| People v Spaulding |
| 2022 NY Slip Op 50544(U) [75 Misc 3d 1219(A)] |
| Decided on June 29, 2022 |
| Criminal Court Of The City Of New York, Bronx County |
| Licitra, J. |
| As corrected in part through August 11, 2022; it will not bepublished in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on June 29, 2022
The People of theState of New York against Spaulding, Defendant. |
Docket No. CR-010039-21BX
For the People: Darcel Clark, District Attorney of Bronx County (by ADA KevinRisch)
For Mr. Spaulding: Benjamin R. Williams, The Legal Aid Society
Wanda L. Licitra, J.
Pursuant to C.P.L. § 30.30(1)(b), the defense has moved to dismiss this case. Theyallege that the People did not file a proper certificate of compliance ("COC") before stating readyfor trial within 90 days of arraignment. Specifically, they allege that the People filed their COCwithout first disclosing various disciplinary records under C.P.L. § 245.20(1)(k) relating tothe People's police witnesses. The People concede that they did not disclose "the underlyingsummaries or additional information" relating to substantiated misconduct before filing theirCOC. Nonetheless, they maintain that their COC was proper. For the following reasons, themotion is GRANTED.
The procedural history is uncontested. OnAugust 6, 2021, Bronx Criminal Court arraigned Mr. Spaulding. He pled not guilty. OnSeptember 24, 2021, the People filed a supporting deposition. On October 19, 2021, Mr.Spaulding did not appear, and the Court stayed a bench warrant. On November 3,2021—the 89th day after arraignments—the People filed and served an off-calendarCOC and a statement of readiness. On November 9, 2021, Mr. Spaulding did not appear, and theCourt issued a bench warrant. On November 15, 2021, Mr. Spaulding appeared in custody beforean arraignment court in New York County, which vacated the bench warrant on this case andsent this case back to the Bronx for November 16, 2021. On that day, even though he was in thecustody of the New York City Department of Corrections on this case and on another matter, Mr.Spaulding was not produced before the Court. On December 16, 2021, the Court set a motionschedule, which resulted in this motion.
LEGAL DISCUSSION
I. The COC in this case was not proper.
Because the People withheld various disciplinary records relating to prior bad acts by theirpolice witnesses, their COC was not proper. The discovery statute works as follows. First, thePeople must make a diligent effort to ascertain the existence of items and information subject[*2]to discovery. C.P.L. §§ 245.50(1), 245.20(2). Thatincludes "all items and information that relate to the subject matter of the case and are in thepossession, custody or control of the prosecution or persons under the prosecution's direction orcontrol." C.P.L. § 245.20(1). The "possession, custody or control of the prosecution"includes all such items and information "in the possession of any New York state or local policeor law enforcement agency." C.P.L. § 245.20(2). Second, the People must "disclose[]" andmake available "all known material and information subject to discovery" in their possession,custody, or control. C.P.L. §§ 245.50(1); 245.20(2). The only default statutoryexception to this requirement is for items that are "lost or destroyed." C.P.L. § 245.50(1).Third, the People must file and serve a proper certificate of compliance, truthfully affirming that"after exercising due diligence and making reasonable inquiries to ascertain the existence ofmaterial and information subject to discovery, the prosecutor has disclosed and made availableall known material and information subject to discovery." Id. Finally, the People cannotbe deemed ready for trial until they file and serve a COC meeting these requirements, absent anindividualized finding of special circumstances. C.P.L. §§ 30.30(5); 245.50(3).
