precinct, on January 6, 2019, PO O'Neil did engage in conduct prejudicialto the good order, efficiency or discipline of the police department, to wit said Police Officer didfail to safeguard department equipment, and was responsible for missing departmentequipment.
"Please note that additional information regarding thisofficer's NYPD disciplinary history may be available at https://nypdonline.org/link/2."
However, this document does not appear to be from the police department; it is clearly asummary produced by the Queens District Attorney's Office. The court also notes that thehyperlink provided by the People does not contain any underlying documents from the CCRBinvestigation of Officer O'Neill. An August 1, 2022 email correspondence with the court anddefense counsel indicated that this is a summary — or, at best, not complete: "Thedisciplinary matter at issue is that Detective O'Neil failed to safeguard department equipment— specifically OC Spray. Defense has been provided with the date, the allegation, the casestatus, and the action taken."
Furthermore, the next page of the July 27, 2022 email attachment, entitled "Officer History,"later identified in a July 29, 2022 email as a "CCRB disciplinary summary — whichsummarizes complaints from the Civilian Complaint Review Board," states: "Total Charges =0""Total Cases = 0."
In an email dated July 29, 2022, the People explained:
"Regarding CCRB documents, QDA is typically in possession of a single PDF filefor NYPD officers who act in an enforcement capacity, as opposed to officers who are assignedto conduct lab work or for example school safety agents. This PDF will always contain an'Officer History' section. If there was an allegation, dated 2000 or later, which was either'substantiated' or entered as 'other (potential) misconduct noted then the PDF file will include the'Investigative Recommendation' report associated with the substantiated or other misconductnoted allegations. Please note, dispositions of Other Misconduct Noted designated that CCRBbelieved their [sic] was potential misconduct by the officer but that CCRB did not havejurisdictional oversight of the potential misconduct. Additionally, the 'InvestigativeRecommendation' report is just that, a recommendation. Therefore, the dispositions as listed inthe 'Investigative Recommendation' are preliminary and may not match those in the OfficerHistory.' If the dispositions differ, the 'Officer History' is the correct/final disposition asdetermined by CCRB."
There is a split of persuasive authority as towhether LEOW letters or other summaries are sufficient to satisfy the People's CPL 245.20 (1)(k) obligation.
As set forth below, this Court finds that LEOW letter summaries are legally insufficient tomeet the clear statutory disclosure requirements of CPL 245.20 (1) (k), and the certificate ofcompliance filed by the People must be invalidated.
CPL Article 240 was repealed effective January 1, 2020 and replaced by CPL Article 245(see L 2019, ch 59, part KKK, § 1). For the first time, New York tied speedy trialand discovery together. The newly enacted CPL Article 245 requires that "automatic discovery"(CPL 245.20) be completed before the People can announce their readiness for trial (CPL 245.50[3]; 30.30 [5]).
CPL 245.20 (1) provides a non-exhaustive list of the items the People must disclose (People v Soto, 72 Misc 3d 1153,1155 [Crim Ct, NY County 2021]; People v Pennant, 73 Misc 3d 753 [Nassau Dist Ct 2021]).
CPL Article 245 clearly states that the police department's personnel files — like allitems and information related to the prosecution of a criminal action — are "deemed to bein the possession of the prosecution" (CPL 245.20 [2]). This is particularly important in casesinvolving LEOW letters because the District Attorney is in possession of the evidence andinformation in question — that is, the underlying records and documentation — andsimply elects not to disclose them.
Summaries are Not "All Evidence andInformation"
A. Statutory Construction
Under the automatic discovery statute (CPL 245.20 [1]), the term "summary" is onlymentioned twice: (1) under expert opinion evidence, the People are required to disclose "awritten statement of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and asummary of the grounds for each opinion" (CPL 245.20 [1] [f]) (emphasis added); and(2) the People are required to disclose "[a] summary of all promises, rewards andinducements made to, or in favor of, persons who may be called as witnesses, as well as requestsfor consideration by persons who may be called as witnesses and copies of all documentsrelevant to a promise, reward or inducement" (CPL 245.20 [1] [i]) (emphasis added).
CPL 245 (1) (k) does not mention the term "summary" but states clearly and unequivocally"[a]ll evidence and information." If the legislature intended police department disciplinaryrecords to be turned over by the prosecution as summaries, this language would have been used;but such language was expressly left out. In other words, the legislature clearly intended "allevidence and information" to mean exactly what it says. "As the clearest indicator of legislativeintent is the statutory text, the starting point in any case of interpretation must always be thelanguage itself, giving effect to the plain meaning thereof" (People v Roberts, 31 NY3d 406, 418 [2018]; People v Golo, 26 NY3d 358, 361[2015]; Majewski v Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 NY2d 577, 583 [1998];see also People v Ryan, 82 NY2d 497, 502 [1993]).