As the Appellate Division has explained, until C.P.L. § 245.20(1) material is "actuallyproduced" to the defense, the prosecution's COC "[can]not be deemed complete." People ex rel. Ferro v. Brann, 197AD3d 787, 788 (2d Dep't 2021). This Court agrees—as it must[FN1]—just like other courts across the state. "In order for the People to file a valid certificate ofcompliance, they must actually turn over all known material and information." E.g., People v. Cooper, 71 Misc 3d 559,566 (Erie Cty. Cty. Ct. 2021); People v.Portillo, 73 Misc 3d 216, 229 (Suffolk Cty. Sup. Ct. 2021) (stating the same); see also People v. Naula, 75 Misc 3d1205(A), at *4 (Queens Cty. Sup. Ct. 2022) ("[T]he People's filing of a certificate ofcompliance . . . cannot be deemed complete until all material and information subject todiscovery was actually disclosed."); People v. Perez, 75 Misc 3d 1205(A) (Bronx Cty. Crim. Ct. 2022)("[T]he People failed to meet their discovery obligations when the COC was filed and therefore,the certificate is deemed invalid."); People v. Williams, 73 Misc 3d 1209(A), at *2 (NY Cty. Crim. Ct.2021) ("The People's failure to disclose rendered their COC invalid, regardless of the rationalefor that failure."); People v. Quinlan, 71 Misc 3d 226, 271 (Bronx Cty. Crim. Ct. 2021)("[W]hat the People may not do is file a certificate of compliance in which they claim to haveexercised due diligence and turned over all known material and information while at the sametime not actually turning over all known material and information."); People v. Adrovic, 69 Misc 3d563, 574 (Kings Cty. Crim. Ct. 2020) (stating the same).
As the Appellate Division has also recognized, the plain text meaning of C.P.L. §245.20(1)(k) requires the People to disclose all underlying information relating to the misconductof their police witnesses—mere summaries are not sufficient. Matter of Jayson C., 200 AD3d447 (1st Dep't 2021); see alsoPeople v. Polanco-Chavarria, 74 Misc 3d 1210(A), at *4 (Rockland Cty. Cty. Ct. 2021)(analyzing Jayson C.).
Innumerable lower courts have held the same. E.g., id.; People v. Williams, 72 Misc 3d1214(A), at *3 (NY Cty. Crim. Ct. 2021); People v. Castellanos, 72 Misc 3d 371, 375-76 (Bronx [*3]Cty. Sup. Ct. 2021) ("The court holds that when the statuteexplicitly says 'all' information and evidence that tends to impeach credibility, the statute meansjust that: all underlying records for substantiated and unsubstantiated misconduct complaintsmust be provided by the People."); People v. Perez, 71 Misc 3d 1214(A) (Bronx Cty. Crim. Ct. 2021);People v. Herrera, 71 Misc 3d1205(A) (Nassau Cty. Dist. Ct. 2021); Cooper, 71 Misc 3d 559; People v. Edwards, 74 Misc 3d433 (NY Cty. Crim. Ct. 2021).
And that is no surprise. The statute plainly requires that the People disclose "all evidence andinformation that tends to impeach the credibility of a testifying prosecution witness . . . [w]hetheror not in tangible form." C.P.L. § 245.20(1)(k). This mandate encompasses the substance ofallegations, as well as the tangible files, records, and other materials on which disciplinaryfindings against the People's police witnesses are based.
As a result, the People's withholding of police misconduct records here violates their C.P.L.§ 245.20(1) discovery obligations. The People note that they intend to call police officersAlex Schmidt, Alex Tegan, and Kamaal Ryan as their witnesses at trial. Resp. at 6. They affirmthat they have disclosed "substantiated summaries" of misconduct, "CCRB allegation history,"and "lawsuit information" for the officers for whom it exists. Id. at 6-7. However, theyconcede, as the defense has alleged, that they "have not yet disclosed the underlying summariesor additional information related to three different substantiated allegations" of Officer AlexTegan's misconduct in NYPD possession. Id. at 8.[FN2] The defense also alleges that the People have entirely redacted "an additional fourth item listedon the disclosure form" and that the People have produced "no underlying documentation"regarding NYPD disciplinary records. Def. Mot. ¶ 48. The People do not specifically denythose allegations. See generally Resp. 4-10.
Because the People did not disclose these materials, their COC was not proper. They didprecisely what they "may not do": they "file[d] a certificate of compliance in which theyclaim[ed] to have exercised due diligence and turned over all known material and information,while at the same time not actually [having] turn[ed] over all known material and information."Quinlan, 71 Misc 3d at 271; see also Adrovic, 69 Misc 3d at 574 (noting thesame).
The People here did not exercise the requisite due diligence before filing their COC. In thecontext of the discovery statute, "due diligence" concerns the People's effort "to ascertain theexistence" of discoverable material. C.P.L. § 245.50(1). After diligently ascertaining theexistence of discoverable material, the People must then make that material available to thedefense. Id. Here, the People did not do either. For the first time in this motion briefing,the People allege that they "requested the underlying IAB logs" and "as of March 3, 2022, wereinformed that the logs were not in the Bronx District Attorney's Office Discovery ComplianceBureau file." Resp. at 8. This statement implies that the People only requested the underlyingNYPD Internal Affairs Bureau files from another part of their own office and not from the NYPDitself. See id. The People also state that they are "informed that 'due to staffing shortagesin the NYPD's Giglio Unit, obtaining underlying documents will take much longer than it has in[*4]the past.'" Id. The People do not explain whoinformed them of this claim or why it justified filing a COC despite knowing that there werediscovery documents outstanding. These bare allegations—establishing at best anintraoffice "request"—do not fulfill the People's statutory obligation to "ensure that a flowof information is maintained between the police . . . and [their] office . . . including, but notlimited to, any evidence or information discoverable under [C.P.L. § 245.20(1)(k)]." C.P.L.§ 245.55. Further, none of these allegations explain why the People unilaterally chose tofully redact a police disciplinary document that they provided to the defense, a charge they do notcontest. The decision to redact such documents lies with the Court, not the People. SeeC.P.L. § 245.70 (providing for protective orders). "That the People might have applied goodfaith and due diligence in making their own determination that disciplinary records do not— or should not — fall within the statute is of no moment. That is not the People'sdetermination to make." Williams, 72 Misc 3d 1214(A), at *5. In sum, the People havenot established that they diligently ascertained the existence of discoverable material anddisclosed it to the defense.
Moreover, the People do not explain why they did not even attempt to pursue any of thediscovery statute's "numerous opportunities" for relief from their discovery obligations beforefiling their COC. See Soto, 72 Misc 3d at 1162-63. They did not apply to a court for anextension of time upon a showing of "special circumstances." C.P.L. § 245.50(3). They didnot apply to a court for a modification of discovery periods for "good cause." C.P.L. §245.70(2). And they did not apply to a court for a protective order to redact any materials. C.P.L.§ 245.70. If the People are aware of outstanding discovery that cannot be disclosed, thediscovery statute requires that they pursue at least one of these numerous opportunities. But whatthey cannot do is file a COC certifying they have turned over all discovery pursuant to C.P.L.§ 245.20 when, in truth, they did not actually do so. Where the People do not seek any ofthese numerous opportunities for relief, they cannot be said to have exercised due diligencebefore filing their COC.
The People advance two arguments that their COC should be deemed proper despite thewithheld documents. First, they argue that, in their view, the "nature of the [withheld] allegationshave little to no impact on the Officer's character for truthfulness were he to be called as awitness at trial." Resp. at 8. Second, they argue that the People "are not under an obligation" toacquire records "so long as the defendant has a means of obtaining the records." Id. at 9.On each count, the People misapprehend the law.