CPL article 245 was enacted to expedite and simplify the discovery process. It is a statute ofopenness and undoubtedly disclosure. It was designed to remove the discretion of the parties indetermining what and how much discovery to turn over or to provide a statutory mechanism byway of a protective order when a party wishes to withhold discovery. Through these reforms,discovery was deemed "automatic," meaning the parties are required to turn over the informationwithout application (formerly a demand) or motion from the other party.
B. Impeachment Material and Presumption ofOpenness
As previously discussed, under CPL 245.20 (1) (k), the People aremandated to disclose "[a]ll evidence and information, including that which is known topolice or other law enforcement agencies acting on the government's behalf in the case, that tendsto: . . . impeach the credibility of a testifying prosecution witness" (CPL 245.20 [1] [k] [iv])(emphasis added). This obligation is not just a codification of Brady. To the contrary,CPL 245.20 (1) (k) goes beyond what Brady required. For example, this provisionjettisons the "materiality" requirement (Brady at 87) (see Pennant, 73 Misc 3d at756; People v Sozoranga-Palacios,73 Misc 3d 1214[A], 2021 NY Slip Op 51036[U], *4 [Crim Ct, NY County2021]).[FN3] Furthermore, "impeachment evidence and information is not limited to that which is related tothe subject matter of the underlying case" (People v Williams, 72 Misc 3d 1214[A], 2021 NY Slip Op50743[U], *4 [Crim Ct, NY County 2021]).
The People cite to Kyles v Whitley (514 US 419 [1995]) and People v Garrett (23 NY3d 878[2014]) for support. However, those cases, dealing with Brady [FN4]violations, were decided prior to the enactment of CPL 245.20 (1) (k), and are of no help to thePeople (see People v Martinez, 75Misc 3d 1212[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50476[U], n3 [Crim Ct, NY County 2022]; People v Darren, 75 Misc 3d1208[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50415[U], n1 [Crim Ct, NY County 2022]; see alsoWilliam C. Donnino, Practice Commentary, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 11A, CPL245.10 [questioning the continued viability of Garrett in light of CPL 245.20 (2)]).
The only appellate court applying CPL 245.20 (1) (k) (iv) is Matter of Jayson C (200 AD3d447, 449 [1st Dept 2021]). There, the First Department held that in juvenile delinquencyproceedings, the use of "disclosure letters" pertaining to NYPD disciplinary records violated theequal protection clause and, applying CPL 245.20 (1) (k) (iv), that respondent was entitled "allimpeachment evidence" — the same impeachment material as defendants in criminalcases (id.). In other words, Matter of Jayson C holds that the plain text meaningof CPL 245.20 (1) (k) (iv) requires the People to disclose all underlying information relating tothe misconduct of their police witnesses; mere summaries are not sufficient (People v Spaulding, 75 Misc 3d1219[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50544[U], *2 [Crim Ct, Bronx County 2022]; People vPolanco-Chavararria, 74 Misc 3d 120[A], 2021 NY Slip Op 51297[U] [Rockland County Ct2021]; see also People v Alvia, — Misc 3d —, 2022 NY Slip Op 22233, *3[Crim Ct, Bronx County 2022]).
Published criminal court decisions have shown an inclination to require the disclosure of allunderlying documents, not mere summaries written by the prosecution or summaries obtainedthrough questioning of the implicated officer-witness (see People v Francis, 75 Misc 3d 1224[A], 2022 NY Slip Op50655[U], n2 [Crim Ct, Bronx County 2022]; People v Martinez, 2022 NY Slip Op50655(U), n3; People v Spaulding, 2022 NY Slip Op 50544[U], *2; People v Florez, 74 Misc 3d1222(A), 2022 NY Slip Op 50202(U), *10 [Sup Ct, Nassau County 2022]; People v Polanco-Chavarria, 74 Misc3d 1210[A], 2021 NY Slip Op 51297[U], *3 [Rockland County Ct 2021]; Pennant,73 Misc 3d at 760; Edwards, 74Misc 3d 433; Salters, 2021 NY Slip Op 50800[U], *3-4; Portillo, 73 Misc 3dat 219; Castellanos, 72 Misc 3d at 375; McKinney, [*4]2021 NY Slip Op 50456(U), *6; Herrera, 2021 NY Slip Op50280(U); Cooper, 71 Misc 3d at 566).