First, the People's assertion that, in their view, the withheld allegations "have little or noimpact" on the officer's credibility is not a decision for them to make. "It is not for the People todecide, in the first instance, if a particular item from a disciplinary record might be admissible ormight impeach a witness." People v.Pennant, 73 Misc 3d 753, 761 (Nassau Cty. Dist. Ct. 2021). "As the Court of Appealshas long recognized, the best judge of the impeachment value of evidence is the 'single-mindedcounsel for the accused.'" Edwards, 74 Misc 3d at 443 (quoting People v. Rosario,9 NY2d 286, 290 (1961)). "To permit the single-minded counsel for the accused to be permittedonly to see filtered allegations of misconduct impinges on counsel's ability to represent theaccused." Id. It also violates the plain text of C.P.L. § 245.20(1)(k), which demandsthat the People disclose "all" impeachment information relating to their testifyingofficers—not to pick and choose which they think would have "impact" on the officer'scredibility. The clear scope of the statute removes that discretion from the People."Pennant, 73 Misc 3d at 761.
Second, it is not true that the discovery statute allows the People to withhold information[*5]in their possession, or in the possession of lawenforcement,[FN3] simply because the defense could subpoena it. "On the contrary, the discovery statute nowimposes upon the People an affirmative obligation to ferret out and ascertain whether anymaterial responsive to the dictates of section exists." Castellanos, 72 Misc 3d at 376-77.The People are not "relieved of [their] obligation simply because the [defense] has independentaccess, by subpoena or otherwise, to the same information." People v. Barralaga, 73 Misc 3d 510 (NY Cty. Crim. Ct. 2021). Ofcourse, the defense "is not precluded from seeking information by way of a subpoena, but thisdoes not excuse the People from their duty to supply potential impeachment information that theypossess or is within the possession of law enforcement," as is the case here. Id. Moreover,"since the new discovery statute was meant to reduce discovery delays, it makes little sense tolimit the required disclosure and shift the burden to the defense to attempt to learn the specificsof a misconduct complaint through a subpoena." Castellanos, 72 Misc 3d at 376-77(internal quotation marks omitted). The party in possession of information should bear theburden of producing it. See
In sum, the Court finds that the People's COC was improper because they filed it eventhough they had not disclosed discoverable disciplinary records in their possession or in thepossession of law enforcement.
II. The People's statement of readiness wasinvalid.
The Criminal Procedure Law requires that the People fully comply with theirinitial discovery obligations and file a proper COC before validly stating ready for trial. CriminalProcedure Law § 30.30(1) mandates that the People state ready for trial within its prescribedtime limits. Before validly stating ready for trial, the People must do "all that is required of themto bring the case to the point where it may be tried." People v. England, 84 NY2d 1, 4(1994). That includes removing all legal impediments to bringing the case to trial. Id. In amisdemeanor case, those legal impediments include filing a "facially sufficient information."E.g., People v. Maslowski, 187 AD3d 1211, 1214 (2d Dep't 2020); see also People v. Sosa, 71 Misc 3d140(A), at *3 (2d Dep't App. Term 2021). Under the discovery-reform statute, they now alsoinclude filing and serving a proper COC, C.P.L. §§ 30.30(5) and 245.50(3), andactually producing the discovery listed, Ferro, 197 AD3d at 788."Pre-readiness"—or before the People state ready for the first time—only specificprovisions in the text of C.P.L. § 30.30(4) may exclude any time. See People v.Liotta, 79 NY2d 841, 842 (1992); Sosa, 71 Misc 3d 140(A), at *3; People v. Simon, 48 Misc 3d1225(A), at *4 (Kings Cty. Crim. Ct. 2015) ("[I]n a pre-readiness posture . . . the entireadjournment is chargeable to the People unless otherwise specifically excluded under C.P.L.§ 30.30(4)."); People v. Canosa, 38 Misc 3d 1231(A), at *3 (Nassau Cty. Dist. Ct.2013) (stating the same).
Against this statutory framework, the People argue that the Court can also freely exclude[*6]C.P.L. § 30.30 time, even where a COC and an initialstatement of readiness are invalid. See Resp. at 4-5. But they do not point to any C.P.L.§ 30.30(4) exclusion. See id. Instead, they argue that the Court can deem that thePeople's own failure to meet their own discovery obligations was "attributable" to the defense.See id. The People cite only two decisions in support of this argument, both from lastyear, and both unpublished: People v. Nova-Ceballos, Indictment 98/2019 (NY Cty. Sup.Ct. Mar. 15, 2021) (Kiesel, J.); and People v. Randolph, Indictment 2326/2019 (BronxCty. Sup. Ct. June 29, 2021) (Fabrizio, J.). These decisions excluded C.P.L § 30.30 time byimposing an "obligation" on defense attorneys to "challenge the People's discovery compliance"before the speedy-trial clock expires.
The Court rejects this argument, which has no basis in either the discovery or speedy-trialstatutes. Criminal Procedure Law § 30.30(1) requires that "the People" validly stateready for trial within the prescribed time periods after commencing a criminal action. (emphasisadded). "The inquiry is whether the People have done all that is required of them to bringthe case to a point where it may be tried." People v. Brown, 28 NY3d 392, 403 (2016) (emphasis added).After all, C.P.L. § 30.30 "was specifically intended 'to address delays occasioned byprosecutorial inaction'"—not defense inaction. People v. Clarke, 28 NY3d 48, 52 (2016) (quoting People v.McKenna, 76 NY2d 59, 63 (1990)) (emphasis added). Indeed, that guiding principle isprecisely why the People are charged with any delay pre-readiness, subject to C.P.L. §30.30(4) exclusions, but only with delay "solely attributable to them" post-readiness. SeePeople v. Jackson, 267 AD2d 183, 184 (1st Dep't 1999). As a result, like any other legalrequirement that the People face before stating ready for the first time, the burden of fulfilling thePeople's own initial discovery obligations lies "squarely upon the shoulders of the DistrictAttorney." See People v. N.S., 58Misc 3d 613, 616 (Queens Cty. Crim. Ct. 2018), aff'd 71 Misc 3d 140(A) (2d Dep'tApp. Term 2021) ("The People's obligation—that they alone possess—[is] to beready for trial before the expiration of their '30.30 clock.'").
The Court also rejects "[a]ny argument from the prosecution that [the defense] had anobligation to confer with it in a way that would impact the accrual of speedy trial time," which isalso "nowhere to be found in the statute." People v. Audino, 2022 NY Slip Op. 22177, at*5 (NY Cty. Crim. Ct. 2022); People v.Rahman, 74 Misc 3d 1214(A), at *3 (Queens Cty. Sup. Ct. 2022) (noting that orders thatparties confer about discovery do not and "could not" change "any of the People's statutory[readiness] obligations"). It is squarely the People's burden to ascertain the existence of, anddisclose, discoverable material within their own allotted speedy-trial time. See C.P.L.§§ 245.20(1), (2). And it is also squarely the People's burden to seek any of the"numerous opportunities" available to them in Article 245 should they face special circumstancesthat would prevent them from doing so timely. See Audino, 2022 NY Slip Op. 22177, at*5 (noting that the People "failed to avail [themselves] of any such recourse"); Soto, 72Misc 3d at 1162-63 (same). Any attempt by the People "to minimize or shift blame to the defensefor the prosecution's own failure to [produce police misconduct records or seek an advancejudicial remedy] are ineffectual in light of both the letter and the spirit of Article 245."Audino, 2022 NY Slip Op. 22177, at *5. There is simply no requirement in the statutethat the defense utter even a single word to the People about discovery in a way that wouldrelieve the [*7]People's burden to validly state ready within theirown C.P.L. § 30.30 timeframe.[FN4] And there is certainly no requirement that the defense rush to object to the People's discoveryproduction so that the People may avert a C.P.L. § 30.30 dismissal. That is especially truewhen the People wait until the 89th day to file a COC and state ready for trial, as they did in thiscase.