Whether something is potential impeachment material is not for the People to determine, butrather for defense counsel:
"As the Court of Appeals has long recognized, the best judge of the impeachmentvalue of evidence is the 'single-minded counsel for the accused' (People v Rosario, 9NY2d 286, 290, cert denied 368 US 866 [1961] . . . . To permit the single-mindedcounsel for the accused to be permitted only to see filtered allegations of misconduct impinges oncounsel's ability to represent the accused. That is not what the Legislature intended" (People vEdwards, 74 Misc 3d 433, 443-444 [Crim Ct, NY County 2021]) (citationsomitted).
In discovery there is a presumption of openness (CPL 245.20 [7]):"There shall be a presumption in favor of disclosure when interpreting sections 245.10 and245.25, and subdivision one of section 245.20, of this article" (see People v Porter, 71 Misc 3d187 [Crim Ct, Bronx County 2020]; People v Georgiopoulos, 71 Misc 3d 1215[A], 2021 NY Slip Op50380[U] [Sup Ct, Queens County 2021]).
The People should have either disclosed the underlying information or sought a protectiveorder through a motion on notice (CPL 245.70 [1]):
"[T]he prosecutor's obligations to provide discovery under the current statutes areso broad as to virtually constitute 'open file' discovery, or at least make 'open file' discovery thefar better course of action to assure compliance. Thus, a prosecutor who fails to engage in 'openfile' discovery (except for 'work product' and information subject to a protective mandate of astatute or court order) may do so at his or her professional peril while also jeopardizing theviability of a prosecution" (William C. Donnino, Practice Commentary, McKinney's Cons Lawsof NY, CPL 245.10; see also Sozoranga-Palacios, 2021 NY Slip Op 51036[U];Williams, 2021 NY Slip Op 50743[U]; Soto, 72 Misc 3d at1153).
It is well settled that "[t]he prudent prosecutor will resolvedoubtful questions in favor of disclosure" (United States v Agurs, 427 US 97, 108 [1976],quoting Kyles, 514 US at 419; People v Portillo, 73 Misc 3d 216 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 2021]).The Kyles Court went on to state:
"Such disclosure will serve to justify trust in the prosecutor as 'the representative ...of a sovereignty ... whose interest ... in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, butthat justice shall be done.' And it will tend to preserve the criminal trial, as distinct from theprosecutor's private deliberations, as the chosen forum for ascertaining the truth about criminalaccusations. The prudence of the careful prosecutor should not therefore be discouraged" (514US at 439-440) (internal citations omitted).
Providing mere summaries ofpolice disciplinary records — that is, omitting the actual records themselves —cannot satisfy the requirements of CPL 245.20 (1) (k). The underlying records may consist oftestimonial evidence, exhibits, reports by investigative agencies and other types of materialnecessary for defendant to properly prepare their cross-examination and impeachment of thePeople's witness. Whether substantiated or unsubstantiated, all disciplinary records must beturned over to the defense. The People are without authority to determine unilaterally, bythemselves, what "tends to" or does not tend to go towards the impeachment of a witness. Such adetermination — whether those records can be used for impeachment or further [*5]investigation at trial — is a matter for defense counsel toreview and for the trial court to determine. But the disclosure of such records must be automatic,absolute and without redaction, adulteration, or censorship by the People, except as allowed inCPL 245.20 (6)[FN5]. Anything short of full disclosure without a protective order would amount to a subjectivedetermination by the parties as to what should be turned over. This is contrary to the automaticdisclosure requirements and the purpose of the reformed discovery statute.
Protective Orders
Where there is any dispute or uncertainty as to whether particular information or evidencemust be disclosed, the People always have the option of seeking a ruling from the court(see CPL 245.35). "In short, the People's certificate of compliance is not valid simplybecause it reflects the prosecutor's sincere belief as to what material is discoverable"(Edwards, 2021 NY Slip Op 50944[U], *6, citing Soto, 72 Misc 3d at 1163).
If the People wish to redact or withhold any information that may be discoverable then theymust follow the process in CPL article 245 — i.e. prior to filing the certificate ofcompliance seek a protective order pursuant to CPL 245.70, wherein the judge would rule as towhether the People may withhold the police personnel files until a certain time, or if thedisclosure of those records would be ordered to satisfy the People's disclosure obligations underCPL 245.20 (1) (k). The People, as a matter of internal office policy, have been unilaterallyredacting law enforcement information without leave of court and have been selectivelywithholding disciplinary records that they themselves deem non-discoverable or irrelevant to thequestion of impeachment. These are determinations that are not for the People to decide.