Indeed, a requirement otherwise would be highly problematic for criminal litigation. "[A]nyrequirement that defense counsel assist the People in rooting out deficiencies [in the People'sdiscovery production], and do so in time to preserve the continued prosecution of their client,would have the untenable effect of forcing defense attorneys to potentially harm [their client] andstrain the attorney-client relationship." See N.S., 58 Misc 3d at 617 (articulating a similarproblem in the context of facial sufficiency defects); see also NY R. of Prof. Conduct §§ 1.7(a)(1); 1.8(b). The Court declines the People's invitation to invent such aproblematic requirement out of thin air when it has no basis in the text of any statute.
As a result, the Court respectfully disagrees with the two unpublished decisions from lastyear on which the People rely. It is notable that one of those decisions, Nova-Ceballos,relies on People v. Odoms, 143 Misc 2d 503 (NY Crim. Ct. 1989). Odoms, atrial-court decision from 1989, held that defense attorneys have an obligation to alert prosecutorswhen an information is facially insufficient so that prosecutors can cure their errors before thecase is dismissed. Several appellate courts have since held otherwise. E.g., Sosa,71 Misc 3d 140(A), at *3 ("[I]f the original accusatory instrument was jurisdictionally defective,any statement of readiness made by the People was illusory because the People could not validlydeclare themselves ready until there was an accusatory instrument sufficient for trial.");Maslowski, 187 AD3d at 1214 ("Without a fully converted, facially sufficientinformation, any statement of readiness by the People is illusory and ineffective."). Accordingly,Odoms should not be followed, and the Court does not find Nova-Ceballospersuasive. It is also worth noting that Randolph, the other case the People cite, involveda "delay" of around 450 days, while here, any arguable "delay" was, at maximum, 79 days.
In any event, the overwhelming weight of case authority—including at least onedecision from an Appellate Term this year—agrees that where a COC is invalid and nospecial circumstances were presented, the statement of readiness is "also invalid." People v. Guzman, 75 Misc 3d132(A), at *3 (2d Dep't, App. Term. 2022); accord Martinez, 75 Misc 3d 1212(A), at*2-*3 ("Trial readiness is contingent on compliance with CPL 245.20."); Audino, 2022NY Slip Op. 22177, at *5 (holding that where a "certificate of compliance is improper," then "theprosecution's certificate of readiness and subsequent statements of readiness were illusory andinsufficient to stop the running of the speedy trial clock"); Darren, 75 Misc 3d 1208(A),at *2 ("The People cannot be deemed ready for trial until a proper COC is filed with the courtand served upon the defense."); Peoplev. Perez, 75 Misc 3d 1205(A), at *5 (Bronx Cty. Crim. Ct. [*8]2022) ("Since the COC has been deemed invalid, the People'sstatement of readiness . . . was ineffective to stop the speedy trial clock."); People v. Naula, 75 Misc 3d1205(A), at *4-*5 (Queens Cty. Sup. Ct. 2022) ("[T]he SOR filed on November 16, 2021,was neither accompanied and/or preceded by the requisite good faith certification of compliance .. . and is therefore illusory."); People v.Pierna, 74 Misc 3d 1072, 1087 (Bronx Cty. Crim. Ct. 2022) ("No trial ready statement isvalid unless the People file a proper COC."); People v. Surgick, 73 Misc 3d 1212(A), at *4 (Albany Cty. Cty. Ct.2021) ("No trial ready statement is valid unless the People file a [proper] COC.");Quinlan, 71 Misc 3d at 270-73 (holding that "as the [COC] was not and could not havebeen valid when it was filed," the speedy-trial clock was not stopped); Soto, 2021 NYSlip Op. 21204, at *1 (finding a COR invalid because a COC was invalid because discovery wasincomplete); Aquino, 72 Misc 3d at 913 (holding that an invalid COC "will not shield thePeople from application of the speedy trial statutes, where discovery is incomplete"); People v. Lobato, 66 Misc 3d1230(A), at *1 (Kings Cty. Crim. Ct. 2020) ("[D]iscovery compliance is a conditionprecedent to a valid announcement of readiness for trial."); Adrovic, 69 Misc 3d at 570(finding a "statement of readiness and certificate of compliance insufficient to toll the speedytrial clock").
These decisions also explain why the People's citation to C.P.L. § 245.80(2) sanctionsis misplaced. In their response, the People cite this discovery-sanction statute to argue that thedefense has not shown prejudice resulting from the discovery failures. But in doing so, thePeople conflate the discovery-sanction statute, C.P.L. § 245.80, with the speedy-trialstatutes, C.P.L. §§ 245.50(3), 30.30(5). The issue before the Court is not a motion forsanctions under C.P.L. § 245.80(2). "Dismissal pursuant to C.P.L. § 30.30 is not asanction" pursuant to C.P.L. § 245.80. People v. Martinez, 75 Misc 3d 1212(A), at *6 (NY Cty. Crim. Ct.2022); People v. Darren, 75 Misc 3d1208(A), at *5 (NY Cty. Crim. Ct. 2022) (stating the same). Where the People do notcomply with their discovery obligations, they do not do what is necessary to stop the speedy-trialclock. "Prejudice," which is a consideration for § 245.80 sanctions, "is not a factor" in a§ 30.30 analysis. Adrovic, 69 Misc 3d at 574. "[T]he People's obligation to providediscovery, and to certify compliance with that obligation, is not relieved by an absence ofprejudice to the defendant." Id. "Therefore, while a defendant must show some prejudicein order to obtain a [pre-30.30] sanction against the People under CPL 245.80, the burden is notlifted from the People to comply with their obligation in the first instance." Id.
Finally, the People here never sought an individualized finding of special circumstancesbefore stating ready with an improper COC, and even if they had, it would have been denied.See C.P.L. § 245.50(3). As noted previously, the People have blamed their failure todisclose on various office failures. They note that logs were "not in the Bronx District Attorney'sOffice Discovery Compliance Bureau." Resp. at 8. They also note, without establishing thesource, basis, or reliability of the information, that the NYPD's Giglio Unit has "staffingshortages." Id. However, as an Appellate Term recently explained, "it is well settled thatoffice failure does not amount to special circumstances" for purposes of Article 245.Guzman, 75 Misc 3d 132(A), at *5. Of course, even if such an office failure did establisha "special circumstance," there are no special circumstances presented that would justify thePeople choosing to unilaterally redact a police disciplinary document.
For these reasons, the Court concludes that the Criminal Procedure Law requires that thePeople file a proper COC before validly stating ready for trial. The People's COC in this case wasinvalid. Therefore, their statement of readiness was invalid, as well.
C.P.L. § 30.30 CALCULATION
Mr. Spaulding's top charge is fourth-degree criminal mischief, a violation of P.L. §145.00(1). That charge is a class A misdemeanor, punishable by up to 364 days in jail.Accordingly, the People had 90 days from arraignment to validly state ready for trial on this case.See C.P.L. § 30.30(1)(b).
August 6, 2021 — October 19, 2021 = 74days
A Bronx arraignment court arraigned Mr. Spaulding on August 6, 2021. The People did notstate ready for trial. The court adjourned the case to September 8, 2021. On that day, the Peopleagain did not state ready for trial. The court adjourned the case to October 19, 2021. On that day,the People yet again did not state ready for trial. Both the People and the defense agree that as ofOctober 19, 2021, a period of 74 days of time had accrued since arraignment.
October 19, 2021 — November 15, 2021 = 0days
On October 19, 2021, Mr. Spaulding did not appear. The Court stayed a bench warrant andadjourned the case to November 9, 2021. On November 9, 2021, Mr. Spaulding again did notappear, and the Court issued a bench warrant. No days accrue here. People v. Alexander, 67 Misc 3d126(A) (1st Dep't App. Term 2020).