This is not to say that everything discoverable under CPL article 245 will be admissible attrial. "Rather, only after compliance with the disclosure statute can the Court and public beassured that both parties are properly prepared to present cogent, contextual arguments in limineregarding permissible areas of cross-examination, thus ensuring a fair trial" (Portillo, 73Misc 3d at 247).
Certificate of Discovery Compliance
The issue is how much is enough for the People to satisfy their CPL 245.20 (1) (k) (iv)obligations. The assigned ADA stated in a July 29, 2022 email:
"I have turned over every document in my possession with respect to detectiveO'Neil. I have subsequently checked in the QDA system if there were any additional documents. Ialso contacted the director of the QDA LEOW unit for clarification regarding all of the court'squestions about these documents. I believe it is quite clear - that I have exhibited a diligent goodfaith effort with respect to the extensive amount 245.20 (1) (k) information turned over inconjunction with the Certificate of Compliance in this case."
Contrary to thePeople's position, the issue is not whether all LEOW documents in the actual physical possessionof the Queens District Attorney's Office were turned over, but whether all the personnel recordsfrom the police department were provided to the assigned Assistant District Attorney, as requiredby CPL 245.55, and then whether those records were provided to the defense as required by CPL245.20 (1) (k).
The "filing of the certificate of compliance pursuant to CPL 30.30 (5)" cannot "be [*6]deemed complete until all of the material and informationidentified in the certificate as subject to discovery and electronically shared with the defendantwas actually produced to the defendant, pursuant to CPL 245.50 (1) and (3)" (People ex rel Ferro v Brann, 197 AD3d787, 788 [2d Dept 2021], lv denied 38 NY3d 909 [2022]) (emphasis added). Thetrial courts have consistently held that the People are required to disclose the complete files priorto filing the certificate of compliance (see People v Spaulding, 75 Misc 3d 50544[U],2022 NY Slip Op 50544[U], *2 [Crim Ct, Bronx County 2022]).[FN6]
CPL 245.20 (2) states that what the police possess, the District Attorneypossesses.[FN7]Further, CPL 245.55 requires the "district attorney and the assistant responsible for thecase":
"to ensure that a flow of information is maintained between the police and otherinvestigative personnel and his or her office sufficient to place within his or her possession orcontrol all material and information pertinent to the defendant and the offense or offensescharged, including, but not limited to, any evidence or information discoverable under paragraph(k) of subdivision one of section 245.20 of this article."
This is not a case where the People were awaiting discovery, reviewing recently receiveddiscovery or mistakenly not disclosing information in good faith, or documents they never knewexisted nor is this a situation of inadvertent failure to disclose discovery. Rather, here, the Peopleknowingly failed to disclose discoverable material in their possession without leave of the courtor a protective order demonstrating a blatant disregard for the disclosure requirements of thestatute.
This Court holds that when the People have actual possession or are statutorily presumed tobe in possession of police officer disciplinary records, including the underlying documentation,and they willfully elect not to disclose that information then they cannot be deemed incompliance with their discovery obligations and any corresponding certificate of compliancemust be invalidated. Accordingly, defendant's motion to invalidate the certificate of compliancefiled in this case is granted.
Speedy Trial
The defendant moves to dismiss pursuant to CPL 170.30 (1) (e) on the ground that he hasbeen denied his right to a speedy trial (CPL 30.30). Since the top count charged is a class Amisdemeanor, the People have 90 days from the commencement of the criminal action to beready for trial (CPL 30.30 [1] [b]; People v Cooper, 98 NY2d 541, 543 [2002]). Thecriminal action commenced on November 4, 2021, when the defendant first appeared in responseto the appearance ticket (CPL 30.30 [7] [b]).
"[O]nce a defendant has shown the existence of an unexcused delay greater than [90 days],the burden of showing that time should be excluded falls upon the People" (People v Barden, 27 NY3d 550[2016], quoting People v Santos, 68 NY2d 859, 861 [1986]; see People v [*7]Santana, 80 NY2d 92, 105 [1992]):
"Generally, the burden is on the People to establish their entitlement to exclude anypre-readiness delays from the calculation under a CPL 30.30 motion and the burden is on adefendant to prove that any post-readiness delays that directly implicate the People's ability toproceed with trial are chargeable to the People, unless the People failed to satisfy their burden toensure that the record is sufficiently clear as to who is chargeable for an adjournment" (People v Robinson, 67 AD3d 1042[3d Dept 2009], citing People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 210, 215-216[1992]).