November 15, 2021 — December 16,2021 = 31 days
On November 15, 2021, Mr. Spaulding returned on the warrant, in custody, before anarraignment court in New York County. The arraignment court set $1.00 bail on this case andadjourned it back to the Bronx for November 16, 2021. On that day, however, even though Mr.Spaulding was in the custody of the New York City Department of Corrections on this case (andon his New York County matter), he was not produced before the Court.
Thirty-one days accrue here. Neither subsection of C.P.L. § 30.30(4)(c) excludes timebecause Mr. Spaulding's location was known, he was in the People's custody on this case, and thePeople have not shown that they could not obtain his presence by due diligence. See alsoPeople v. Daniels, 217 AD2d 448, 453 (1st Dep't 1995) ("The failure of officials havingcustody of a defendant to produce him for appearance in court is chargeable to the prosecution.");People v. Ali, 209 AD2d 227, 227 (1st Dep't 1994) ("[T]he five-day period during whichthe People failed to produce defendant while in their custody is chargeable to the People.");People v. Mapp, 308 AD2d 463, 464 (2d Dep't 2003) (charging time where the Peopleshould have known that the accused person was incarcerated and failed to show due diligence inproducing him); People v. Jackson,48 Misc 3d 1202(A), at *1-*2 (Bronx Cty. Sup. Ct. 2015) (charging time where the Peoplefailed to establish due diligence in attempting to produce the accused person from jail for court).At "a minimum," the People are "obligated to establish" that they "properly followed theapplicable rules, regulations, or statutes governing the process for securing the defendant'spresence in court." Jackson, 48 Misc 3d at *1. Here, they provided no information aboutany such efforts whatsoever.
In addition, as explained in this decision's legal discussion, the People's COC was improper.Therefore, their November 3, 2021, statement of readiness was invalid and did not stop thespeedy-trial clock.
December 16, 2021 — June 27, 2022 = 0days
On December 16, 2021, the Court set a motion schedule. This tolls C.P.L. § 30.30 time.See C.P.L. § 30.30(4)(a).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasoning, the Court concludes that: (1) the COC filed on November3, 2021, was invalid; and (2) that 105 days passed from arraignment without a validstatement of readiness from the People. This amount of time exceeds the People's 90-day speedytrial period. C.P.L. § 30.30(1)(b). Therefore, the defense's motion to dismiss isGRANTED.
In light of this decision, the defense's remaining motions are moot.
The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.
Dated: June 29, 2022
Bronx, NY
Wanda L. Licitra, J.C.C.
Footnote 1: The Appellate Division, SecondDepartment's decision in Ferro is controlling on this court. See People v. TupacShakur, 215 AD2d 184, 185 (1st Dep't 1995) (noting that unless there is contrary authorityfrom the First Department, trial courts "must follow the determination of the Appellate Divisionin another Department").
Footnote 2: In one part of their response, thePeople inexplicably claim that "[t]he defendant wants this Court to dismiss this case based onone allegedly missing underlying document relating to PO Alex Tegan." Resp. at 4. Thisconflicts with the People's later explicit concession that they have not disclosed "the underlyingsummaries or additional information" related to three different substantiated allegationsof Officer Alex Tegan's misconduct. See id. at 8.
Footnote 3: The discovery statute deemsitems and information "in the possession of any New York state or local police or lawenforcement agency" to be in the possession of the People. C.P.L. § 245.20(2).
Footnote 4: The 2022 amendments to thediscovery statute were not in effect at the time of the COC in this case. However, even thoseamendments, which newly require COC challenges to be made "as soon as practicable," makeclear that "nothing in this section shall be construed to waive a party's right . . . to a motionpursuant to section 30.30." C.P.L. § 245.50(4)(c). In any event, the challenge here was madewithin 79 days of the People's COC, well within what is a practicable period for reviewing andobjecting to discovery. After all, the People took 89 days to (incompletely) ascertain and disclosediscovery in this case. See C.P.L. § 30.30(1)(b).