The following is the court's period-by-period analysis:
November 4, 2021 to January 19, 2022. On November 4, 2021, the defendant firstappeared in response to an appearance ticket. The felony complaint charged the class E felony ofcriminal mischief in the third degree (Penal Law § 145.05 [2]). The matter was adjourned toJanuary 19, 2022, for grand jury presentment. On January 18, 2022, the People, through EDDS,delivered to the court a supporting deposition, certificate of compliance, and statement ofreadiness. However, since a felony complaint was still pending, the People could not announcetheir readiness for trial.
It should be noted that the People state in their reply that the 75-day period of delay —from the commencement of the criminal action on November 4, 2021, to January 18, 2022, whenthe People delivered a statement of readiness on January 18, 2022 — should be the onlyperiod included in speedy trial calculations. However, the People have failed to explain how theycould be ready for trial on a felony complaint. A reduction of a felony complaint to amisdemeanor accusatory instrument can only be accomplished if the mechanism of CPL 180.50is followed (see People v Yolles, 92 NY2d 960, 961 [1998]; People v Toribio, 68 Misc 3d128[A], 2020 NY Slip Op 50933[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2020]; People v Kane, 57 Misc 3d 35, 38[App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2017]). Such a procedure was not utilized onJanuary 18, 2022.
January 19, 2022 to March 18, 2022 (58 days included). On January 19, 2022, thecourt dismissed the felony count upon the People's motion. Applying CPL 30.30 (7) (c) to theinstant case, this commenced the 90-day speedy trial time limit (see Cooper, 98 NY2d at544).
In court on January 19, 2022, the People stated that they were ready for trial. The matter wasadjourned to March 18, 2022 for a discovery update.
The People cannot be deemed ready for trial without a valid certificate of compliance (CPL245.20 [3]). Until the People have fully complied with their discovery obligations, any certificateor statement of readiness is invalid. To permit the People to state their readiness for trial withouthaving a properly filed certificate of discovery compliance (which must have some meaning andnot just be a piece of paper having no force and effect) would render the speedy trial statutetoothless when it comes to blatant and willful discovery violations and improperly filedcertificates of discovery compliance. Therefore, the statement of readiness is invalid.
Therefore, this 58-day period of delay is included in speedy trial calculations.
March 18, 2022 to April 26, 2022 (39 days included). On March 18, 2022, the courtstated that there was an issue as to the underlying disciplinary records and the matter wasadjourned to April 26, 2022. Since the certificate of compliance and the statement of readinessbased on that certificate were invalid, this 39-day period of delay is included in speedy trialcalculations.
April 26, 2022 to August 1, 2022 (0 days included). On April 26, 2022, a motion[*8]schedule was set therefore stopped the speedy trial clock(CPL 30.30 [4] [a]).
The court finds 97 days included in speedy trial calculations which exceed the90-day limit pursuant to CPL 30.30 (1) (b). Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss isgranted.
IT IS SO ORDERED. The clerk is directed to enter this order. Sealing is stayed 30 days.
DATE: September 13, 2022Kew Gardens, NY
JEFFREY GERSHUNY, J.,
Judge of the Criminal Court
Footnote 1: This case was dismissed in adecision dated August 2, 2022. This decision has been revised to expand on the court'sreasoning.
Footnote 2: CPL 245.10 states thatautomatic discovery (CPL 245.20) is to be provided "as soon as practicable but not later than . . .thirty-five calendar days after the defendant's arraignment" (CPL 245.10 [1] [a] [ii]).
Footnote 3:See also People v Salters, 72 Misc3d 1219(A), 2021 NY Slip Op 50800(U) (Nassau Dist Ct 2021); People v McKinney, 71 Misc 3d1221(A), 2021 NY Slip Op 50456(U) (Crim Ct, Kings County 2021); People v Castellanos, 72 Misc 3d371 (Sup Ct, Bronx County 2021).
Footnote 4: Brady v Maryland, 373US 83 (1963)
Footnote 5: Under this subsection "[e]itherparty may redact social security numbers and tax numbers from disclosures under this article."
Footnote 6: See also Darren,2022 NY Slip Op 50415(U), *3; Edwards, 74 Misc 3d 433, 436; Barralaga,73 Misc 3d 510, 512-513; Soto, 72 Misc 3d at 1156; Williams, 2021 NY Slip Op50743(U), *4; Kelly, 2021 NY Slip Op 50264(U), *2; Perez, 2021 NY Slip Op50374(U), *3; Herrera, 2021 NY Slip Op 50280(U), *3; Rosario, 70 Misc 3d at757.
Footnote 7: "For purposes of subdivisionone of this section, all items and information related to the prosecution of a charge in thepossession of any New York state or local police or law enforcement agency shall be deemed tobe in the possession of the prosecution" (CPL 245.20 [2]).